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European Security and the Future of Transatlantic Relations, edited by
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Democracy in the EU after the Lisbon Treaty, edited by Raffaello Matarazzo,
2011
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The Challenges of State Sustainability in the Mediterranean, edited by
Silvia Colombo and Nathalie Tocci, 2011
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Re-thinking Western Policies in Light of the Arab Uprisings, edited by
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The transformation of the armed forces: the Forza NEC program, edited
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Strengthening the Africa-EU Partnership on Peace and Security, edited
by Nicoletta Pirozzi, 2012
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Stop Mass Atrocities, edited by Luis Peral and Nicoletta Pirozzi, 2013
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The Uneasy Balance, edited by Riccardo Alcaro and Andrea Dessì, 2013
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Global Turkey in Europe, Edited by Senem Aydın-Düzgit, Anne Duncker,
Daniela Huber, E. Fuat Keyman and Nathalie Tocci, 2013
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Italy and Saudi Arabia confronting the challenges of the XXI century,
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N. 11
The Italian Civil Security System, Federica Di Camillo, Alessandro Marrone,
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N. 12 Transatlantic Security from the Sahel to the Horn of Africa, edited by
Riccardo Alcaro and Nicoletta Pirozzi, 2014
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Global Turkey in Europe II, edited by Senem Aydın-Düzgit, Daniela Huber,
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Imagining Europe, edited by Nathalie Tocci, 2014
N. 16
The Role of Italian Fighter Aircraft in Crisis Management Operations: Trends
and Needs, Vincenzo Camporini, Tommaso De Zan, Alessandro
Marrone, Michele Nones, Alessandro R. Ungaro, 2014
Italian combat aircraft have played an increasing important role in the
international missions in which Italy has participated in the post-Cold War era
– from the First Gulf War to Libya, including Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and
Afghanistan. This participation has been a significant tool of Italy's defense
policy, and therefore of its foreign policy towards crisis areas relevant to its
national interests (from the Western Balkans to the Mediterranean), as well as
towards its most important allies within NATO and the EU. This IAI publication
analyses the role of these military capabilities in recent operations and their
prospects for the future. In fact, a number of trends can be inferred from the
operational experience in ten international missions, in which Italy deployed
more than 100 combat aircraft in more than 13,000 sorties, clocking up 36,000
flight hours. These trends are considered in light of the recent developments
in the doctrine of Air Power, as well as possible future scenarios for the use of
combat aircraft in crisis theaters. The aim of the analysis is to understand the
needs of the Italian Armed Forces – the Air Force and Navy in particular –
which will have to replace a substantial portion of their current combat fleets
in the near future due to the gradual obsolescence of the aircraft in service –
an operational necessity linked to the inevitable political decisions regarding
the options available in the field of military procurement for maintaining the
capabilities required so far for international missions. In this context, the
study looks into the acquisition of F-35 aircraft, also considering the industrial
aspects of a multinational program that will produce more than 3,000 units
for over 12 countries.
Vincenzo Camporini is Vice President of IAI
Tommaso De Zan was intern in the Security and Defence Programme at IAI
Alessandro Marrone is Researcher in the Security and Defence Programme at IAI
Michele Nones is Head of the Security and Defence Programme at IAI
Alessandro R. Ungaro is Research Assistant in the Security and Defence
Programme at IAI
12.40 EURO
9788868123291_148_FM_2
SEGUICI SUI SOCIAL NETWORK
THE ROLE OF ITALIAN FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: TRENDS AND NEEDS V. Camporini, T. De Zan, A. Marrone, M. Nones, A.R. Ungaro
N. 1
IAI RESEARCH PAPERS
IAI Research Papers
THE ROLE OF ITALIAN
FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN
CRISIS MANAGEMENT
OPERATIONS:
TRENDS AND NEEDS
Vincenzo Camporini, Tommaso De Zan,
Alessandro Marrone, Michele Nones,
Alessandro R. Ungaro
The IAI Research Papers are brief monographs written by one or
more authors (IAI or external experts) on current problems of international politics and international relations. The aim is to promote
greater and more up to date knowledge of emerging issues and
trends and help prompt public debate.
A non-profit organization, IAI was founded in 1965 by Altiero Spinelli,
its first director.
The Institute aims to promote understanding of international politics
through research, promotion of political ideas and strategies, dissemination of knowledge and education in the field of foreign policy.
IAI main research sectors are: European institutions and policies;
Italian foreign policy; trends in the global economy and internationalisation processes in Italy; the Mediterranean and the Middle East;
defence economy and policy; and transatlantic relations.
IAI Research Papers
The Role of Italian Fighter Aircraft
in Crisis Management Operations:
Trends and Needs
Vincenzo Camporini, Tommaso De Zan, Alessandro Marrone,
Michele Nones, Alessandro R. Ungaro
Edizioni Nuova Cultura
SeriesEditor
NatalinoRonzitti
_________________________
First published in March 2014 by Edizioni Nuova Cultura
For Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI)
Via Angelo Brunetti 9 - I-00186 Roma
www.iai.it
Copyright©2014EdizioniNuovaCultura‐Roma
ISBN:9788868123291
Cover:byFrancescaMinnocci
GraphicComposition:byLucaMozzicarelli Theunauthorizedreproductionofthisbook,evenpartial,carriedoutbyanymeans,
includingphotocopying,evenforinternalordidacticuse,isprohibitedbycopyright.
Table of Contents
ExecutiveSummary........................................................................................................................9
Preface...............................................................................................................................................23
ListofAcronyms.............................................................................................................................27
1. Italy’sparticipationincrisismanagementoperations:fighteraircraft’s
role................................................................................................................................................31
1.1.
1.2.
1.3.
1.4.
1.5.
1.6.
Iraq(1990‐1991)........................................................................................................31
Bosnia‐Herzegovina 1993‐1998 .......................................................................35
Kosovo(1999)..............................................................................................................42
Afghanistan(2001‐2014)........................................................................................47
Libya(2011)..................................................................................................................53
TheroleofItalianfighteraircraftincrisismanagementopera‐
tions...................................................................................................................................59
2. Currentandfutureairoperations:doctrineandtrends......................................65
2.1. AirPower:doctrine’sfundamentals...................................................................65
2.2. Trendsfromtherecentoperationalexperience............................................69
3. Scenariosofpossiblefutureairoperations...............................................................73
3.1. Establishing and enforcing a No‐Fly Zone: “Protect Turians”
scenario............................................................................................................................74
3.1.1Strategiccontext...............................................................................................74
3.1.2Missionobjectives............................................................................................75
3.1.3Criticalfactorsoftheoperationalenvironment.................................76
3.1.4Adversary’scapabilitiesandCourseofAction....................................76
3.1.5 Air Component’s Course of Action and required capabi‐
lities........................................................................................................................77
3.2. Air support to land‐based operation: “Stability in Banon” sce‐
nario..................................................................................................................................80
3.2.1Strategiccontext...............................................................................................80
3.2.2Missionobjectives............................................................................................81
5
TABLE OF CONTENTS
3.2.3Criticalfactorsoftheoperationalenvironment.................................82
3.2.4Adversary’scapabilitiesandCourseofAction....................................83
3.2.5 Air Component’s Course of Action and required capabi‐
lities........................................................................................................................83
4. ThemilitaryneedsofItalianArmedForcesandtheF‐35programme.............87
4.1. Firstkeyquestion:doesItalianparticipationincrisismanage‐
mentoperationsservenationalinterests?........................................................88
4.2. Second key question: what kind of air capabilities does Italy
needtoparticipateincrisismanagementoperations?..............................95
4.3. Thirdkeyquestion:whatprocurementoptionsareavailableto
acquirethiskindofaircapabilities?..................................................................101
4.4. Forthkeyquestion:itisbettertobuyF‐35“off‐the‐shelf”orto
participateinthemultinationalprocurementprogramme?................110
5. TheF‐35programmeandItaly:theindustrialperspective.................................115
5.1. Thebestvalueformoneyapproach.................................................................115
5.2. TheItalianparticipationintheprocurementprogramme....................121
Conclusions..................................................................................................................................129
Bibliography.................................................................................................................................131
AnnexI.Listofinterviews......................................................................................................145
TablesandFigures
Figure1.ItalianAirForceactivitiesininternationalmissions.............................13
Figure 2. Participation of Italian fighter aircraft in international mis‐
sions:achronology................................................................................................63
Table1.Internationalmissions 1990‐2013 :anoverview.....................................61
Table2.Italiancontributiontointernationalmissions 1990‐2013 ..................62
Table3.F‐35’sacquisitionplans.........................................................................................116
6
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Theresearchteamwouldliketothankseveralpeoplefortheircontribu‐
tion to this Research Paper: the Gen. Stefano Cont Capo Ufficio per la
PoliticaMilitare,MinisterodellaDifesa forthefruitfulandconstructive
exchangeofviewsonthecontentofthisstudy;theGen.RobertoNordio
ComandanteComandoOperazioniAeree,PoggioRenatico andtheCol.
StefanoGensiniandLeut.Col.FabrizioPiermarioli,aswellastheentire
SezioneStatisticaoftheStatoMaggioreAreonautica,fortheirextremely
usefulsupportonfindingdataonItalianAirForce’scapabilitiesincrisis
management operations; the Gen. Lucio Bianchi Capo del Centro Poli‐
funzionaleVelivoliAerotattici,Cameri ,forthevaluableopportunityto
visittheCameribaseanddiscussaboutitsfutureperspectives,andthe
Eng.Stranda AleniaAermacchi forkindlyguidingusinsidethefacility.
Aspecialthanksgoestothepeopleinterviewedforthisresearch,whose
frank, interesting and well‐informed thoughts have fed the elaboration
of this study. A list of interviews with a short biography of each inter‐
viewedpersonisincludedintheAnnex I ofthis ResearchPaper.Obvi‐
ously, the authors bear the entire and exclusive responsibility for the
content of this study. This research has been carried out with the sup‐
portofLockheedMartin.
7
Executive Summary
ThisResearchPaperconsiderstheroleofItalianfighteraircraftinmis‐
sions abroad in the post‐Cold War period, the current Air Power’s
trends and doctrinal evolution, as well as possible future scenarios of
crisismanagementoperationsinthe“EnlargedMediterranean”envisag‐
ingtheuseoffighteraircraft.Onthebasisofsuchanalysis,theneedsof
Italianmilitaryconcerningfighteraircraftareoutlined,andthepossible
procurementoptionstosatisfythemarediscussed.Thelastchapterad‐
dresses the Italian participation in the F‐35 procurement programme
anditsindustrialaspects.
ThefirstchapterisaimedtooutlinetheroleofItalianfighteraircraft
incrisismanagementoperationsthatoccurredinthelast24years.Sev‐
eral missions abroad have been considered: the First Gulf War in Iraq
1991 , the NATO operations in Bosnia‐Herzegovina 1993‐1998 , in
SerbiaandKosovo 1999 andAfghanistan 2001‐2014 ,aswellasthe
multinational air campaign in Libya in 2011, which came under NATO
commandafterthefirstphase.
IntheFirstGulfWar,underaUNmandate,theUSleda“coalitionof
the willing” including 35 countries to conduct Operation Desert Storm
aimedatfreeingKuwaitterritoryoccupiedbyIraq.Thebulkofairsor‐
ties was flown by the US 89,1% , while a non‐marginal contribution
wasprovidedbytheUK,SaudiArabia,Kuwait,FranceandItaly.Inpar‐
ticular, Italy deployed 8 Tornado which flew 2,326 sorties during the
40‐day long air campaign. The military operation ended when Iraq
withdrewitsforcesfromKuwaitandacceptedtheceasefireconditions.
Between 1993 and 1998, under UN mandate, NATO undertook sev‐
eraloperationstodealwiththecivilwarinYugoslaviaandparticularly
in Bosnia‐Herzegovina. They included: Operation Sharp Guard in sup‐
9
THE ROLE OF ITALIAN FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: TRENDS AND NEEDS
portofmaritimeembargotocombatants 1993‐1996 ;OperationDeny
Flight aimed to enforce a No‐Fly Zone NFZ over Bosnia‐Herzegovina
1993‐1995 ; Operation Deliberate Force to protect UN‐declared “safe
areas”bytargetingBosnianSerbmilitarycapabilities 1995 ;Operation
Joint Endeavour 1995‐1996 a peace‐keeping ground mission with
considerableairsupportincludingfighteraircraft;finallyOperationDe‐
liberateGuardtosupportOperationJointGuard 1996‐1998 .Italycon‐
tributedtoallmissionsbydeployingTornado,AMXandAV‐8B,conduct‐
ing5,023sortiesandflyingfor11,973hours.Italyalsoprovidedthemil‐
itarybasesandthelogisticssupportindispensabletoconducttheseop‐
erations.ThesetofNATOcrisismanagementoperationswasinstrumen‐
taltoforcethevariousYugoslavpartiestosigntheDaytonAgreementin
1995,andtoenforceitinthefollowingyears.
On March 1999 NATO undertook Operation Allied Force, aimed to
putanendtothearmedrepressionofKosovarminoritiesconductedby
theSerbianmilitaryandparamilitaryforces.Theaircampaignlastedfor
78dayswithintensebombingagainstSerbiantargets.Italycontributed
with approximately 50 aircraft, including F‐104, Tornado, AMX, reach‐
ing up 1,072 sorties and2,903 hours of flight. Overall, the quantitative
and qualitative effort of the Italian forces was highly regarded, as Italy
was the third largest European contributor of aircraft and the fourth
largestEuropeanintermsofnumberofairsorties.Inparticular,Torna‐
dowereutilizedforSuppressionofEnemyAirDefence SEAD tasks.As
alreadyhappenedfortheoperationsinBosnia‐Herzegovina,Italianmili‐
tarybasesandlogisticssupportprovedtobeessentialtoconducttheair
campaign.TheoperationendedinJune1999withamilitaryagreement
betweenNATOandSerbiawhichenvisagedthecompletewithdrawalof
Serbian forcesfrom Kosovo.TheUNSecurityCouncilresolution1244/
1999pavedthewayforthesubsequentNATOpeace‐keepingmissionin
Kosovo.
Since2001,theUnitedStatesstartedoperationEnduringFreedomin
Afghanistan, with the contribution of several European countries com‐
prising Italy, to undermine terrorist activities from groups linked to Al‐
Qaeda. Concerning the aerial component, the Italian contribution was
mainly effectuated by AV‐8B deployed on the Garibaldi aircraft carrier
from 2002 to 2006, which carried on Intelligence, Surveillance and Re‐
10
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
connaissance ISR andCloseAirSupport CAS operations,amountingto
328 sorties and 860 hours of flight. In the meanwhile and starting from
2001, the International Security Assistance Force ISAF has been de‐
ployedin Afghanistan under aUN mandate,in orderto actively support
theestablishmentofapeacefulandstableAfghanstatethatwillnotcol‐
ludewithAlQaedaorotherterroristgroupsthreateningNATOmembers.
InAugust2003,NATOtookoverthecommandofISAFandextendedthe
areaofoperationtocovertheentirecountrywiththecontributionoffifty
NATO members and partners. Italy has participated to ISAF since 2002.
ItalianGeneralMauroDelVecchiotookcommandofthewholeISAFoper‐
ationbetween2005and2006.SincetheestablishmentofISAFRegional
Commandsin2006,ItalyhasmaintainedtheRegionalCommandWest.As
of February 2014, Italy had 2,165 units on the ground, ranking fourth
amongcontributingnations.Concerningaircapabilities,in2007theJoint
AirTaskForcewasestablishedinKabulaspartoftheRegionalCommand
West.Asof31stDecember2013,thefighteraircraftdeployedbyItaly,in‐
cludingTornado,AMXandAV‐8B,conductedatotalof3,301airsortiesin
theatre,and8,477flighthours.MostsortiesconcernedISRactivities,but
fighteraircraftwerealsousedforCAStogroundtroopsengagedwithin‐
surgents.TheISAFmissionissettolastuntiltheendof2014,whenthe
transition of security responsibilities to Afghan national security forces
andcivilianauthoritieswillbecompleted.
ThereasonsthatledsomeNATOcountriestoplanandconductapro‐
longedaircampaigninLibyain2011arestillacontentiousissueandan
object of studies and analysis. In March 2011 the UN Security Council
resolution1973authorizedtheuseofforce,includingtheestablishment
of a NFZ to protect civilians and civilian areas targeted by the Gaddafi
loyalistforces.On19MarchtheUS‐ledoperationOdysseyDawnstarted
withFrench andBritish militarysupport.On31 March,NATOformally
assumedcommandoftheOperationUnifiedProtector,whichlastedun‐
til31 October2011.Bothoperations resultedintheestablishmentand
enforcementofaNFZovertheentireLibyanterritory,aswellasintar‐
getingofLibyangovernment’smilitaryandparamilitaryforces.Themil‐
itaryoperationendedwiththecollapseoftheLibyangovernment,with‐
out, nonetheless, any follow‐up NATO mission to support the stabiliza‐
tionofthecountry.Italianmilitarycontributionwasthree‐fold.First,ina
11
THE ROLE OF ITALIAN FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: TRENDS AND NEEDS
chronologicalorder,theItalianNavyledtheNATOnavaloperationtoen‐
forcetheUNarmsembargo.Second,theuseofmilitarybasesintheItal‐
ian territory was crucial to carry on operations, which could not have
beenpossiblewithoutsuchalargefootprintclosetotheoperationalthea‐
tre.Third,andmostimportantlyforthefocusofthisstudy,Italianaircraft
conductedabout7%ofthetotalalliedmissionsintheLibyanskies.The
bulkofcommittedItalianaircapabilitieswerefighteraircraftincludingF‐
16,AMX,AV‐8B,EurofighterandTornado.Theseaircraftexecuteddiffer‐
enttypesofmissions,suchasSEAD,DefensiveCounterAir DCA ,Offen‐
siveCounterAir OCA ,StrikeCoordinationandReconnaissance SCAR and ISR activities. The Italian armed forces totalled 2,113 sorties flown
and 7,255 flight hours during operations in Libya, being this the largest
aircampaignItalianAirForcehasbeenengagedinsinceWorldWarII.
Considering the aforementioned 10 air operations,1 Italy has de‐
ployeditsfighteraircraft90%underUNSecurityCouncilmandate,and
80% under NATO’s chain of command and control. This insight shows
not only Italy’s deep integration and commitment to those organiza‐
tions,butalsothestronginfluenceofaglobalizedinternationalsystem
which requires the management of crises by the whole international
community. Moreover, Italy’s operational participation in missions
abroad envisaging the use of Air Power has grown in qualitative and
quantitativetermsoverthelast24years.
Italy’s use of fighter aircraft in the post‐Cold War period has gone
handinhandwithdevelopmentsoccurredinAirPower’sdoctrine.The
secondchapterofthisResearchPaperoutlinesthedoctrinefundamen‐
talsandtrendsstemmingfromtherecentoperationalexperience,with
theaimtounderstandcurrentandpossiblefuturewaystoutilizeairca‐
pabilities,includingfighteraircraft.AirPowerisdefinedasthecapacity
to project power in the air to influence people’s behaviour and the
course of events. Coupled with increasingly capable technology, Air
Powerisaflexible,rapid,24/7availabletooltoinfluencetheoperating
1DesertStorm,DenyFlight,SharpGuard,DeliberateForce,DecisiveEndeavour,De‐
liberateGuard,AlliedForce,EnduringFreedom,UnifiedProtector,andInternationalSe‐
curityAssistanceForce ISAF .
12
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Figure1.ItalianAirForceactivitiesininternationalmissions
environment.Asaresult,AirPowercanbeconsideredasaforcemulti‐
plierfordeployedlandandmaritimemilitaryforces.
Overall, it is possible to identify four main roles in which Air Power
finds its concrete application: Control of the Air; Intelligence, Surveil‐
lance,TargetAcquisition,Reconnaissance ISTAR ;Engagement;AirMo‐
bility.Thefirstthreerolesareparticularlyrelevantinrelationstofighter
aircraft. Achieving Control of the Air means being free to use a specific
volume of airspace in a given period of time for one’s own purposes,
whiledenyingitsusetoothers,ifnecessary.Thankstotheacquisitionof
information, ISTAR activities contribute to planning activities and deci‐
sion making during all air operations’ phases. It improves the ability to
gain and maintain information superiority, and aims to achieve Situa‐
tionalAwareness,thatishavingafullcomprehensionoftheoperational
situationintheatre.IntermsofEngagement,AirPowerroleincludesvar‐
ioustypesofstrikemissions,withmaritimeandterrestrialtargets.
Inthiscontext,someimportanttrendsseemtoemergefromairop‐
13
THE ROLE OF ITALIAN FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: TRENDS AND NEEDS
erationsconductedintheselatest24years.First,therecentoperational
experience has raised awareness at the political‐strategic level that
complexairoperationsrequiretheavailabilityofallaircomponentsto
perform the four Air Power’s roles, and that air capabilities are more
andmoreintertwinedamongeachother.Second,ISTARisnotprovided
onlybydedicatedplatforms,suchastheRemotelyPilotedAircraftSys‐
tems RPAS , but by a number of sensors and systems embedded in a
wideandcomplementaryrangeofaircraft,includingfighter.Third,Con‐
troloftheAirshouldnotbetakenforgranted:inLibya 2011 ,Kosovo
1999 andIraq 1991 thepriorityofthefirstdaysofoperationswas
still to ensure coalition’s Control of the Air by destroying opponent
command and control structures, most of its air defence fixed systems
andcombataircraft.Fourth,withregardtoEngagement,theuseofPre‐
cisionGuidedMunitions PGM hasexponentiallygrownfromtheFirst
Gulf War to the Libya campaign. In the future, the need to attack indi‐
vidual targets accurately will continue to be paramount, especially to
limitthenumberofcollateraldamagesinhighlypopulatedareas.
Building on the analysis of previous crisis management operations,
as well as on trends and doctrinal evolutions of Air Power, the third
chapterofthisResearchPaperpresentstwoscenarios,showinghowair
capabilities,inparticularfighteraircraft,maybeusedincrisismanage‐
mentoperationsinthe2015‐2025timeframe.Inthefirstscenario,itis
exposed how air operations are undertaken to establish and enforce a
NFZ,whilethesecondoutlineshowairoperationssupportlandopera‐
tions. Each scenario has been redacted on the basis of the same struc‐
ture,whichincludesthe followingelements:StrategicContext;Mission
Objectives; Critical Factors of the Operational Environment; Adversary
Capabilities and Course of Actions; Air Component Course of Actions
andAssociatedCapabilities.
Despite this Research Paper does not address the likelihood of these
twoscenarios,itisassumedthattheyareatleastpossibleexamplesofair
operationsEuropeancountriessuch asItalymayjoininthefuture.As a
matter of fact, Italian fighter have been deployed in different contexts,
that isin an interstatewar Gulf ,in civilconflicts Bosnia‐Herzegovina,
KosovoandLibya andinafailedstatewithsometypicalconnotationsof
insurgency and civil war Afghanistan . Indeed, armed conflicts will still
14
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
beafeatureoftheinternationalsecurityenvironmentinthemedium‐long
term,withconflictareasparticularlyconcentratedinAfrica,MiddleEast
andEastandSouthAsia.Thephenomenonof“failedstates”willalsore‐
mainonthesceneforlong,especiallyifthelevelofviolenceintheafore‐
mentionedregionswillnotdecrease.Inthiscontext,itispossibletoimag‐
ine the future employment of fighter aircraft inthoseregions, either for
combatorstabilizationpurposes.AsonemightarguethatNATOwillnev‐
er go “that out of area,” one might reply that probably at the end of the
ColdWarnonewouldhaveexpectedtoseeNATOrunningpeace‐keeping
operationsinKosovofirstandinAfghanistanlater,orcarryingonmilitary
interventionsintheBalkansandinLibya.
Theanalysisofpastoperationalexperiences,AirPower’strendsand
possiblefuturescenariosofairoperationspose anumber ofkeyques‐
tionsthatshouldbeaskedtoItalianpolicy‐makers,includingcivilianau‐
thorities – in primis the Parliament and the Government – and the
armedforces.Therefore,thefourthchapterofthisResearchPaperaims
toaddresssuchquestions,todiscusstherelatedprocurement’sneedsof
theItalianmilitary,andfinallytoassesswhethertheF‐35procurement
programmemightbeabletosatisfythoseneedsornot.
ThefirstkeyquestioniswhetherItalianparticipationincrisisman‐
agementoperationstogetherwithEuropeanandNorthAmericanallies
doesservenationalinterests.Thechangesoccurredintheinternational
contextmakenationalinterestsaffectedbycrisis,risksandthreatsoc‐
curringwellbeyondterritorialborders.Globalizationandeconomicin‐
terdependencehaveobviouslyplayedafundamentalroleinthisregard.
TheItalianparticipationincrisismanagementoperationsinthelast24
yearshascontributeddirectlyorindirectlytoprotectandpromotena‐
tional interests. For example, the stabilization of Bosnia‐Herzegovina,
Kosovoand,generallyspeaking,theWesternBalkanswasaclear,direct
nationalinterest.Sincetheearly1990s,Italyhadsufferedboththeflows
ofillegalimmigrantsfromtheseregionsandtheemergenceofillicittraf‐
fics or the development of organized crime. For that reason, interna‐
tional missions, including those conducted through Air Power, have
beeninstrumentaltopacifyandstabilizeageographicalareaextremely
closetotheItaliansoilandlinkedtoItaly’seconomicsystem.
Italianparticipationinothermissionsabroadhasservednationalin‐
15
THE ROLE OF ITALIAN FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: TRENDS AND NEEDS
terests in a more indirect way. For instance, the active participation in
NATOoperationsrepresentsaninvestmentinakindof“insurancepoli‐
cy”forItaly’snationalsecurity.Italydoesnothavesufficientcapabilities
toprotectaloneitssecurityinterests.Ineffect,theystretchwellbeyond
national borders and include: safe trade routes in the “Enlarged Medi‐
terranean,”energysuppliesfromNorthAfrica,MiddleEastandCentral
Asia,bordercontrolintheMediterraneaninrelationtoillegalimmigra‐
tionandmaritimesecurity.Anactive,reliableandstableItalianpartici‐
pationinallNATOmissionsisinstrumentaltogainthenecessarycredi‐
bility to push the Alliance to deal with the purposes of Italian interna‐
tional agenda. Furthermore, being these crisis management operations
setupandledbyinternationalorganizations,itallowsItalytosharese‐
curity risks and costs, to extend its intervention’s range to protect na‐
tional interests, and to enhance inter‐allies solidarity. Finally, Italian
participationinmissionsabroadisalsoamannertomaintainstrongre‐
lationswithitsmainsecurityally,theUS.Beingsurroundedbyunstable
regions–fromWesternBalkanstotheSouthernMediterraneanshores–
andunableasa“middlepower”toshapetheeventsintheseregionson
its own, Italy has traditionally relied on “asymmetric alliances” with
stronger partners such as the US to address common security con‐
cerns. Italian participation in crisis management operations foreseeing
theuseofAirPowerdoesnotguaranteepersétheprotectionofItaly’s
nationalinterests.Suchprotectiondepends,amongotherthings,bythe
capacityoftheItaliangovernmenttomakethebestofthemilitarycon‐
tributionprovidedvis‐à‐vistheallies.Inthisregard,Italy’sparticipation
inmissionsabroad,whichalsoincludesairoperations,isafundamental
enablerforItaliandefenceandforeignpolicy.
IfitisassumedthatmaintainingthecapacitytoprojectAirPowerin
crisis management operations does serve Italian defence and foreign
policy,andultimatelyItaly’snationalinterests,thesecondkeyquestion
iswhatkindofaircapabilitiesareneeded.Asamatteroffact,thefighter
aircraftfleetusedsofarwillbephasedoutinthenextdecade.Thereis
thusanunavoidableneedtoreplace253aircraftbelongingtothreedif‐
ferentline‐ups,including18AV‐8BoftheNavy,136AMXand99Torna‐
dooftheAirForce.Manyofthemhavebeenbuiltinthe1980s,oreven
inthe1970s,andasfarastheirlife‐cyclereaches35/40years,theycan‐
16
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
not guarantee safety conditions to the aircrew anymore. Besides, one
shouldconsiderthat,althoughRPASarelikelytocomplementfutureair
fleets, they will not yet replace manned fighter aircraft completely. In
thisregard,toidentifyItalianfutureaircapabilities’needs,severalles‐
sonscanbelearnedfrommissionsconsideredinthisstudy.Firstofall,
interoperabilityconstitutesacrucialrequirement,sinceItalianaircraft–
bothfromtheAirForceandtheNavy–havealwaysoperatedwithinin‐
ternationalcoalitions.Second,thecapacitytoconnectfighteraircraftto
otherplatforms,fromunitsonthegroundtothecommandandcontrol
centresisfundamental:theaircraftshouldbe“net‐centric,”thatisbeing
fullyableto gatheranddisseminateinformationfromandtotheother
nodesofthenet.Athirdcrucialneedistheradarlow‐observability also
called “stealthness” , as it greatly reduces the chances of an aircraft to
beshutdownbytheopponentairdefencesystem.Finally,thefactthat
all considered crisis management operations have taken place beyond
national territory makes “deployability” at strategic distance another
fundamentalneedforaircapabilities.
If it is assumed that keeping the capacity to project Air Power
through crisis management operations does serve Italian defence and
foreign policy, and ultimately Italy’s national interests; if it is assumed
thatcurrentItalianfighteraircraftfleetneedstobereplacedbyaircraft
whichshouldbeinteroperable,net‐centric,low‐observableanddeploy‐
able;thenthenextkeyquestionforpolicy‐makersiswhatprocurement
optionsareavailabletoacquirethekindofaircapabilitiesneededbyIt‐
aly.Intheory,afirstoptionistodevelopaEuropeanprocurementpro‐
grammebringingtogetherthemainEuropeancountriesintermsofde‐
fencecapabilities,namelyFrance,GermanyandtheUK,aimedtodevel‐
opa5thgenerationfighteraircraft.Suchaninvestmentshouldhavebeen
doneinthe mid‐1990sinordertodeliver afightercapabilityby 2020.
Yet,thishasnotoccurred,eitherbecauseEuropeancountriespreferred
toinvestinnationalprocurementprogrammes,likeFranceforinstance,
orbecausetheypreferredtocutthedefencebudgetandsobenefitfrom
theso‐called“peacedividends”,asGermanydid.Astodaythereisnopo‐
liticalwillinEuropetoinvestinthiskindofprogramme,suchprocure‐
mentoptionremainsoffthetablebecauseofthechoicesmadebymajor
European countries back in the 1990s. A second theoretical option for
17
THE ROLE OF ITALIAN FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: TRENDS AND NEEDS
Italy, in order to obtain needed air capabilities to replace old ones,
wouldbetodevelopandbuildaground‐attackversionoftheEurofight‐
er,thefighteraircraftdesignedbyGermany,Italy,Spain and theUKin
the 1980s, with a full 5th generation strike capacity. Again, this option
shouldhave beenundertakenat maximumintheearly 2000s,through
significantEuropeanjointinvestmentsinresearchanddevelopmentac‐
tivities,aimingtomodifyanaircraftwhichwasnotoriginallydesigned
tofulfilsuchaground‐attackrole.GiventhatmembersoftheEurofight‐
erconsortiumwere andare notwillingtoundertakethispath,there‐
forethisoptionisoffthetabletoo.
ThethirdandlastoptiontosatisfyItalianmilitaryneedsintermsof
air capabilities is to acquire F‐35 aircraft. It has been estimated that
more than 3,000 F‐35 units will beprocured, 2,443 of them for the US
armed forces, and the rest for other 12 countries Australia, Canada,
Denmark,Italy,Israel,Japan,theNetherlands,Norway,Singapore,South
Korea,TurkeyandtheUK .Thiswillpermithighlevelofinteroperabil‐
itytothosecountriestakingparttotheprocurementprogram.TheF‐35
presents all the advanced features typical of 5th generation fighter air‐
craft:itisequippedwithsensorsandcomputingcapacityfordatafusion
inanet‐centricperspective;itslowobservabilityisensuredbyanum‐
berofelements,includingitsairframe’sdesign,theconfigurationofits
internalbayswhereweaponsarestoredandaspecifictypeofpainting.
Moreover, the F‐35 internal bays avoid that weapon’s systems located
ontheexternalsidewoulddamageaircraft’saerodynamic,itsspeedor
manoeuvrability; in turn, this diminishes fuel consumption while fa‐
vouring the aircraft range and deployability. The latter is greatly aug‐
mentedbythepresenceofaspecificversionoftheF‐35 F‐35B capable
ofverticaltake‐offsandlandingfromaircraftcarriers,forinstancefrom
ItalianCavourcarrier.ThisisparticularlyimportantforItalyinorderto
maintainNavy’saircapabilities,sofarguaranteedbyAV‐8Baircraft.
