1. Some basic features of European Law
The European legal system offers particular features when compared to
other international organizations. These aspects are clearly described in
the leading case Van Gend & Loos, where the European Court of Justice
(hereinafter “ECJ”) explicitly recognizes that the European law directly
confers obligations and rights to individuals.
In the relationship between EC law and national law two are at least the
principles:
a) The supremacy of European law over national law;
b) The direct effect of some provisions.
After the Court of Justice established the principle of supremacy a wide
debate between ECJ and National Constitutional Courts has taken place.
Firstly the Italian Court perceived the supremacy principle in a different
and more restrictive way than ECJ.
After the Granital case the Italian Constitutional Court finally recognized
the direct effect of the European regulation, but only under certain conditions.
The Supremacy theory of the European law over national law was based
on article 11 of the Italian Constitution.
An important step towards a different, more communitarian, interpretation of the relationship between the two legal systems is represented by
judgment no. 102/2008, first reference for a preliminary ruling by the
Italian Constitutional Court. In this case the European provisions now integrate the constitutional parameter in accordance with the new article
117 par. 1 of the Italian Constitution (“The legislative power is exerted by
the State and Regions in the respect of the Constitution and the duties
stemming from the communitarian legal system and the international duties”).
Another consequence of the principle of supremacy (the so called
primauté) requires that any provision of national law which contravenes a
European rule is to be disapplied. Consequently not only national courts
but also all bodies of the State, including local administrations and administrative authorities, are required to disapply (See Fratelli Costanzo
and Consorzio Industrie Fiammiferi (CIF) Cases).
1. Some basic features of European Law
1
1.1. The foundation of European public law through the Court of Justice’s landmark decisions 1.1.1. The new legal order: Van Gend en Loos and Costa «…The Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for the
benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited
fields, and the subjects of which comprise not only Member States but also their
nationals. Independently of the legislation of Member States, Community law therefore not only imposes obligations on individuals but is also intended to confer
upon them rights which become part of their legal heritage. These rights arise not
only where they are expressly granted by the Treaty, but also by reason of obligations which the Treaty imposes in a clearly defined way upon individuals as well as
upon the Member States and upon the institutions of the Community» (ECJ – Van
Gend en Loos, C-26/1962 [1963]).
«By contrast with ordinary international treaties, the EEC Treaty has created
its own legal system which, on the entry into force of the Treaty, became an integral part of the legal systems of the Member States and which their courts are
bound to apply.
By creating a Community of unlimited duration, having its own institutions, its
own personality, its own legal capacity and capacity of representation on the international plane and, more particularly, real powers stemming from a limitation of
sovereignty or a transfer of powers from the States to the Community, the Member
States have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and have thus
created a body of law which binds both their nationals and themselves.
[…]
The precedence of Community law is confirmed by Article 189 1, whereby a
regulation ‘shall be binding’ and ‘directly applicable in all Member States’. This
provision, which is subject to no reservation, would be quite meaningless if a State
could unilaterally nullify its effects by means of a legislative measure which could
prevail over Community law.
It follows from all these observations that the law stemming from the Treaty, an
independent source of law, could not, because of its special and original nature, be
overridden by domestic legal provisions, however framed, without being deprived
of its character as Community law and without the legal basis of the Community
itself being called into question.
The transfer by the States from their domestic legal system to the Community
legal system of the rights and obligations arising under the Treaty carries with it a
1
See now article 288 TFUE.
1. Some basic features of European Law 2 permanent limitation of their sovereign rights, against which a subsequent unilateral act incompatible with the concept of the Community cannot prevail. Consequently Article 177 2 is to be applied regardless of any domestic law, whenever
questions relating to the interpretation of the Treaty arise» (ECJ, C-6/1964, Costa,
[1964]).
1.1.2. State liability for breach of European Law
«It should be borne in mind at the outset that the EEC Treaty has created its
own legal system, which is integrated into the legal systems of the Member States
and which their courts are bound to apply. The subjects of that legal system are not
only the Member States but also their nationals. Just as it imposes burdens on individuals, Community law is also intended to give rise to rights which become part
of their legal patrimony. Those rights arise not only where they are expressly
granted by the Treaty but also by virtue of obligations which the Treaty imposes in
a clearly defined manner both on individuals and on the Member States and the
Community institutions (see the judgments in Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos
[1963] ECR 1 and Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585).
Furthermore, it has been consistently held that the national courts whose task it
is to apply the provisions of Community law in areas within their jurisdiction must
ensure that those rules take full effect and must protect the rights which they confer
on individuals (see in particular the judgments in Case 106/77 Amministrazione
delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629, paragraph 16, and Case
C-213/89 Factortame [1990] ECR I-2433, paragraph 19).
The full effectiveness of Community rules would be impaired and the protection
of the rights which they grant would be weakened if individuals were unable to obtain redress when their rights are infringed by a breach of Community law for
which a Member State can be held responsible.
The possibility of obtaining redress from the Member State is particularly indispensable where, as in this case, the full effectiveness of Community rules is subject
to prior action on the part of the State and where, consequently, in the absence of
such action, individuals cannot enforce before the national courts the rights conferred upon them by Community law.
It follows that the principle whereby a State must be liable for loss and damage
caused to individuals as a result of breaches of Community law for which the State
can be held responsible is inherent in the system of the Treaty.
A further basis for the obligation of Member States to make good such loss and
damage is to be found in Article 5 of the Treaty, under which the Member States
are required to take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure
2
See now article 267 TFUE.
1. Some basic features of European Law
3
fulfilment of their obligations under Community law. Among these is the obligation to nullify the unlawful consequences of a breach of Community law (see, in
relation to the analogous provision of Article 86 of the ECSC Treaty, the judgment
in Case 6/60 Humblet v Belgium [1960] ECR 559).
It follows from all the foregoing that it is a principle of Community law that the
Member States are obliged to make good loss and damage caused to individuals by
breaches of Community law for which they can be held responsible».
The conditions for State liability
Although State liability is thus required by Community law, the conditions under which that liability gives rise to a right to reparation depend on the nature of the
breach of Community law giving rise to the loss and damage.
Where, as in this case, a Member State fails to fulfil its obligation under the
third paragraph of Article 189 of the Treaty to take all the measures necessary to
achieve the result prescribed by a directive, the full effectiveness of that rule of
Community law requires that there should be a right to reparation provided that
three conditions are fulfilled.
The first of those conditions is that the result prescribed by the directive should
entail the grant of rights to individuals. The second condition is that it should be
possible to identify the content of those rights on the basis of the provisions of the directive. Finally, the third condition is the existence of a causal link between the breach
of the State’ s obligation and the loss and damage suffered by the injured parties.
Those conditions are sufficient to give rise to a right on the part of individuals
to obtain reparation, a right founded directly on Community law.
Subject to that reservation, it is on the basis of the rules of national law on liability that the State must make reparation for the consequences of the loss and
damage caused. In the absence of Community legislation, it is for the internal legal
order of each Member State to designate the competent courts and lay down the detailed procedural rules for legal proceedings intended fully to safeguard the rights
which individuals derive from Community law (see the judgments in Case 60/75
Russo v AIMA [1976] ECR 45, Case 33/76 Rewe v Landwirstschaftskammer Saarland [1976] ECR 1989 and Case 158/80 Rewe v Hauptzollamt Kiel [1981] ECR
1805).
Further, the substantive and procedural conditions for reparation of loss and
damage laid down by the national law of the Member States must not be less favourable than those relating to similar domestic claims and must not be so framed
as to make it virtually impossible or excessively difficult to obtain reparation (see,
in relation to the analogous issue of the repayment of taxes levied in breach of
Community law, inter alia the judgment in Case 199/82 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v San Giorgio [1983] ECR 3595).
In this case, the breach of Community law by a Member State by virtue of its
failure to transpose Directive 80/987 within the prescribed period has been con-
1. Some basic features of European Law
4
firmed by a judgment of the Court. The result required by that directive entails the
grant to employees of a right to a guarantee of payment of their unpaid wage claims.
As is clear from the examination of the first part of the first question, the content of
that right can be identified on the basis of the provisions of the directive.
Consequently, the national court must, in accordance with the national rules on
liability, uphold the right of employees to obtain reparation of loss and damage
caused to them as a result of failure to transpose the directive.
The answer to be given to the national court must therefore be that a Member
State is required to make good loss and damage caused to individuals by failure to
transpose Directive 80/987». (ECJ, C-6, 9/90, Francovich [1991], § 31-46).