IfitisassumedthattheF‐35istheonlyavailableoptiontoprocure
an interoperable, net‐centric, low‐observable and highly deployable
fighter aircraft to satisfy Italy’s military needs to participate in crisis
managementoperations,thelastkeyquestionforpolicy‐makersregards
howtoacquirethisaircraft.Inprinciple,twowaysareavailable:either
to participate in the procurement programme, or to buy F‐35 “off‐the‐
18
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
shelf”thatisonthemarketplace.Fromamilitarypointofview,partici‐
pating in the procurement programme generates several positive out‐
comes.First,itbooststhe“operationalsovereignty”–thatisthepossibil‐
ity to have platform, weapons’ system and ISTAR’s functions at your
complete disposal, without relying on third parties for technology, up‐
dates, security of supply of various components – which is clearly re‐
duced,ifnotdepleted,incaseof“off‐the‐shelf”acquisitions.Second,ital‐
lows Italian pilots to start as soon as possible their training with part‐
ners’aircrews–particularlyUSones–thusenjoyingimmediatebenefits
intermsofinteroperability.Eventually,theconstructionoftheFinalAs‐
sembly and Check Out FACO of Cameri, as part of the procurement
programme,impliesthattheItalianMinistryofDefencewillnothaveto
spendmoretobuildanotherfacilitytomaintainandupgradethe90F‐35
ItalyhascommitteditselftobuyfortheAirForceandtheNavy.Indeed,
FACOisalreadysettobecometheMaintenanceRepairOverhaulandUp‐
grade MRO&U centerforF‐35basedinEurope.Regardingthetimeline
of F‐35’s acquisition and its related cost, Italy has chosen to wait the
sixthtrancheofLowRateInitialProduction LRIP tobuyitsfirstaircraft
at the cost of around 130 million dollar, way less in comparison to the
230milliondollarofthefirstaircraftproduced.Thecostatthefullrate
productionisestimatedtodecreaseat85milliondollarperunit.
ThefifthandlastchapterofthisResearchPaperdiscussestheindus‐
trialaspectsoftheF‐35multinationalcollaborationandtheItalianpartic‐
ipation in the procurement programme. Italy participation in the F‐35
programme began in 1998 when the left‐wing government decided to
invest 10 million dollar in the Concept Demonstration Phase. In 2002,
theItalianright‐winggovernmentconfirmedthischoicebycommitting
1,028 billion dollar in the System Design and Development Phase. In
2007, the left‐wing government signed the bilateral Memorandum of
Understanding MoU withtheUSfortheProduction,Sustainment,and
Follow‐onDevelopmentPhase,withaninvestmentof904milliondollar.
In2009,theItalianParliamentapprovedtheacquisitionof131F‐35.At
the same time, Italy decided to build the FACO/MRO&U facility at
Cameri.In2012,theItaliangovernmentreducedtheoverallfleetnum‐
ber of F‐35 from 131 to 90 60 F‐35A and 30 F‐35B . Since Italy is in‐
volvedintheF‐35programmeasLevel2partner,sharingroughly4%of
19
THE ROLE OF ITALIAN FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: TRENDS AND NEEDS
the total cost, it has limited opportunities to influence aircraft’s re‐
quirements.
The F‐35 entails a radical change of the way to envisage a multina‐
tionalprocurementprogrammeinthedefencefield.Infact,itisbasedon
theprincipleof“bestvalueformoney”,whichimpliesacertaindegreeof
competitionamongsupplierstoofferthebestprice/qualityratiotothe
primecontractor–LockheedMartin.ThisisquitenewconsideringItal‐
ianindustry’spastexperienceinprogrammesbasedonthe“justeretour
principle”,wherebycost‐sharedividedamongparticipatinggovernments
mustequalthework‐shareamongnationalindustriescomposingthein‐
dustrial consortium. Nevertheless, it has been considered necessary to
applythesetwoconcepts–competitionandbestvalueformoney–with
certainflexibilitytoavoidto“overstress”thesupplychain.Forinstance,
LockheedMartinforeseesthepossibilityofsigningagreementswithtwo
differentsuppliersofagivenitem,asitdeemsstrategictohavingmore
than a single supply source – the so‐called “strategic second sources”
method.ThisisthecaseoftheFinmeccanicacompanyAleniaAermacchi
thathasa“strategicsecondsource”statusfortheF‐35wings.
The majority of supplier agreements with Lockheed Martin have a
one‐yearterm,astheUSgovernmentdecidesthenumberofF‐35tobe
purchased year by year, influencing the production planning of the
prime contractor. Such a management system seems to overstress the
supply chain and it does not encourage sub‐contractors to adopt long‐
term investments plans, because it has to take on its own the risk to
makeinvestmentswithouttheassurancethatthevolumeofproduction
will be guaranteed in the next years. Another critical issue regards the
lack of Italian industries’ participation in development and integration
phases, characterized by a greater use of high technologies. Obstacles
aremainly,butnotonly,duetoUSregulationsuchastheInternational
TrafficinArmsRegulation ITAR ,aswellastoAmericanNationalDis‐
closurePolicy.
Around 90 Italian companies are involved in the procurement pro‐
gramme,andsofarthecontractsawardedtotheItalianindustrieshave
reachedanoverallvalueof715milliondollar.Ofthisamount,565mil‐
liondollararerelatedtotheFinmeccanicagroup,mainlythroughAlenia
Aermacchi,whichisresponsiblefortheconstructionofmorethan1,200
20
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
wings.Theterm“wings”includesboththetwosemi‐wings–morethan
2,400units–andthecentralcelloftheaircraftholdingthemtogether,
beingthis30%oftheentireairframewithsignificantengineeringchal‐
lenges.ConcerningSmallandMediumEnterprises SMEs ,theyproved
tobeflexibleandadaptableinofferingthebestvalueformoneywithin
theF‐35programme.However,theysufferedmorethanlargercontrac‐
torstheone‐yearcontractsapproach,thispracticediscouragingthemto
makelong‐terminvestments.
Theprocurementprogrammepresentspotentialrevenuesaround10
billiondollarforItalianindustries,butthiswilldependontheabilityto
exploit the infrastructures created – first and foremost the Cameri FA‐
CO/MRO&U–tobuildcomponentsandtoprovidemaintenance,support
and upgrade, in particular regarding avionics and electronics. The
Camerisiteincludes:aFACOfacilitytoassembletheItalianF‐35AandF‐
35B variants, the F‐35A procured by Netherlands, and potentially the
aircraft to be procured by other European partners such as Denmark
and Norway; a wing construction facility which serves the entire pro‐
curement programme; the aircraft test facility aimed at testing low‐
observable performance, and the related final paint facility; buildings
aimed to support F‐35 operating by the US and allies in Europe. Being
the only FACO outside US territory, Cameri represents a fundamental
asset for the entire F‐35 global production and maintenance system.
Maintenancewillalsointroducesignificanttechnologicaldevelopments
andinnovationbecauseitwillgohandinhandwiththeplatform’sup‐
gradeandrevisionthroughoutitswholelife‐cycleof30/40years.
Asawhole,theItalianparticipationintheprocurementprogramme
presentsprosandcons,opportunitiesandchallenges.Inotherpastpro‐
grammes,basedonthejusteretourprinciple,negotiationslargelyended
whentheagreementoncost‐shareandwork‐sharewasreached.Thisis
not the case of the F‐35 programme. The new procurement approach
basedonthebestvalueformoneyprinciplehasimposedontheItalian
industrytobecomemorecompetitiveandtotakemorerisksinmanag‐
ing its own investments. It also requires the Italian military and gov‐
ernment to assist the industry in this regard, by making an additional
and constant effort in negotiating with US counterparts on technology
transferandotherrelevantaspectsoftheprocurementprogramme.
21
Preface
MilitaryexpendituresseldomenjoyapopularpositionwithintheItalian
public debate, except for experts and practitioners including the armed
forcesanddefenceindustry.Therefore,therecentandstillharshpolemics
ononeofthemostimportantItaliandefenceprocurementprogrammesof
thelastyearsarenotsurprising.Though,itisrathersurprisingthatthese
controversies have basically regarded just one specific programme, al‐
mostomittingotherswhicharefinanciallymoredemanding.
Inanycase,theaimofthisstudyisnotthatofanalysingthereasons
behindvariouspolemics.Ourpurposeisratherthatofgraspingthecore
reasons which led Italy to find a future replacement for the current
fighteraircraftoftheAirForceandNavy,equippedwithTornado,AMX
andAV‐8Baircraft.Furthermore,weevaluatethewaytosatisfymilitary
requirementsbytakingintoaccount operational,logistic,technological
andindustrialaspects.Theanalysisisconductedbymaintainingareal‐
istic approach with regard to both international scenarios and the na‐
tionalandEuropeanindustrialcontext.
We started from an historical overview in order to have a concrete
ideaoftheactionofItalianfighteraircraftduringthepost‐ColdWarpe‐
riod.Itisacomplexandstillon‐goinghistoricalphase,characterizedby
high level of uncertainty. This requires an extraordinary flexible mind‐
setfrompolicy‐makers,whichinturnimpliestheavailabilityoflikewise
flexiblepolicytools–includingmilitaryones.Inthiscontext,AirPower
hasproventoplayacrucialrole.First,itenablesothermilitarycompo‐
nentstofullyexploittheirpotentialities,withoutworryingaboutanyair
threat.Second,insomecases,AirPoweralonehasledtodesiredpoliti‐
calachievements,suchasthesigningoftheDaytonAgreementafterthe
1995 air campaign in Bosnia‐Herzegovina, or the Military Technical
23
THE ROLE OF ITALIAN FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: TRENDS AND NEEDS
Agreements after the 1999 air campaign in Kosovo, which provided
groundforcestheabilitytooperateinapermissiveenvironment.Recent
historyshowstheimpossibilityofrenouncingtoControltheAir.
Theproverbsaysthatgeneralstendtolosethenextwarbyusingthe
strategies used in the previous one – even if those were successful.
Therefore,weputacreativeefforttoidentifypossiblefuturescenarios
ofairoperationsnotthataffectedbypreviousoperationalexperiences–
while taking advantage of them. These scenarios demonstrate that the
full availability of Air Power is necessary to ensure security, mobility
and logistics support to ground and maritime forces, as well as that of
civilian organizations whose action is necessary to manage any crisis
whichoftenandtragicallytakesplaceinourneighbourhood.
Fromanoperationalpointofview,Italianfighteraircraftaregradual‐
lybecomingmoreandmoreobsolete,soItalyneedstohandletheissue
ofreplacingthecurrentfleet.Welookedatallpossibleoptionstosolve
this problem, which can ensure adequate timing, sustainable costs as
well as interoperability with the necessary and potential partners and
allies.Operationalneedsshouldbeconsideredtogetherwiththeoverall
economic situation in Italy, both in budgetary terms and from an eco‐
nomic‐industrialpointofview.Consequently,wedevotedaspecificfo‐
custotheindustrialaspectsoftheprocurementprogramme,inorderto
test its compatibility with current technological capacities and occupa‐
tionaltrendswithinthecountry.Thedecisiontojointheprogrammefor
the production of F‐35 aircraft seems to be the only feasible option. In
fact, developing a ground attack version of the Eurofighter Typhoon
would present technical uncertainties hard to solve, which imply very
high costs and uncertain timing, and European partners seems not in‐
terested to do it. Moreover, because of the way the Eurofighter pro‐
grammeisconceived,choosingthispathmeansthatonly21%oftheen‐
tirework‐sharewillbecarriedoutinItaly,whereasGermany,Spainand
UKwillbenefitfrom79%oftheinvestment.
The Italian F‐35 choice requires political and military authorities to
pay attention to any single phase of the procurement programme, in‐
cludingthelogisticsupportinthelongterm,inordertoprotectnational
interestsfrombothanoccupationalandtechnologicalpointofview.In
other words, they must avoid any subjection towards the US govern‐
24
PREFACE
ment, as well as towards the prime contractor Lockheed Martin. The
strategicvalueoftheF‐35programme,alsoconsideredasabindingfac‐
torinthecontextoftransatlanticsecurity,makesitacentralelementin
the relationship with the American government. It is in such compre‐
hensiveperspectivethatthisprogrammeshouldbeevaluated.
VincenzoCamporini
VicePresidentofIAI
25
List of Acronyms
AAR ACE AI
APOD ASUW ASW ATO BLF BNDF BVR C2
C4I
CAS CBG CDP CNO CoA COAC COMAO
CSAR CSDP CTOL DCA ECM ECR EO
Air‐to‐AirRefuelling
AlliedCommandEurope
AirInterdiction
AerialPortsofDebarkation
Anti‐SurfaceWarfare
Anti‐SubmarineWarfare
AirTaskingOrder
BanonLiberationFront
BanonNationalDefenceForce
BeyondVisualRange
CommandandControl
Command,Control,Communications,Computersand
Intelligence
CloseAirSupport
CarrierBattleGroup
ConceptDemonstrationPhase
ComputerNetworkOperations
CourseofAction
COmbinedAiroperationCentre
COmbinedAirOperations
CombatSearchandRescue
CommonSecurityandDefencePolicy
ConventionalTake‐OffandLanding
DefensiveCounterAir
ElectronicCounterMeasures
ElectronicCombatReconnaissance
EarthObservation
27
THE ROLE OF ITALIAN FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: TRENDS AND NEEDS
EW
F2T2EA
FACO FMS GoB HARM HN
IADS ICT
IED
IFOR IO
ISR
ISTAR ITAR JATF JFACC JFC
JPO
KLA LRIP MANPADS
MoU MRO&U
NAEW NEC NFZ OCA PGM PNT PSFD RoE RPAS RS
ElectronicWarfare
Find,Fix,Track,Target,Engage,Assess
FinalAssemblyandCheckOut
ForeignMilitarySales
GovernmentofBanon
HighSpeedAnti‐RadiationMissile
HostNation
IntegratedAirDefenceSystem
InformationandCommunicationTechnologies
ImprovisedExplosiveDevice
ImplementationForce
InformationOperations
Intelligence,SurveillanceandReconnaissance
Intelligence,Surveillance,TargetAcquisition,
Reconnaissance
InternationalTrafficinArmsRegulation
JointAirTaskForce
JointForceAirComponentCommand
JointForceCommand
JointProgrammeOffice
KosovoLiberationArmy
LowRateInitialProductionPhase
MAN‐PortableAir‐DefenceSystems
MemorandumofUnderstanding
MaintenanceRepairOverhaulandUpgrade
NATOAirborneEarlyWarning
NetworkEnabledCapability
No‐FlyZone
OffensiveCounterAir
PreciseGuidedMunitions
PositionNavigatingandTiming
Production,Sustainment,andFollow‐onDevelopment
(Phase)
RulesofEngagement
RemotelyPilotAircraftSystem
RepublicofSari
28
LIST OF ACRONYMS
RSS
SA
SAM SAR SCAR SDA SDB SDD SEAD STOVL TACP TAR UNAMA
UNFB UNSC WEU ReformofSecuritySector
SituationalAwareness
SurfacetoAirMissile
SearchAndRescue
StrikeCoordinationAndReconnaissance
SariDemocraticArmy
SmallDiameterBomb
SystemDesignandDevelopment(Phase)
SuppressionofEnemyAirDefenses
ShortTake‐OffandVerticalLanding
TacticalAirControlPost
TacticalAirReconnaissance
UnitedNationAssistanceMissioninAfghanistan
UNForceinBanon
UnitedNationsSecurityCouncil
WesternEuropeanUnion
29
1.
Italy’s participation in crisis
management operations: fighter
aircraft’s role
ThischapterisaimedtooutlinetheroleofItalianfighteraircraftincri‐
sismanagementoperationswhichoccurredinthelast24years.Several
missionsabroadhavebeenconsidered:theFirstGulfWarinIraq 1990‐
1991 ; the North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO operations in
Bosnia‐Herzegovina 1993‐1998 ,SerbiaandKosovo 1999 ;theinter‐
nationalmissionsinAfghanistan 2001‐2014 ,andfinallythe2011mul‐
tinationalaircampaigninLibya,whichcameunderNATOcommandaf‐
terthefirstphaseofairoperations.1Thefollowingparagraphssumma‐
rizeforeachmissionthemotivationsandgoalsofthemilitaryinterven‐
tion,andexplaintheroleofItalywithrespecttocoalitionallies.
1.1 IRAQ (1990-1991)
IraqinvadedKuwaiton2August1990.Thiswastheculminationoflong
standingtensionsbetweenthetwostates.Inparticular,SaddamHussein
1Inthepost‐ColdWarperiodtheItalianarmedforcesengagedinmanyotherinter‐
nationalmissions,includingthreelarge‐scalechallengingonesinSomalia,Lebanonand
Iraq. In some cases, i.e. in Iraq in 2003‐2006, they envisaged also the utilization of air
capabilitiessuchashelicopters,RemotelyPilotedAerialSystems RPAS ,andairliftca‐
pabilitieslikeC‐130J.Inparticular,theAV‐8BaircraftwereusedinSomaliain1995to
supporttheredeploymentItalianandcoalitiontroops,andin2006operatedinfrontof
Lebanoncoasttomonitornavalcommercialtraffic.Allthesemissionsabroadhavenot
beenconsideredinthisstudy,becauseitfocusesoncrisismanagementoperationsfea‐
turingasubstantialuseoffighteraircraft.
31
THE ROLE OF ITALIAN FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: TRENDS AND NEEDS
hadaccusedsomeGulfstatesof“stabbingIraqintheback”byproducing
more oil than the quotas agreed with other states belonging to the Or‐
ganization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries OPEC and thus de‐
creasing world oil price.2 After the invasion, international diplomacies
begantoworktofindapoliticalsolutiontothecrisis.Despitetheeffort,
no agreement was reached and the UN Security Council UNSC ap‐
proved resolution 678/1990, authorizing UN member‐states to “use all
necessarymeans”ifIraqhadnotcompliedwithpreviousUNresolutions
– i.e. resolution 661/1990 – and withdrew its military forces from Ku‐
waitby16 January1991.SaddamHussein’sregimedisregardedtheulti‐
matumandon17JanuaryaUS‐ledcoalitionbegantobombIraqimilitary
installationsinIraqandKuwait.3OperationDesertStormhadstarted.
Thefirst goalof theUS‐ledcoalitionwas torestoreinternationallaw
thathadbeenviolatedbyIraqiaggressionofKuwait.Theinterventionoc‐
curredincompliancewiththeUnitedNationsChart–inparticularChap‐
ter VII, art. 51 – which recognizes the right of individual and collective
self‐defence if an armed attack occurs against a UN member, as well as
withUNSCresolutions661/1990and678/1990,whichprovidedaneven
broader mandate than self‐defence. Furthermore, the military interven‐
tion was also meant to avoid the diffusion of political instability in the
PersianGulf,thisregionbeingextremelyimportantforworldeconomyas
amajorsourceofoilproduction.AsstatedbyUSSecretaryofStateJames
Baker in November 1990, “Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait
threatenedtheeconomiclifelineoftheWestandthatUSeffortstocontain
SaddamHusseinweretoprotectUSjobs.”4Likewise,arobustmilitaryre‐
sponsefromtheinternationalcommunitywouldhavediscouragedIraqto
carryonanexpansionistandaggressivepolicytowardsSaudiArabia,one
ofthemainUSalliesintheregiontogetherwithIsrael.5
Sincethe beginningoftheintervention,35countries “theCoalition
oftheWilling” wereengagedinoneformoranotherinOperationDe‐
2 Clyde R. Mark, Renee Stasio, “Iraq‐Kuwait Crisis: A Chronology of Events July 17,
1990‐May6,1991”,inCRSReportforCongress,No.91‐14F May1991 .
3Ibid.
4Ibid.
5Ibid.
32
1. ITALY’S PARTICIPATION IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: FIGHTER AIRCRAFT’S ROLE
sert Storm,6 although only US, UK, Saudi Arabia, France, Italy, Kuwait,
andBahraincontributedintermsofairassetstotheoperation.Contri‐
butionisintendedasthenumberofairsortiesflownbyacertaincoun‐
tryinrelationtothetotalofthecoalition seetablebelow .TheNorth
AtlanticAllianceOrganization NATO wasengagedwithinthecoalition
aswell:ontherequestoftheTurkishgovernmenttheAlliedCommand
Europe ACE MobileForce Air wasdeployedtoprotectTurkeyfrom
possibleIraqiretaliations,andItalyprovidedacellof6F104‐Gfromthe
28th squadron, which successfully completed their deterrence mission
withoutanyrealengagement.
SincetheUSprovidedtheoverwhelmingmajorityofmilitarycapabili‐
ties, the coalition strategy reflected American objectives and concerns.
TheUSadministrationledbyGeorgeBushinsistedthatthecoalitionpri‐
mary objective was to free Kuwait and not to pursue regime change in
Iraq,aslookingforthistypeofgoalwouldhavestrainedrelationshipwith
the Arab world and with Western states within the coalition.7 In doing
that, two important related objectives were made clear from the begin‐
ning: avoiding another Vietnam type of experience and minimizing as
muchaspossiblecasualtiesamongWesterntroops.TheVietnamWarhad
hadastrongimpactonAmericanapproach,withPresidentBushpromis‐
ingtheAmericanpublicopinionthatanymilitaryactionwould nothave
been“anotherVietnam”andaskingthemilitarytodefuseatanycostan‐
other similar quagmire scenario. Moreover, casualties should have been
keptbelow aminimumthresholdtoensurepublicopinion’ssupport for
theentiredurationofthewar,thuspreventinganymanifestationofpub‐
licdisapprovalwhichcouldhaveplayedinfavourofSaddamHussein.
All this was translated into a military strategy aiming to the rapid
6Albania,Australia,Bahrain,Bulgaria,Croatia,CzechRepublic,Denmark,Egypt,Es‐
tonia, Ethiopia, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Kuwait, Japan, Jordan, Latvia, Lithuania,
Macedonia,Netherlands,Oman,Palau,Poland,Portugal,Oman,Palau,Poland,Portugal,
Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, United Arab Emir‐
ates,Turkey,UK,USA.ForadetaileddescriptionoftheircontributionseeJesseLorenz,
“TheCoalitionoftheWilling”,June2003,http://www.stanford.edu/class/e297a/The%
20Coalition%20of%20the%20Willing.htm.
7LawrenceFreedmanandEfraimKarsh,“HowKuwaitWasWon:StrategyintheGulf
War”,inInternationalSecurity,Vol.16,No.2 Fall1991 ,pp.5‐41.
33
THE ROLE OF ITALIAN FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: TRENDS AND NEEDS
achievementofairsuperiority,theinterdictionofsupplylines,andafi‐
nal fast and mobile desert campaign based on manoeuvre rather than
attrition.8 After a five‐weeks long intense bombing campaign, which
deeply weakened Iraqi military forces, the land operation to liberate
Kuwaitcitybeganon23 February.Onlythreedayslater,Baghdadradio
announcedthewithdrawalofallIraqiforcesfromKuwaitincompliance
withUNSCresolution660/1990.9
InthecontextofOperationDesertStorm,Italydeployed8Tornado
fighter of 6th, 36th and 50th Wings to the Persian Gulf since September
1990.TheirfirstmissionwastodefendItalianNavalForcesthatwere
operating in the region, enforcing the international embargo put in
placebyUNresolution661/1990.10OperationLocustastartedfromGi‐
oia del Colle military basis on 25 September and had its operational
headquarterinAlDhafraAirBase,intheUnitedArabEmirates.Italian
militaryoperationsstartedon17January,whentheItaliangovernment,
with the support of the Parliament, decided to upgrade missions and
tasksoftheItalianAutonomousFlightDepartmentinthePersianGulf,
allowing its units to conduct war operations for the first time since
WorldWarII.
Inthenightbetween17and18 January,ItalianTornadocarriedout
theirfirstmissionorderedbytheInter‐AlliedAirCommand.Duetothe
prohibitive meteorological conditions, the eight Tornado fighter‐
bomber, except for one, missed the window of the air‐to‐air refuelling.
Theonlyaircraftthatwasabletorefueldecidedtocontinuethemission
alone.Intheprocessofdisengagement,afterhavingsuccessfullyhitthe
target,aTornadowasshotdownbytheIraqiairdefencesystemandPi‐
lotMajorGianmarcoBelliniandhisnavigatorCaptainMaurizioCoccio‐
lonehadtoejectfromtheaircraft.Later,theywerecapturedbytheIraqi
forcesandwereimprisoneduntiltheendofthewar.Fromthenon,Ital‐
8Foraninsiderperspectiveontheaircampaign,seeMarioArpino,IltargetinginDe‐
sertStorm,speechdeliveredattheconferenceon“L’Aerocooperazioneneiteatriopera‐
tivi”,Rome,27June2013.
9ClydeR.Mark,ReneeStasio,“Iraq‐KuwaitCrisis…”,cit.
10 “I Tornado nel Golfo Persico: Operazione Locusta”, in Rivista Aeronautica, n. 6/
1990,pp.26‐29.
34
1. ITALY’S PARTICIPATION IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: FIGHTER AIRCRAFT’S ROLE
ian Air Force successfully completed 31 missions, including those be‐
tween 24 and 27 February, when land forces began ground operations
and freed Kuwait city from Iraqi occupation. When all UN resolutions
were accepted by the Iraqi government on 28 February, war activities
stopped. Three days later, Major Gianmarco Bellini and Captain Mau‐
rizioCocciolonewerereleasedbytheIraqigovernmentandflewbackto
Italy.Bymid‐March,thetenTornadoslefttheGulfandwentbacktoGi‐
oiadelColle,wheretheywerewelcomedbytheMinisterofDefenceand
the highest military representatives.11 Overall, the number of sorties
flown by Italian fighter aircraft during Operazione Locusta – from 25
September 1990 to 16 March 1991 – was 2,326, with 4,503 flight
hours.12
OPERATIONDESERTSTORM
Generalinformation(August1990‐February1991)
CoalitionForces
(maincontributors)13
ChainofCommand
UNSecurityCouncil
Resolution
US,UK,SaudiArabia,Ku‐
wait,France,Italy,Bahrain
UnitedStates
Yes
Italiancontribution (September1990‐March1991)
Aircraft
Sorties
FlightHours
8Tornado
2,326
4,503
1.2 BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA (1993-1998)
In the early 1990s civil conflicts erupted in Slovenia, Croatia and Bos‐
nia‐Herzegovina, materializing the fears of the “Yugoslavia Break‐up”,
11 Italian Air Force, Operazioni Internazionali, Iraq 1990 , http://www.aeronautica.
difesa.it/Operazioni/Internazionali/Pagine/LaguerrainIraq.aspx.
12DataprovidedbytheItalianAirForce’sstatisticaldivision.
13JesseLorenz,TheCoalitionoftheWilling,cit.
35
THE ROLE OF ITALIAN FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: TRENDS AND NEEDS
whose first symptoms should be traced back to the 1980s with the
deathofYugoslavia’sunifyingleaderTito.Hisdeathmarkedthebegin‐
ning of an intense economic decline and rising ethnic nationalism
amongthesixrepublicscomposingYugoslavia.14Furthermore,theend
oftheColdWarandthenoveltyoffreemultipartyelectionsopenedup
newpossibilitiesforpopulistleadersinsearchforpower,whoexploit‐
ed ethnic tensions to enhance their political role. After the Slovenian
and Croatian declarations of independence 25 June 1991 , Bosnia‐
Herzegovina, comprising mainly of Muslims 40% , Serbs 30% and
Croats 17% ,decidedtofollowthesamepathanddeclareditsownin‐
dependenceinMarch1992.Becauseofthefearofbeingdominatedby
theMuslimmajorityinaunifiedcountry,SerbsdidnotendorseBosni‐
an declaration and heralded the creation of “the Serbian Republic of
BosniaandHerzegovina.”TheregularityofkillingsinSarajevoandoth‐
er provinces of Eastern Bosnia made violence escalating by mid‐April
andMay1992.
International community’s efforts to manage the conflict started
soon,withtheEUandtheUNimposingeconomicsanctionsonthebel‐
ligerents.In1993,theUNSCdeclaredsomecitiesinBosnia‐Herzegovina
to be “safe areas,”15 allowing NATO to protect civilians with the use of
force in these cities. Intense fighting continued throughout 1994, with
the Bosnian Serb protagonist of shelling safe areas on repeated occa‐
sions and causing the deaths of thousands of civilians.16 The turning
points of the crisis occurred in July 1995, when 8,000 Bosnian Muslim
weremassacredbytheBosnianSerbtroopsinSrebrenica.Inthepres‐
ence of a UN ultimatum and previous UNSC resolutions, NATO started
OperationDeliberateForceon30August1995.Thisoperationwascon‐
ductedby16NATOalliesandresultedintwoweeksofintensebombing,
14 For this paragraph see Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Bosnia‐Herzegovina,
http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id 20.
15 UN Security Council Resolution 816/1993, 31 March 1993, http://www.un.org/
en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol S/RES/816 1993 .
16 United Nations, Past peacekeeping operations: United Nations Protection Force‐
Former Yugoslavia, September 1996, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/
past/unprof_b.htm.
36
1. ITALY’S PARTICIPATION IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: FIGHTER AIRCRAFT’S ROLE
mainly directed towards Bosnian Serb command and control installa‐
tionsandammunitionfacilities,17involvingatotalof3,515airsorties.18
According to the US Defense Department, Operation Deliberate Force
provedtobeeffectiveinhelpingtoliftthesiegeofSarajevo,savinglives
andcontributing greatly topavethe way foranegotiatedsettlement.19
The settlement, namely the General Framework Agreement for Peace,
was signed on 21 November 1995 at the US Air Force base in Dayton,
Ohio. NATO air operation and the following Dayton agreement can be
considered“theresultofapurposefulU.S.strategyofcoercivediploma‐
cyputintoplacefromearly1994onward.”20Thisstrategycomprisedof
several elements, including military, economic and diplomatic types of
intervention:maintenanceofeconomicsanctionsagainstSerbianleader
SlobodanMilosevic,covertarmingofBosnianMuslimandCroattroops,
limitedairstrikesasaformofwarning,andtheapplicationofdecisive
useofforcethroughairpower,finallypairedwithagroundoffensiveby
CroatandMuslimforces.Hence,thiscoercivediplomacywasaimed“to
breaktheSerbparty’sterritorialdominanceinsideBosnia‐Herzegovina
and create a balance on the ground propitious to a negotiated out‐
come.”21 In the implementation phase, a strong NATO Implementation
Force IFOR replacingUNtroopswasdeployedinBosnia‐Herzegovina
toverifytheexecutionoftheagreement’smilitaryprovisions,whilethe
HighRepresentativeoftheInternationalCommunityinBosniaandHer‐
zegovina,namelyCarlBildt,wasappointedtosupervisetherealization
of the civilian elements of Dayton.22 In 1996, the Stabilization Force
17NATOAlliedCommandOperation, NATO’sOperations1949‐Present,http://www.
aco.nato.int/resources/21/NATO%20Operations,%201949‐Present.pdf.
18RyanC.Hendrickson,“CrossingtheRubicon”,in NATOReview,No.3/2005 Sum‐
mer 2005 , http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2005/Combating‐Terrorism/Crossing‐
Rubicon/EN/index.htm.
19 Global Security, Military Operations, Operation Deliberate Force, http://www.
globalsecurity.org/military/ops/deliberate_force.htm.
20R.CraigNation, WarintheBalkans 1991‐2002 ,Carlisle,StrategicStudiesInsti‐
tute, August 2003, p. 193, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/dis‐
play.cfm?pubID 123.
21Ibid.
22UppsalaConflictDataProgram,Bosnia‐Herzegovina,cit.
37
THE ROLE OF ITALIAN FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: TRENDS AND NEEDS
SFOR replaced IFOR, and later continued its peace‐keeping mission
underNATOcommanduntil2004andthenunderEUcommand Opera‐
tionAlthea .
In this context, Italy contributed to all NATO missions conducted in
Bosnia‐Herzegovinautilizingavastvarietyofplatformsincludingfight‐
eraircraft.
Operation Deny Flight, lasting from 12 April 1993 to 20 December
1995,wasaimedathinderinganymilitaryoperationintheskiesover
Bosnia‐Herzegovina by enforcing a No‐Fly Zone NFZ , in compliance
with UNSC resolution 816/1993. For the first time in NATO history,
OperationDenyFlightfeaturedacombatoperationinwhichfourBos‐
nianSerbfighter‐bomberwhereshutdownbyAlliedaircraftpatrolling
the NFZ.23 For almost three years, Italy took part to Deny Flight mis‐
sionswithTornadoand AMXfighter aircraft,whichcollected543sor‐
ties and 1,288 flight hours.24 In addition, Italy provided an extremely
valuable logistical support to NATO units deployed on Italian military
bases.
Likewise, Italian armed forces also contributed to NATO Operation
Sharp Guard from 12 April 1993 to 20 December 1995, to support UN
maritimeembargoaimingtostopweapons’importationbythecombat‐
ants. In the operation, 8 Tornado reinforced Italian Maritime Units’
presence in the Adriatic Sea, racking up 230 sorties and 267 flight
hours.25
From30 Augustto20 September1995,theItalianAirForcewasem‐
ployedalsoinOperationDeliberateForce,26with8Tornado,6AMX,one
Boeing707Tanker,oneC‐130andfourG‐222.27Asstatedbefore,Oper‐
23NATOAlliedCommandOperation,NATO’sOperations1949‐Present,cit.
24ItalianAirForce, OperazioniInternazionali, Jugoslavia 1999 ,http://www.aero‐
nautica.difesa.it/Operazioni/Internazionali/Pagine/Jugoslavia.aspx.
25DataprovidedbytheItalianAirForce’sstatisticaldivision.