1.2. The relationship between EU Law and Italian Law: toward the
integration of legal systems
1.2.1. The acceptance (not unconditional) of the Supremacy of Community
Law
«L’assetto dei rapporti fra diritto comunitario e diritto interno, oggetto di varie
pronunzie rese in precedenza da questo Collegio, è venuto evolvendosi, ed è ormai
ordinato sul principio secondo cui il regolamento della CEE prevale rispetto alle
confliggenti statuizioni del legislatore interno”.
[…]
«I principi stabiliti dalla Corte in relazione al diritto – nel caso in esame, al
regolamento – comunitario, traggono significato, invece, precisamente da ciò: che
l’ordinamento della CEE e quello dello Stato, pur distinti ed autonomi, sono, come
esige il Trattato di Roma, necessariamente coordinati; il coordinamento discende, a
sua volta, dall’avere la legge di esecuzione del Trattato trasferito agli organi comunitari, in conformità dell’art. 11 Cost., le competenze che questi esercitano, beninteso nelle materie loro riservate».
[…]
«L’ordinamento italiano – in virtù del particolare rapporto con l’ordinamento
della CEE, e della sottostante limitazione della sovranità statuale – consente, appunto, che nel territorio nazionale il regolamento comunitario spieghi effetto in
quanto tale e perché tale. A detto atto normativo sono attribuiti “forza e valore di
legge”, solo e propriamente nel senso che ad esso si riconosce l’efficacia di cui è
provvisto nell’ordinamento di origine.
Il risultato cui è pervenuta la precedente giurisprudenza va, quindi, ridefinito, in
relazione al punto di vista, sottinteso anche nelle precedenti pronunzie, ma non
condotto alle ultime conseguenze, sotto il quale la fonte comunitaria è presa in considerazione nel nostro ordinamento. Il giudice italiano accerta che la normativa sca-
1. Some basic features of European Law
5
turente da tale fonte regola il caso sottoposto al suo esame, e ne applica di conseguenza il disposto, con esclusivo riferimento al sistema dell’ente sovrannazionale:
cioè al solo sistema che governa l’atto da applicare e di esso determina la capacità
produttiva. Le confliggenti statuizioni della legge interna non possono costituire ostacolo al riconoscimento della “forza e valore”, che il Trattato conferisce al regolamento comunitario, nel configurarlo come atto produttivo di regole immediatamente applicabili. Rispetto alla sfera di questo atto, così riconosciuta, la legge statale
rimane infatti, a ben guardare, pur sempre collocata in un ordinamento, che non
vuole interferire nella produzione normativa del distinto ed autonomo ordinamento
della Comunità, sebbene garantisca l’osservanza di essa nel territorio nazionale.
D’altra parte, la garanzia che circonda l’applicazione di tale normativa è – grazie al precetto dell’art. 11 Cost., com’è sopra chiarito – piena e continua. Precisamente, le disposizioni della CEE, le quali soddisfano i requisiti dell’immediata applicabilità devono, al medesimo titolo, entrare e permanere in vigore nel territorio
italiano, senza che la sfera della loro efficacia possa essere intaccata dalla legge
ordinaria dello Stato. Non importa, al riguardo, se questa legge sia anteriore o successiva. Il regolamento comunitario fissa, comunque, la disciplina della specie. L’effetto connesso con la sua vigenza è perciò quello, non già di caducare, nell’accezione propria del termine, la norma interna incompatibile, bensì di impedire che
tale norma venga in rilievo per la definizione della controversia innanzi al giudice
nazionale» […].
«Diversamente accadrebbe, se l’ordinamento della Comunità e quello dello
Stato – ed i rispettivi processi di produzione normativa – fossero composti ad unità.
Ad avviso della Corte, tuttavia, essi, per quanto coordinati, sono distinti e reciprocamente autonomi. Proprio in ragione, dunque, della distinzione fra i due ordinamenti, la prevalenza del regolamento adottato dalla CEE va intesa come si è con la
presente pronunzia ritenuto: nel senso, vale a dire, che la legge interna non interferisce nella sfera occupata da tale atto, la quale è interamente attratta sotto il diritto
comunitario.
Il regolamento comunitario va, dunque, sempre applicato, sia che segua, sia che
preceda nel tempo le leggi ordinarie con esso incompatibili: e il giudice nazionale
investito della relativa applicazione potrà giovarsi dell’ausilio che gli offre lo strumento della questione pregiudiziale di interpretazione, ai sensi dell’art. 177 3 del
Trattato. Solo così è soddisfatta la fondamentale esigenza di certezza giuridica,
sempre avvertita nella giurisprudenza di questo Collegio, che impone eguaglianza e
uniformità di criteri applicativi del regolamento comunitario per tutta l’area della
Comunità Europea.
Le osservazioni fin qui svolte non implicano, tuttavia, che l’intero settore dei
rapporti fra diritto comunitario e diritto interno sia sottratto alla competenza della
Corte. Questo Collegio ha, nella sentenza n. 183/73, già avvertito come la legge di
3
Now article 267 TFEU.
1. Some basic features of European Law
6
esecuzione del Trattato possa andar soggetta al suo sindacato, in riferimento ai
principi fondamentali del nostro ordinamento costituzionale e ai diritti inalienabili
della persona umana…» (Corte costituzionale, sent. 170/1984, Granital, § 3-6).
«Come più volte affermato da questa Corte, l’art. 11 Cost., prevedendo che
l’Italia «consente, in condizioni di parità con gli altri Stati, alle limitazioni di sovranità necessarie ad un ordinamento che assicuri la pace e la giustizia fra le Nazioni», ha permesso di riconoscere alle norme comunitarie efficacia obbligatoria nel
nostro ordinamento (ex plurimis, sentenze n. 349 e n. 284 del 2007; n. 170 del
1984). Il nuovo testo dell’art. 117, primo comma, Cost., introdotto dalla legge costituzionale n. 3 del 2001 – nel disporre che «La potestà legislativa è esercitata dallo Stato e dalle Regioni nel rispetto della Costituzione, nonché dei vincoli derivanti
dall’ordinamento comunitario […]», ha ribadito che i vincoli derivanti dall’ordinamento comunitario si impongono al legislatore nazionale (statale, regionale e
delle Province autonome). Da tale quadro normativo costituzionale consegue che,
con la ratifica dei Trattati comunitari, l’Italia è entrata a far parte di un ordinamento
giuridico autonomo, integrato e coordinato con quello interno, ed ha trasferito, in
base all’art. 11 Cost., l’esercizio di poteri, anche normativi, nelle materie oggetto
dei Trattati medesimi. Le norme comunitarie vincolano in vario modo il legislatore
interno, con il solo limite dell’intangibilità dei princípi fondamentali dell’ordinamento costituzionale e dei diritti inviolabili dell’uomo garantiti dalla Costituzione
(ex multis, sentenze nn. 349, 348 e 284 del 2007, n. 170 del 1984).
Con specifico riguardo al caso, che qui interessa, di leggi regionali della cui
compatibilità con il diritto comunitario (come interpretato e applicato dalle istituzioni e dagli organi comunitari) si dubita, va rilevato che l’inserimento dell’Italia
nell’ordinamento comunitario comporta due diverse conseguenze, a seconda che il
giudizio in cui si fa valere tale dubbio penda davanti al giudice comune ovvero davanti alla Corte costituzionale a séguito di ricorso proposto in via principale. Nel
primo caso, le norme comunitarie, se hanno efficacia diretta, impongono al giudice
di disapplicare le leggi nazionali (comprese quelle regionali), ove le ritenga non compatibili. Nel secondo caso, le medesime norme «fungono da norme interposte atte
ad integrare il parametro per la valutazione di conformità della normativa regionale
all’art. 117, primo comma, Cost.» (sentenze n. 129 del 2006; n. 406 del 2005; n. 166
e n. 7 del 2004), o, piú precisamente, rendono concretamente operativo il parametro
costituito dall’art. 117, primo comma, Cost. (come chiarito, in generale, dalla sentenza n. 348 del 2007), con conseguente declaratoria di illegittimità costituzionale
delle norme regionali che siano giudicate incompatibili con il diritto comunitario.
Questi due diversi modi di operare delle norme comunitarie corrispondono alle
diverse caratteristiche dei giudizi.
Davanti al giudice comune la legge regionale deve essere applicata ad un caso
concreto e la valutazione della sua conformità all’ordinamento comunitario deve
essere da tale giudice preliminarmente effettuata al fine di procedere all’eventuale
1. Some basic features of European Law
7
disapplicazione della suddetta legge, previo rinvio pregiudiziale alla Corte di giustizia CE – ove necessario – per l’interpretazione del diritto comunitario. Una volta
esclusa tale disapplicazione, il giudice potrà bensí adire la Corte costituzionale, ma
solo per motivi di non conformità del diritto interno all’ordinamento costituzionale
e non per motivi di non conformità all’ordinamento comunitario. Ne consegue che,
ove il giudice comune dubitasse della conformità della legge nazionale al diritto
comunitario, il mancato rinvio pregiudiziale alla Corte di giustizia CE renderebbe
non rilevante e, pertanto, inammissibile la questione di legittimità costituzionale da
lui sollevata.