26Bombingsbeganbetweenthe30 andthe31AugustwithOperationDeadeye.The
operation paused between the 1 and the 5 September and then restarted again under
thenameof“OperationDeliberateForce”,followingtheBosnianSerbfailedattemptto
complywithUNresolutions.
27 Hellenic Resources Network, Operation Deliberate Force. Summary Data, 15 No‐
vember1995,http://www.hri.org/docs/nato/summary.html.
38
1. ITALY’S PARTICIPATION IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: FIGHTER AIRCRAFT’S ROLE
ation Deliberate Force was initiated with the intent to protecting UN
“safe areas,” which came under attack by Bosnian Serbian militias de‐
spite UNSC resolutions. In particular, Allied aircraft were tasked to hit
anyartillery i.e.tank,mortar,etc enteringa40kmlargecirclearound
the cities.28 Of the total of 3,515 sorties flown, 2,470 were penetrating
sorties,includingattackson48BosnianSerbiantargets,whereasofthe
1,026bombsdropped,708werePrecisionGuidedMunitions PGM and
318 non‐precision munitions. Italian fighter conducted 26 sorties,
amountingto41flyinghours.29
From6December1995to20 December1996,Italyalsoparticipated
in Operation Decisive Endeavour in support of NATO Operation Joint
Endeavour. In this operation, Italy backed NATO’s first peace‐keeping
mission,theImplementationForce IFOR ,whichwastoimplementthe
military aspects of the Dayton Agreements. Italy contributed with 8
Tornado and 6 AMX. The fighter aircraft deployed amounted for 1,250
sortiesand3,150flighthours.30
Finally,followingtheendofOperationJointEndeavour,theItalian
Air Force was involved in Operation Deliberate Guard in support of
Operation Joint Guard 21 December 1996‐11 June 1998 . In this op‐
eration, Italian aircraft carried out 2,974 sorties and 7,227 hours of
flight.31
Overall, Italy provided the indispensable logistical footprint for
NATOoperationsinBosnia‐Herzegovina,withapeakof350alliedair‐
craft hosted in the basis of Rimini, Piacenza, Ghedi, Brindisi and Vil‐
lafranca.32
28Interviewdated11December2013.
29DataprovidedbytheItalianAirForce’sstatisticaldivision.
30ItalianAirForce,OperazioniInternazionali,Jugoslavia
1999 ,cit.
31DataprovidedbytheItalianAirForce’sstatisticaldivision.
32Interviewdated11December2013.
39
THE ROLE OF ITALIAN FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: TRENDS AND NEEDS
OPERATIONDENYFLIGHT
Generalinformation(April1993‐December1995)
CoalitionForces33
ChainofCommand
UNSecurityCouncil
Resolution
Belgium,Canada,Denmark,
France,Germany,Italy,the
Netherlands,Norway,
Spain,Turkey,UKandthe
US
NATO
Yes
Italiancontribution (April1993‐December1995)34
Aircraft
Sorties
FlightHours
Tornado,AMX
543
1,288
OPERATIONSHARPGUARD
Generalinformation(June1993‐October1996)
CoalitionForces35
ChainofCommand
UNSecurityCouncil
Resolution
Belgium,Canada,Denmark,
France,Germany,Italy,the
Netherlands,Norway,
Spain,UKandtheUS
NATO
Yes
Italiancontribution (April1993‐December1995)36
Aircraft
Sorties
FlightHours
8Tornado
230
267
33 Hellenic Resources Network, NATO Operation Deny Flight, 15 September 1995,
http://www.hri.org/news/misc/misc‐news/1995/95‐09‐15.misc.html; Canadian Forc‐
es‐DirectorateofHistoryandHeritage, OperationsDatabase:DenyFlight,http://www.
cmp‐cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh‐dhp/od‐bdo/di‐ri‐eng.asp?IntlOpId 158.
34ItalianAirForce,Operazioniinternazionali:Jugoslavia 1999 ,cit.
35 NATO‐IFOR, NATO/WEU Operation Sharp Guard, 2 October 1996, http://www.
nato.int/ifor/general/shrp‐grd.htm.
36ItalianAirForce,Operazioniinternazionali:Jugoslavia 1999 ,cit.
40
1. ITALY’S PARTICIPATION IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: FIGHTER AIRCRAFT’S ROLE
OPERATIONDELIBERATEFORCE
Generalinformation(August1995‐September1995)
CoalitionForces37
ChainofCommand
UNSecurityCouncil
Resolution
US(65.9%),UK(9.3%)
France(8.1%),theNether‐
lands(5.6%),Spain(3.4%),
NATO,NAEW(2.7%),Tur‐
key(2.2%),Germany
(1.7%),Italy(1%)
NATO
Yes
Italiancontribution (August1995‐September1995)
Aircraft38
Sorties39
FlightHours
8Tornado,6AMX
26
41
OPERATIONDECISIVEENDEAVORINSUPPORTOFJOINTENDEAVOR
Generalinformation(December1995‐December1996)
CoalitionForces40
ChainofCommand
UNSecurityCouncil
Resolution
Belgium,Canada,Denmark,
France,Germany,Italy,the
Netherlands,Norway,
Spain,Turkey,UKandthe
US
NATO
Yes
Italiancontribution (December1995‐December1996)
Aircraft41
Sorties
FlightHours
Tornado,AMX
1,250
3,150
37GlobalSecurity, MilitaryOperations:OperationDeliberateForce,cit.;JohnA.Tir‐
pak, “Deliberate Force”, in Air Force Magazine, Vol. 80, No. 10 October 1997 ,
http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/1997/October%201997/1097d
eliberate.aspx.
38HellenicResourcesNetwork,OperationDeliberateForce.SummaryData,cit.
39DataprovidedbytheItalianAirForce’sstatisticaldivision.
40CanadianForces‐DirectorateofHistoryandHeritage, OperationsDatabase:Deci‐
sive Endeavor, http://www.cmp‐cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh‐dhp/od‐bdo/di‐ri‐eng.asp?Intl
OpId 154.
41ItalianAirForce,Operazioniinternazionali:Jugoslavia 1999 ,cit.
41
THE ROLE OF ITALIAN FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: TRENDS AND NEEDS
OPERATIONDELIBERATEGUARDINSUPPORTOFJOINTGUARD
Generalinformation(December1996‐June1998)
CoalitionForces42
ChainofCommand
UNSecurityCouncil
Resolution
Belgium,Canada,Denmark,
France,Germany,Italy,the
Netherlands,Norway,
Spain,Turkey,UKandthe
US
NATO
Yes
Italiancontribution(December1996‐June1998)
Aircraft
Sorties
FlightHours
Tornado,AMX
2,974
7,227
1.3 KOSOVO (1999)
Another civil war erupted in Yugoslavia in June 1998 in Kosovo, a
SouthernprovinceofSerbia.Severalcausescanbeattributedtotheini‐
tiationofhostilities.“Theneighboureffect”playedcertainlyamajorrole
in the onset of violence, as the previous wars in the region spread re‐
gionalinstability,whichincreasinglyfedtheraisingnationalismsofthe
KosovarandtheSerbianethnicitiesinKosovo.Moreover,sinceSerbian
independence in 1878, tensions based on ethnic affiliation fuelled mis‐
perceptionsandbrutalitiesbetweentheAlbaniansandtheSerbs.43The
latter also depicted the territory of Kosovo as “the holy land”, where
their ancestries had fought the renowned “Battle of Kosovo” and from
where the Kosovar had to be expelled.44 In this already troublesome
context,politicalandeconomicgrievancesalsotriggeredastrongsense
42CanadianForces‐DirectorateofHistoryandHeritage, OperationsDatabase:Delib‐
erateGuard,http://www.cmp‐cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh‐dhp/od‐bdo/di‐ri‐eng.asp?IntlOpId
159.
43ChristopherCviic,Reviewof“Kosovo1945‐2005”,in InternationalAffairs,Vol.81,
No.4 July2005 ,pp.851‐860.
44 Michael E. Salla, “Traveling the Full Circle: Serbia’s ‘Final Solution’ to the Kosovo
Problem”,inJournalofMuslimMinorityAffairs,Vol.18,No.2 October1998 ,pp.229‐240.
42
1. ITALY’S PARTICIPATION IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: FIGHTER AIRCRAFT’S ROLE
ofresentmentamongtheKosovarpopulation.Intheend,SerbianPresi‐
dent Slobodan Milosevic suspended in 1990 the constitutional amend‐
mentwhichhadgivenKosovoequalautonomywiththeotherrepublics
inYugoslavia.
SkirmishesbetweentheKosovoLiberationArmy KLA andtheSer‐
bian troops began in 1996, although an open civil war erupted only in
1998, after the killing of 56 Albanians in the village of Prezak, in the
Drenicaregion.45Theviolentescalationoftheconflictmountedconcern
intheinternationalcommunity,whichsoughttoregulateitbyimposing
sanctions and an arms embargo on Serbia.46 The US made Milosevic
agreeonaceasefireinOctober1998,butthesituationcrashedsoonand,
after the massacre of 45 civilians in Racak, the ceasefire was dead and
gone.47InJanuary1999,aconferencewasheldatChâteaudeRambouil‐
let France by the Contact Group US, Russia, UK, France, Italy and
Germany withthepurposeofsittingKosovarandSerbstogetheratthe
same table to negotiate a solution to the dispute. After fifteen days of
consultation,theKosovaracceptedthefinalsettlementproposedbythe
ContactGroup.However,sinceNATOwouldhaveenjoyedfreeaccessto
the entire territory of Serbia during the implementation, the Serbian
governmentdecidednottosigntheagreement.
Afterthefailureofdiplomatictalks,NATOdecidedtointervenemili‐
tarilyintheconflict,inspiteoftheabsenceofanadhocauthorizationby
theUNSC.Kosovo’saircampaign,namelyOperationAlliedForce,began
onMarch24andconsistedof78daysofintensebombing.Accordingto
NATO, the air campaign was launched “to halt the humanitarian catas‐
trophethatwasthenunfoldinginKosovo.Thedecisiontointervenefol‐
lowedmorethanayearoffightingwithintheprovinceandthefailureof
international efforts to resolve the conflict by diplomatic means.”48 In
doingso,NATOmeantalsotoavoidthedestabilizationofSouthEastern
45 Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Serbia Yugoslavia , http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gp
database/gpcountry.php?id 171.
46Ibid.
47HowardClark,CivilResistanceinKosovo,LondonandSterling,PlutoPress,2000.
48 NATO, The Kosovo Air Campaign, 5 March 2012, http://www.nato.int/cps/el/
natolive/topics_49602.htm.
43
THE ROLE OF ITALIAN FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: TRENDS AND NEEDS
Europe and stop the displacement of refugees in neighbouring coun‐
tries. Finally, the credibility of the Alliance was at stake too, once the
threatoftheuseofforcehadbeenwavedduringtheentirenegotiation
process. These goals were developed into a military strategy which
aimedtoforcetheSerbianforcesoutofKosovo,tostoptherepression
of the Kosovars and to minimize Western casualties and the loss of
friendlyaircraft.49Inthefirstdaysofthewar,NATOconcentrateditsef‐
fort in destroying Serbian air defense system. Nonetheless, after ten
daysofaircampaign,resultswerefarfrombeingenthusiastic,asSerbi‐
andefenceshadnotbeenseriouslydamagedbyNATO’smissilesandMi‐
losevicdidnotappeartobemorewillingtonegotiate.50Atthebeginning
ofApril,NATOdecidedtomodifyitsstrategyandstartedtotargetSer‐
bian economic and strategic lines of communication and to cut off its
energy supplies. Furthermore, NATO began to cooperate with KLA
troops on the ground to challenge the Serbs directly in Kosovo.51 This
change in strategy brought the expected results, as “costs associated
withintensedailybombingeffortsandthegradualaccrualofcostsover
time”52 forced Milosevic to accept the final settlement. Besides the air
campaign,themediation rolebytheinternationalcommunity wasalso
essentialtoterminatetheconflict,53asmilitaryactionanddiplomaticef‐
forts were strictly intertwined. The civil war officially terminated in
June 1999, following the Military Technical Agreement between NATO
and Serbia 9 June 1999 and the UN Security Council resolution
1244/1999. Since 1999, the NATO Kosovo force KFOR has been de‐
ployedinKosovowithpeace‐keepingandstabilizationpurposes,backed
49DanielL.BymanandMatthewC.Waxman,“KosovoandtheGreatAir Power De‐
bate”, in International Security, Vol. 24, No. 4 Spring 2000 , pp. 5‐38, http://belfer‐
center.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/428; Susan H. Allen and Tiffany Vincent, “Bombing
toBargain?TheAirWarfor Kosovo”,in ForeignPolicyAnalysis,Vol.7,No.1 January
2011 ,pp.1‐26.
50IISS,“NATO’scampaigninYugoslavia”,in StrategicComments,Vol.5,No.3 April
1999 ,pp.1‐4.
51Ibid.
52SusanH.AllenandTiffanyVincent,“BombingtoBargain?…”,cit.
53Ibid.SeealsoEfirdBrianetal.,“NegotiatingPeaceinKosovo”,in InternationalIn‐
teractions,Vol.26,No.2 2000 ,pp.153‐178.
44
1. ITALY’S PARTICIPATION IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: FIGHTER AIRCRAFT’S ROLE
upbyanEUoperation–EULEXKosovo–tosupportthedevelopmentof
theKosovarState’snewinstitutions.
In Operation Allied Force, from 24 March to 10 June 1999, Italy in‐
tervened with approximately 50 aircraft, including F‐104, Tornado,
AMX, and AV‐8B. In particular, Tornado and AMX platforms achieved
1,022sortiesand2,828flighthours,54whereas6AV‐8Bdeployedonthe
Cavour carrier realized 50 sorties for 75 flight hours.55 Overall, the
quantitative and qualitative effort of the Italian forces was highly re‐
garded, as Italy was the third largest contributor of aircraft and the
fourthlargestforthenumberofairsorties,excludingtheUS.56Liketheir
German counterparts, the Italian Tornados, in the Electronic Combat
Reconnaissance ECR version, were “the shooters,”57 generally de‐
ployedinSuppressionofEnemyAirDefenses SEAD missionsandem‐
ployingAGM‐88HighSpeedAnti‐RadiationMissile HARM missilesto
targetSerbianobjectives.Usually,Italianaircrafthadtopenetrateene‐
my air space, locate radars and Surface‐to‐Air Missiles SAM systems
and destroy them. These missions were conducted at night and during
theday,inthehardestmeteorologicalconditions,withtheoverallscope
toachieveairsuperiorityandallowbomberaircrafttohitstrategicob‐
jectivesafterwards.58TheAMXaircraftalsohadanimportantroleintac‐
ticalsupportandbattlefieldAirInterdiction AI .59Althoughperforming
well also in the presence of possible attacks, AMX usually conducted
missionswithinconsistentSerbthreatandabove15,000feetofaltitude.
Departing from the Italian bases of Gioia del Colle and Amendola, Tor‐
nadoandAMXdidnotparticipateinoperationsagainstSerbseconomic
andstrategictargets,suchasenergyplantsandtheBelgradetelevision
station, which raised criticisms about the use of force against non‐
54DataprovidedbytheItalianAirForce’sstatisticaldivision.
55Interviewdated14March2014.
56 John E. Peters et al., European Contributions to Operation Allied Force. Implica‐
tions for Transatlantic Cooperation, Santa Monica, RAND Corporation, 2001, http://
www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1391.html.
57Ibid.
58“50°stormo:GhostWeasel”,inRivistaaeronautica,n.1/2000,pp.35‐47.
59AndreaNativi,“Jugoslavia:unamaratonamilitareperlaNATO”,inRID:Rivistaita‐
lianaDifesa,n.7/1999,pp.26‐33.
45
THE ROLE OF ITALIAN FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: TRENDS AND NEEDS
military targets. Italian fighter carried on missions mainly to obstruct
Serbian military forces threatening the Albanian population in Kosovo.
InrelationtotheNavy’saircraft,ItalianAV‐8Bwereinitiallyexploitedto
protect national maritime units deployed in the Adriatic sea, even
though they were later used in air‐to‐surface engagement operations,
thankstotheirinfraredtargetingtechnologies.60Finally,F‐104alsogave
a contribution to NATO mission, especially in some emergency situa‐
tionswhentheyhadtosubstituteothercountries’aircraft.61
Additionally, other Italian and allies air capabilities were employed
toprotectItaly’snationalterritoryfrompossibleretaliationfromtheSer‐
bianmilitary,i.e.throughmissileorairattacks,byconductingDefensive
CounterAir DCA sortiesontheItalianeasternborder.Actually,Italyhas
been one of the very few NATO members exposed to these risks in the
post‐ColdWarperiod,becauseofitsgeographicalproximitytotheopera‐
tionaltheatre–andparticularlywiththeSerbianmilitarycapabilities.
OPERATIONALLIEDFORCE
Generalinformation(March1999‐June1999)
CoalitionForces62
ChainofCommand
UNSecurityCouncil
Resolution
US(80%),France(6%),UK
(5%),Italy(3%),theNeth‐
erlands(3%),Germany
(2%)
NATO
No
Italiancontribution(March1999‐June1999)
Aircraft63
Sorties
FlightHours
22Tornado,6AMX,6F‐
104ASA,6TornadoIDS,4
TornadoECR/IDS,4F‐104
ASA,6AV‐8B
1,072
2,903
60Interviewdated14March2014.
61Ibid.
62JohnE.Petersetal.,EuropeanContributionstoOperationAlliedForce,cit.
63Ibid.
46
1. ITALY’S PARTICIPATION IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: FIGHTER AIRCRAFT’S ROLE
1.4 AFGHANISTAN (2001-2014)
The terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on 11 September
2001 caused a strong military response by the US administration
headed by George W. Bush, appealing to the right of self‐defence
againsttheperpetrators.Thisright,acknowledgedbyArt.51oftheUN
Chart,waslaterrecognizedandreaffirmedbyresolutions1368/2001
and1373/2001,whichwereissuedbytheUNSCfollowingthemassa‐
cre of the World Trade Center. In particular, resolution 1368/2001
called“onallstatestoStatestoworktogetherurgentlytobringtojus‐
tice the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these terrorist at‐
tacks and stresses that those responsible for aiding, supporting or
harbouring the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these acts
willbeheldaccountable.”64
Operation Enduring Freedom begun on 7 October and took place
primarilyinAfghanistan,wheretheTalibanregimehostedandsupport‐
edAlQaeda,aterroristorganizationledbyOsamaBinLaden.According
toUSintentions,theoperationwasaimedtodestroyAlQaedaterrorist
training camps and infrastructures, capture its leaders and ensure the
cessationofterroristactivitiesinAfghanistan.65Sevencountriesactively
contributedtotheoperation:Australia,Canada,France,Germany,Italy,
NorwayandtheUnitedKingdom,whileseveralothercountriesoffered
theirmilitarycooperationandsupport.66ThroughtheuseofAirPower
andspecialforcesinsupportofAfghanopposition,theUSanditsallies
managed to overthrow the Taliban regime from Kabul and began a
country‐wide counter‐terrorism campaign targeting Al Qaeda affiliated
combatants. In February 2007, the commands of Operation Enduring
64UNSecurityCouncilResolution1368/2001,12September2001,http://www.un.
org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol S/RES/1368 2001 .
65GeorgeW.Bush, AddresstoaJointSessionofCongressandtheAmericanPeople,20
September 2001, http://georgewbush‐whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/
09/20010920‐8.html.
66 Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Grecia, Japan, Jordan, New
Zealand,NorwayPakistan,Poland,Portugal,Romania,Slovakia,Slovenia.USDeptofDe‐
fense‐OfficeofPublicAffairs, InternationalContributionstotheWaragainstTerrorism,
14June2002,http://2001‐2009.state.gov/coalition/cr/fs/12753.htm.
47
THE ROLE OF ITALIAN FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: TRENDS AND NEEDS
Freedom and of International Security Assistance Force ISAF were
unitedunderthesameUScommander.
Following the UN Security Council Resolutions 1378/2001 and
1386/200167ofDecember2001,ISAFwasdeployedinKabultoassistthe
AfghanTransitionalAuthorityinpartnershipwiththeUnitedNationAs‐
sistance Mission in Afghanistan UNAMA . On August 2003, NATO took
over ISAF’s command, and gradually extended the area of operation to
covertheentirecountrybytheendof2006.Indoingso,forthefirsttime
initshistory,NATOactivatedart.5oftheWashingtonTreatyoncollective
defencetoinitiateamilitaryintervention.FiftycountrieshavejoinedIS‐
AF, including members and non‐members of the Atlantic Alliance. Since
2007, the mission has been under American command,68 with the US
providing between two thirds and three quarters of ISAF troops.69 The
strategyandthecharactersofthemission,aswellasthetasksfulfilledby
ISAF,havechangedinthelast13yearsmainlyaccordingtoUSdecisions.
However,theultimategoalofthemissionhassubstantiallyremainedthe
same: to actively support the establishment of a peaceful and stable Af‐
ghanstatethatwillnotprovideanyhelptoAlQaedaoranyotherterror‐
ist groups threateningNATO members.70Political, diplomatic, economic,
military and intelligence efforts have been undertaken to achieve this
goal.Concerningthemilitaryefforts,particularlyfrom2008to2013,ISAF
hasfocusedontwotypesofactivities:ononehand,tocounteranypossi‐
bleTalibaninsurgencybyundertakingcombatoperationsandpatrolac‐
tivities;ontheotherhand,tobuildupAfghannationalsecurityforcesby
trainingandequippingthem.ISAF’smandateisgoingtoexpirebytheend
of 2014, and NATO has already set the deployment of mission Resolute
Support to continue training Afghan security forces without combat
tasks ,whichishoweverexpectedtorelyonlessunitsthanISAF.
67FurtherUNSCResolutionshaverenovatedtheISAFmandateinAfghanistanover
the years: 1413/2002, 1510/2003, 1563/2004, 1623/2005, 1659/2006, 1707/2006,
1444/2006,1746/2007,1817/2008,1890/2009,1917/2010,2041/2012,2069/2012.
68NATO‐ISAF,History,http://www.isaf.nato.int/history.html.
69 NATO‐ISAF, Troop numbers and contributions, updated 1 April 2014, http://
www.isaf.nato.int/troop‐numbers‐and‐contributions/index.php.
70Ibid.
48
1. ITALY’S PARTICIPATION IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: FIGHTER AIRCRAFT’S ROLE
ItalycontributedtoOperationEnduringFreedomfrom18November
2001 to 3 December 2006.71 The Italian Navy sent a task force in the
PersianGulfincludingtheGaribaldiCarrierwiththreesupportfrigates,
fromwhich8AV‐8Bandadozenofcombathelicoptersoperated,witha
total of 1,400 military personnel in theatre.72 In the first phase of the
operation, the Alliance aircraft could not use any terrestrial airport to
start or continue their missions. Indeed, in the meantime diplomatic
agreementswerebeingsignedtoallowWesternaircrafttobedeployed
fromtheregion,tacticalaircraftdeployedoncarriersweretheonlyfea‐
siblesolutiontokeepexecutingmissionsandproduced75%ofground‐
attacksforalongtimesincethemissionhadstarted.Inthisfirstperiod,
aircraftwereaskedtorealize6to8hourslongmissionstoreachobjec‐
tives located up to 1,500 km from the carrier, at night and during the
day.Thishasbeenmadepossiblethankstoair‐to‐airrefuellingfromal‐
lied tankers.73 In this phase, the Garibaldi carriers remained at sea for
87days,without anytechnicallayover,sailingmorethan 20,000 miles
intheIndianOceanandpermittingAV‐8BtooperateintheAfghanthea‐
tre,giventheabsenceofterrestrialsupport.74TheItalianfighteraircraft
fulfilledtaskssuchasairinterdiction,suppressionofenemyairdefence,
CloseAirSupport,airdefence,interceptionofsuspectaircraft,recogni‐
tion,monitoringofseatrafficandcommunicationlines,seainterdiction
and fleet protection.75 During this operation, 328 sorties have been
completed, for a total of 860 flight hours.76 The Italian Navy AV‐8Bs
showed a full interoperability with the rest of the coalition platforms
andcarriedonmissionsin“combinedpackets”withAmericanandEng‐
71ItalianChamberofDeputies‐ResearchService,“LamissioneISAFinAfghanistan”,
in Documentazione e ricerche, No. 20 28 May 2013 , http://documenti.camera.it/leg
17/dossier/Testi/DI0030.htm.
72ItalianSenate,ComunicazionidelGovernosull’impiegodicontingentimilitariitaliani
all’esteroinrelazioneallacrisiinternazionaleinattoeconseguentediscussione,7Novem‐
ber2001,http://www.senato.it/leg/14/BGT/Schede/ProcANL/ProcANLscheda6814.htm.
73Interviewdated14March2014.
74Ibid.
75ItalianSenate, ComunicazionidelGovernosull’impiegodicontingentimilitariita‐
lianiall’estero…,cit.
76Interviewdated14March2014.
49
THE ROLE OF ITALIAN FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: TRENDS AND NEEDS
lishsimilarvehicles.Lateron,theyhavealsooperatedautonomouslyin
groups of 2/4 aircraft, performing CAS and recognition missions with
infraredprecisionmunitionssystems.77
WithrespecttoISAF,Italyhasbeenpartofthemissionsince itsin‐
ceptionandhasincreaseditsmilitarycontributionsfromafewhundred
troopsin2002tonearly4,000in2009,inlinewiththerestofcontribu‐
tions from other NATO members. General Mauro Del Vecchio took
commandofthewholeISAFbetween2005and2006,whileItalyhasled
theRegionalCommandWestsinceitsestablishmentin2006.AsofFeb‐
ruary2014,Italyhad2,165unitsontheground,rankingfourthamong
contributing nations.78 Italian troops have been deployed mainly be‐
tweenKabulandthewesternregion,intheHeratandFarahprovinces.
Concerningaircapabilities,in2007theJointAirTaskForce JATF was
establishedinKabulaspartoftheRegionalCommandWestandtheAir
Component of ISAF. Comprised entirely of Italian personnel, the Task
Force’sfirstaimistocoordinatethoseItalianassetsthatareunderthe
directcontrolofNATOoperations.Theimportanceofthepresenceofair
capabilities in Afghanistan stems from the extension and geography of
theterritory,whichNATOrequiredtoprotectwithanumberofforcesof
alltypes.79Asof2013,JATFwasarticulatedinthreeTaskGroups,each
ofthemhavingdifferentplatformsattheirdisposal:AMX “BlackCats” ,
C‐130JandC‐27JJEDI “Albatros” andPredatorMQ1C “Astore” .80
InNovember2008,followingaNATOrequesttoimproveaerialsur‐
veillanceoftheAfghanterritory,4TornadosleftItalytoreachtheGer‐
manbaseofMazar‐eSharif,establishingthe“TaskGroupDevil.”Torna‐
dosweredeployedtorunIntelligence,SurveillanceandReconnaissance
77In2004eightpilotsfromtheItalianNavyhavebeenawardedoftheUnitedStates
AirMedalfortheirvaluablecontributiontoOperationEnduringFreedom.
78NATO‐ISAF,Troopnumbersandcontributions,cit.
79 Italian Air Force, Operazioni internazionali: Afghanistan 2002 ‐ Joint Air Task
Force JATF , http://www.aeronautica.difesa.it/Operazioni/Internazionali/afghanistan/
Pagine/JointAirTaskForce JATF _ENG.aspx.
80ItalianAirForce, News:Herat:AMXconduconoazionidisicurezza,26September
2013, http://www.aeronautica.difesa.it/News/Pagine/AfghanistangliAMXitalianiporta‐
noatermineloperazioneBallpark_260913.aspx.
50
1. ITALY’S PARTICIPATION IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: FIGHTER AIRCRAFT’S ROLE
ISR activities,81providingonethirdofallphotographicmaterialinthe
digital format among forces responsible for IRS missions and thus be‐
comingthefirstsupplierforthequantityandqualityofthematerialde‐
livered.82Thisresultwaspossiblethankstoanewreconnaissancesys‐
tem, namely the pod RecceLite, able to transfer in real time ISR infor‐
mation to stations on the ground, and to the support of Remotely Pi‐
lotedAerialSystems RPAS ,83suchasthePredatorsMQ1C.Bytheend
ofDecember2009,Tornadosachievedmorethan350sorties,amount‐
ingtoabout900hoursofflightsandcovering800targets.84AMXvehi‐
clesfromthe52ndand31stWingsofAmendolareplacedTornadosin
the same year, arriving in Herat in November to carry out similar ISR
activities.85
Italian AMX aircraft were also involved in operations such as those
named Shrimps Net in August 2012 and Ballpark in September 2013.
During Operation Shrimps Net, Black Cats Task Group conducted 16
missions,eitherTacticalAirReconnaissance TAR orCloseAirSupport
CAS ,totallingmorethan45flighthours.86OperationBallpark,coordi‐
natedandconductedentirelybyJATF,aimedatensuringoptimalsecuri‐
ty conditions against Improvised Explosive Device IED or attacks by
the insurgents along one of the main Afghan highways, the Highway
One.Inthiscontext,AMXreactedagainsthostileforcesoperatingalong
the highway, exploiting images from Predators and information from
81 Gregory Alegi, “Quattro Tornado italiani partiranno lunedì per l’Afghanistan”, in
DedaloNews,19November2008,http://www.dedalonews.it/it/?p 16935.
82 Italian Air Force, Operazioni internazionali: Afghanistan 2002 ‐ Joint Air Task
Force JATF ,cit.
83RPASplatformsarealsoknownasUnmannedAerialVehicles UAV orUnmanned
AerialSystems UAS ,andultimatelywiththename“Drones”.
84ItalianAirForce, News:RientratalabandieradiGuerradel6°Stormo,15Decem‐
ber 2009, http://www.aeronautica.difesa.it/News/Pagine/Rientro_Bandiera_Guerra_
Ghedi.aspx.
85 Italian Air Force, News: Quattro caccia AM‐X giunti ad Herat, 4 November 2009,
http://www.aeronautica.difesa.it/News/Pagine/AM‐X_Herat.aspx.
86 Italian Air Force, News: Conclusa l’operazione ‘Shrimps Net’, 20 August 2012,
http://www.aeronautica.difesa.it/News/Pagine/Conclusal%E2%80%99operazioneShri
mpsNet.aspx.
51
THE ROLE OF ITALIAN FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: TRENDS AND NEEDS
troopsontheground.87Inadditiontotheseoperations,AMXwerealso
employed in more “assertive” type of missions, for instance when they
targetedandhittwocommunicationsystemsusedbyinsurgentsinthe
districtofBakwainDecember2012,88orwhentheydestroyedthreean‐
tennatowersusingGPS‐guidedmissilesintheprovinceofFarahinApril
2013.89UntilMay2013,AMXvehicleshavebeenengagedinmorethan
2,400 sorties in day and night operations, covering 6,300 targets and
photographing several kilometers of the Afghan territory.90 On the
whole,untilDecember2013,Italianfighterhavecontributed3,031sor‐
tiesand8,447flighthourstoISAFmission.91
OPERATIONENDURINGFREEDOM
Generalinformation(2001‐2006)
CoalitionForces
ChainofCommand
UNSecurityCouncil
Resolution
Italy,France,Netherlands,
UK,US
UnitedStates
Yes
Italiancontribution(November2001‐December2006)
Aircraft
Sorties
FlightHours
AV‐8B
328
860
87ItalianAirForce,News:Herat:AMXconduconoazionidisicurezza,cit.
88ItalianAirForce, News: Afghanistan:AMXdistruggonoantennedeiribelli,7July
2012,
http://www.aeronautica.difesa.it/News/Pagine/AMXdell%E2%80%99Aeronauticadistr
uggonodueantennedeiribelli.aspx.
89ItalianAirForce,News:Durocolpoallecomunicazionidegliinsorti,30April2013,
http://www.aeronautica.difesa.it/News/Pagine/Afghanistandurocolpoallecomunicazio
nidegliinsorti_300413.aspx.
90 Italian Air Force, News: Afghanistan: 7000 ore di volo per gli AMX, 6 May 2013,
http://www.aeronautica.difesa.it/News/Pagine/ContinualaserieditraguardioperativiRC
W.aspx.
91DataprovidedbytheItalianAirForce’sstatisticaldivision.
52
1. ITALY’S PARTICIPATION IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: FIGHTER AIRCRAFT’S ROLE
OPERATIONISAF
Generalinformation(2001‐ongoing)
CoalitionForces
ChainofCommand
UNSecurityCouncil
Resolution
Italy,Germany,France,The
Netherlands,UK,US92
NATO
Yes
Italiancontribution(2002‐ongoing)
Aircraft
Sorties
FlightHours
Tornado,AMX
3,031
8,477
1.5 LIBYA (2011)
The reasons that led some NATO countries to plan and conduct a pro‐
longedaircampaigninLibyain2011arestillacontentiousissueandan
object of studies and analysis by experts and jurists.93 France, the UK
andtheUShadaleadingpoliticalroletoinitiatethemilitaryoperation,
notwithstanding their different perspectives and political intents. The
US military effort certainly was indispensable to launch the multina‐
tionaloperationandconductthefirstphaseofthecampaigninLibya.In
thewarmupoftheoperations,13morenationsdecidedtojointhecoa‐
lition,thoughsomeofthem–includingItaly94–wereparticularlyscep‐
ticalaboutitslong‐termimplicationsonLibya’sstability.95Althoughthe
time is not yet sufficiently ripe to draw final considerations, it seems
92Since2001around50countriescontributedtothemission.Butonlyfewcountries
providedaircapabilitiesrelevantforthefocusofthisstudy.Formoreinformationsee
NATO‐ISAF,Troopnumbersandcontributions,cit.