Davanti alla Corte costituzionale adita in via principale, invece, la valutazione
della conformità della legge regionale alle norme comunitarie si risolve, per il
tramite dell’art. 117, primo comma, Cost., in un giudizio di legittimità costituzionale; con la conseguenza che, in caso di riscontrata difformità, la Corte non procede
alla disapplicazione della legge, ma – come già osservato – ne dichiara l’illegittimità costituzionale con efficacia erga omnes (ex multis, sentenza n. 94 del 1995).
In conclusione, alla luce di quanto sopra rilevato, la censura in esame deve ritenersi ammissibile, perché le norme comunitarie sono state correttamente evocate
dal ricorrente nel presente giudizio, per il tramite dell’art. 117, primo comma,
Cost., quale elemento integrante il parametro di costituzionalità.
[…]
Occorre ora verificare se sussistano le condizioni perché questa Corte, al pari
del giudice comune, possa sollevare davanti alla Corte di giustizia CE – nel caso
in cui la questione di conformità alla normativa comunitaria non sia manifestamente infondata – questione pregiudiziale sull’interpretazione del diritto comunitario ai sensi dell’art. 234 del Trattato CE (secondo il quale, «La Corte di giustizia
è competente a pronunciarsi, in via pregiudiziale: a) sull’interpretazione del presente trattato […]. Quando una questione del genere è sollevata in un giudizio pendente davanti a una giurisdizione nazionale, avverso le cui decisioni non possa proporsi un ricorso giurisdizionale di diritto interno, tale giurisdizione è tenuta a rivolgersi alla Corte di giustizia»).
La risposta, al riguardo, è positiva, perché questa Corte, pur nella sua peculiare posizione di organo di garanzia costituzionale, ha natura di giudice e, in particolare, di giudice di unica istanza (in quanto contro le sue decisioni non è ammessa alcuna impugnazione: art. 137, terzo comma, Cost.). Essa pertanto, nei giudizi
di legittimità costituzionale in via principale, è legittimata a proporre rinvio pregiudiziale ai sensi dell’art. 234, terzo paragrafo, del Trattato CE.
Tale conclusione è confermata dalle seguenti considerazioni.
In primo luogo, la nozione di «giurisdizione nazionale» rilevante ai fini dell’ammissibilità del rinvio pregiudiziale deve essere desunta dall’ordinamento comunitario e non dalla qualificazione “interna” dell’organo rimettente. Non v’è
dubbio che la Corte costituzionale italiana possiede requisiti individuati a tal fine
dalla giurisprudenza della Corte di giustizia CE per attribuire tale qualificazione.
1. Some basic features of European Law
8
In secondo luogo, nell’àmbito dei giudizi di legittimità costituzionale promossi
in via principale, questa Corte è l’unico giudice chiamato a pronunciarsi in ordine
al loro oggetto, in quanto – come già sopra osservato – manca un giudice a quo
abilitato a definire la controversia, e cioè ad applicare o a disapplicare direttamente
la norma interna non conforme al diritto comunitario. Pertanto, non ammettere in
tali giudizi il rinvio pregiudiziale di cui all’art. 234 del Trattato CE comporterebbe
un’inaccettabile lesione del generale interesse all’uniforme applicazione del diritto
comunitario, quale interpretato dalla Corte di giustizia CE» (Corte cost., sent.
102/2008, § 8.2.8.1-8.2.8.3).
1.3. Principle of supremacy and duty to disapply by administrative
authorities
1.3.1. The foundation: Fratelli Costanzo Case
[...]
«In the fourth question the national court asks whether administrative authorities, including municipal authorities, are under the same obligation as a national
court to apply the provisions of Article 29(5) of Council Directive 71/305 and to
refrain from applying provisions of national law which conflict with them.
In its judgments of 19 January 1982 in Case 8/81 Becker v Finanzamt MuensterInnenstadt ((1982) ECR 53, at p. 71) and 26 February 1986 in Case 152/84 Marshall v Southampton and South-West Hampshire Area Health Authority ((1986) ECR
723, at p. 748) the Court held that wherever the provisions of a directive appear, as
far as their subject-matter is concerned, to be unconditional and sufficiently precise, those provisions may be relied upon by an individual against the State where
that State has failed to implement the directive in national law by the end of the period prescribed or where it has failed to implement the Directive correctly.
It is important to note that the reason for which an individual may, in the circumstances described above, rely on the provisions of a directive in proceedings
before the national courts is that the obligations arising under those provisions are
binding upon all the authorities of the Member States.
It would, moreover, be contradictory to rule that an individual may rely upon the
provisions of a directive which fulfil the conditions defined above in proceedings
before the national courts seeking an order against the administrative authorities,
and yet to hold that those authorities are under no obligation to apply the provisions
of the directive and refrain from applying provisions of national law which conflict
with them. It follows that when the conditions under which the Court has held that
individuals may rely on the provisions of a directive before the national courts are
met, all organs of the administration, including decentralized authorities such as
municipalities, are obliged to apply those provisions.
1. Some basic features of European Law
9
With specific regard to Article 29(5) of Directive 71/305, it is apparent from the
discussion of the first question that it is unconditional and sufficiently precise to be
relied upon by an individual against the State. An individual may therefore plead
that provision before the national courts and, as is clear from the foregoing, all organs of the administration, including decentralized authorities such as municipalities, are obliged to apply it.
[…]
«The answer to the fourth question must therefore be that administrative authorities, including municipal authorities, are under the same obligation as a national
court to apply the provisions of Article 29(5) of Council Directive 71/305/EEC and
to refrain from applying provisions of national law which conflict with them.»
(ECJ, C-103/1988, Fratelli Costanzo, [1989], §28-31, 33).
1.3.2. The duty to disapply to Independent Commissions (Consorzio Italia‐
no Fiammiferi – CIF Case) «The CIF submits that by virtue of the Court’s case-law Articles 81 EC and 82
EC apply only to anti-competitive conduct engaged in by undertakings on their
own initiative. If anti-competitive conduct is required of undertakings by national
legislation or if the latter creates a legal framework which itself eliminates any possibility of competitive activity on their part, Articles 81 EC and 82 EC do not apply.
In such a situation, the restriction of competition is not attributable, as those provisions implicitly require, to the autonomous conduct of the undertakings. Articles 81
EC and 82 EC may apply, however, if it is found that the national legislation does
not preclude undertakings from engaging in autonomous conduct which prevents,
restricts or distorts competition (Joined Cases C-359/95 P and C-379/95 P Commission and France v Ladbroke Racing [1997] ECR I-6265, paragraphs 33 and 34).
The CIF also points out that when the Commission is considering the applicability of Articles 81 EC and 82 EC to the conduct of undertakings, a prior evaluation of national legislation affecting such conduct should therefore be directed solely to ascertaining whether that legislation prevents undertakings from engaging in
autonomous conduct which prevents, restricts or distorts competition (Commission
and France v Ladbroke Racing, paragraph 35).
From that, the CIF infers that, when the Authority is carrying out an investigation, it must, at an early stage, determine solely whether the Italian legislation allows the undertakings concerned any latitude in their conduct. Only if that is the
case can Articles 81 EC and 82 EC apply to the undertakings. It follows, by implication, that it is inconceivable that the undertakings should be obliged not to apply
the Italian legislation when faced with mandatory national rules.
In the CIF’s submission, although Law No 52/1996 confers on the Authority
power to apply Article 81 EC for the purpose of ruling on, and imposing penalties
1. Some basic features of European Law 10 in respect of, anti-competitive agreements between undertakings, it does not confer
on it power to check the validity of national legislative measures for the purposes
of the combined provisions of Articles 3 EC, 10 EC and 81 EC.
Consequently, the conduct of undertakings such as those in the CIF is covered
by Article 81 EC only if the Authority first – and as a preliminary issue – looks into and establishes how autonomous those undertakings are in the light of the provision made by the national legislation.