93See,amongothers,NatalinoRonzitti,“NATO’sInterventioninLibya:AGenuineAc‐
tion to Protect a Civilian PopulationinMortalDangeror anInterventionAimedatRe‐
gimeChange?”,inTheItalianYearbookofInternationalLaw,Vol.21,2011,pp.3‐21.
94“Libia:il“Colle”sostieneibombardamenti.Berlusconi:‘con laLegaètuttoapo‐
sto’”, in Corriere della Sera, 26 November 2011, http://www.corriere.it/politica/11_
aprile_26/napolitano‐libia‐frattini_a17bffc4‐6fea‐11e0‐9dd7‐595a41612a44.shtml.
95IanBlack,“ConcernedneighbourswarnagainstforeigninterventioninLibya”,in
TheGuardian,2March2011,http://gu.com/p/2nfan/tw.
53
THE ROLE OF ITALIAN FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: TRENDS AND NEEDS
thatthehumanitarianrationale,whichhascharacterizedtheinitiativeat
the UN Security Council level, was an important factor, especially in
termsoflegitimacyintheeyesofthepublicopinion.Howeverthiswas
not the unique element, and maybe not even the most important one,
explainingthemilitaryintervention.96
Officially, the military operations were undertaken in response to
eventsoccurredduringtheLibyanrebellion,whichcameinthecontext
of a wider unrest in the Middle East and North Africa. The insurgency
started after a series of protests and revolts against the regime of
Muammar Gaddafi in February 2011, partly inspired by the uprisings
that brought down the governments of Libya’s neighbours, Egypt and
Tunisia.Theprotests,particularlyintheBenghaziarea,escalatedintoan
armed rebellion that spread across the country with the objective to
overthrowtheincumbentgovernment.
This situation caused the reaction of the UN Security Council on 26
February, which passed an initial resolution establishing an arms em‐
bargo, asset freeze and travel ban against Gaddafi and other high‐level
members of the regime, while also referring the matter to the Interna‐
tionalCriminalCourtforfurtherinvestigation.97On17 March2011,the
UNSC adopted resolution 1973, which authorized the use of force, in‐
cludingtheestablishmentofaNFZ,toprotectciviliansandareastarget‐
edbytheGaddafiloyalistforces.98
With respect to the military intervention, the UNSC Resolution
1973/2011:

AuthorizedMemberStates,actingnationallyorthroughregional
organizations or arrangements, to take all necessary measures
to protect civilians and related populated areas under attack,
including Benghazi. The resolution specifically excluded the
establishmentofaforeignforceoranyotherforminanypartof
theLibyanterritory.
96MarioArpino,“L’ItalianelleoperazioniinLibia”,in AffarInternazionali,6Decem‐
ber2011,http://www.affarinternazionali.it/articolo.asp?ID 1925.
97 Resolution 1970/2011, 26 February 2011, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/
view_doc.asp?symbol S/RES/1970 2011 .
98 Resolution 1973/2011, 17 March 2011, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_
doc.asp?symbol S/RES/1973 2011 .
54
1. ITALY’S PARTICIPATION IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: FIGHTER AIRCRAFT’S ROLE



Called Members States of the Arab League to cooperate in the
implementationoftheestablishedmeasures.
Authorized the establishment of a NFZ in Libyan airspace. That
flight ban would not apply to flights that had as their sole
purposehumanitarianaid,theevacuationofforeignnationals,to
enforcingthebanor“otherpurposesdeemednecessaryforthe
benefitoftheLibyanpeople.”
Authorized Member States to take all necessary measures to
enforcecompliancewiththebanonflightsimposed.
InordertoimplementtheUNSCResolution1973,on19MarchaUS‐led
operation, named Operation Odyssey Dawn, started with French and
Britishsupport.Thegoalwastwofold:1 preventingfurtherattacksby
loyalist forces on Libyan citizens and opposition groups, especially in
andaroundBenghazi;2 degradingtheloyalistforces’capabilitytore‐
sisttheNFZauthorizedbytheUNSCresolution.99Inthemeanwhile,po‐
liticalnegotiationsstartedtoshifttheoperationfroma“Coalitionofthe
Willing” to a NATO integrated military command. On 23 March, NATO
assumed command of military operations to enforce the UN arms em‐
bargo. The transfer of command responsibility for the NFZ was agreed
on24 March,whilethedecisiontotransfercommandandcontrolforall
militaryoperationsin Libyawastakenon27 March.Asaresult,NATO
formallyassumedtheresponsibilityofthere‐namedOperationUnified
Protector on 31 March 2011. Operation Unified Protector ended on 31
October2011,afterthecollapseoftheloyalistforcesandLibyanincum‐
bentgovernment.100Asof2013,neitherNATO,norEUstabilizationmis‐
siononthegroundhasfollowedtheaircampaign.
Italy’scontributiontooperationsinLibyahasbeenthree‐fold.First,
in a chronological order, the Italian Navy, including the Navy Aviation,
led NATO naval operation to enforce the UN arms embargo, including
99USDeptofDefense, DoDNewsBriefingbyViceAdm.GortneyfromthePentagonon
Lybia Operation Odyssey Dawn, 19 March 2011, http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/
transcript.aspx?transcriptid 4786.
100 Italian Air Force, News: Task Group Air di Trapani Birgi, 31 August 2011,
http://www.aeronautica.difesa.it/News/Pagine/Raggiuntidueimportantitraguardiperil
TaskGroupAirBirgi_310811.aspx.
55
THE ROLE OF ITALIAN FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: TRENDS AND NEEDS
operationsinLibyancoastalwaterssubjecttomilitarythreatsfromloy‐
alistforces.
Second,theuseofmilitarybasesontheItalianterritorywascrucial
tocarryontheairoperation,whichcouldnothavebeenpossiblewith‐
outsuchlargefootprintclosetotheoperationaltheatre.Asithappened
duringNATOmissionsintheWesternBalkans,thisimpliedtheriskof
retaliationbytheLibyanloyalistforcesagainstItaly,asitwasagainone
ofthefewNATOmembersgeographicallyclosetotheoperationalthea‐
tre.ItalsoimpliedasignificantItalianeffortintermsofmanpowerand
economic resources. The Italian air bases involved in military opera‐
tionswereAviano,Amendola,Decimomannu,GioiadelColle,Panteller‐
ia, Sigonella, and Trapani. Overall, 4,800 military personnel have been
committed to provide a set of activities and services, from air traffic’s
controltotechnicalassistanceontheground.Inparticular,Trapanimil‐
itarybasishosted14%ofthetotalcoalitionsorties.Italy’salsoprovid‐
ed the operation with “operational planners,” as they contributed to
NATO command and control structure at all levels. Moreover, Italy
hostedtheJointForceCommand JFC inNaples,whilecontributingat
thetacticallevelwiththeCombinedAirOperationCentre5 COAC in
PoggioRenatico.
Third,giventhefocusofthisstudy,itisparticularlyimportanttolook
aftertheactiveparticipationofItalianaircapabilitiestobothOperation
OdysseyDawnandthenOperationUnifiedProtector.Overall,Italianair‐
craftconductedabout7%ofthetotalAlliedmissionsinLibyanskies,ac‐
countingforthelargestItalianAirForceoperationafterWorldWarII.101
The bulk of committed Italian air capabilities were fighter aircraft in‐
cludingF‐16,Eurofighter,TornadoandAMXbasedinTrapaniunderthe
Birgi Air Task Group, as well as AV‐8B deployed on the Italian carrier
Garibaldi.TankerssuchasKC‐130JandKC‐767AaswellasPredatorsB
contributedtotheairpackages.102
Italianfighteraircraftexecuteddifferenttypesofmissions,including:
101 Italian Air Force, Operazioni Internazionali, Libia 2011 , http://www.aero‐
nautica.difesa.it/Operazioni/Internazionali/Pagine/Libia 2011 _eng.aspx.
102Ibid.
56
1. ITALY’S PARTICIPATION IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: FIGHTER AIRCRAFT’S ROLE
a
b
c
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses SEAD . The Italian Air
Forcewastheonlyairforce togetherwiththeAmericanone to
carry out this type of mission, employing Tornados ECR from
Piacenza Airbase’s 50th Wing. These aircraft are equipped with
particularsystemsabletolocateairdefenceradaremissionsand
to neutralize them by delivering air‐to‐surface AGM‐88 HARM
missiles. These activities coerce opponents to deactivate their
systems and allow friendly forces to enter the zone of the
operationstoconducttheirownmissionwithoutthepossibility
ofbeinghitbytheenemy.103DuringSEADoperations,Tornados
operateas“FirstInLastOut,”astheymustbethefirstaircraftto
reach the centre of gravity and the last to leave in order to
protect friendly forces from the beginning until the end of the
mission.104
DefensiveCounterAir DCA .DCAactivitiesconsistofpatroland
air defence operations, which were performed by F‐16 fighter
aircraft from the 37th Wing and Eurofighters from the 4th and
36th Wings. In particular, F‐16 and Eurofighters were deployed
in support of NFZ over Libya to defend Allied aircraft from air
and ground attacks, as well as to maintain air superiority.105
Moreover,Eurofighterswereemployedtosafeguard“HighValue
Airborne Assets,” hence to escort tactical aircraft deployed in
particularmissions.106
Offensive Counter Air OCA and Strike Coordination And
Reconnaissance SCAR . The OCA envisaged air‐to‐surface
attacks on prearranged ground targets, while SCAR aimed at
“dynamic” targets in areas with high concentration of enemy
103Ibid.
104 Italian Air Force, News: Unified protector: le capacità di attacco dell’AM, 6 June
2011, http://www.aeronautica.difesa.it/News/Pagine/UnifiedProtectorlecapacit%C3%A0
diattaccodell%E2%80%99AeronauticaMilitare_060611.aspx.
105Ibid.
106 Italian Air Force, News: Unified Protector: 1000 ore di volo per l’Eurofighter, 15
June 2011, http://www.aeronautica.difesa.it/News/Pagine/operazioneunifiedprotectorl
%E2%80%99f2000%E2%80%9Ctyphoon%E2%80%9Draggiungele1000oredivolo.aspx.
57
THE ROLE OF ITALIAN FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: TRENDS AND NEEDS
d
assets.Thesetypeofmissions,withasubstantialcontributionof
AV‐8B,wereledbothbyTornadoIDSfromthe6thWingandAMX
fromthe32ndand51stWings.AlltargetswereassignedbyNATO,
afterverificationofcompliancetotheguidelinesestablishedby
the political authority. Italian fighter launched more than 550
GPSandlaserguidedmissiles,includingGBU‐12,16,24,32,38,
48, EGBU‐24, and long range Storm Shadow cruise missile,
havinga96%strikeaccuracy.107
Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance ISR . These missions
were conducted by Tornado IDS initially, then by AMX fighter
andAV‐8BwiththesupportofRPASsuchasPredatorsB.During
these missions, Italian aircraft were tasked to acquire the
necessary information on the ground to be used during air
operations. In particular, Italian forces exploited the RecceLite
electronic pods technology employed on Tornado and AMX to
realizemorethan340,000high‐resolutionpictures,whichwere
crucialforintelligenceactivities.108
ItalianAirforcefighterconductedoverall1,695sortiesand6,254flight
hours.109Missionsweredistributedaccordingtothefollowingpercent‐
ages:DCA38%,ISR23%,OCA14%,SEAD8%,SCAR5%.110The8AV‐8B
of the Navy carried out first DCA missions and OCA later, resulting in
418sortiesand1,001flighthours.111OperatingfromtheGaribaldicar‐
rier,AV‐8Bwerebasedatasafetydistanceof100milesfromtheLibyan
shores,butclosertoaircraftoperatingfromItalianlandbasesandthus
workingalsowithoutair‐to‐airrefuelling.Overall,fighteraircraftofthe
ItalianArmyperformed2,113sortiesfor7,255flighthours.112
107Ibid.
108Ibid.
109DataprovidedbytheItalianAirForce’sstatisticaldivision.
110ItalianAirForce,Operazioniinternazionali:Libia
2011 ,cit.
111Interviewdated14March2014.
112DataprovidedbytheItalianAirForce’sstatisticaldivision.
58
1. ITALY’S PARTICIPATION IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: FIGHTER AIRCRAFT’S ROLE
OPERATIONUNIFIEDPROTECTOR
Generalinformation(March2011‐October2011)
CoalitionForces113
ChainofCommand
UNSecurityCouncil
Resolution
US(27%),France(21%),
UK(11%),Italy(7%),Can‐
ada,Denmark,UnitedArab
Emirates,Turkey,Qatar,
Sweden,Belgium,Spain,
TheNetherlands,Norway,
Jordan,Greece
NATO
Yes
Italiancontribution (March2011‐October2011)
Aircraft
Sorties
FlightHours
F‐16,Eurofighter,AV‐8B,
Tornado,AMX
2,113
7,255
1.6 THE ROLE OF ITALIAN FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN CRISIS
MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS
In the last 24 years, Italian fighter have been deployed in different cir‐
cumstances:inaninterstatewarlikeintheGulfwar,incivilconflictslike
inBosnia‐Herzegovina,KosovoandLibyaandinafailedstatewithsome
typicalconnotationsofinsurgencyandcivilwarlikeinAfghanistan.
Considering the aforementioned 10 air operations,114 Italy has de‐
ployed its aircraft 90% following a UN Security Council resolution and
80% under NATO framework. This insight shows not only Italy’s deep
integrationandcommitmenttothoseorganizations,butalsothestrong
influence of a globalized international system which requires the man‐
agement of international crisis by the whole international community.
113 Italian Air Force, Operazioni internazionali: Libia 2011 , cit.; Mario Arpino,
“L’ItalianelleoperazioniinLibia”,cit.
114 Desert Storm, Deny Flight, Sharp Guard, Deliberate Force, Decisive Endeavour,
DeliberateGuard,AlliedForce,EnduringFreedom,UnifiedProtector,andInternational
SecurityAssistanceForce ISAF .
59
THE ROLE OF ITALIAN FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: TRENDS AND NEEDS
Indeed, Italy has devoted to international missions approximately 100
fighter aircraft, performed more than 13,000 sorties and flied around
36,000hoursinoperations.
Italy’s operational participation in missions abroad has grown in
qualitativeandquantitativetermsoverthelast24years.Startingfroma
minor althoughimportantcontributiontoOperationDesertStorm,Ita‐
ly’sposturewasraisedinBosnia‐Herzegovina,KosovoandAfghanistan
later. Finally, it increased substantially in the latest operation in Libya,
where it conducted 7% of NATO air sorties and provided the Alliance
withcrucialcommandandcontrolactivities,aswellaslogisticfootprint.
Hence, and despite an economic situation which has left little room of
manoeuvringforforeignpolicyconsiderations,Italyhasnotrenounced
to deal with important security issues – although events and interna‐
tionalconstraintsseemtohaveshapedItalianinterventionsmorethana
clearnationalstrategy.
Intheend,Italianfighteraircrafthaveprovedtheirgreatversatility,
performingawidevarietyoftasksindifferentconditionsandregionsof
theworld.TheFirstGulfWarepitomizedseveralshortfallsandgaps,for
example in terms of technologies, which have been successfully ad‐
dressed in the following two decades. In particular, Italian Air Force
pursued an improvement of Precision Guided Munitions PGM , Elec‐
tronic Warfare Systems EWS , Air‐to‐Air Refuelling AAR , infrared
sensors, weapons systems like AARM missiles, night vision, radio and
communication systems up to Link 16.115 In Kosovo, and then in Libya
even more, the progress achieved by Italian air capabilities have been
proven by the increased quality and quantity of its allocated contribu‐
tionstocrisismanagementoperations.Thishasbeenepitomizedbythe
factthatItalianAirForcehasbeentheonlyEuropeanpower,asidefrom
theAmericans,tohaveconductedSEADmissionsinLibya,116andthatit
has been one of the most effective suppliers of photographic material
provided in ISR activities in Afghanistan.117 The Italian Navy has also
115Interviewdated11December2013.
116ItalianAirForce,Operazioniinternazionali:Libia
2011 ,cit.
2002 ‐ Joint Air Task
117 Italian Air Force, Operazioni internazionali: Afghanistan
Force JATF ,cit.
60
1. ITALY’S PARTICIPATION IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: FIGHTER AIRCRAFT’S ROLE
soughttoimproveandupgradeitsaero‐tacticalcomponent,forinstance
thanks to the acquisition of the POD Litening II, in order to acquire an
autonomoustargetingcapacity,whosebenefitshavebeenevidenttoIta‐
lyanditsalliesinthecontextofOperationEnduringFreedom.118
Table1.InternationalMissions(1990‐2013):anoverview
Operation
CoalitionForces
Chainof
Command
UNSecurity
Council
Resolution
DesertStorm
1990‐1991 US,UK,SaudiArabia,Kuwait,France,
Italy,Bahrain
United
States
Yes
DenyFlight
1993‐1995 Belgium,Canada,Denmark,France,
Germany,Italy,theNetherlands,
Norway,Spain,Turkey,UK,US
NATO
Yes
SharpGuard
1993‐1996 Belgium,Canada,Denmark,France,
Germany,Greece,Italy,theNether‐
lands,Norway,Portugal,Spain,
Turkey,UK,US
NATO
Yes
DeliberateForce
1995 US 65.9% ,UK 9.3% France
8.1% ,theNetherlands 5.6% ,
Spain 3.4% ,NATO,NAEW 2.7% ,
Turkey 2.2% ,Germany 1.7% ,
Italy 1%
NATO
Yes
DecisiveEndeavour Belgium,Canada,Denmark,France,
1995‐1996 Germany,Italy,theNetherlands,
Norway,Spain,Turkey,UK,US
NATO
Yes
DeliberateGuard
1996‐1998 Belgium,Canada,Denmark,France,
Germany,Italy,theNetherlands,
Norway,Spain,Turkey,UK,US
NATO
Yes
AlliedForce
1999 US 80% ,France 6% ,UK 5% ,
Italy 3% ,Netherlands 3% ,
Germany 2%
NATO
No
EnduringFreedom US,UK,Italy,France,theNetherlands
2001‐2006 United
States
Yes
ISAF
2001‐2014 US,UK,Italy,Germany,France,
theNetherlands,Canada
NATO
Yes
UnifiedProtector
2011 US 27% ,France 21% ,UK 11% ,
Italy 7% ,Canada,Denmark,United
ArabEmirates,Turkey,Qatar,Swe‐
den,Belgium,Spain,theNetherlands,
Norway,Jordan,Greece
NATO
Yes
118Interviewdated14March2014.
61
THE ROLE OF ITALIAN FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: TRENDS AND NEEDS
Table2.Italiancontributiontointernationalmissions(1990‐2013)
Operations
Aircraft
Sorties
Flying
hours
DesertStorm
8Tornado
2,326
4,503
DenyFlight
4Tornado,4AMX
543
1,288
SharpGuard
8Tornado
230
267
DeliberateForce
8Tornado,6AMX,AV‐8B
26
41
DecisiveEndeavour
Tornado,AMX
1,250
3,150
DeliberateGuard
Tornado,AMX
2,974
7,227
AlliedForce
22TornadosECR/IDS,6AMX,
6F‐104ASA,6TornadoIDS,
4TornadoECR/IDS,4F‐104ASA
1,072
2,903
EnduringFreedom
AV‐8B
328
860
ISAF
4Tornado,4AMX,
AV‐8B
3,031
8,477
UnifiedProtector
F‐16,Eurofighter,Tornado,AMX,
AV‐8B
2,113
7,255
64Tornado,20AMX,6F‐104,F‐16,
AV‐8B,Eurofighter
13,893
35,971
Total
62
1. ITALY’S PARTICIPATION IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: FIGHTER AIRCRAFT’S ROLE
63
2.
Current and future air operations:
doctrine and trends
Italy’suseoffighteraircraftinthepost‐ColdWarperiodhasgonehand
inhandwithdevelopmentsinAirPowerdoctrine.Thischapteroutlines
doctrine’s fundamentals and trends stemming from the recent opera‐
tional experience,1 in order to understand current and possible future
waystoutilizeaircapabilitiesincludingfighteraircraft.
2.1 AIR POWER: DOCTRINE’S FUNDAMENTALS
Intheory,AirPowerdoctrineevolvesbyconsideringbestpracticesre‐
sultingfromoperationalexperiences,aswellasinnovationsintechnical
andconceptualterms,andbyradicalchangesoccurringintheinterna‐
tionalsystem.2
1 This chapter partly draws from the extensive work conducted by IAI, Fondation
pour la Recherche Stratégique FRS and Royal Aeronautical Society RAeS , in 2012
within the IAI‐led research project “Landscaping – Identifying the mismatch between
requirementsandplannedcapabilities:AirOperations”.
2Formoredetailedinformationseealso:NATOAlliedJointPublication, JointAirand
Space Operations Doctrine, 2002; NATO Allied Joint Publication, Joint Operations Doc‐
trine, 2010; Christopher Harper, “Challenges for NATO Air & Space Power”, in JAPCC
Journal, No. 14 Autumn 2011 , pp. 33‐37, http://www.japcc.org/publications/journal/
Journal/20111014_‐_Journal_Ed‐14_web.pdf; EU Military Staff,DraftconceptforAirOp‐
erationsinsupportoftheEUCSDP,2011;USAirForce, AirForceBasicDoctrine,Organi‐
zationandCommand.AirForceDoctrineDocument1,14October2011,http://www.au.
af.mil/au/cadre/aspc/l002/pubs/afdd1.pdf; Denis Mercier, “Thinking about Air and
Space Power in 2025: Five Guiding Principles”, in Air & Space Power Journal, Vol. 26,
No.3 May‐June2012 ,pp.16‐30;JohnD.Jogerst,“AirpowerTrends2010:TheFutureis
65
THE ROLE OF ITALIAN FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: TRENDS AND NEEDS
AirPowerisdefinedasthecapacitytoprojectpowerfromtheairto
influencethebehaviourofpeopleorthecourseofevents.Itisanessen‐
tialelementinalmostallmilitaryoperations,whichexploitsallaspects
oftheEarth’satmospheresuchasheightandreachoverbothlandand
sea. These key characteristics, coupled with increasingly capable tech‐
nology, makes Air Power a flexible, rapid, 24/7 available tool to influ‐
ence the operating environment – thus ensuring Air Power’s “virtual
presence” throughout the entire operation, thanks to its extreme de‐
ployability.Asaresult,AirPowercanbeconsideredasamultiplierforce
fordeployedlandandmaritimemilitaryforces.
Furthermore, the utilization of air capabilities is not limited to any
particularkindofoperation,asAirPower’skeycharacteristicspermitto
achieve strategic, operational or tactical results, in a joint or separate
fashion,rangingfromdiplomaticwarningstotheactualuseofforce.The
flexibility,reachandabilitytoconcentrateforcemakeAirPowerableto
concurrentlyconductorsupportdifferentlinesofoperationagainstdif‐
ferent targets. Moreover, Air Power can be switched from one role or
objective to another, within or between operational theatres. Conse‐
quently, it can be rapidly adapted to meet evolving operational re‐
quirements. In addition, Air Power provides the means to take ad‐
vantageofbothfriendlystrengthsandopponentweaknesses.Infact,it
maydirectsymmetricalactionswheretheopposingforcesandfriendly
forces aresimilar,i.e.airdefenceversusairattack,orit may utilizeits
strengthsagainsttheopponent’svulnerabilities,forexamplebyattack‐
ing Command and Control C2 architecture and/or critical infrastruc‐
turessuchasenergygrids.
AlthoughbeingpredominantlydeliveredbyAirForce,AirPoweralso
includes aerial capabilities provided by other services, even by civilian
aviation.Atthesametime,AirPowerismadenotonlybyplatformsand
weaponsystems,butitcruciallyreliesontrainedpersonnel,aswellas
Closer Than You Think”, in Air & Space Power Journal, Vol. 23, No. 2 Summer 2009 ,
pp. 101‐102, http://faculty.nps.edu/nlmiller/docs/sum09.pdf; Basilio Di Martino, “Air
PowerandTechnology:ATentativeApproachtotheYear2025andBeyond”,inRUSIDe‐
fence Systems, 23 June 2010, pp. 56‐60, https://www.rusi.org/publications/defence‐
systems/ref:A4C221670ABFA3.
66
2. CURRENT AND FUTURE AIR OPERATIONS: DOCTRINE AND TRENDS
oninfrastructurestooperatefrom,andsparepartsvitaltomaintainits
useeffectivelyandefficiently.
Overall,itispossibletoidentifyfourmainrolesinwhichAirPower
finds its concrete application: Control of the Air; Intelligence, Surveil‐
lance, Target Acquisition, Reconnaissance ISTAR ; Engagement; Air
Mobility. The first three roles are particularly relevant in relation to
fighteraircraft.
AchievingControloftheAirmeanshavingthefreedomtouseaspe‐
cific volume of airspace within a given period of time for its own pur‐
poses,while,ifnecessary,denyingitsusetoothers.3Thiscontrolisab‐
soluteincaseofAirSupremacy.InthecaseofAirSuperiority,itrather
impliesthedegreeofdominanceintheairbattle‐spacethatpermitsto
conductmilitaryoperationsatanygiventime,withoutprohibitiveinter‐
ferencebyopposingair forces.AirParityisthelowestlevelofcontrol,
meaningcontroloftheskiesonlyin the airspaceabove friendlytroop
positions.Vice‐versa,AirDenialismaintainingalevelofoperationsthat,
althoughconcedingAirSuperioritytotheopponent,preventstheenemy
toachieveAirSupremacy.OperationstoachieveControloftheAirmay
beoffensive OffensiveCounter‐Air and/ordefensive DefensiveCoun‐
ter‐Air, which includes air and missile defence . Offensive Counter Air
OperationsaimtoobtainControloftheAirbydestroying,degradingor
disrupting the air capabilities of the adversary that is Suppression of
Enemy Air Defenses SEAD . Defensive Counter‐Air DCA consists of
active and passive actions aimed to protect friendly forces and non‐
combatantpersonnelintheatre.
ISTARmissionscontributetoallintelligenceproductsbysupporting
planning activities and decision making of all air operations’ phases.
They improve the ability to gain and maintain information superiority,
andaimtoachieveSituationalAwareness SA thatishavingafullcom‐
prehension of the operational situation in theatre. For example, ISTAR
air capabilities are, together with space Earth Observation EO sys‐
tems,themainimageryintelligenceprovider.Bycombininghighsensor
3OneofthefirstandmostimportantauthorstheorizingtheimportanceoftheCon‐
troloftheAirdoctrinehasbeentheItalianGiulioDouhetinhisstudyIldominiodell’aria
TheAirSupremacy ,publishedin1921.
67
THE ROLE OF ITALIAN FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: TRENDS AND NEEDS
imagery,hype‐spectralsensorsandall‐weatherradarsensors,aircapa‐
bilitiesovercomethelackofpersistenceexperiencedforexamplebyob‐
servation satellites. Air capabilities also complement naval and land
fixed and mobile sensors by providing stand‐off interception of high‐
frequencysignalseitherforcommunicationintelligenceorforelectronic
intelligence.
IntermsofEngagement,AirPowerroleincludes:deepattack,ground
attack,andinformationoperations.4Deepattackisaimedatdisrupting
or destroying vital targets such as C2 infrastructures, industries of de‐
fence, command and control elements, war production resources, de‐
ployedforcesorkeysupportinginfrastructures.Inparticular,adeepat‐
tackseekstodisruptanenemy’sstrategyandabilityorwilltowagewar.
Groundattacksoperationsintendtoachieveandmaintainaspecificde‐
gree of control of the battlefield by targeting enemy ground forces
and/or infrastructures supporting them, or by using air psychological
effects. These operations are subdivided in Air Interdiction AI and
CloseAirSupport CAS .AIencompassesairoperationswhichaffecten‐
emy potential before it can retaliate against friendly surface forces,
whileCASimpliesEngagementinsupportoflandforcesalready facing
theiropponents.Similarly,withcounter‐seaoperations,suchasforex‐
ample Anti‐Surface Warfare ASUW , Anti‐Submarine Warfare ASW andAerialMining,theobjectiveistoattainandmaintainthedesiredde‐
greeofmaritimesuperioritybythedestruction,disruption,delay,diver‐
sion, or other neutralization of threats in the maritime environment.5
Finally,InformationOperationsarenon‐kinetic measures,6takentoin‐
fluence,affectordefendinformation,systemsanddecision‐makingpro‐
cess.Amongtheso‐calledInformationOperations,ElectronicWarfareis
oneofthemostextensivelycarriedoutanditseekstocontroltheelec‐
4 UK Ministry of Defence, British Air and Space Power Doctrine AP 3000 , 4th ed.,
2009, http://www.raf.mod.uk/rafcms/mediafiles/9E435312_5056_A318_A88F14CF6F4
FC6CE.pdf.
5USAirForce, CounterseaOperations.AirForceDoctrineDocument3‐04,26Octo‐
ber2010,https://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/usaf/afdd3‐04.pdf.
6Ingeneral,theterm“non‐kinetic”referstotheabilitytocreateeffectsthatdonotrely
on explosives or physical momentum e.g., directed energy, computer viruses/hacking,
etc .
68
2. CURRENT AND FUTURE AIR OPERATIONS: DOCTRINE AND TRENDS
tromagnetic spectrum, both to enable friendly‐force operations and to
denyanenemythesamedegreeoffreedom.ElectronicWarfareisalso
conducted as a part of SEAD kinetic operations aiming to achieve Con‐
troloftheAir.
Finally,theprovisionofAirMobilitypermitsglobal,regionalandlo‐
caldeploymentofmilitaryandcivilianpersonnelandmateriel.Airmo‐
bilityactsasafundamentalenablertomoveandsustainforcesinsever‐
aloperationsanditcanberealizedthroughAir‐to‐AirRefuelling AAR ,
Airlift, Aero‐medical Evacuation, Airborne Operations, Aerial Delivery
andSpecialAirOperations.Intheend,itshouldberemindedthatAirlift
andAAR–necessarytoensureAirMobility–requiretheachievementof
theControloftheAirbyfriendlyforces.
2.2 TRENDS FROM THE RECENT OPERATIONAL
EXPERIENCE
Asmentionedbefore,AirPower’sdoctrinealsotendstoevolvefollow‐
ingpracticesresultingfromoperationalexperience.Inthisperspective,
sometrendsseemtoemergefromairoperationsconductedinthepost‐
ColdWarperiod.
Firstofall,recentmissionsabroadhaveraisedawarenessatthepo‐
litical‐strategiclevelthatcomplexairoperationsrequiretheavailability
ofallaircapabilitiesnecessarytoperformthefourAirPowerroles,and
that air capabilities are more and more interlinked among each other.
Forexample,thepreciseEngagementofaselectedtargetontheground
isthelaststepinachainofactions,whichincludesthepreliminaryCon‐
troloftheAir,ISTARfindingsandtherelatedAirMobility.
Second,ISTARimportancehasincreasedevermoreanditnowrep‐
resents an essential factor in all military operations. An emerged first
key trend is that ISTAR is not provided only by dedicated platforms,
such as RPAS, but by a number of sensors and systems embedded in a
wide and complementary range of air platforms – obviously including
fighteraircraft–aswellassatellites.Anothertrendisthattheprocessof
collection,analysisanddisseminationisincreasinglyimportant.Onthe
one hand, augmented dataflow needs greater capabilities of data man‐
69
THE ROLE OF ITALIAN FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: TRENDS AND NEEDS
agement, processing, storage and sharing. On the other hand, human
analysisisvital:itisworthlesstoincreasethenumberofsensorsandto
make dissemination more rapidly if this is not made compatible with
humanprocessingcapacity.
Third,ControloftheAirshouldnotbetakenforgranted.Airopera‐
tionsin Afghanistanhaveshownpoorlyorganizedortotallyabsent air
defencesystems,butinbothLibya 2011 andKosovo 1999 casesthe
priorityofthefirstdaysofoperationswasstilltoensurecoalition’sCon‐
troloftheAirbydestroyingopponentcommandandcontrol C2 struc‐
tures,mostofitsairdefencefixedsystemsandcombataircraft.There‐
fore, SEAD capability and other survivability issues will demand atten‐
tionandsubstantialinvestments.Thealternativeistoacceptasituation
of Air Superiority or even Air Parity implying significant risk for allied
aircrews. This is particularly true as non‐European powers, including
China and Russia, are investing in air capabilities, and even opponents
lacking advancedcapabilitieswillhavetheabilitytoimperil Controlof
theAirthroughtheuseofshortrangeairdefence–includingMANPort‐
ableAir‐DefenceSystems MANPADS ,whichcancontestControlofthe
Airbelow10,000feet.7
AsfarastheEngagementisconcerned,atrendworthtomentionis
related to the use of Precision Guided Munitions PGM . Their use has
exponentiallygrownsincethefirstGulfWar,whentheyhadbeenintro‐
ducedasasmallpercentageoftheoverallsetofammunition,toairop‐
erations in Libya, where they has been extensively used during the air
campaign roughly 7,600 PGM were fired in seven months . This also
reflectsachangeinthepoliticalandethicalmilieu,whichinfluencesthe
planningandconductofairoperations:thosekindsofengagementthat
couldbeeffective,butmightinvolveacertainnumberofciviliancasual‐
ties–notnecessarilyahighnumberinabsoluteterms–arenotpoliti‐
callyacceptableanymorebyEuropeangovernmentsandpublicopinion.
In the future, the need to attack individual targets accurately will con‐
tinuetobeparamount.
7USDeptofState, AddressingtheChallengeofMANPADSProliferation,2February
2012,http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rm/183097.htm.
70
2. CURRENT AND FUTURE AIR OPERATIONS: DOCTRINE AND TRENDS
ThisissueappliesalsotoCAS.Inthiscontext,AirPowerrepresentsa
strategic advantage but it can become a strategic vulnerability if not
employedwithrestraintandprecisioninoperationswherethesupport
oflocalpopulationiscrucialtosucceed,asanopponentcouldeasilyex‐
ploit collateral damages caused by the use of Air Power. CAS requires
closeair‐landintegration,clearlydefinedproceduresanddetailedinte‐
grationofAirPoweractionswithfiringandmovementbyfriendlyforc‐
es,fortargetingguidanceandtoavoidfratricide.Proceduresarepartic‐
ularlyimportant,butthereisalsoaninteroperabilityissuewithregard
todigitalCAS:differentnationalproceduresandtechnologiesmayham‐
perthisrole–aswellasothers.Inthiscontext,AirPowercontribution,
often in joint missions and to support relatively small and mobile
groundunits,willcontinuetorequireevengreaterall‐weathercapacity,
precision,range,andrapiditywithregardtothesensor‐to‐shootercycle.
Finally,inrelationtoAirMobility,adecisivetrendregardstheissue
of operating at a strategic distance, in particular for European armed
forces. There is a lack of air capabilities able to project Air Power, as
demonstrated by European countries during the operation in Libya,
where the operational theatre was relatively close to the Italian bases.
Each option which has been designed to solve the issue, like more ad‐
vancedfighteraircraft,forwardbases,carriers,AARandstrategicairlift
hasrevealeditsownlimitationssofar.Asaresult,onlyabalancedmix
oftheseoptionscanmitigatesuchadeficiency.
71
3.
Scenarios of possible future air
operations
Thefutureisnotpredictableandthischapterdoesnotaimtodoso.It
ratherpresentstwoscenariosinordertopointouthowaircapabilities,
in particular fighter aircraft, may be used in crisis management opera‐
tionsinthe2015‐2025timeframe.Thetwoscenariosare:first,airoper‐
ationstoestablishandenforceaNFZ;second,airsupporttoland‐based
crisismanagementoperations.Eachscenariohasbeenbuiltaccordingto
the same structure, which includes the following elements: Strategic
Context; Mission Objectives; Critical Factors of the Operational Envi‐
ronment;AdversaryCapabilitiesandCourseofActions;AirComponent
CourseofActionsandAssociatedCapabilities.
Thelikelihoodofthesescenariosisnotaddressed,butitisassumed
theyareatleastpossibleexamplesoffuturejoinedairoperationsbyEu‐
ropeancountries,includingItaly.ThestartingpointisthatItalianfighter
have been deployed in different crisis management operations in the
last two decades, and armed conflicts will still be a feature of interna‐
tionalsecurityuntil2050 andprobablybeyond ,withconflictcountries
concentrated in Africa, Middle East and East and South Asia. Also, the
phenomenon of failed states will probably remain on the international
scene for a long time, especially if political violence in Africa and the
MiddleEastisnotlikelytodecrease.1
Againstthisbackdrop,itispossibletoimagineafutureemployment
of fighter in those regions, either for combat and/or stabilization pur‐
poses. As one might argue that NATO will never go “that out of area,”
1FundforPeace, TheFailedStatesIndex,http://ffp.statesindex.org/rankings‐2013‐
sortable.
73
THE ROLE OF ITALIAN FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: TRENDS AND NEEDS
one might reply that probably at the end of the Cold War none would
haveexpectedtoseeNATOrunningpeace‐keepingoperationsinKosovo
first and in Afghanistan later. Additionally, while a NATO naval opera‐
tionisalreadyfullyoperationalintheHornofAfrica,ifthethreatofter‐
rorismraisesinthenextyears,carefulanalystswouldnotbecompletely
surprisedtonoticeafurtherengagementofthealliesinthearea.More‐
over,astherecentcasesofFranceinterventionsinMali2andtheCentral
AfricanRepublic3demonstrate,NATOisnottheonlyframeworkunder
whichoperationsrequiringtheuseoffighteraircraftmaybemanaged.
Inaddition,UN‐sponsoredmissionsintheshortterm,orEUonesinthe
long run, might request the level of Air Power necessary to deal with
complex in securityissues.
3.1 ESTABLISHING AND ENFORCING A NO-FLY ZONE:
“PROTECT TURIANS” SCENARIO
Thefollowingscenarioisonlyahypotheticalcontingency,yetsufficient‐
lyrealistictodrawimplicationsforthekindofaircapabilitiesthatmight
berequiredinthefuture.
3.1.1 Strategic context
Turia is country in the North African littoral inhabited by 30 million
peopleoveralargeterritoryofmorethan2millionsquaredkilometers.
The population is largely concentrated in the coastal areas. The gov‐
ernmentofTuriahasbeguntouseAirPowerasameantooppressinga
segmentofitsownpopulation,theRegtura.Thisminorityhasadistinct
ethnicbackgroundandhasbecomeincreasinglystridentinitsdemands
ofself‐determination.TheareainwhichthemajorityofRegturaisbased
isrelativelyrichinmineralsandisregardedasaninalienableportionof
2 “France confirms Mali military intervention”, in BBC News, 11 January 2013,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world‐africa‐20991719.
3“FrenchtroopsinCentralAfricanRepublicto“avoidcarnage”,in BBCNews,11De‐
cember2013http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world‐europe‐25327976.
74
3. SCENARIOS OF POSSIBLE FUTURE AIR OPERATIONS
thenationalterritorybytheTurianState.Therulinggovernmentthere‐
forecannotaffordtorelinquishtheterritoryandhasinstitutedaharsh
policecrackdown,escalatingintowidespreadhumanrightsabuses.Ac‐
tion against the minority grouping is believed to include the use of air
assets for a variety of purposes including police deployments, recon‐
naissance,crowdsuppressionandtargetedassassinations.
Theinternationalcommunitydeemsnecessarytointerveneforava‐
rietyofreasons–includingbutnotlimitedtothefactthatahumanitari‐
andisasteristakingplacewiththousandsofpeoplekilledorinjuredand
dozens of thousands of refugees directed towards both neighbour and
European countries. Peace‐keeping ground forces cannot be deployed
for legal and political motivation, but action is considered essential.
Therefore,theUNSecurityCounciladoptsaresolutiontoestablishaNo‐
FlyZone NFZ inordertoprotectTuriansfromairthreats,andcallsthe
international community to act. The US had deployed part of their air
capabilities in the Pacific area, where the American administration be‐
lievemorecompellingsecurityinterestsareatstake.Asaresult,theUS
has acquiesced to provide platforms and highly technological assets to
begintheoperation theso‐called“enablers” andtherestofthesignifi‐
cant air capabilities required for the operation in Turia, but European
countries will make a substantial and prolonged contribution to estab‐
lish and enforce a No‐Fly Zone. The operation will take place through
NATOintegratedmilitarycommand.
Thescenariotakesplaceroughly2,500kmfarfromEuropeanairba‐
ses,thatmeanswithinrangeofforcesthatcouldbebasedandsupport‐
edfrombaseslocatedinEurope,withsupplementingcarrierforces.
3.1.2 Mission objectives
AccordingtoUNmandateissuedbytheSecurityCouncil,inthisscenario
the Mission Statement for the Joint Force Air Component Command
JFACC istoestablishandenforceaNFZovertheentireTuriaterritory
inordertotheprotectcivilianpopulationfromgovernment’suseofAir
Power.
Accordingly,JointForceCommander’sintentistodisrupttheairca‐
pability of the Turia regime, its capacity to ill people, and then to act
75
THE ROLE OF ITALIAN FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: TRENDS AND NEEDS
firmlyanddecisivelytoeffectthelevelsofprotectionenvisagedbythe
internationalcommunityandtheUNSCResolution.
As a result, the two main objectives are: first, to achieve Control of
the Air by suppressing Turia government’s air capabilities, Integrated
AirDefenceSystems IADS ,CommandandControl C2 structures;se‐
cond,toenforcea24‐hoursNFZforaperiodofseveralmonths.
3.1.3 Critical factors of the operational environment
Forthisscenario,twocriticalfactorshavetobeconsidered.Ontheone
hand,thelargesizeofTurianterritory,whichmakesparticularlyexpen‐
siveanddifficulttoeffectivelyenforcetheNFZalloverthecountry.On
theotherhand,thenecessitytokeepairoperationswithinthestrictlim‐
itsenvisagedbyUNmandateandaccordingtoitslegalbasis,inorderto
maintain legitimacy in the eyes of domestic public opinion and Allied
politicalcohesion.
3.1.4 Adversary’s capabilities and Course of Action
ThemilitarycapabilitiesofTuriangovernmentwillbelargelycomposed
byantiquatedlegacyplatforms,withsomemodernequipmentincluding
rotary‐wingsplatforms.Air‐defencesystemswillberelativelyeffective,
includinga numberofSAM.The armedforces willbeprimarilyconsti‐
tutedbyconscriptandparamilitaryforces,althoughacoreofrelatively
trained professionals will be in place and the command and control
networkwillworkquitecomprehensivelyacrossallservicebranches.
Given the gap with Allied air capabilities, the Turian government’s
Course of Action CoA will rely on an asymmetric strategy aimed at
weakeningthepoliticalcohesionoftheAlliedcoalition–consideredits
centerofgravity.Suchstrategywillsee,forexample,civiliansforcedto
be present nearby likely military targets for NATO air operations. This
willbedoneinordereithertopreventtheengagementofsuchtargets
becauseofstrictrulesofengagement RoE ,ortoblamecollateraldam‐
ages possibly caused by the occurred Engagement in the eyes of Euro‐
peanandNorthAmericapublicopinion.
76
3. SCENARIOS OF POSSIBLE FUTURE AIR OPERATIONS
3.1.5 Air component’s Course of Action and required
capabilities
Althoughthishasbeenconceivedpredominantlyasanairoperation,the
internationalcommunityhassetupajointheadquarterincasethesitu‐
ationdevelopstothepointthatwidermilitaryoperationsarenecessary.
GiventheoftenindecisivenatureofNFZ,thecoalitionmustbewillingto
consideritasanenduringoperationcarriedout24/7.RulesofEngage‐
ment will be paramount on this operation, including air‐to‐air engage‐
mentsalongwithkeyair‐to‐groundprecisionattacks.
Phase1
Thefirstphasewillinvolvethesetupofmission’sheadquarterandthe
coalitionorderofbattle,alongwithanassessmentofthethreatposedto
the Regtura ethnic minority. Since Phase 1, the headquarters will need
to have timely and accurate intelligence assessments based on openly
sharedmaterial.TheJFCneedstohaveclearlyagreedRulesofEngage‐
mentandmustbeawareofthescopeofnationalcaveat.
Itwillbesetupacommand,control,communication,computingand
intelligence C4I architecturerelyingonrobustnetworkenabledcapa‐
bilitiestointegrateallairandjointoperationelements.Spaceassetswill
alsobeintegratedintheC4Iinordertosupportplanningandconductof
operationsthroughEarthObservation EO ,PositioningNavigationand
Timing PNT andsatellitecommunications.Coincidentwiththis,theair
plannerswillneedtoestablishthelikelychallengeingainingControlof
the Air to enable their own air operations. This is likely to involve the
full panoply of intelligence gathering, dissemination and pooling capa‐
bilities.
Phase2
This phase will first involve the establishment of Control of the Air
against potential air and ground threats. It will include EW and SEAD
tasks,aswellasair‐to‐airengagement.Thecommandandcontrolcapa‐
bilitiesrequiredinPhase1willbeutilizedalsoinPhase2.Itwillbevital
to ensure suitable communications, especially from the joint and com‐
binedheadquartertoairassets.
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THE ROLE OF ITALIAN FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: TRENDS AND NEEDS
RequiredcapabilitiesforISTARpurposesinclude:
-
-
-
ISTAR capability to provide wide area coverage on a continual
basisthroughamixofspaceassets,fighteraircraftandClassIII
RPAS, supplemented by further RPAS to pin point specific
targetsasrequired;
ISTAR capability to support Find, Fix, Track, Target, Engage,
Assess F2T2EA dynamictargetingcycleinthetheatre;
Intelligence gathering, dissemination and pooling capabilities
willbeheavilyusedalsoduringthisphase,particularlyfordata
management,processing,storageandsharing;
ResponsiveandrobustSpacecollectioncapabilitiesforrealtime
surveillanceandtargeting.
RegardingEngagement,itwillbenecessary:
-
-
CapabilitytoconductavarietyofComputerNetworkOperations
CNO againstAdversaryaircapabilitiesandC2networks;
RPAScapabilitytobeusedseparatelyand/orjointlywithfighter
aircraftforEW;
Fighter aircraft and combat RPAS capability to perform SEAD
and ensure Control of the Air against potential air and ground
threats;
CapabilityforBeyond‐Visual‐Range BVR air‐to‐airfighting;
Airsurveillancecapability.
ConsideringUNSCmandate,Alliedpublicopinion’sconcernsandadver‐
sary’sCoArelyingonasymmetrictactics,precisionattackswillbevital
capabilities throughout the entire operation. This will include both the
use of a range of all‐weather Precision Guided Munitions PGM , en‐
compassingSmallDiameterBombs SDB andsmallblastradiusweap‐
ons to limit collateral damages, and the capability for assessing battle
damagealsothroughRPASandSpaceassets.Theywillbeusedthrough
theaircampaigntoeliminateadversarygroundbasedfacilitiessuchas
radars,missilesitesandC2centerswithminimumcollateraldamage.
Inordertoprotectaircapabilities,spaceassetsprovidingSAwillbe
necessary. Given the cost and complexity of enforcing a NFZ in the re‐
gion,ideallytheAlliedforcewillrequireacarriergroup,fromwhereair
assetswillbedeployed,availablefortheentiredurationofthemission.
78
3. SCENARIOS OF POSSIBLE FUTURE AIR OPERATIONS
Phase3
ThisphasewillmainlyconsistofenforcingtheNFZovertheentireTuri‐
an territory. It will be enduring and will involve countering air threats
againsttheethnicminorityontheground.Thismaybesupplementedby
attacksonkeyenemyC2nodes.
Air operations might vary from mounting non‐kinetic interdiction
and deterrence operations on a 24/7 basis to short periods of intense
kinetic activity. Rapid and flexible response will be a key requirement,
basedonsoundandaccurateintelligenceandrapiddecisionmakingto
allowengagementwithadversarialforceswherenecessary.
A central minimum requirement will be the ability to operate sus‐
tained24/7operationstopreventortodeteradversarialfixedwingac‐
tivity.Inprinciple,NATOEuropeanmemberswillhavesufficientaircraft
tomountaNFZmission,albeitsomeoftheplatformshavelimitedorno
all‐weather24‐hourscapability:theissuewillberathertheirreadiness.
This need to be an enduring operation and the participating nations
must assure their presence for the long haul. This has implications for
sustainabilityandforthe“roulement”offorces.
The same C2 and ISTAR capabilities needed for Phase 2 will be uti‐
lizedalsoforPhase3,althoughthenumberofsortieswillbelikelylower
thaninthepreviousphasebecausetheAdversarymilitarycapabilities,
and particularly air capabilities and C2 networks, will be severely dis‐
rupted. Required capabilities for engagement will include a sufficient
combat aircraft capability to ensure more than 100 daily sorties. AAR
capabilitywillbevitaltoenableNFZpolicingoverawidearea.Theca‐
pabilitytolimitcollateraldamagesasmuchaspossiblewillcontinueto
be required, inter alia through the use of SDB and small blast radius
bombs,aswellastheabilitytoassessbattledamages.
European countries will struggle to support such an operation on a
longduration,namelymorethansixmonths.EnforcingaNFZwouldin‐
evitably imply ability and a willingness to escalate to a more active ki‐
netic engagement scenario. Its absence could seriously undermine the
credibilityoftheNFZ,encouragingtheadversarytosimplywaitforAl‐
lieddeterminationandresourcestowane.
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THE ROLE OF ITALIAN FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: TRENDS AND NEEDS
3.2 AIR SUPPORT TO LAND-BASED OPERATION:
“STABILITY IN BANON” SCENARIO
Again, the following scenario is only an hypothetical contingency, yet
sufficientlyrealistictodrawimplicationsforthekindofaircapabilities
required.
3.2.1 Strategic context
AcountrycalledBanoninthe EastMediterraneanseais avictimofan
ethnic and religious internal conflict supported by a Northern neigh‐
bouringstate,theRepublicofSari.Theframeworkoftheaircampaignis
typicallytailoredtomatchacounterinsurgencyenvironmentinsupport
ofanincumbentgovernment.Inthisscenario,Europeanaircomponent
is deployed to support a multinational ground force committed to im‐
plement a UN Resolution. A substantial number of European countries
contribute to a UN‐mandated multinational force. The UN back the in‐
terventionandprovidelegitimacythroughamandatebasedonthe“Re‐
sponsibility to Protect” the civilian population, while the Arab League
alsosupportsandcontributestothemultinationalforce.ThereisUSdi‐
rect support to the air campaign, but for a variety of political reasons
largepartoftheburdenhastobeshoulderedbyEuropeans.TheNATO
commandandcontrolarchitectureandproceduresareinusetomanage
themilitaryoperations.AnEUcivilianmissionistaskedforSecuritySec‐
torReform SSR ofBanon.
The Banon Liberation Front BLF backed by RS government is in‐
creasingitsinfluenceinBanon.BLFisanon‐stateactorwhichrelieson
roughly9,000combatants,operatingalongtheborderdeepintoBanon
territoryfromSarisanctuaries.Theypracticeparamilitaryandterrorist
activities.Theirplannedcampaignconsistsofraidingvillagesandsmall
townsandtocleanotherethnicorreligiousgroupsfrom“liberatedter‐
ritories.”Ingovernmentcontrolledareas,theBLFperformsterroristac‐
tivities such as assassination of Banon citizens, random bombings, at‐
tacks on official buildings or governmental representatives. There are
dozensofthousandsofdisplacedpeople,andamassiveflowofrefugees
towardsbothneighbourcountriesandEurope.
80
3. SCENARIOS OF POSSIBLE FUTURE AIR OPERATIONS
The Banon National Defense Force BNDF is a very weak regular
forceof35,000menshowingnoabilitytostoptheguerrillaandtheethnic
cleansing in the Northern region of Banon. Except two elite battalions,
mostpartofthetroopsareilltrained,poorlyequippedandunderpaid.
The Sari Democratic Army SDA is 45,000 men strong. Almost en‐
tirelyoperational,theregularforcescandeploytwobrigadessupported
by field artillery and Special Forces. The Sari Air Force is air capable
with around 25 fighter/bomber jets, 10 training/bomber jets, 3 cargo
planesand12helicopters,including6attackand6transport.Aneffec‐
tiveairdefensesystemprovidesprotectionoftheSariRepublicthrough
missilesandheavyartillery,whileDozensofMAN‐PortableAir‐Defence
Systems MANPADS areavailabletoregularandirregularforces.
TheUNForceinBanon UNFB is8,000menstrongandisreadyto
bedeployedonshortnoticetoprotectthesovereigntyofBanon,assist
the Government of Banon in restoring a safe and secure environment
andprovidesupporttoNGOsandinternationalorganizationsmanaging
humanitarianactivities.Theairoperationstakeplaceatabout3,500km
fromEuropeanairbases.
3.2.2 Mission objectives
The Joint Force Air Component Command JFACC is deployed in the
East Mediterranean on a projection and command ship nearby the Re‐
publicofBanon’scoasts.AccordingtotheUNmandateissuedbytheSe‐
curity Council, JFACC mission statement is: to assist the GoB to defend
the territorial integrity of Banon; to support the deployment of the
UNFB, to restore a safe and secure environment and to execute a non‐
combatantevacuationonshortnotice 72hours ,ifnecessary.
The operation may be divided in two phases. In the first one, the
Commander’sintentistorapidlydeployacapable,credible,visibleand
sustainableaircomponentinorderto:demonstratetheUNFBresolveto
enforcetheUNResolution;assisttosetconditionstodeteranyforeign
aggression; prevent deterioration of the humanitarian crisis. The main
effortatthisearlystagewillbeestablishmentoftheNFZintheareaof
operations;supporttoUNFBuntiltheachievementofafulloperational
capability;evacuationofnon‐combatantforeigncitizensifrequired.
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THE ROLE OF ITALIAN FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: TRENDS AND NEEDS
Thisimpliesto:
1. Secure airbases and Aerial Ports of Debarkation APOD in the
RepublicofBanon;
2. CombatSearchandRescue CASR activities;
3. Establish a NFZ along the international border with RS with
associatedsurveillancecapabilities;
4. Establishairdefenceinareaofoperations.
Then, in the second phase, the main effort will be expanding the en‐
forcement of the UN Resolution and countering hostile forces through‐
out the Republic of Banon, giving to Banon Government the necessary
time and support to achieve internal stability. Developing a self‐
sustained Banon National Defence Force will be the key to ensure that
thisstabilitywillberemnant:theCommanderwilltrytoachieveitbya
strong partnership and combined planning and operations with UNFB,
the EU RSS Mission and the Government of Banon. The second Phase
willfocusonsupportingtheUNFBandhastheobjectivesto:
1. AssurefullmobilityofUNFBandBNDF;
2. ProtectandsupportdirectlyUNFBandBNDFonrequest;
3. AssisttheciviliandeploymentofBanonandinternationalorgani‐
zations’representatives;
4. Opposeinfiltrationandfreedomofmaneuverofhostileelements
inBanonterritory;
5. Deterfurtheraggressions.
3.2.3 Critical factors of the operational environment
At political level, it has to be considered a weak legitimacy of the Gov‐
ernmentofBanonintheNorthernregionandapoorBanonstateagen‐
cies’capability.ArabLeaguediplomaticeffortsfocusonapeaceprocess
between the Republic of Sari and Banon, therefore no military retalia‐
tionisallowedintheSariterritory.
Inthetheatre,intheshorttermthemilitarybalanceofforcefavours
theBLFanditssupporterfromtheRepublicofSari,becauseofanaccu‐
rateknowledgeoftheregion,afavourablesupportofindigenouspopu‐
82
3. SCENARIOS OF POSSIBLE FUTURE AIR OPERATIONS
lation and a porous border. Military operations will have significant
negative impact on economic growth and activities. Likewise, evacua‐
tionofforeignpersonnelcoulddeprivethecountryofinvaluablecompe‐
tences.Besides,destructionorseizureofcriticalassetsincludingoilrigs
andkeyindustrialfacilitiescouldhittheBanonsocialstability.Moreo‐
ver, economic and industrial facilities are not adequately linked by
roads and railways, thus maintaining operational ground lines of com‐
municationisdifficult.Therefore,airmobilityisofcriticalimportance.
Finally,internationalpublicopinionisnotconcernedwiththeevolu‐
tioninthefield,exceptincaseofmediacoverageofahumanitariandis‐
asteroroperationalcasualties.Thesupportwillbehardtomaintainin
themid‐term.
3.2.4 Adversary’s capabilities and course of action
TheRepublicofSari,awareofthepoliticalriskofaninvasionofBanon,
would opt for an attrition strategy to delaying the political peace pro‐
cessandupholdingthe“LiberationCampaign”ledbyBLF.
TheinitialdeploymentofUNFBisunopposed,whereasallinitiativesto
restoring a safe and secure environment are strongly denied. A double
lineofoperationsisdeveloped:aparamilitary/terroristcampaigninthe
Northernregion;aterroristcampaigninthebigcitiesofBanontodestabi‐
lizetheGovernmentandcreateconditionsforacoup.Thehighvaluetar‐
getofhostileforcesshouldthenbe:UNFBunitsinplace;innocentpeople
harassedintargetedareastocreateconditionsformass‐migration;sabo‐
tageofinfrastructuresinkeyeconomicfacilities;BanonNDFoutpostsand
policestations;officialbuildingsand/orrepresentatives.
3.2.5 Air component Course of Action and required
capabilities
Phase1
The JFACC is included in a layer of multinational C2 structures and is
sufficient to provide C2 framework for a non‐combatant evacuation.
Furthermore,ithasanAirTaskingOrder ATO of100sortiesperday
toestablishandenforceaNFZandtheprojectionofacompositesquad‐
83
THE ROLE OF ITALIAN FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: TRENDS AND NEEDS
ron for a month. At this stage, signal intelligence and electronic intelli‐
gencecapabilitiesarerequiredtomonitorthedispositionandthestatus
of air defence systems along the border with the Republic of Sari. Im‐
ageryintelligenceassetsprovidedbysatellitesandrecce‐podsmakead‐
ditionaldataavailableforsurveillanceofBLFmovementswithinBanon.
ThecoreofthemissionistheactivationofaNFZalongtheinternational
border,whoseactivationencompasses:



Earlywarningandpermanentsurveillanceofairspaceprovided
by AWACS for long range monitoring of Republic of Sari air
bases;
FighterCombatAirPatrol;
DefensiveElectronicWarfare.
The NFZ layout should demonstrate a strong commitment. Regarding
the protection of the headquarter, two options are available. A Carrier
BattleGroup CBG isprobablythelessriskyoptionconsideringthelow
levelofthreatinbluewater.However,theCBGavailabilitycouldnotbe
assured, at least permanently. The second option relies on a hardened
airbaseinBanon,closetothecapitalcityRutbei.Theneededcapabili‐
tiesincludeAirengineersandAirSpecialForcescapabilities,defensive
EW.DeployabilityandAirMobilityarekeyissues,sincethejointopera‐
tionsareais3,500kmfarfromEuropeanairbases.Thenon‐combatant
evacuation is a priority. Critical capabilities include long range airlift
and related air tankers for insertion of air engineers elements, special
forces,fewsupporthelicoptersforCombatSARandplatformsforair‐to‐
airrefuelling.ThequalityofBanoninfrastructuresislow.Consequently,
thebulkoflogistics,intermsofmodernairnavigationandadaptationto
militarystandardswillbechargedonthemultinationalforce.
Phase2
Inthisphase,themission’stasksconsistof:
-
establishing a coherent C2 architecture with UNFB and Host
Nation HN ;
providingintelligence;
assuring increased mobility in theatre, including medical
evacuation;
84
3. SCENARIOS OF POSSIBLE FUTURE AIR OPERATIONS
-
deliveringfiresupport–i.e.CAS–onrequest;
assistingtheRSSoftheHN,forinstancebytrainingandequipping
anewBanonAirForce.
Three chains of command have to be intermingled: NATO, UNFB and
HN.Thepurposeistogetacommonpictureandplanningprocessinto
the Combined Air Operation Centre CAOC . Command and control ar‐
chitecturemustbeflexibleenoughtoprovideaquickresponseattacti‐
callevel.Theapportionmentofassetsandmissionassignmentsmustbe
preciselycoordinatedwithgroundforcesand,inordertofollowtheflu‐
idevolutionofthetacticalsituation,mustbeorganizedtoallowaneasy
and rapid en‐route re‐tasking of the aircraft. Required capabilities in‐
clude Tactical Air Control Post TACP network in ground units, rapid
engagementwithswiftchainofF2T2EA.
It is also required a permanent ISR function: combination of fighter
aircraftandbothClassIIIandClassIIRPASmonitoringremoteterrain,
keyareasandfriendlyforcesallacrosstheareaofoperations.Support
tothegroundmanoeuvreswillvaryaccordingtothephaseofthestabil‐
itycampaignledbytheHNandUNFB.However,aircomponentwillplay
adirectactionrolethroughanti‐surfaceactionsincludingCASwithdis‐
criminatestrikes,interdictionandpsychologicaloperationsandinfoop‐
erationsinsupporttogroundforces.
Thus,somespecificcapabilitieswillberequired:
-
-
Precision strike should be assured by PGMs and a combination
of low cost weapons provided by attack helicopters. Visual
identification of target is the key condition to reduce risks of
collateraldamagestoanacceptablelevel.
AAR capacity is critical to maintain a significant fighter aircraft
andhelicoptersloiteringcapacityforaprolongedperiodoftime.
ThebestcontributionofAirPowertothejointforceprotectionrelieson
a flexible and responsive system of mission tasking: reconnaissance,
mobility, direct support, increase the confidence of friendly forces and
cripplethemoraleofinsurgents.Re‐establishingasafeandsecureenvi‐
ronmentimpliesadualroleforAirPower:firstly,providingsecurityto
friendly forces and HN Authorities; secondly, limiting insurgents’ mili‐
taryoptions.
85
THE ROLE OF ITALIAN FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: TRENDS AND NEEDS
Required capabilities also include airmobile units Army Aviation ,
with heavy medium helicopters and tactical airlifts to support Banon
Government’sstabilityoperationsbyprovidingtransporttopoliceforc‐
es, national and international agencies’ personnel for election pro‐
gramme,humanitarianassistanceandmedicalevacuationmissions.
Finally, the air component will contribute to the SSR’s efforts of the
HNthroughtrainingandtheprovisionofnewequipmenttotheBanon
Airforce,whosecreationisenvisagedtoassuringtheControloftheAir
alsointheaftermathofthepeacekeepingmission.
86
4.
The military needs of Italian Armed
Forces and the F-35 programme
Asithasemergedinthefirstchapter,Italyhasdeployedmorethan100
fighteraircraftin10internationalcrisisoperationsinthelast24years,
flyingmorethan13,000sortiesandtotalling36,000flighthours.
Theuseofaircapabilitiesformissionsabroadislikelytocontinuein
the next future, although it is not possible to exactly foresee where,
when, and how many fighter aircraft will be used by Italy. The second
chaptersummarizesdoctrine’sfundamentalsandtrendsstemmingfrom
operationalexperienceinordertoshedsomelightonpossiblewaysto
useAirPower.
Inthisregard,thethirdchapterprovidespossiblescenarios,whereby
fighteraircraftmaybeusedfordifferenttasks,rangingfromthosenec‐
essarytoestablishandenforceaNFZtoothersinsupportofgroundop‐
erations. These scenarios may well take place in regions surrounding
Europe,suchasNorthAfrica,MiddleEastandthe“enlargedMediterra‐
nean,”1whereItaliannationalinterestsaremostlyatstake.
Such analysis poses a number of key questions for Italian policy‐
makers,includingcivilianauthorities–inprimistheParliamentandthe
Government–andthearmedforces.Thischapteraimstoaddresssuch
questionsandtherelatedprocurementneedsofItalianmilitary,aswell
astoassesswhetherandhowtheF‐35procurementprogrammesatis‐
fiestheaforementionedneeds.
1 For a definition of “Enlarged Mediterranean” see for example: Italian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Rapporto 2020: le scelte di politica estera, April 2008, p. 57,
http://www.esteri.it/mae/doc/Rapporto2020_SceltePoliticaEstera_090408.pdf; Italian
MinistryofDefence‐DefenceGeneralStaff, IlconcettostrategicodelCapodiStatoMag‐
giore della Difesa, March 2005, http://www.difesa.it/SMD_/CASMD/CONCETTOSTRA‐
TEGICO/Pagine/default.aspx.
87
THE ROLE OF ITALIAN FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: TRENDS AND NEEDS
4.1 FIRST KEY QUESTION: DOES ITALIAN
PARTICIPATION IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT
OPERATIONS SERVE NATIONAL INTERESTS?
ThefirstkeyquestioniswhetherItalianparticipationincrisismanage‐
ment operations together with European and North American allies
doesservenationalinterests.Thisisprimarilya politicalquestionthat
deserves a preliminary clarification on the international security envi‐
ronment.
Inthepost‐ColdWarperiodthedirectthreatofmilitaryinvasionof
Italianterritoryhasgreatlydecreasedincomparisonwithpreviousdec‐
ades. Even if this threat has become highly unlikely, it would be ex‐
tremely dangerous to rule it out as a possible contingency in the long‐
term:attheendoftheday,intheearly20thcentury,Europeancountries
didnotexpectWorldWarItooccur,andthishasparadoxicallybeenone
ofthereasonswhyitdid.Incontrast,duringtheColdWar,NATOcoun‐
triesandtheSovietblocdidexpectanotherconflicttoeruptinEurope,
andthisisoneofthereasonswhyitdidnot.Inotherwords,inthese‐
cond half of 20th century deterrence prevented armed conflicts in Eu‐
rope.Therefore,itisworthyforNATOmemberstomaintaintheneces‐
sarymilitarycapabilities–includingaircapabilities–inordertodeter
thataneventualescalationofpoliticalclashesintheinternationalarena
wouldrevertintoanopenmilitaryconfrontation.Thecrisisoccurredin
Ukraine between 2013 and 2014 has been a strong reminder that the
useofmilitaryforceinEuropeisstillanoptionforsomeregionalactors
in order to pursue their political goals. Something similar occurred in
theFirstGulfWar,whenItalyjoinedthewarcoalitionledbytheUSto
putanendtotheIraqinvasionofKuwait.Itisnotbyaccidentthatthe
firstNATO“coretask”,reaffirmedinthe2010StrategicConcept,isthe
collectivedefenceofmemberstatesagainstanythreatofaggression.2
2 The 2010 Strategic Concept has established three core tasks for NATO: collective
defenceaccordingtoArt.5,crisismanagementoperationsbeyondAlliedterritories,and
cooperativesecuritythroughinteraliapartnerships.NATO, NewStrategicConcept,No‐
vember2010,http://www.nato.int/strategic‐concept/Index.html.
88
4. THE MILITARY NEEDS OF ITALIAN ARMED FORCES AND THE F-35 PROGRAMME
Having said that, after the end of the Cold War, the main activity of
Italian military has not been territorial defence. It has rather been the
participationincrisismanagementoperationsbeyondnationalborders.
Oneofthe mainreasonsofthisshiftwerethechanges occurredinthe
internationalsecurityenvironment,whichmakesecurityinterests–and
generally speaking national interests – affected by events, crises, risks
andthreatsoccurringwellbeyondcountry’sborders.Globalizationand
economicinterdependencehaveobviouslyplayedafundamentalrolein
this regard. The analysis of such changes is beyond the scope of this
study. The bottom line is that in the last 24 years military capabilities
have been used in missions abroad to defend Italian security interests
andnationalinterestsinanewandunexpectedway.Asmentionedbe‐
fore,nobodyin1989wasexpectingNATOtointerveneinYugoslaviato
haltacivilwar,althoughtheAlliancediditwithairandgroundopera‐
tionsfew yearslater.Similarly,itwasnotexpectedthat2001terrorist
attacks–andlateronterroristbombingsinMadridandLondon–would
havepromptaninternationalefforttofightterrorism,includingthrough
militarymeanssuchasthoseemployedbyNATOforonedecadeinAf‐
ghanistan.Finally,stillinearly2000s,itwasnotexpectedthatEuropean
Navies would have countered piracy in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean
throughNATOandEUmissionsOceanShield3andAtalanta.4Recentse‐
curitystrategiesadoptedbyinternationalorganizations–suchas2010
NATOStrategicConcept or2003EuropeanSecurityStrategy5–aswell
asthosebytheUS,FranceandtheUK,dotaskarmedforcestoperforma
broad spectrum of missions, predominantly within a coalition rather
thanalone,againstavarietyofthreatsandinawiderangeofcrises.This
internationalsecurityenvironmentexplainstheimportanceofmissions
abroadforEuropeancountriessuchasItaly.
3NATOMaritimeCommand, OperationOceanShield,http://www.mc.nato.int/ops/
Pages/OOS.aspx.
4EUNavalForceSomalia,http://eunavfor.eu.
5Alreadyin2003,the EuropeanSecurityStrategyfocusedonsecuritythreatsdiffer‐
entfromterritorialdefence,suchasterrorism,statefailure,proliferationofweaponsof
mass destruction, regional instability and organized crime, and set as priority for EU
memberstatesthecapacitytoacttroughcivilianandmilitarymissions.
89
THE ROLE OF ITALIAN FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: TRENDS AND NEEDS
Inthiscontext,Italianparticipationincrisismanagementoperations
inthelast24yearshascontributeddirectlyorindirectlytoprotectand
promote national interests. For example, the stabilization of Bosnia‐
Herzegovina,KosovoandgenerallyspeakingtheWesternBalkanswasa
clear, direct national interest, because, since the early 1990s, Italy had
sufferedfromboththeflowofillegalimmigrantscomingfromthesere‐
gionsandthecreationofafavourableenvironmentforinternationalor‐
ganizedcrimeandillicittraffics.Crisismanagementoperations,includ‐
ingthoseconductedthroughAirPower,havebeeninstrumentaltopaci‐
fy and stabilize an area extremely close to Italian national territory.
Once stabilized, countries in this region became or rather are becom‐
ing partofbothEUandNATO6andhaveprovidedeconomicopportuni‐
tiesforItalianeconomyintermsofexportandinvestments.
Italianparticipationinothermissionsabroadhasservednationalin‐
terestsinanindirectway.7Forinstance,theactiveparticipationinNATO
operations,particularlytheeleven‐yearlongISAFoperationinAfghani‐
stan,hasbeenaninvestmentinakindofAllied“insurancepolicy”forIta‐
ly’snationalsecurity.DuringtheColdWar,theAtlanticAlliance,andthe
USinparticular,hasbeentheonlysecurityguaranteeItalyhad,thisbe‐
ing a sort of invisible “shield” or “umbrella” vis‐à‐vis the Soviet threat.
SincetheendoftheColdWar,this“shieldrole”hasevolvedintoan“in‐
surancepolicy”incasetheinternationalsecuritycontextwoulddeterio‐
rateagain.ThecurrenttransitionoftheinternationalsystemfromaUS
hegemony towards an uncertain and unstable multi‐polar equilibrium,
with emerging or re‐emerging powers that do not necessarily share
Western interests and values, pushes Italy to consider maintaining this
“insurance policy” even more worthy. Participation in NATO most im‐
portant missions, such as those in Afghanistan and Kosovo, is a way to
maintainasolid,cohesiveandcrediblemilitaryAllianceandtokeepthe
investmentmadeinthe“insurancepolicy”fornationalsecurity.
6SloveniaandCroatiahavealreadybecomemembersofNATOandEU.Albaniahas
joined NATO too. Other Western Balkan countries are either candidate to join both
NATOandEUortheyareexpectedtobecomecandidateinthenextyears.
7ThisappliesalsotootherimportantmissionsabroadsuchasthoseinLebanonor
Somalia, which are beyond the scope of this study since they did not envisaged a sub‐
stantialuseoffighteraircraft.
90
4. THE MILITARY NEEDS OF ITALIAN ARMED FORCES AND THE F-35 PROGRAMME
This is particularly true for Italy, a “middle power”8 which does not
havesufficientcapabilitiestoprotectitssecurityinterestsalone–with
the only relevant exception of Alba’s crisis management operation, led
byItalyin1996withtheendorsementofUNSC,torestoresecurityand
stability in Albania. In fact, Italy has national interests well beyond its
borders: safe trade routes in the “Enlarged Mediterranean,” stretching
totheRedSeaandtheIndianOcean;energysuppliesfromNorthAfrica,
theMiddleEastandCentralAsia;maritimesecurityandbordercontrol
intheMediterraneaninrelationtoillegalimmigration;ageneralinter‐
estininternationalfreetradeandopennessofforeignmarketsforItal‐
ianexport.Yet,suchinterestscannotbeprotectedbyItalyalone–nei‐
therbyanyotherEuropeancountryactingonitsown.Asaresult,Italian
activeparticipationininternationalorganizationssuchasNATO,theEU
andtheUN,aswellasininformalforasuchasG8andG20,isawayto
press its allies and the international community to deal with security
challenges that are intertwined with Italian national interests.9 In par‐
ticular, an active, reliable and stable Italian participation in all NATO
missions,includingthoselessdirectlyconnectedwithnationalinterests
such as ISAF, is instrumental to gain the necessary credibility to push
theAlliancetodealwithkeyItaliansecuritypriorities.Moreover,being
crisismanagementoperationssetupandorganizedunderinternational
organizations’frameworkallowsItalytosharetheirrisksandcosts,to
extendtheinterventionrangetoprotectitsnationalinterestsandtoen‐
hance inter‐allies solidarity.10 Vice‐versa, a “free rider” approach with
regard to operational burden sharing would inevitably weaken Italy’s
positionwithinNATOandotherinternationalorganizationsanditsabil‐
itytoinfluencetheallieswithrespecttoItaliandefenceandforeignpol‐
icygoals.Thisappliesalso,toacertainextent,toItaly’sroleintheUN.In
8OntheItaly’sstructuralconditionas“middlepower”inthepost‐ColdWarperiod
see,amongothers,GiampieroGiacomelloandBertjanVerbeek eds ,Italy’sForeignPol‐
icy in the Twenty‐First Century. The New Assertiveness of an Aspiring Middle Power,
Lanham,LexingtonBooks,2011.
9See,amongothers,StefaniaForteandAlessandroMarrone eds. ,“L’Italiaelemis‐
sioni internazionali”, in Documenti IAI, No. 12|05 September 2012 , pp. 27‐28,
http://www.iai.it/pdf/DocIAI/iai1205.pdf.
10Ibid.,p.44.
91
THE ROLE OF ITALIAN FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: TRENDS AND NEEDS
fact,ItalianparticipationinUN‐mandatedmissions,includingforexam‐
plethoseinIraqandBosnia‐Herzegovina,hasbeenoneofthemainar‐
gumentsusedtofosterItalianpositionwithinthenegotiationontheUN
SecurityCouncil’sreform,inordertopreventadifferentsettlementthat
wouldhaveincludednewpermanentmembers,butleftItalyoutofUN’s
apicalbody.
This approach is linked to Italian traditional effort to be part of the
coregroupsofcountriesdealingwithsecurityissuesaffectingItaly’sna‐
tional interests. The condition of “middle power” makes it difficult for
Italytomaintainitsstatusvis‐à‐vismorepowerfulcountries.Thisisone
ofthemainreasonswhy,sincetheendofWorldWarII,Italiangovern‐
ments have constantly sought to join any form of enhanced security‐
related cooperation: European Defence Community, Western European
Union,NATO,EUinstitutionsandmissionsdealingwithCommonSecuri‐
tyandDefencePolicy CSDP ,uptothevarious“contactgroups”estab‐
lishedduringYugoslavia’sbreakupinthe1990s.TheratioisthatifItaly
ispartofthecore group,Italianchancestoinfluencethegoalspursued
bysuchgroupincrisisaffectingnationalinterestsaregreaterthanifItaly
operates out of it. This has been one of the reasons Italy has chosen to
joinoperationsOdysseyDawnandUnifiedProtectorin2011,despiteof
ItalianscepticismontheireffectsonLibyansecurityandstability–scep‐
ticismwhichhasprovedtoberightinthefollowingyears.Whether2011
airoperationsinLibyahavecontributedtoupholdItaly’snationalinter‐
estsremainsanopenquestion.However,sincethemilitaryintervention
byotherWesterncountriesbecameinevitableatthattime,Italianpartic‐
ipation in the multinational and then NATO air campaign has at least
benefited Italy’s position with respect to the newly established Libyan
leadership.This,inturn,hasprovidedwiththebasisforarenewedbilat‐
eral cooperation on important Italian priorities such as border control
andmaritimesecurity,immigrationmanagementandenergysupplies.
Finally, participation in crisis management operations is also a way
tomaintainstrongrelationswithItaly’smainsecurityally,theUS,con‐
sideredsincetheendofWorldWarIIthebedrockofEuropeanandItal‐
iansecurity.Beingsurroundedbyunstableregions–fromtheWestern
BalkanstotheSouthernMediterraneanshores–andnotableasa“mid‐
dlepower”toshapeeventsintheseregionsonitsown,Italyhastradi‐
92
4. THE MILITARY NEEDS OF ITALIAN ARMED FORCES AND THE F-35 PROGRAMME
tionallyreliedon“asymmetricalliances”withstrongerpartners suchas
theUS toaddresscommonsecurityconcerns.11Moreover,thebilateral
relation with Washington has been deliberately pursued by Rome as a
leveragetoenhanceItaly’sstatusvis‐à‐visstrongerEuropeancountries
such as France and Germany. Despite the disappearance of the Soviet
threat,thistwo‐foldapproachintherelationswiththeUShascontinued
inthe1990sbecauseofinternationalcrisesintheBalkansandtheMedi‐
terranean,aswellasbecauseofthekindofrelationshipswithotherEU
members.12Furthermore,the2001terroristattacksshiftedUSnational
securityprioritiesfromEuropetotheGreaterMiddleEastandmadeEu‐
ropeanalliesincreasinglyvaluedbyWashingtonintermsoftheirpoliti‐
calandmilitarycontributiontoUS‐ledcrisismanagementoperations,13
suchasthoseinAfghanistan.Asaresult,theItalianparticipationinmis‐
sionsabroadhasbecomeafundamentaltoolforItaliandefenceandfor‐
eignpolicywithrespecttotheUSally.14
Obviously,themilitaryparticipationincrisismanagementoperations
envisaging the use of Air Power does not guarantee per sé the direct
protectionofItaly’snationalinterests.Neitheritensuresdirectandpos‐
itive effects on Italian credibility vis‐à‐vis important allies, Italy’s role
within multilateral organizations such as NATO, UN or EU, or bilateral
relationswiththeUS.Indeed,suchprotectionofnationalinterestsand
positiveeffectonItaliancredibilitydepend,amongotherthings,onthe
capacity of Italian governments – and of the country as a whole – to
makethebestofthemilitarycontributionprovidedbyItaly.15Inthisre‐
11See, amongothers,“L’Italiaelatrasformazionedelloscenariointernazionale”,in
Alessandro Colombo and Gianni Bonvicini eds. , La politica estera dell’Italia. Edizione
2012,Bologna,IlMulino,2012,pp.9‐25.
12LeopoldoNuti,“TheRichestandFarthestMasterisAlways Best:US‐ItalianRela‐
tionsinHistoricalPerspective”,inDavidM.Andrews ed. , The AtlanticAllianceUnder
Stress,Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress,2005,p.189.
13CeMiSSandRAND, ChangingU.S.DefensePolicyandtheWaronTerrorism:Impli‐
cationsforItalyandforUS‐ItalianRelations,Gaeta,Artistic&Publishing,2002,p.46.
14ForadetailedcomparisonofItalian,FrenchandBritishcontributiontoUS‐ledmil‐
itaryoperationsseeJasonW.Davidson, America’sAlliesandWar.Kosovo,Afghanistan,
andIraq,NewYork,PalgraveMacmillan,2011.
15Interviewdated11December2013.
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THE ROLE OF ITALIAN FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: TRENDS AND NEEDS
gard,participationinmissionsabroadisafundamentalenablerforItal‐
iandefenceandforeignpolicy,despitebeingnotsufficientwithoutafull
and stable diplomatic and political commitment. In the future, the ef‐
fectsofthiscontributionwilldependoncircumstances,aswellasonthe
abilityofItaliangovernmentstoexploitthisvaluabletool.Forsure,giv‐
ing up the ability to participate in missions abroad through Air Power
would hamper this possibility, having a negative impact on Italian de‐
fence and foreign policy, and thus on Italy’s ability to protect and pro‐
motenationalinterestsintheinternationalarena.
Inordertomaintainsuchatool,acertainlevelofdefencespendingis
necessary.Sincetheearly2000s,Italyhasallocatedanaverageof0.9%
ofGDPperyeartothedefencefunction,16roughlyhalfofwhathasbeen
spent in the same period – in absolute terms – by European countries
suchasFrance,GermanyandtheUK.TheItaliandebateondefencemat‐
ters includes critics of military spending, particularly in times of eco‐
nomic crisis. For example, in February 2013, left‐wing political parties
and pacifist groups have put forward the “Agenda for Peace and Dis‐
armament.”17 The initiative proposed to dismantle large defence pro‐
curement programmes and re‐allocate the related funds to social poli‐
ciestosupportemploymentandprotecttheenvironment.Thisdecision
wouldimplyanegativecascadeeffectwhichisoftenunder‐evaluatedby
the Italian debate on defence matters. In fact, the first effect would be
the reduction of Italy’s ability to protect national interests through de‐
fence and foreign policy, which in turn would have a significant and
negativeimpactonItaliansocietyandeconomy.
16 The term “defence function” includes all expenditures necessary to perform the
specificsetoftasksassignedtoArmy,Navy,Air,Forceandjointcomponent,aswellas
technical and administrative personnel of Defence Ministry. See Alessandro Marrone,
Elena Cesca, Alessandro R. Ungaro, Defence Budgets and Industry: Tables and Graphs,
July2013,http://www.iai.it/pdf/Economia_difesa/Tabelle‐grafici‐EN.pdf.
17SEL, Agendaperlapaceeildisarmoperlaprossimalegislatura,February2013,
http://www.sinistraecologialiberta.it/wp‐
content/uploads/2013/02/SELDisarmoPAce12Feb.pdf.
94
4. THE MILITARY NEEDS OF ITALIAN ARMED FORCES AND THE F-35 PROGRAMME
4.2 SECOND KEY QUESTION: WHAT KIND OF AIR
CAPABILITIES DOES ITALY NEED TO PARTICIPATE
IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS?
IfitisassumedthatmaintainingthecapacitytoprojectAirPowerincri‐
sismanagementoperationsdoesserveItaliandefenceandforeignpoli‐
cy,thesecondkeyquestioniswhataircapabilitiesareneededinthisre‐
gard. Particularly, Air Mobility is a crucial role to be performed by air
capabilities. Nonetheless, Air Mobility is not the focus of this study,
whichisratheronEngagement,ISTARandControloftheAirroles.
Inthelast24years,theEngagementrolehasbeenperformedbyItal‐
ianmilitarythroughfighteraircraftsuchasTornado,AMX,F‐16,F‐104
and AV‐8B. Some of them, mainly Tornado, have been used together
withEurofightertogainandmaintainControloftheAirinLibya 2011 andKosovo 1999 .Asamatteroffact,thefighteraircraftfleetusedso
farbyItalyinmissionsabroadisbeingphasedoutorwillbephasedout
inthenextdecade.Asstatedin2012bytheItalianNationalArmament
Director, there is an “unavoidable requirement for the replacement of
253aircraftbelongingtothreedifferentlineups:18verticaltake‐offair‐
craft AV‐8B of the Navy, 136 AMX and 99 Tornado of the Air Force.”18
The main reason is that many of them have been built in the 1980s or
even in the 1970s, and, as far as their life‐cycle reaches thirty or forty
years,theycannotassurehighsecuritystandardsfortheaircrew.Their
effectivenessalsodecreases,asthey areneither designedto reachcer‐
tain performances, nor adaptable to incorporate new technologies.
Moreover, maintaining an ageing aircraft in service beyond a certain
timeline becomes more and more inefficient and expensive because of
two main reasons. First, when a kind of aircraft is not produced any‐
more worldwide the availability of spare parts to maintain and fix the
18ItalianChamberofDeputies‐DefenceCommittee, AudizionedelSegretariogenera‐
ledellaDifesaeDirettorenazionaledegliarmamenti,generaledisquadraaereaClaudio
Debertolissullostatodiavanzamentodelprogrammad’armamentoJointStrikeFighter,
5 December 2012, p. 4, http://documenti.camera.it/_dati/leg16/lavori/stencomm/04/
audiz2/2012/1205/pdf001.pdf.
95
THE ROLE OF ITALIAN FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: TRENDS AND NEEDS
fleetinservedecreasesandtheircostincreases.Tomakejustallbutone
comparison,itislikewhathappenswiththesparepartsofavintagecar
“autod’epoca” .ThisisparticularlythecaseofTornado,AMXandAV‐
8B.ThisisoneofthemainreasonstheUKisplanningtoanticipatethe
acquisition of F‐35 and the phasing out of its ageing fighter aircraft:
maintaining old platforms soon will cost to the British military more
poundsthantheacquisitionofnewones.19Inaddition,themoreanair‐
craftbecomesoldandobsoletethemoreeffortsarerequiredtorealizea
possible upgrade, both in terms of time and economic investments. To
sumup,ifItalywantstomaintainitsabilitytoparticipateincrisisman‐
agement operations involving the use of Air Power, it would be neces‐
sary to procure new fighter aircraft to replace the current ageing plat‐
forms–whichwillbeinevitablyphasedoutinanycase.
In this context, a clarification is needed with regard to RPAS. Their
use has exponentially increased in the last decade, mainly for ISTAR
purposes, but also for Engagement, including Close Air Support for ex‐
ampleinAfghanistan.MilitaryoperationsinLibyahaveprovedthepo‐
tentialityofcombineduseofRPASandfighteraircraft.Inthe2015‐2025
timeframe, RPAS contribution to air operations is expected to grow in
quantitative and qualitative terms because these platforms provide a
valuable combination of endurance, connectivity, flexibility, autonomy
and efficiency.20 Particularly, endurance is increased as human limita‐
tionsdonotapply:forexample,themaximumnumberofhoursapilot
can fly per mission through a manned aircraft is extended by aircrew
turnoverinthecontrolroompilotingtheRPAS.Moreover,thefactthat
RPASdonotputaircrews’lifeatriskdoeseasesomepoliticalconcerns
increasinglydiffusedinWesterncountriesregardingtheuseofAirPow‐
er.However,RPASarelikelytocomplementbutnottoreplacemanned
fighteraircraftbecauseofanumberofreasons.Infact,fromapolitical
pointofview,Europeanauthoritiesandpublicopinion–includingItal‐
19Interviewdated13December2013.
20 Alessandro Marrone, Alessandro R. Ungaro, “The Evolution of AGC: Power and
Technology”,inClaudioCatalano ed. , Globalcommons:threatoropportunity?,Roma,
Finmeccanica Research Department, October 2013, pp. 19‐26, http://www.finmeccani
ca.com/documents/10437/7958427/body_FIN_OP_Global_Commons_V2.pdf.
96
4. THE MILITARY NEEDS OF ITALIAN ARMED FORCES AND THE F-35 PROGRAMME
ianones–aremuchlessateasethanAmericanstohavecombatRPAS
operatingwithoutamaninthecockpit,eveniftheyareremotelypiloted
fromthecontrolroomandarenotfullyautonomous.Furthermore,Eu‐
ropeanshaveissuedstrictrulesofengagementconcerningmilitaryop‐
erations, and are likely to establish comparably severe limits to the
weaponscarriedonbyRPASandtheirrelease,particularlywithregard
to automated weapons’ release.21 From a military point of view, RPAS
willnotbeabletoreachtheperformancesofa5thgenerationfighterair‐
craft in terms of speed, manoeuvrability and survivability. Therefore,
theywillnotbecapabletoreplacefighteraircraftinthemostdemand‐
ing tasks concerning Control of the Air and Engagement roles. It is not
byaccidentthatthemajorproducersworldwideofRPAS,theUSandIs‐
rael, have decided to procure on a large scale a 5th generation fighter
aircraftsuchasF‐35:theyplantohaveabalancedfleetofmannedand
remotely piloted aircraft. The future of Air Power, at least until the
2030‐2040timeframe,willlikelyseeacomplementaryutilizationof5th
generation aircraft and RPAS, with almost no possibility of a complete
replacement of manned platforms by remotely piloted ones.22 The re‐
quirementtomaintainfighteraircraftcapabilityregardsallmajorEuro‐
peancountries.Withouttheavailabilityofstrategicbomber–whichthe
UShavemaintained–theonlywayforEuropeanstocontinueperform‐
ing air‐to‐ground attacks is through this kind of aircraft, whose range
can be extended by air‐to‐air refuelling, long‐range weapons systems23
and/orforwardbasing–alsothroughcarriersiftheaircraftareableto
landontheseships.
Having said that, it is worth considering Italian needs derived from
the considered international missions in terms of air capabilities, par‐
ticularlyfighteraircraft.Firstofall,interoperabilityiscrucialsinceItal‐
ianaircapabilitieshavealwaysoperatedwithincoalitionpredominantly
composed by NATO members. Most of the time the US had a leading
role, although in Bosnia‐Herzegovina and Libya American role was not
asdominantasinAfghanistan,KosovoandIraq.WhileinmostcasesUK
21Ibid.
22Interviewsdated10December2013and21January2014.
23Interviewdated21January2014.
97
THE ROLE OF ITALIAN FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: TRENDS AND NEEDS
and France have been major contributors, countries like Germany, the
Netherlands, Canada, Denmark and Norway have assumed relevant
rolesinsomeoperations.AlsofromaUSperspective,operatingwithina
coalitionresultswaymoreconvenientandefficientthanoperatingonits
own because it allows to share an operation’s military, economic and
politicalcosts.24AccordingtoNATOofficialdefinition,interoperabilityis
“the ability to act together coherently, effectively and efficiently to
achieve Allied tactical, operational and strategic objectives.”25 In other
words, it refers to the ability to jointly operate with allies in terms of
platforms, systems, technologies, communications, tactics, procedures,
trainingandlogistics.Therearevariousaspectsandlevelsofinteroper‐
ability.Obviously,havingthesameaircraftwiththesamesystems,tech‐
nologies and communications, including the same cockpit and display,
allows reaching the highest level of interoperability in crisis manage‐
ment operations, but also in terms of training and logistics. The more
the aircraft are interoperable, the more effective is their joint deploy‐
mentintheoperationaltheatre.
Second, it is fundamental the capacity to connect aircraft to other
platformssuchasfighterorRPAS,aswellastounitsoperatingonthe
ground,andtocommandandcontrolcentreswherevertheyarelocated
–i.e.intheoperationaltheatreorinthehomeland.Theexponentialin‐
novationexperiencedinthelasttwodecadesintheInformationCom‐
munication Technology ICT field has radically changed the ways
economiesandsocietieswork.Obviously,themilitaryhasbeeninvest‐
edbythischangetoo,forcingNATOarmedforcestoexploitnewpoten‐
tialities to connect through the cyberspace single elements in the air,
land, sea and space domains. In 2002, at the NATO Summit in Prague,
some important steps were taken in this direction, such as the allies’
commitment to acquire a set of core capabilities including a Network
Enabled Capability NEC to implement such a transformation pro‐
gress.ThroughNEC,NATOplannedtocombinediversetraditional,pro‐
cedural, technical, organizational and human elements from different
24Interviewdated10December2013.
25 NATO Standardization Agency, NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions, Edition
2013,http://nsa.nato.int/nsa/zPublic/ap/aap6/AAP‐6.pdf.
98
4. THE MILITARY NEEDS OF ITALIAN ARMED FORCES AND THE F-35 PROGRAMME
agencies into a single network, with the objective of enabling interac‐
tion to achieve and maintain significant strategic superiority.26 A plat‐
formisconsidered“netcentric”whenitisfullyabletogatheranddis‐
seminateinformation–andorders–fromandtotheothernodesofthe
net.Thisiscrucialinordertolettheaircraftexploitingnotonlytheda‐
ta gathered from its own sensors, but also the huge amount of data
madeavailablebyavarietyofsensorsmanagedbyanumberofinter‐
connected nodes. This include satellite imagery, information gathered
bySpecialForcesonthegroundorothermannedaircraft,intelligence
providedbyRPAS,andsofarandsoon.
ThisinturncreatesamuchbetterSA,thataccordingtoNATOofficial
definitionisthe“theknowledgeoftheelementsinthebattle‐spacenec‐
essary to make well‐informed decisions.”27 This means a complete, ac‐
curate and real‐time knowledge of the operational theatre including
friendly,opponentandotherelementspresentbothintheairspaceand
onthesurface onthegroundoratsea .AnefficientSAisthenecessary
pre‐conditiontoachieveanumberofgoals.First,itallowsapreciseen‐
gagementoftargets,whichreducestheriskofcollateraldamagesatthe
lowest possible level, which means a more limited number of victims
among non‐combatants in the operational theatre. This is becoming a
more and moreimportantpoliticalcaveatposed bycivilian authorities
to military operations, because of a number of reasons including the
abilityofoldandnew mediatospreadimmediatelyworldwideimages
and videos of collateral damages and the sensitivity of Western public
opinioninthisregard.Moreover,suchSAgreatlyincreasestheaircrew
capacity to detect, pre‐empt and counter threats, thus augmenting the
survivability of the aircraft and its chances to come back home from
eachmission.AlreadyduringKosovoaircampaignin1999thishasbeen
astrictrequisiteimposedbythepoliticalauthoritiestothemilitaryop‐
eration, and this will likely be a binding condition also in the planning
andconductoffuturecrisismanagementoperations.
26MicheleNonesandAlessandroMarrone eds. ,“ThetransformationoftheArmed
Forces: the Forza NEC Programme”, in IAI Research Papers, No. 6 October 2012 ,
http://www.iai.it/content.asp?langid 2&contentid 804.
27NATOStandardizationAgency,NATOGlossaryofTermsandDefinitions,cit.
99
THE ROLE OF ITALIAN FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: TRENDS AND NEEDS
A third crucial need is the radar low‐observability of the platform.
The aircraft survivability depends on a number of elements, including
speed, manoeuvrability and SA. In this context, the radar low‐
observability – the so‐called “stealthness” – assumes a particular im‐
portance, as it greatly decreases the chances of an aircraft to be shut
downbyopponent’sairdefencesystems,anditsaircrewtobekilledor
imprisoned.28Specifically,AirObservabilitydependsonanumberoffac‐
tors:theairframe’sdesign,whichmayreducetheradarsignature;spe‐
cific paintings applicable to the aircraft’s surface; the fact that aircraft
reliesonnet‐centriccommunicationtoexchangedataanddoesnotre‐
quirepilotstoflyclosetoeachother,ortocommunicateviaradiowhich
couldbedetectedbyopponent’ssystems.29
Finally, the fact that all considered crisis management operations
have taken place beyond national territory, and even at strategic dis‐
tance like in Iraq and Afghanistan, makes deployability another funda‐
mentalneedforItalianaircapabilities.Thedeployabilityofaircapabili‐
ties can increase proportionally to a number of elements, including:
range of the platform, capacity to carry on more fuel, ability to utilize
air‐to‐airrefuelling,andthecapacitytotakeoffandlandoncarriers,as
well as on basis with limited infrastructures and/or airways. Deploya‐
bilityalsodependsonthesupportpackagerequiredbytheaircraft,for
example in terms of logistics: the more logistic support is needed, the
lesstheplatformisdeployable.Withregardtocarriers,ithastobeno‐
ticedthattheItalianNavyhastoreplacetheageingAV‐8Bcurrentlyop‐
eratingfromthecarrierCavour,whichareexpectedtobephasedoutby
2020.Withoutaircraftabletolandverticallytheverysameutilityofthe
Cavourasacarrierwouldbequestioned,andthedeployabilityofItalian
AirPowerwouldbereduced.
28 On 18 January 1991, one of the Italian Tornado participating to First Gulf War
wasshutdownbyanIraqiairdefencesystem,andtheaircrew–theMajorGianmarco
BelliniandtheCaptainMaurizioCocciolone–hadtoejectfromtheaircraftwhileitwas
crashing.TheyhavebeencapturedbyIraqiarmedforces,tortured,andkeptprisoners
for44days.TheywerereleasedonMarch3rd,afterIraqwasdefeatedandacceptedthe
ceasefire.
29Interviewdated11December2013.
100
4. THE MILITARY NEEDS OF ITALIAN ARMED FORCES AND THE F-35 PROGRAMME
The importance of interoperability, net‐centric or network enabled
capabilities,deployabilityor“expeditionary”characterofmilitarycapa‐
bilities, has been recognized by a number of official documents issued
by the Italian Ministry of Defence and/or by single services, such as:
Concetto Strategico del Capo di Stato Maggiore della Difesa 2005 ,30
DottrinaMilitareItaliana 2011 ,31DocumentoProgrammaticoPlurien‐
nale per la Difesa per il triennio 2013‐2015 2013 ,32 Verso il 2018 –
Lineeguidaediindirizzostrategico 2013 .Infact,theneedofinterop‐
erable, net‐centric, expeditionary armed forces, including air capabili‐
ties,ispartofthetransformationtheItalianmilitaryexperiencedinthe
lasttwodecades,asaresultofthechangesintheinternationalsecurity
context,aswellasoftheoperationalexperienceinmissionsabroad.Alt‐
hough the requirements for the fighter aircraft scheduled to replace
Tornado,AMXandAV‐8Bhavebeendevelopedinthe1990s,thefollow‐
ingoperationalexperienceinKosovo,AfghanistanandLibyahasfurther
confirmedthecharactersofsuchrequirements.33
4.3 THIRD KEY QUESTION: WHAT PROCUREMENT
OPTIONS ARE AVAILABLE TO ACQUIRE THIS KIND
OF AIR CAPABILITIES?
IfitisassumedthatkeepingthecapacitytoprojectAirPowerthrough
crisis management operations does serve Italian defence and foreign
policy,andultimatelyItaly’snationalinterests;ifitisassumedthatcur‐
rentItalianfighteraircraftfleetneedstobereplacedinthenextdecade
30ItalianMinistryofDefence‐DefenceGeneralStaff,IlconcettostrategicodelCapodi
StatoMaggioredellaDifesa,cit.
31 Italian Ministry of Defence‐Defence General Staff, La dottrina militare italiana,
2011, http://www.difesa.it/SMD_/Staff/Reparti/III/CID/Dottrina/Pagine/Dottrina_Mili
tare_Italiana.aspx.
32 Italian Ministry of Defence, Documento Programmatico Pluriennale per la Difesa
per il triennio 2013‐2015, April 2013, http://www.difesa.it/Content/Documents/DPP_
2013_2015.pdf.
33Interviewdated21January2014.
101
THE ROLE OF ITALIAN FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: TRENDS AND NEEDS
by manned aircraft which should be interoperable, net‐centric, low‐
observable and deployable; then the next key question for civilian and
militarypolicy‐makersiswhatprocurementoptionsareavailabletoac‐
quirethekindofaircapabilitiesneededbyItaly.
In theory, a first option is to develop a European procurement pro‐
gramme bringing together Italy and other main European countries in
thefieldofdefence–namelyFrance,GermanyandtheUnitedKingdom
– to develop and produce a 5th generation fighter aircraft. On the one
hand,ifthishadbeendone,itwouldhaveprovidedthehighestlevelof
operational sovereignty34 and produced concrete positive consequenc‐
es,suchasaccesstonewtechnologies,updatesorupgrades,andbetter
security of supply, as well as the greatest technological and industrial
return on European industries.35 On the other hand, this option would
haveimpliedhighercosts,becauseEuropeangovernmentsshouldhave
borneontheirownalltheresearchanddevelopmentcostswithoutrely‐
ing on US investments, and without enjoying the decrease of unitary
costsbroughtbythelargenumberofaircraftproducedbyatransatlan‐
ticprogramme.Inanycase,suchaninvestmentshouldhavebeendone
inthemid‐1990sthroughanimmediateandsignificantEuropeanfund‐
ingofresearchanddevelopmentactivities,inordertodeliverafighter
capability by 2020‐2025. In fact, twenty/twenty‐five years have been
thetime‐spanneededbyotherlarge‐scaleandhigh‐techEuropeanpro‐
34 The definitions of “operational sovereignty” vary according to the subject ana‐
lyzed.Forexample,fromanindustrial/technologicalperspective,thetermindicatesthe
ability to use the respective armed forces’ capabilities with appropriate government
control and without third party constraints. It is understood to rely on access to tech‐
nology and definition for development, configuration management, and upgrade and
security of supply for availability assurance , dealing with globalization of the supply
chain.Similarly,afurtherdefinitionmoreclosetoaplatformperspectivecanbededuct‐
edbyquotingtheUKGeneralSirKevinO’Donoghue:“operationalsovereigntyistheabil‐
itytousetheplatformanditsweaponssystemanditsISTARsystemsinthewaywe,the
UK,wishtoatthetimeandplaceofourchoosing”.HouseofCommons‐DefenceCommit‐
tee, DefenceEquipment2009,ThirdReportofSession2008‐09 HC107 ,http://www.
publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmdfence/107/8112501.htm.
35MicheleNones,GiovanniGaspariniandAlessandroMarrone,“EuropeandtheF‐35
JointStrikeFighter JSF Program”,inIAIQuaderni.EnglishSeries,No.16 July2009 ,
p.8,http://www.iai.it/content.asp?langid 2&contentid 143.
102
4. THE MILITARY NEEDS OF ITALIAN ARMED FORCES AND THE F-35 PROGRAMME
curement programmes, such as Eurofighter, from the beginning of re‐
searchactivitiestothedeliveryofthefirstoperationalaircraft.Europe‐
ans countries decided not to make such an investment, either because
they preferred to allocate resources in a national procurement pro‐
gramme, like France, or because they opted to cut defence budget to
harvesttheso‐called“peacedividend,”likeGermanyandothers.Today
there is no political will in Europe to undertake this path, and even if
European countries will decide to reinvest in this kind of programme,
thefirstaircraftwouldnotbeavailablebefore2035.Insum,thisoption
is off the table because of the choices made by major European coun‐
tries back in the 1990s. Military procurement is a long‐term process,
therefore certain choices have to be made well before capability gaps
arises.
Theoretically,asecondoptiontoobtaintheaircapabilitiesneededby
Italytoreplacetheoldoneswouldbetodevelopandbuilda5thgenera‐
tion, ground‐attack version of Eurofighter, the 4th generation air‐to‐air
fighter aircraft developed by Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK in the
1980sandacquiredinthe2000s.Thiswouldhavehadpositivebenefits
intermsofoperationalsovereignty,industrialandtechnologicalreturn.
Moreover,iftheEurofighterfleetcurrentlyusedforair‐to‐airsuperiori‐
ty would have been coupled with a ground‐attack version of the same
aircraft,interoperabilitywithinItalianaircapabilitieswouldhavebeen
evengreater.ThisoptionhasbeensubjectofdebateinItalyinJanuary
2014,whenagroupofprogressivelaw‐makersoftheItalianParliament
putforwardtheideatoreducethenumberofF‐35tobeprocuredand
increasethenumberofEurofighterasapossiblewaytorealizebudget‐
ary savings and to support European and Italian defence industry.36
Previously, the Italian participation to the F‐35 programme has been
criticised by other columnists supporting the continuation of the Eu‐
rofighterprogramme.37However,thechoicetomakeEurofighterafully‐
36 Alberto Custodero, “Costano troppo, megliogli Eurofighter: il Pd vuol dimezzare
l’acquistodegliF35”,in Repubblica, 1February2014,http://www.repubblica.it/ politi‐
ca/2014/02/01/news/f35_pd_dimezza_acquisto‐77429492.
37GianandreaGaiani,“F‐35:Chihapauradimettercilafaccia?”,in AnalisidiDifesa,
15July2013,http://www.analisidifesa.it/?p 4374.
103
THE ROLE OF ITALIAN FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: TRENDS AND NEEDS
fledged ground attack aircraft should have been taken in the early
2000s, through significant European joint investments in research and
developmentactivities,aimingtomodifyanaircraftwhichwasnotorig‐
inallydesignedtofulfilsucharole.Again,thishasnotbeendonebyEu‐
ropeans, while the aforementioned absence of political will in Europe
hasbeenepitomizedbythereductionanddelaysaffectingthepurchase
ofEurofighter’s3rdtranche.Evenifsuchapoliticalwillmaterialize,the
resultswouldnotbeavailablebefore2025.Besides,inrecentyearsthe
UKhasmadeaninvestmenttodevelopaground‐attackversionofpart
ofitsEurofighterfleet,mainlyinordertofilltheexistinggapuntiltheF‐
35 will be procured, albeit with contested results. In fact, it is unlikely
thatamodifiedversionofa4thgenerationaircraftcouldreachthesame
advancedtechnologicallevelensuredbya5thgenerationaircraft,forin‐
stance in terms of low‐observability, network enabled capabilities and
data fusion.38 The Eurofighter was designed in the 1980s to perform a
certain role and without the “open architecture” indispensable to pro‐
ceed to a further transformation or to plug new systems in – which
wouldhaveimpliedsignificantinvestmentsanduncertainresultsinre‐
gard to the attainable technological level.39 A high technological level
willberequiredinfutureairoperationsinordertoensurethesurviva‐
bilityoftheaircraft.40Assuch,AirForcesthatwilloperateunderacer‐
taintechnologicalthresholdarelikelytobeexcludedbythecoregroup
ofcountriesrunningmissionsabroad.Thereasonisthatthepresencein
theatreofaircraftwithoutlowobservabilityfeaturescouldendangerthe
rest of low observable platforms by signalling to enemy radars the air
sortie.41Inanycase,asamatteroffact,alsothisoptionisoffthetable
because of the decisions made by European countries in the last two
decades.42
ThethirdandlastoptiontosatisfyItalianmilitaryneedsintermsof
38Interviewsdated10November2013,10December2013,11December2013,23
January2014.
39Interview21January2014.
40Interviewdated10December2013.
41Interviewsdated10November2013and11December2013.
42Interviewdated10November2013.
104
4. THE MILITARY NEEDS OF ITALIAN ARMED FORCES AND THE F-35 PROGRAMME
fighteraircraftistoacquireF‐35.TheF‐35isasupersonic,single‐seat,
single‐engine, fighter bomber. Three different variants are being pro‐
duced: a Conventional Take‐Off and Landing version CTOL, F‐35A ; a
ShortTake‐OffandVerticalLandingversion STOVLF‐35B ,fittedwith
auniquepropulsionsystemthatallowsittooperatefrommedium‐sized
shipsandlimitedairstrips,drawingupontheexperiencegatheredwith
theAV‐8B;aCarrierVersion CV,F‐35C ,deemedtotakeofffromcon‐
ventionalaircraftcarriersequippedwithCatapultAssistedTakeOffBut
ArrestedRecovery CATOBAR .Itisestimatedthatmorethan3,100F‐
35aircraftwillbeprocured,2,44343ofwhichfortheUSAirForce,Navy
andMarineCorps,andtherestforother12countries:Australia,Canada,
Denmark,Japan,Israel,Italy,theNetherlands,Norway,Singapore,South
Korea, Turkey and the United Kingdom. That means that the F‐35 will
becomeinthenextdecadethefighteraircraftmostusedworldwide,and
the “backbone of next generation NATO operations.”44 From a US per‐
spective,theF‐35asmultiroleaircraftwillreplaceF‐16,F‐18andother
ageingfighteraircrafttocarryontasksincluding:deepattack;CloseAir
Supportwithgreataccuracy;thewholerangeofISTARtasks;jamming
andelectronicwarfaretasks;complementingF‐22fighter,whichispro‐
ducedinlimitednumbers,toensureairsuperiority.45
The F‐35 presents the advanced features typical of 5th generation
fighteraircraft.First,itisaplatformequippedwithsensorsandcompu‐
tingcapacityfordatafusioninanet‐centricperspective.Thatmeansthe
pilotdoesnotreceiveseparatedatafromdifferentsources,whichhehas
tomentallycombineintoacoherentpicture:heratherdirectlyreceives
a single, integrated and accurate picture with all data already verified,
correlated and fused.46 According to testing pilots, this data fusion is a
43 US Government Accountability Office, F‐35 Joint StrikeFighter: Program has im‐
provedinsomeareasbutaffordabilitychallengesandotherrisksremain,17April2013,
http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/653857.pdf.
44JAPCC,“F‐35,TheBackboneofNextGenerationNATOOperations”,in JAPCCJour‐
nal, No. 18 Autumn‐Winter 2013 , pp. 74‐78, http://www.japcc.org/publications/
journal/Journal/2013‐09‐23‐JAPCC_Journal_Ed‐18_web.pdf.
45Interviewdated10December2013.
46Ibid.
105
THE ROLE OF ITALIAN FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: TRENDS AND NEEDS
leapforwardintermsofSituationalAwareness.47BecauseofF‐35’snet‐
centriccharacter,informationcanbeimmediatelysharedwithotherF‐
35 through Link 16 data‐link. This means that every aircraft provides
thepilotagreaterSituationalAwarenessthankstobothitssensorsuite˗
whichincludesradar,infraredsensors,electro‐opticalcamera,electron‐
icwarfaresystems˗andthoseofotheraircraftflyingindifferentparts
of the battle‐space. Data fusion from different sensors also increases
cyber‐security of air operations, because if one sensor is disrupted,
jammed or spoofed, reliable data can be provided by other sensors.48
Theincreasedrangeofsensors,theirnet‐centric character,data fusion
andthefactthatthesamepictureisprovidedtoallpilotsflyingF‐35in‐
creaseboththesurvivabilityoftheaircraftandtheprecisionofengage‐
ment thanksalsotoPrecisionGuidedMunitions thusreducingtherisk
ofcollateral damages.Thesecondcharacterofa 5thgenerationaircraft
liketheF‐35isitslowobservability.Thisisensuredbyanumberofel‐
ements,forexample,thedesignoftheairframeandthefactthatweap‐
onsarestoredininternalbays,whichreduceaircraft’sradarsignature.
A specific painting also reduces aircraft’s observability, while the fact
that information can be shared without radio communication prevents
communicationstobecapturedbyenemyradars.Thelowobservability
hasthepotentialitytoradicallychangetacticsandwaystoconductair
operations,asdemonstratedbythefirstpilots’training.49
Moreover,F‐35’sinternalbays–whereweaponsarelocated–allow
greaterspeedandmanoeuvrabilityduringmissionswhentheaircraftis
loaded up of missiles and other weapons, because the platform’s aero‐
dynamics is not affected by additional external volumes. This, in turn,
reduces the fuel consumption, while increasing aircraft range and per‐
sistence. That means also the F‐35 needs less air‐to‐air refuelling than
4th generation aircraft, thus ensuring greater deployability in crisis
managementoperations.Deployabilityisalsoimprovedbythefactthat
the F‐35 requires less support packages than 4th generation aircraft,
since it is a multirole platform able to perform simultaneously ISTAR,
47Interviewdated19November2013
a .
b .
49Interviewsdated19November2013 b and10December2013.
48Interviewdated19November2013
106
4. THE MILITARY NEEDS OF ITALIAN ARMED FORCES AND THE F-35 PROGRAMME
electronic warfare and Engagement, with high survivability.50 At the
sametime,interoperabilityamongthethreeF‐35variantsisensuredby
the high degree of commonalities, in particular regarding cockpit, mis‐
sions systems, engine, communication systems and pilot’s helmets.51
Themaintenanceandrepairactivitiesalsobenefitfromthishighdegree
of commonalities, because in most cases the same spare parts can be
usedforallthreevariantsoftheF‐35.TheverysamefacttheF‐35will
replacethreedifferentaircraftoftheItalianNavyandAirForces Tor‐
nado, AMX and AV‐8B with three different maintenance and logistics
requirementswillreducethecosttooperateandmaintainthemthrough
their life‐cycle. Thanks to the significant commonalities among the dif‐
ferentversionsoftheF‐35,thepresenceofbothF‐35AandF‐35Bwithin
the Italian fleet should not represent a problem, also because the Air
Force is already used to different versions for example of Tornados –
namely ECR and IDS versions.52 Interoperability among US and NATO
allieswillbegreaterforthosecountriesacquiringF‐35becausetheair‐
craftarethesame,producedbythesameassemblylines.Theonlymain
difference will regard the software, as single nations require different
software,forexample,tofitdiverseweaponssystemsproducedbyna‐
tionalindustries.Yet,thisdoesnotcreateaproblemintermsofinterop‐
erability or maintenance because the software’ upgrade is more eco‐
nomicandaffordablethanchangesinthehardware53–asithappensfor
civilianinformationandcommunicationtechnology.
Net‐centric and low observability features make the F‐35 different
from advanced 4th generation aircraft such as Eurofighter and Rafale.
TheF‐35isinfacta5thgenerationmultiroleaircraft,whosehighsurviv‐
abilityandinteroperabilitymakeitsuitabletobedeployedfortasksin
distanttheatres.54
In conclusion, among the three theoretical possibilities, the F‐35 is
50Interview19November2013
a ,10December2013,11December2013.
a .
52Interviewdated6December2013.
53Interviewdated19November2013 b .
54MicheleNones,GiovanniGaspariniandAlessandroMarrone,“EuropeandtheF‐35
JointStrikeFighter JSF Program”,cit.,pp.9‐10.
51Interviewdated19November2013
107
THE ROLE OF ITALIAN FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: TRENDS AND NEEDS
the only available option for Italy to procure an interoperable, net‐
centric,low‐observableandhighlydeployablefighteraircraft.
This option has been debated in Italy, particularly since 2012, and
differentcriticshavebeenraisedbythoseopposingtheprocurementof
thisaircraft.55AfirstcriticregardsthehighcostoftheF‐35incompari‐
sonwith otherfighter aircraft,with differentestimatesaired bydiffer‐
entsources,suchasthenewscirculatedonJune2013thateachF‐35to
be acquired by Italy will cost 155 million.56 Some of these critics are
basedonin‐correct,partialorolddata.Infact,asexplainedinthenext
chapter on the F‐35 programme and Italy, the unitary cost of each air‐
craft decreases over time, because the overall non‐recurrent costs are
subdivided into greater number of produced units – as it happens to
otherlarge‐scalecivilianproductions.WhilethefirstF‐35Aprocuredby
theUSdidcost215milliondollar,thefirstF‐35tobeacquiredbyItaly
will cost around 130 million dollar and the price will further decrease
downto85millioninthenextphaseoffullrateproduction.
Asecondkindofobjectionaffirmsthatsuchan“enormousandpro‐
longedprocurementprogrammeisunabletoguaranteepeaceandsecu‐
ritybecauseitisdesignedforaglobalcontext theColdWar different
fromtoday’sone.”57However,thisprogrammebegunseveralyearsafter
the collapse of the Soviet Union, taking into account the uncertainties
andchangingcharacterofthecurrentinternationalsystem.Indeed,the
F‐35 is not designed with the primary purpose to perform air‐to‐air
combat,likepreviousUSplatformssuchastheF‐22.TheF‐35israther
designedtobeamulti‐rolefighter,withprimaryair‐to‐groundcapacity
andtheabilitytocontributetoair‐to‐aircombat.58Thatmeansitisbuilt
55ForananalysisofthecriticsonF‐35procurementprogrammeseeMicheleNones,
“IlcaproespiatorioF‐35”,presentationholdattheconferenceorganizedbytheItalian
CentreforAeronauticalMilitaryStudies“GiulioDohuet”on14May2013,http://www.
aeronautica.difesa.it/News/Pagine/IlCaproEspiatorioF‐35.aspx.
56 Luigi Grassia, “F35, pieno di guai ma difficile da eliminare”, in La Stampa, 27 June
2013, http://www.lastampa.it/2013/06/27/italia/cronache/f‐pieno‐di‐guai‐ma‐difficile‐
da‐eliminare‐2tnKEoVCydUAtDlmwAKoaK/pagina.html.
57CampagnaTaglialealiallearmi, CacciaF‐35Laveritàoltrel’opacità,18February
2014,http://www.disarmo.org/nof35/docs/4642.pdf.
58Indeed,Canada,theNetherlandsandNorwaywilluseF‐35aircraftalsoforair‐to‐
108
4. THE MILITARY NEEDS OF ITALIAN ARMED FORCES AND THE F-35 PROGRAMME
to fulfil the kinds of tasks experienced in international missions in the
last24years,suchassuppressionofenemyairdefenceand/orprecise
striketoestablishandenforceano‐flyzone,CloseAirSupporttoground
troops deployed in the operational theatre subject to ground‐based
threats,andISTAR.
A third group of critics denounces the technical problems occurred
during the F‐35 procurement programme, for example regarding the
aircraft’s software, engine and helmets. Again, some of the critics are
based on in‐correct or partial data. For example, the fact that the air‐
craft’s design makes it more difficult for the pilot to see directly back‐
wardsbymovinghishead59isnotarealissuebecause,asmentionedbe‐
fore, the pilot receives straight in the helmet an integrated picture of
bothimagesanddatacomingfromthesixcamerasmountedindifferent
partsoftheaircraft,aswellasfromothersensorspositionednotonlyon
hisaircraft,butalsoonotherF‐35ordifferentplatformspartofthemili‐
tarynet.Incontrast,othercriticsarewell‐groundedandbaseduponre‐
altechnicalproblemsoccurredduringtheprogramme.Thekeyissueis
whether these real problems are a normal part of the research, devel‐
opment and testing activities, as for any technologically advanced pro‐
curement programme, or they are so exceptional to make the aircraft
notworthytobeprocured.Attheendoftheday,threeofthemosthigh‐
tech armed forces in the world – American, British and Israeli ones –
have chosen to buy an overall number of 2,600 F‐35, while other 556
aircraft are set to be procured by technologically advanced militaries
such those of Australia, Canada, Denmark, Japan, Netherlands, Norway
andSouthKorea.Thisdemonstratesthat,despiteitstechnicalproblems,
the F‐35 represents the next Air Power’s military and technological
frontier, a frontier which NATO members and partners seem deter‐
minedtoexplore.
airoperations.
59GianlucaDiFeo,“F‐35:tuttalaverità”,inL’Espresso,26June2013,http://espres‐
so.repubblica.it/attualita/cronaca/2013/06/26/news/f35‐tutta‐la‐verita‐1.55939.
109
THE ROLE OF ITALIAN FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: TRENDS AND NEEDS
4.4 FORTH KEY QUESTION: IT IS BETTER TO BUY F-35
“OFF-THE-SHELF” OR TO PARTICIPATE IN THE
MULTINATIONAL PROCUREMENT PROGRAMME?
IfitisassumedthattheF‐35istheonlyavailableoptionto procurean
interoperable,net‐centric,low‐observableandhighlydeployablefighter
aircraft to satisfy Italy’s military needs to participate in crisis manage‐
mentoperations,thelastkeyquestionforpolicy‐makersregardshowto
procureit.Inprinciple,twooptionsareavailable.Ontheonehand,one
mightbuyit“off‐the‐shelf,”thatmeanstobuytheaircraftinthemarket‐
place when it is already developed and produced on a large scale – in
Italianitwouldbesaid“chiaviinmano.”Ontheotherhand,onemight
participateinitsdevelopmentandproduction,investingintheresearch
anddevelopmentphasesandinvolvingnationalindustries.
Fromamilitarypointofview,participatingfromthebeginninginthe
procurementprogrammebringsthreemainpositiveeffects.First,ital‐
lowstoreceivethefirstaircraftalreadyin2016andtoproceedwiththe
replacementoftheageingfleet–Tornado,AMX,AV‐8B–withoutexpe‐
riencingcapabilitiesgap.Thisensurestokeeptheabilitytoparticipate
in missions abroad in the 2015‐2025 timeframe, and to not spend fur‐
therfundstoleaseaircrafttofilleventualgaps,ashappenedwiththeF‐
16intherecentpast.Second,participationinthedevelopmentandpro‐
ductionoftheaircraftincreasestheoperationalsovereignty,60whichis
near‐zeroincaseofthe“off‐the‐shelf”acquisition.Thatmeansinteralia
being more able to operate, modify and upgrade the aircraft according
to national needs and timeline. Third, being a fully‐fledged part of the
programme allows Italian pilots to start sooner rather than later their
training with American and other aircrews, with obvious benefits in
termsofinteroperabilitywithUSandmajorNATOpartners.
On the other hand, participation in the procurement programme
bringstwomoreadditionalcosts.First,ItalyalsocontributedtotheF‐35
research and development activities by investing 1,028 million euro in
60Interviewdated10December2013.
110
4. THE MILITARY NEEDS OF ITALIAN ARMED FORCES AND THE F-35 PROGRAMME
2002.61Second,thebuiltupoftheFinalAssemblyandCheckOut FACO ofCamericosted775millioneuro.62Bothfundscouldhavebeensaved
by acquiring F‐35 “off‐the‐shelf.” However, the Italian military would
have needed to build a proper capacity for maintenance, upgrade and
logisticstooperatethefleetof90F‐35–bothCTOLandSTOVLversions
–forthenextthreeorfourdecadesinanycase.ThecreationofCameri
FACOaspartoftheprocurementprogrammemeansthatItalianMinis‐
tryofDefencewillnotspendfurtherbudgettobuildaredundantfacili‐
ty,astheFACOisalreadysettobecometheMaintenanceRepairOver‐
haul and Upgrade MRO&U centre for Italian F‐35. This prevents the
expensive duplication experienced in past procurement programmes,
whentherewerebothanindustrialfacilityfortheFACOandamilitary
facilityfortheMRO&U.Hence,thisensuresamoreeffectiveandefficient
management of the aircraft through its entire life‐cycle.63 By using the
samefacilityfortheentireItalianfleetofF‐35,significantsavingscanbe
made, while a more rapid replacement of spare parts can also be fa‐
voured.64SincetheF‐35isexpectedtoremaininservicefor35‐40years,
this would be a significant improvement in the way funds are spent in
defence procurements, something which could not happen if Italy had
bought F‐35 “off‐the‐shelf.” Moreover, having the FACO within the
Camerimilitarymulti‐functionalcenterforaero‐tacticalaircraftdoesal‐
lowthearmedforcestobetterknowtheplatformalreadyduringtheas‐
semblyphases,thusincreasingoperationalsovereignty.65
A third issue concerning whether participating in the procurement
programme or buying F‐35 “off‐the‐shelf” regards the timeline of air‐
craft’s acquisition and its related cost. As in any procurement pro‐
gramme, the F‐35’s cost curve decreases over time and then stabilizes
itself. The very first aircraft are more expensive because they bear the
61Nothwithstandingtherisingcostsoftheresearchanddevelopmentactivities,Ital‐
iancontributiondidnotincreaseastheUnitedStatestookchargeoftheseextracosts.
62 Italian Chamber of Deputies‐Defence Committee, Programma pluriennale di A/R
n. SMD 02/2009…, 25 March 2009, http://documenti.camera.it/leg16/resoconti/com
missioni/bollettini/pdf/2009/03/25/leg.16.bol0157.data20090325.com04.pdf.
63Interviewdated6December2013.
64Interviewdated21January2014.
65Interviewdated6December2013.
111
THE ROLE OF ITALIAN FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: TRENDS AND NEEDS
cost,delaysandproblemsoccurredinthedevelopmentandproduction
phases of a new platform. Then, the so‐called “learning curve” makes
productionmoreefficient,andtheincreasenumberofaircraftproduced
peryearbringsunitarycostsdown–asithappensincivilianproduction
too.ThisisoneofthereasonsF‐35 productionisstructuredaccording
toseveralLowRateInitialProductionPhases LRIP ,beforemovingto
thefullrateproduction.Thebillofthefirstaircraftproducedbythefirst
LRIP LRIP1 andacquiredbytheUSwasaround215milliondollar.In
contrast, the cost of the aircraft being produced by the sixth LRIP
LRIP6 , which is going to be acquired by the US, the UK and Italy,
shrinkstoaround130milliondollar–asimilarcosttoalessadvanced
4th generation fighter aircraft. According to Lockheed Martin’s official
estimates, the F‐35 aircraft produced by the full rate production will
cost about 85 million dollar. This is important because each country
paystheaircraftprocuredtheexactcostofeverydifferentLRIP,which
meansdifferentcostsovertime.ItalyhaschosentostartbuyingF‐35at
LRIP6inordertobalance,ontheonehand,theneedtoavoidcapability
gaps since ageing aircraft will inevitably phased out, and on the other
hand, the goal to save money by paying a lower price in comparison
withthefirstfiveLRIPs.IfItalyhadprocuredF‐35“off‐the‐shelf,”itmay
haveenteredLRIP8orLRIP9thussavingfewdozensofmillionsofeuro.
However,inthiscase,itshouldalsobeconsideredthecoststomaintain
in use the ageing Tornado and AMX fleet for more years, and/or costs
associated with leasing other platforms to fill eventual capability gaps.
Inthepast,Italyfacedasimilarchoiceafterdecidingtoextendthelifeof
the ageing Starfighter: the delays of the Eurofighter programme re‐
quired gap fillers identified initially in the Tornado ADV’s leased from
UK whichwasbyfarmoreexpensivethanenvisaged andlaterinF‐16
leased from the US. The expenditures made to lease these aircraft did
notentailanybenefitintermsofindustrialandtechnologicalreturnsfor
Italiandefenceindustry.
Fromadefenceindustrialpolicy’spointofview,66themaindifference
66ForadetailedhistoryofItalianaeronauticindustryseeGregoryAlegi, Involoda
100anni.Lastoriadell’industriaaeronauticaitalianadal1913adAleniaAermacchi,No‐
vara,DeAgostini,2013.
112
4. THE MILITARY NEEDS OF ITALIAN ARMED FORCES AND THE F-35 PROGRAMME
between participating in the procurement programme and acquiring
aircraft“off‐the‐shelf”isthatindustrialreturn,technologytransferand
creation of qualified jobs is much lower in the second case than in the
firstone.InItaly,theNationalArmamentsDirector SegretariatoGener‐
aleDifesa/DirezioneNazionaleArmamentiSGD/DNA hasthemandate
tosafeguardandsupportItaliandefenceindustrybyLaw.67TheNation‐
al Armaments Director, in liaison with single technical services arma‐
mentoffices,underthepoliticalauthorityoftheMinistryofDefence,has
traditionally worked to conduct a defence industrial policy coherent
withtheoperationalneedsofthearmedforces.
Asmentionedbefore,Europeansdidnotinvestinafollow‐upofthe
Eurofighterinthe1990sand2000s.Atthesametime,theUSofferedto
majorEuropeanalliesthepossibilitytojointheF‐35procurementpro‐
gramme.Fromadefenceindustrialpolicy’spointofview,theItaliande‐
cisiontojointhismultinational,US‐ledprogrammemadesensebecause
of two main reasons. First, it allowed enjoying a positive industrial re‐
turnintermsofproductionandmaintenance,inlinewithpreviousex‐
periences.Thisreturnalsoinvolvesadvancedtechnologies,forexample
withregardtothemachinerynecessarytoworkontheaircraftandthe
related know‐how.68 Above all, it provided the opportunity to partici‐
pateinthedevelopmentactivities,aswellasintheproductionandas‐
semblyphases.ThiswasauniqueopportunitytolettheItalianindustry
worknotonlyon4thgenerationaircraftbutalsoon5thgenerationones,
whichisatechnologicalleapforwardwithsignificantandpositiveindus‐
trialeffects.69
Besidestheprimarymilitaryrationaletoreplaceageingandobsolete
aircraftwithnewones,andthesecondaryindustrialrationale,twoother
reasonsmotivatethechoicetojointheF‐35procurementprogramme.70
67Art.41oftheLegislativeDecreeNo.66of15March2010:Codicedell’ordinamento
militare G.U. No. 106 of 8 May 2010 , p. 66, http://www.normattiva.it/uri‐res/N2Ls?
urn:nir:stato:decreto‐legislativo:2010‐03‐15;66.
68Interviewdated23January2014.
69Interviewsdated21January2014and23January2014.
70 Alessandro Marrone, “Italy and the F‐35: Rationales and costs”, in International
Journal,Vol.68,No.1 Winter2012‐13 ,pp.31‐48.
113
THE ROLE OF ITALIAN FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: TRENDS AND NEEDS
First, it is a multinational programme envisaging the participation of
eight Allied countries, including seven NATO members and three EU
members. The multinational rationale is important as far as joint pro‐
curements not only ensures greater interoperability, but also contrib‐
utes to share the costs of programmes which are simply un‐affordable
on a national basis. Finally, it enhances defence and political ties with
partnercountries.Theforthrationaleistransatlantic.Asmentionedbe‐
fore,theUSisstillItaly’smainallyinthedefencefield.Infact,whiledur‐
ingtheColdWaritrepresentedthebedrockofEuropeanandItalianse‐
curity, also in the post‐Cold War period the US has led the majority of
crisis management operations in which Italy was involved, from Iraq
andBosnia‐HerzegovinatoKosovoandAfghanistan.Inthiscontext,the
defence procurement cooperation is part of a wider transatlantic rela‐
tion,whichovertheyearshasbeenconsideredbydifferentItaliangov‐
ernmentoneoftheprioritiesofItaly’sdefenceandforeignpolicy.71
71 On the link between political, diplomatic and defence cooperation between Italy
and the US in the post‐Cold War period see, among others, Alessandro Marrone and
AlessandroR.Ungaro,“TherelationsbetweenUnitedStatesofAmericaandItalyinthe
post‐ColdWarperiod:adefenseindustrialperspective”,in CahiersdelaMéditerranée,
2014, forthcoming .
114
5.
The F-35 programme and Italy:
the industrial perspective
This chapter discusses the industrial aspects of the F‐35 multinational
programmeandItalianparticipationinit.
5.1 THE BEST VALUE FOR MONEY APPROACH
TheF‐35isamultinationalprocurementprogrammeledbytheUSwith
eightparticipatingcountries:Australia,Canada,Denmark,UnitedKing‐
dom, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway and Turkey. Moreover, Israel and
JapanhaveselectedtheF‐35AthroughtheForeignMilitarySales FMS processastheyarenotfullyF‐35partners.SouthKoreahasalsodecided
topurchase40F‐35,withdeliveriesscheduledfrom2018to2021inthe
context of the F‐X III competition.1 Finally, Singapore is considering to
purchase the F‐35 in the near future to replace the F‐16 fighter fleet.2
Overall,theJSFprocurementvolumeiscurrentlyestimatedtobemore
than 3,000 F‐35 aircraft, 2,4433 for the US Air Force, Navy and Marine
Corps and the rest distributed according to partner’s procurement
plans.4
1AndreaShalal‐Esa,“S.KoreaorderwoulddriveF‐35per‐planecostlower”,inReuters,
26 November 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/26/lockheed‐fighter‐
korea‐idUSL2N0JB24120131126.
2“Singaporesaysin‘noparticularhurry’tobuyLockheedF‐35jets”,in Reuters,12
December 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/13/us‐lockheed‐fighter‐id
USBRE9BC02J20131213.
3USGovernmentAccountabilityOffice,F‐35JointStrikeFighter…,cit.
4 Lockheed Martin, F35 Fast‐Facts, February 2014, https://www.f35.com/assets/
115
THE ROLE OF ITALIAN FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: TRENDS AND NEEDS
Table3.F‐35’sacquisitionplans
Customer
PlannedAircraft
USAirForce
1,763 F‐35A
USNavy
260 F‐35C
USMarineCorps
340 F‐35B/80 F‐35C
UKRoyalAirForce/RoyalNavy
138 F‐35B
Turkey
100 F‐35A
Australia
100 F‐35A
Italy
60 F‐35A/30 F‐35B
Canada
65 F‐35A
Norway
52 F‐35A
Japan
42 F‐35A 20optional SouthKorea
40F‐35A
Netherlands
37 F‐35A
Denmark
30 F‐35A
Israel
19 F‐35A
Total
3,156
Withinthisprocurementvolume,416F‐35areexpectedtobedelivered
toNATOcountries,withanestimated49aircraftoperatinginEuropeby
2018.5Thefactthatseveralnewcountries,besidestheninemembersof
the procurement programme, have decided to acquire the F‐35 in last
yearsconfirmstheappealoftheaircrafttotheglobalmarketplace.
In addition, the overall volume of F‐35 is likely to increase in the
2020‐2030 timeframe through FMS process, outside the perimeter of
procurement’s partner countries. In fact, since a significant share of
worldwidefighterfleetshastobereplacedinthenextfuture,itcanbe
assumedthattheF‐35willlikelybeoneofthepreferredchoicesmade
bygovernmentstomodernizetheirairfleet–asitisalreadyhappening
insomeAsia‐Pacificcountries.TheF‐35isindeedlikelytorepeatinthe
uploads/downloads/13567/f‐35fast_factsjfebruary2014.pdf; Anthony Deutsch and An‐
dreaShalal‐Esa,“Dutchtopurchase37F‐35fighterplanes‐sources”,17September2013,
in Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/17/us‐dutch‐fighter‐f‐idUSBRE
98G09I20130917.
5“F‐35,TheBackboneoftheNextGenerationNATOOperations”,cit.
116
5. THE F-35 PROGRAMME AND ITALY: THE INDUSTRIAL PERSPECTIVE
nextdecadestheworldwidediffusionexperiencedbytheF‐16,particu‐
larly–butnotonly–inthoseUSalliedcountriesalreadyfamiliarwith
the F‐16. The more governments purchase F‐35, the more benefits re‐
ceive partner countries like Italy: production unitary costs decrease
thankstolargerprocurementvolumes;sustainmentcostsareexpected
toshrinksincetherewillbemoresparepartsproducedanddistributed
worldwide;6upgradingcostscanbesharedbymorecountriesandthus
becominglessexpensive;7thecomponentsproducedbynationalindus‐
triesinvolvedintheprogramme,suchasAleniaAermacchi,willincrease
inordertosupplyF‐35ordersbynewcustomers.
TheF‐35programmeentailsaradicalchangeofthemindsetandway
to envisage a multinational procurement programme in the defence
field.Infact,comparedtoothermajorinternationalcollaborations such
asTornado,Eurofighter,A400MandMeteor ,itisbasedontheprinciple
ofthebestvalueformoneyandnotontheprincipleofjusteretour.The
procurementprocedureisindeedquitedifferent fromthepast.First,a
participating country formulates its national requests in terms of air‐
craftrequirements,volumeandvarianttotheF‐35JointProgrammeOf‐
fice JPO .Then,theJPOformulatesanoverallrequesttotheprimecon‐
tractorLockheedMartin.Sucharequestindicatesthenumberofaircraft
tobuildforeachvariant,thebasicaircraftrequirementsandthespecific
integrations to the basic configuration requested by individual coun‐
tries. Lockheed Martin manages independently the subcontracts with
AmericanandEuropeansuppliers,whichprovidetheirproductsorser‐
vicestotheprimecontractorresponsiblefordeliveringtheaircraftun‐
derthetermsprovidedbytheJPOcontract.Similarly,Pratt&Whitneyis
theprimecontractorforF‐35’sengineandtheintegrationofitsrelated
systems.TheteamisalsocomposedbyRolls‐Royce,whoisresponsible
for the vertical lift system for the STOVL aircraft, and Hamilton
Sundstrand,inchargeoftheelectronicenginecontrolsystem,actuation
system, gearbox and health monitoring systems. Other companies in
partner countries participate on an equal access basis in the supplies’
6Interviewdated6December2013.
7Interviewdated10December2013.
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THE ROLE OF ITALIAN FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: TRENDS AND NEEDS
competitions managed by the US prime contractors; bids are selected
accordingtotheirbestprice/qualityratio.Therefore,inordertobeen‐
gagedintheF‐35programmetheItaliandefenceindustrialbasehashad
to accept the challenge of the best value for money approach. This is
quitenewwithrespecttoItalianindustry’spastexperienceinmultina‐
tional programme based on juste retour principle, whereby cost‐share
divided among participating governments must equal the work‐share
amongnationalindustriescomposingtheindustrialconsortium.
Although assessing international collaborations in defence procure‐
ment projects is not an easy task, economic theory might offer some
guidelines. First, an international programme has to offer cost‐savings
with respect to an equivalent national programme, and ideally also in
comparisonwiththeleastexpensivealternative,thatisbuying“off‐the‐
shelf.” Such collaborations have to ensure that club membership bene‐
fitsareatleastequaltothecostsofmembership.Second,anefficientin‐
ternational programme should allocate work on the basis of compara‐
tiveadvantagedeterminedbycompetition.Intheory,nosinglecountry
hastherighttoashareofthedevelopmentandproductionworkbased
ontheamountofitsfinancialcontributiontotheprogramme–whichis
ratherthekeyassumptionofthejusteretourprinciple.Finally,accord‐
ing to the economic theory, in order to be more efficient and effective,
the multinational programme has to be managed and monitored by a
unique prime contractor. The prime contractor should be bound by an
incentive‐contract with the public authority establishing rewards and
penaltiesincaseofgoodorpoorperformancesbythecompany.8
TheF‐35programmeseemstosubstantiallyreflectthisapproach,as
opposedtopastandtraditionalcollaborationsindefenceprojects.9Even
atthebeginningoftheprogramme,duringthedesignanddevelopment
phases of the F‐35, two companies – Lockheed Martin and Boeing –
were in competition to acquire the contract. The two competitors had
selectedpartnercompaniesandsuppliersonthebasisoftheirtechnical
8KeithHartley,“OffsetsandtheJointStrikeFighterintheUKandtheNetherlands”,in
JurgenBrauerandJ.PaulDunne eds. , ArmsTradeandEconomicDevelopment.Theory,
Policy,andCasesinArmsTradeOffsets,LondonandNewYork,Routledge,2004,p.134.
9Ibid.
118
5. THE F-35 PROGRAMME AND ITALY: THE INDUSTRIAL PERSPECTIVE
expertise and competitiveness rather than on geographical criteria.
Then,thecontracthasbeenawardedtoLockheedMartinona“winner
takesall”basis,thuswithoutcompensating Boeingwith any additional
orextraprocurements.
Participating countries benefit from the investment made through
theirfinancialcontributiontoF‐35inadifferentwayratherthanauto‐
matic work‐share/cost‐share principle. First, their industries are al‐
lowed to bid for work on the programme. Moreover, partner govern‐
mentshave priorityinF‐35deliveriesandaccesstotechnicalandper‐
formancedatarelatedtotheaircraft,andtheirrepresentativesarepost‐
edintheJPOalongsidewithAmericans.Additionally,theyareexempted
frompayingaResearch&Developmenttaxonanypurchase.Theseben‐
efits are greater than the alternative option of buying “off‐the‐shelf,”
thatisdirectlybuyingtheaircraftinthecommercialmarketplace.
However,itisnecessarytospecifysomeelementsinordertoprovide
apictureas complete aspossibleoftheF‐35project.Ontheonehand,
adopting an approach based on competition and on the best value for
moneyis,undoubtedly,aninnovativeaspect.Fromamanagementper‐
spective,thesetwoinnovativepillarsintendedtomaketheprogramme
moreefficientbyacontinuousanddetailedmonitoringofcosts,andby
avoiding duplication and unnecessary expenditures during the entire
lifecycle of the product. Nevertheless, costs are subject to increase not
least because developing and testing cutting‐edge technologies may
present unexpected costs, and/or unexpected delays, which turn into
further costs.10 For sure, containing costs is in the interest of all part‐
ners, in primis the US, which bears the overwhelming burden of re‐
search,development,designandproductionexpenditures.
Ontheotherhand,itseemsnecessarytoapplythesetwoconcepts–
competitionandbestvalueformoney–withacertainflexibilitytoavoid
to “overstress” the supply chain. In order to correctly understand this
point,somepreliminaryclarificationsareneeded.Ingeneral,theprime
contractor handles contractual relationships with American and Euro‐
peansuppliersthroughoneofthefollowingthreeprocedures:
10Interviewdated23January2014.
119
THE ROLE OF ITALIAN FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: TRENDS AND NEEDS
1. Lockheed Martin can set a maximum level of expenditure for a
given component, system or service, and the supplier initially
selected maintains the contract as long as its price remains
underthatceiling.
2. LockheedMartincanopentoallindustryplayersthebiddingfor
a certain supply, and assign the contract to the company
providingthebestvalueintermsofcostandquality.
3. Lockheed Martin can sign agreements with two different
suppliers of a given product as it deems strategic having more
thanasinglesupplysourcetoprovideit˗theso‐called“strategic
secondsources”method.
ThelatteristhecaseofAleniaAermacchi,aFinmeccanicacompany,that
has “strategic second source” status for F‐35’s wings after Lockheed
Martin.TheItalianindustrywillcontinuetoprovidewingsaslongasit
can keep their price lower or equal to that of the units produced by
LockheedMartin.Ifthe“secondsource”priceincreasescomparedtothe
one provided by the first source, Lockheed Martin could re‐open the
competitiontoseekanothersupplierofferingbestvalueforthatspecific
product. This approach may lead the “second source” company topro‐
duceforawhilewithnegativemarginsinordertoremaincompetitive
andmaintainthecontract,whilethe“learningcurve”makestheproduc‐
tionprogressivelymoreprofitable.
The majority of supplier agreements with Lockheed Martin have a
one‐yearterm,becausetheUSgovernmentdecidesthenumberofF‐35
to be purchased year by year. These contracts are expected to shift to
five‐year term with the start of the full rate production. In any case,
LockheedMartinwillcheckfromtimetotimewhetheritssuppliercon‐
tinues to offer the best value available on the market for that specific
product or service. A system based on one‐year contracts seems to
overstress the supply chain and does not encourage the supplier to
elaborateandadoptlong‐terminvestmentsplan,becausethecontractor
hastobeartheriskofmakinginvestmentscompletelyonitsown–i.e.in
machineriesorhumanresources–withoutanyassurancethatthevol‐
umeofsupplieswillcontinuebeyondthenextyear.
AnothercriticalissueconcernsthelackofItalianindustries’partici‐
pation in the development and integration activities, which entail the
120
5. THE F-35 PROGRAMME AND ITALY: THE INDUSTRIAL PERSPECTIVE
most significant and sensitive technologies. This issue has also applied
tootherEuropeanindustrialpartnersoftheF‐35programme,beingthe
“transatlantic technology transfer” of defence procurements one of the
mostcontestedissueatgovernmentalandindustriallevels.11Demands
fromEuropeansuppliersfaceobstaclesmainly,butnotonly,duetoUS
regulationssuchastheInternationalTrafficinArmsRegulation ITAR and the National Disclosure Policy. Therefore, more work needs to be
donewithintheF‐35cooperationtoaddressthisissue.12
5.2 THE ITALIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE PROCUREMENT
PROGRAMME
There are three levels of international participation in the F‐35 pro‐
curement, which reflect each country’s financial stake in the pro‐
gramme. Ranking in one of these levels influences the amount of tech‐
nology transfer and subcontracts open for bid to national companies,
the number and importance of positions hold by national representa‐
tivesintheJPO,aswellastheorderinwhichcountriesreceiveproduced
aircraft.SinceItalyisinvolvedintheF‐35programmeasLevel2partner
–thesamelevelofNetherlands–withroughly4%sharingofthetotal
cost, it has limited opportunities to influence aircraft’s requirements.
TheUnitedKingdomisaLevel1partnerwith10%ofcost‐share,while
Australia, Canada, Denmark, Norway, and Turkey are Level 3 partners,
eachhavingonetotwopercentofcost‐share.
Italy’sparticipationintheF‐35programmebegunin1998whenthe
left‐winggovernmentdecidedtoinvest10milliondollarintheConcept
DemonstrationPhase CDP .In2002,theItalianright‐winggovernment
11AlessandroMarrone,“Cooperazionetransatlanticanelladifesaetrasferimentodi
tecnologiesensibili”,inIAIQuaderni,No.30 June2008 ,http://www.iai.it/content.asp?
langid 1&contentid 122.
12Forthesakeofcompleteness,itshouldbenoticedthattheissueoftechtransferaf‐
fectsalsoEuropeanprocurementprogrammes,wherebydifferentindustriespartofthe
consortium struggle to not release all high‐tech information to governments of other
countrieswheretheirindustrialcompetitorarebased.Interviewdated21January2014.
121
THE ROLE OF ITALIAN FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: TRENDS AND NEEDS
confirmedthechoicetakenin1998bycommitting1,028billiondollarin
theSystemDesignandDevelopment SDD PhaseandbysigningtheUS‐
Italy related Memorandum of Understanding MoU . In 2007, the left‐
winggovernmentsignedthebilateralMoUfortheProduction,Sustain‐
ment,andFollow‐onDevelopment PSFD Phase,withaninvestmentof
904 million dollar. Two years later, in 2009 the Italian Parliament ap‐
provedtheacquisitionof131F‐35,including69F‐35Avariantsand62
F‐35Bvariants.Atthattime,ItalyalsodecidedtobuildtheFinalAssem‐
bly and Check Out FACO and Maintenance, Repair, Overhaul and Up‐
grade MRO&U facility at Cameri, with an investment of 775 million
dollar. In 2012, due to the decision to adopt wide‐ranging austerity
measures, the Italian government has reduced the overall fleet of F‐35
from131to90 60F‐35Aand30F‐35B .
The delivery of Italian aircraft will be completed by 2027, with the
first34F‐35acquiredby2020.Thisdeliveryschedulehasbeentailored
expresslybytakingintoaccountthereplacementofTornadoandAMX.
Thelatterwillbereplacedbefore2020,whileTornadowillcontinueto
operate until 2027. Therefore, some Tornado will be maintained and
progressivelyphasedoutuntilthelastF‐35willcomeintoservice.13
AccordingtothemostrecentfiguresaboutItaly’sengagementinthe
F‐35 programme, 90 Italian companies are involved and the contracts
awarded to the Italian industries have an overall value of 715 million
dollar.14 Within this volume, 565 million dollar are related to the
Finmeccanica group,15 mainly through Alenia Aermacchi, which is re‐
sponsiblefortheconstructionofmorethan1,200F‐35wings,notonly
for the Italian fleet, but also for the nine partners of the programme.16
13ItalianChamberofDeputies‐ResearchService,“IlprogrammaJointStrikeFighter
F35 ”,inDocumentazioneericerche,No.22 31May2013 ,http://documenti.camera.
it/leg17/dossier/Testi/DI0011.htm.
14ItalianChamberofDeputies‐DefenceCommittee, Audizionedell’AmministratoreDe‐
legatoeDirettoreGeneralediFinmeccanica,16October2013,http://documenti.camera.
it/Leg17/resoconti/commissioni/stenografici/xhtml/04/indag/c04_arma/2013/10/16/r
esoconto.0008.html.
15Ibid.
16AleniaAermacchi,LockheedMartinandAleniaAeronauticasigncontractforinitial
productionofF‐35wings,25September2008,http://www.aleniana.com/node/80.
122
5. THE F-35 PROGRAMME AND ITALY: THE INDUSTRIAL PERSPECTIVE
Theterm“wings”includesboththetwosemi‐wingsandthecentralcell
oftheaircraftholdingthemtogether,thatis30%oftheentireairframe,
presenting significant engineering challenges. The programme has po‐
tentialrevenuesfor10billiondollar,17butthiswilldependonthecapac‐
itytoexploitandusetheinfrastructurescreated–firstandforemostthe
Cameri FACO/MRO&U – to build components and to provide mainte‐
nance,supportandupgrade,inparticularforavionicsandelectronics–
forboththeEuropeanF‐35andtheUSaircraftbasedinEurope.Because
of these reasons, and the very same nature of the procurement pro‐
gramme based on best value for money principle, providing definitive
figures and numbers about the industrial returns of the F‐35 pro‐
grammeisquitecomplicatedandtoacertainextentincomplete.Having
saidthat,arecentreportcarriedoutbytheadvisorybranchofPricewa‐
terhouseCoopers PwC estimatesthattheItalianparticipationintheF‐
35procurementprogrammewillgenerateanaddedvalueof15,8billion
dollarfortheItalianeconomyduringtheentire2007‐2035timeframe
anditwillsupportthecreationofmorethan6,300jobs.18
ConcerningSmallandMediumEnterprises SMEs inthedefenceand
aerospace sector, they proved to be flexible and adaptable in offering
the best value for money within the F‐35 programme.19 However, they
suffermorethanlargersuppliersthefactthatcontractsaregrantedonly
onone‐yearbasisandtheyarethusdiscouragedtomakelong‐termin‐
vestments in machineries, technology and human resources, which
would greatly benefit their competitiveness. Moreover, Italian SMEs
sometimes lack the necessary information and technical/legal assis‐
tancetobecompetitiveintheF‐35procurementbiddingprocess.20Fur‐
17Ibid.
18“F‐35, per l’Italia benefici da 15 miliardi”, in Il Sole 24 Ore, 19 February 2014,
http://www.banchedati.ilsole24ore.com/doc.get?uid finanza‐FM20140219024EAA.
19Interviewdated23January2014.
20Inaddition,SMEsintheaerospaceanddefencesectordosuffercommonproblems
ofItalianeconomy:delaysinthepaymentbypublicauthoritiesandprivateItalianprime
contractors,lowlevelsofpublicfundingforresearchanddevelopmentactivities,inade‐
quategovernment’sexportsupport,hightaxationandanumberofbureaucraticobsta‐
cles.Formoredetailssee,amongothers,AlessandroMarrone,“Piccoleemedieimprese
nelmercatodelladifesa”,inAffarInternazionali,16April2013,http://www.affarinterna
123
THE ROLE OF ITALIAN FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: TRENDS AND NEEDS
thermore, the participation of SMEs to such a complex programme
shouldbefacilitatedthroughasystemofglobalauthorizationsallowing
thetransferofpartsandcomponentsdirectedtotheAmericanandEu‐
ropeancompaniesparticipatingintheF‐35procurement.
A distinguishing feature of Italian participation in the F‐35 pro‐
gramme is the aforementioned FACO/MRO&U Cameri facility. Cameri
facilityisanItalianAirForcebasethathasservedaslogisticshubinthe
last decades, where Tornados and then Eurofighters have been and
continuetobe maintainedandrepaired,ensuringasoundbackground
of technical skills among military and industrial teams. Within the pe‐
rimeter of the base, under the direction of Alenia Aermacchi, 22 new
buildingshavebeenconstructedwiththeaimtosupporttheF‐35pro‐
gramme,21coveringaround140,000squaremeters.22Thankstotheuti‐
lizationofamilitaryairfieldandtothegoodcoordinationamongdiffer‐
entbureaucraciesandwiththeprivatesector,ittookonlyfouryearsbe‐
tweenthedecisionstobuildtheFACOanditsindustrialuse–whichisa
relatively short period for Italian standards in terms of major public
works.AleniaAermacchihasbeguntobuildwingscomponentsforUSF‐
35alreadyin2011,notwithstandingtheCamerifacilitywasstillpartly
under construction, thanks also to additional buildings made available
bytheItalianmilitary.23
In particular, Cameri facility is composed by different and comple‐
mentaryelements:
1. AFACOfacilitytoassembletheItalianF‐35AandF‐35Bvariants,
theF‐35AprocuredbyNetherlands,andpotentiallytheaircraft
to be procured by other European partners such as Denmark
andNorway;asofDecember2013,twoItalianF‐35Aarebeing
zionali.it/articolo.asp?ID 2291.
21RobbinLaird,“TheItalianWayofProcuringtheF‐35:ShapingaEuropeanBasefor
the Global Fleet”, in Second Line of Defense, 1 November 2013, http://www.sldinfo.
com/?p 58473.
22Interviewdated6December2013.
23 The industrial park is owned by the armed forces, which rent it to Alenia Aer‐
macchi to a fixed price accorded by the State Property Agency. Interview dated 6 No‐
vember2013.
124
5. THE F-35 PROGRAMME AND ITALY: THE INDUSTRIAL PERSPECTIVE
assembled in the FACO assembly line, which can reach a
maximumoftwoF‐35assembledpermonth.
2. A wing construction facility serving the entire procurement
programme and not only Italian and Dutch customers. It can
buildamaximumofsixwingspermonth.
3. The aircraft test facility aimed at testing low‐observable
performances,andtherelatedfinalpaintingfacility.
4. Other buildings aimed to support F‐35 operating in Europe by
the US and allies. Since the Mediterranean and the Middle East
continuetobeafundamentaloperationalareaforUSandNATO
members,theCamerifacilitycanprovideanessentialsupportto
theF‐35fleetoperatingthere.
Inotherwords,theCamerifacilityisalreadysettohostbothFACOand
MROUactivities,becauseinthelongterm–thatis2025‐2045period–
maintenance activities will likely bring significant volume of contracts.
Maintenanceisalsoplannedtoinvolvesignificanttechnologiesbecause
it is linked with upgrade. For example, at the time when the software
willneedtobeupgradedregularly,theF‐35openarchitecturewillalso
allow to plug new sensors, systems or weapons in. The expected long
life‐cycleoftheplatformsandthepaceoftechnologicalinnovationmean
that maintenance will be a regular and substantial activity, in order to
preservetheplatformtechnologicallyadvancedincomparisonwithop‐
ponents’airdefencesystems.24ThechallengeforItalyistoinvolvethe
Italian military and industry in the most technologically advanced as‐
pects of F‐35 platform, that is software, electronics and avionics, in
whichtheUShavebeenmorecautioustotransfertechnologyandopen
bidstoEuropeanpartners.TheintegrationoftheMeteormissileswillbe
anopportunityinthisregard.
BeingtheonlycurrentFACOfacilityoutsideUSterritory,Camerirep‐
resents a fundamental asset of the F‐35 global production and mainte‐
nance system. Considering the time and funding necessary to set up
suchafacility,plusthedifficultytogettheAmericanendorsementtoits
construction, Italy has achieved a valuable asset and a competitive ad‐
24Interviewdated6November2013.
125
THE ROLE OF ITALIAN FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: TRENDS AND NEEDS
vantagewithrespecttootherpartnersoftheF‐35procurement,aswell
astocurrentandfuturecustomers.Infact,iftheyarelocatedinEurope
or in its neighbourhood – i.e. the Middle East – they are likely to find
moreconvenient,effectiveandefficient,toutilizetheItalianfacilityra‐
ther than seeking to build a new one on their national territory.25 Un‐
surprisingly, already in 2006 Italy and the Netherlands signed an
agreement that identifies two important areas of cooperation. On the
one hand, to build and test the F‐35 aircraft acquired by Italy and the
Netherlands in an Italian facility – the Cameri facility – as a starting
point for a future high‐level maintenance and repair capability for the
fighter.26Ontheother,aMRO&Ufacilityfortheengineandsomeaircraft
equipment, to be established in the Netherlands, which will maintain,
repair,overhaulandmodifysuchpartsfortheplatformsacquiredbythe
two countries.27 Against this backdrop, contacts have already been es‐
tablished with the Norwegian Ministry of Defence.28 The Cameri FACO
represents a long‐term investment made by the Italian military, and
generallyspeakingbythewhole government,in ordertoensureacer‐
tainamountofwork‐shareforItaliancompanieswithinthenewandun‐
certainframeworkofthebestvalueformoneyprinciple.Itimplieddiffi‐
cultnegotiationswiththeAmericancounterparts,whichweresuccess‐
fully completed.29 Today Cameri represents a unique asset owned by
Italianarmedforces,managedbyAleniaAermacchiinclosecooperation
withthemilitarycounterpart.
As a whole, the Italian participation to the F‐35 procurement pro‐
gramme presents pros and cons, opportunities and challenges. From a
military point of view, the procurement of F‐35 is following a timeline
whichdoesnotseemtocreatecapabilitygaps,itkeepscostsatsustain‐
able level and it dilutes them over more than a decade. Moreover, as
mentionedbefore,theCamerifacilityissettoensureefficiencyandcost
25Interviewsdated6December2013and10December2013.
26MicheleNones,GiovanniGaspariniandAlessandroMarrone,“EuropeandtheF‐35
JointStrikeFighter JSF Program”,cit.
27Ibid.,p.74.
28Interviewdated6December2013.
29Interviewdated21January2014.
126
5. THE F-35 PROGRAMME AND ITALY: THE INDUSTRIAL PERSPECTIVE
savingsinthemaintenance,repairandupgradeactivities,whichwillre‐
paytheinvestmentmadebytheMinistryofDefence.
From an industrial point of view, part of the expectations of large
companies and SMEs with regards to the work‐share of the F‐35 pro‐
curementhavebeendisappointed.Themostcontestedissueshavebeen
and continue to be technology transfer from American counterparts,
involvement in the industrial activities with greater engineering and
technologicaladdedvalue likeelectronicsandavionics ,shortduration
of contracts and uncertainty about their annual renewal. At the same
time, the participation to the F‐35 programme is providing contracts
and opportunities in terms of technological progress, which cannot be
offeredbyanyotheravailableprocurementoptionabletomeetItalian
militaryrequirements.
The new procurement approach based on the best value for money
principlehasimposedtotheItalianindustrytobecomemorecompeti‐
tiveandtotakemorerisksinrelationtoitsowninvestments.Italsore‐
quirestheItalianmilitaryandgovernmenttoassisttheindustryinthis
regard,bymakinganadditionalandconstanteffortinnegotiatingwith
US counterparts on technology transfer and other aspects of the pro‐
curementprogramme.Inotherpastprogrammes,basedonthejustere‐
tourprinciple,negotiationslargelyendedwhentheagreementoncost‐
shareandwork‐sharewasreached.ThisisnotthecaseoftheF‐35.The
Camerifacilityrepresentsakeyopportunityintermsofbothqualityand
quantityofthework‐shareinordertoensurevaluableandtechnologi‐
callyadvancedsuppliestoItaliancompaniesandSMEs.Thisshouldap‐
plytotheproduction,maintenance,repairandupgradeofthewholeF‐
35 fleet based in Europe. The very same nature of this innovative pro‐
curementprogrammedoesnotallowanyoneeithertobesatisfiedwith
the good investments made in the past – such as the build up of the
CameriFACO/MROU–ortowaitforsomepositivedevelopmentstooc‐
curontheirown.Resultsneedtobeachievedbyajointeffortbythemil‐
itary,thegovernmentandtheindustry–eachonewithinitsrespective
roleandcompetencies–stepbystep,negotiationbynegotiation,bidby
bid,contractbycontract.
127
Conclusions
Thisstudytriedtofulfiladifficulttask:tolinktheoperationalandpolit‐
icalelementsofItaliandefencepolicy,bytakingintoaccountalsoitsin‐
dustrialaspects.
Thecomprehensionoftheoperationallevelbythepoliticalauthority
is crucial. This should include the understanding of what tasks have
beenperformedbyItalianaircapabilitiesduringmissionsabroadinthe
last two decades, the requirements for the next fighter aircraft deter‐
mined by the current international security context, the recent opera‐
tional experience and the relevant technological innovation. Such un‐
derstandingisimportantpersé,butitisevenmoreimportanttoinform
decision‐makers who are responsible of taking decisions such as those
necessary to maintain Italy’s ability to join international missions to
protectandpromotenationalinterestsatstake.
These decisions have operational effects, because they are about
whichfighteraircrafthastobeprocured,howmanyandthroughwhich
timeline.Buttheyareneitheronlyoperationalnoronlytechnical.They
are primarily political, because they are about spending the limited
budget allocated to defence policy in order to achieve certain results.
ThemainresultatstakeistomaintainItaly’scapabilitytoactthrough
militarypower,particularlyAirPower.Thesearenotabstractdecisions,
becausesincetheFirstGulfWarItalyhasutilizeditsfighteraircraftfor
22 out of the last 24 years – meaning that Italian military pilots have
beenflyingfor22yearsoveroperationaltheatresinIraq,WesternBal‐
kans,AfghanistanorLibya.Therefore,thedecisiononwhichfighterair‐
craftwillbeusedbyItalianarmedforcesinthenextthirty‐fortyyearsis
ratheraconcreteone.
These decisions do not influence only the current and future effec‐
tiveness and efficiency of Italian military. They also influence the rela‐
tionswithothermajorEuropeancountries,aswellaswiththeUS.They
129
THE ROLE OF ITALIAN FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: TRENDS AND NEEDS
affect the position of Italy within NATO and, to a lesser extent, within
theEUandUN,asfarastheseinternationalorganizationswillcontinue
to deal with crisis management operations. Ultimately, these decisions
influence Italian defence and foreign policies, and thus the national in‐
tereststhatsuchpoliciesaresupposedtoprotectandpromote.
Whateveritwillbedecidedinthisregard,itisimportantthatthese
decisions are taken by understanding the operational level, including
themilitaryrequirementsthatprocurement’sprogrammearemeantto
satisfy. It is also paramount to take them by assessing their significant
and lasting impact on the relations with Italy’s main allies, and on the
Italian defence and foreign policy. Finally, it is fundamental that deci‐
sionsaretakenbyhavingafullunderstandingoftheindustrialaspects
connected to the programme: in major European countries such as
France,GermanyortheUK,letasidetheUS,thedefenceandforeignpol‐
icy is linked with the economic, industrial and commercial interests of
French,GermanorBritishsocieties.Thisisnottosaydefenceindustrial
policyisthemaingoalofdefencepolicy.Thisisrathertosaythatsincea
military need is defined, to make the best of it in terms of national in‐
dustrialreturnisacommonpraxis–orevenaduty–inmajorEuropean
countries. That is one of the reasons this study on Italian fighter air‐
craft’sroleincrisismanagementoperationshasdevotedonechapterto
the industrial aspects of Italy’s participation to the F‐35 procurement
programme.
Inconclusion,bybridgingthegapbetweentheoperationalandpolit‐
ical levels, and by taking into account the industrial aspects of the de‐
fence procurement, this study aimed to stimulate a more constructive,
in‐depth, and systematic debate in Italy on defence matters. A debate
notlimitedonlytothereplacementoffighteraircraft,butincludingalso
purposes,roleandrequirementsoftheItalianarmedforces.
130
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November2011,http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/usaf/afdd3‐2.pdf.
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143
THE ROLE OF ITALIAN FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: TRENDS AND NEEDS
USDeptofState, AddressingtheChallengeofMANPADSProliferation,2
February2012,http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rm/183097.htm.
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hasimprovedinsomeareasbutaffordabilitychallengesandotherrisks
remain,17April2013,http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/653857.pdf.
144
Annex I – List of interviews
MARIO ARPINO,formerlyChiefoftheAirCoordinationUnitinSaudiAra‐
bia during the First Gulf War, served as Air Force Chief of Staff 1995‐
1999 andChiefofDefenceStaff 1999‐2001 .
GIUSEPPE BERNARDIS,formerHeadof 4thDepartmentoftheGeneralAr‐
mamentDirection/DefenceGeneralSecretariatchargedoftheCoordina‐
tion of Procurement Programmes, served as Air Force Chief of Staff
2010‐2013 .
LUCIOBIANCHI,formerChiefofBusinessDevelopmentattheOrganisation
ConjointedeCoopérationenmatièred’Armement OCCAR ,istheChief
of Multipurpose Aero‐Tactical Aircraft Centre Centro Polivalente Ve‐
livoliAerotattici,Ce.Po.V.A. inCamerisinceNovember2012.
CLAUDIODEBERTOLISservedasViceChiefoftheCabinetoftheMinistryof
Defencein2006,andhasbeenSecretaryGeneralofDefenceandNation‐
alArmamentsDirector 2011‐2013 .
DOMENICO ESPOSITOhas beentheGeneralDirectoroftheGeneralDirec‐
torate for Air Armaments ARMAEREO within the Italian Air Force
since2009.
BILLIEFLYNNservedintheCanadianarmedforcesfor23yearsinavarie‐
tyofpositions,hasworkedasprojectpilotforAirbusEADSandcurrent‐
lyholdsthesamepositionatLockheedMartin.Hehasaccumulatedover
4,700flighthoursinmorethan70typesofaircraft.
CRAIG A. FRANKLINisCommanderoftheUS3rdAirForceand17thExpe‐
ditionaryAirForce,atRamsteinAirBase,Germany,whereheisrespon‐
sible for planning, deployment, employment, supporting and redeploy‐
mentofUSAFassets.
145
THE ROLE OF ITALIAN FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: TRENDS AND NEEDS
GIORGIO GOMMA,RearAdmiral,sinceSeptember2013heisCommander
ofItalianNavyAviation.
GIUSEPPE LUPOLI,formerDirectorofthe1st“Aircraft Maintenance”Unit
inCameri Novara ,heisnowworkingattheDirectorateforAirArma‐
ments ARMAEREO ,inparticularontheF‐35programmewithaspecif‐
icfocusontheFACOactivity.
KEVIN MCCORMICKworksasaStrategicPlanneratLockheedMartinAer‐
onauticsCompanywithintheF‐35AirCombatAnalysisUnit.
STEHEN O’BRYAN is the Vice President of Program Integration and Busi‐
nessDevelopment atLockheedMartinCorporation’sAeronauticsCom‐
pany.HeisresponsibleforleadingcoordinationacrossF‐35JointStrike
Fighterbusinessactivities.
STEFANO VITO SALAMIDAistheChiefofthe4thDepartment Logistics of
theItalianAirForce,whilefrom1999to2002servedastheItalianNa‐
tionalDeputyintheF‐35JointProgrammeOfficeinWashington.
GLADSTONE THOMASistheDirectoroftheF‐35AircraftFinishingFacility,
atLockheedMartinAeronauticsCompanyinFortWorthTexas.
146
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