In that regard, it is appropriate to point out, first, that, although Articles 81 EC
and 82 EC are, in themselves, concerned solely with the conduct of undertakings
and not with laws or regulations emanating from Member States, those articles,
read in conjunction with Article 10 EC, which lays down a duty to cooperate, none
the less require the Member States not to introduce or maintain in force measures,
even of a legislative or regulatory nature, which may render ineffective the competition rules applicable to undertakings (see Case 13/77 GB-Inno-BM [1977] ECR
2115, paragraph 31; Case 267/86 Van Eycke [1988] ECR 4769, paragraph 16; Case
C-185/91 Reiff [1993] ECR I-5801, paragraph 14; Case C-153/93 Delta Schiffahrtsund Speditionsgesellschaft [1994] ECR I-2517, paragraph 14; Case C-96/94 Centro
Servizi Spediporto [1995] ECR I-2883, paragraph 20; and Case C-35/99 Arduino
[2002] ECR I-1529, paragraph 34).
The Court has held in particular that Articles 10 EC and 81 EC are infringed
where a Member State requires or favours the adoption of agreements, decisions or
concerted practices contrary to Article 81 EC or reinforces their effects, or where it
divests its own rules of the character of legislation by delegating to private economic operators responsibility for taking decisions affecting the economic sphere
(see Van Eycke, paragraph 16; Reiff, paragraph 14; Delta Schiffahrts– und Speditionsgesellschaft, paragraph 14; Centro Servizi Spediporto, paragraph 21; and Arduino, paragraph 35).
Moreover, since the Treaty of Maastricht entered into force, the EC Treaty has
expressly provided that in the context of their economic policy the activities of the
Member States must observe the principle of an open market economy with free
competition (see Articles 3a(1) and 102a of the EC Treaty (now Article 4(1) EC
and Article 98 EC)).
It is appropriate to bear in mind, second, that in accordance with settled caselaw the primacy of Community law requires any provision of national law which
contravenes a Community rule to be disapplied, regardless of whether it was adopted
before or after that rule.
The duty to disapply national legislation which contravenes Community law applies not only to national courts but also to all organs of the State, including administrative authorities (see, to that effect, Case 103/88 Fratelli Costanzo [1989]
ECR 1839, paragraph 31), which entails, if the circumstances so require, the obligation to take all appropriate measures to enable Community law to be fully applied (see Case 48/71 Commission v Italy [1972] ECR 527, paragraph 7).
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Since a national competition authorithy such as the Authority is responsible for
ensuring, inter alia, that Article 81 EC is observed and that provision, in conjunction with Article 10 EC, imposes a duty on Member States to refrain from introducing measures contrary to the Community competition rules, those rules would be
rendered less effective if, in the course of an investigation under Article 81 EC into
the conduct of undertakings, the authority were not able to declare a national
measure contrary to the combined provisions of Articles 10 EC and 81 EC and if,
consequently, it failed to disapply it».
[...]
In light of the foregoing considerations, the answer to be given to the first question referred for a preliminary ruling is that, where undertakings engage in conduct
contrary to Article 81(1) EC and where that conduct is required or facilitated by
national legislation which legitimises or reinforces the effects of the conduct, specifically with regard to price-fixing or market-sharing arrangements, a national competition authority, one of whose responsibilities is to ensure that Article 81 EC is
observed:
– has a duty to disapply the national legislation;
– may not impose penalties in respect of past conduct on the undertakings concerned when the conduct was required by the national legislation;
– may impose penalties on the undertakings concerned in respect of conduct
subsequent to the decision to disapply the national legislation, once the decision
has become definitive in their regard;
– may impose penalties on the undertakings concerned in respect of past conduct where the conduct was merely facilitated or encouraged by the national legislation, whilst taking due account of the specific features of the legislative framework in which the undertakings acted (ECJ C-198/01, Consorzio industrie di fiammiferi (CIF) [2003], § 40-50, 58).
1.4. The development of the protection of EU human rights
The European Community, based on economic cooperation, has initially
ignored the problem of human rights protection. Nevertheless, as far back
as 1970’s the European Court of Justice developed a jurisprudence on the
“general principles” of Community Law including fundamental rights
(see Stauder (1969) and Internationale Handelsgesellschaft (1970) Cases).
More recently, the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 has finally determined the legally binding effect of the EU Charter of Fundamental rights.
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Treaty of Lisbon
article 6
1. The Union recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 7 December
2000, as adapted at Strasbourg, on 12 December 2007, which shall have
the same legal value as the Treaties.
The provisions of the Charter shall not extend in any way the competences of the Union as defined in the Treaties.
The rights, freedoms and principles in the Charter shall be interpreted in
accordance with the general provisions in Title VII of the Charter governing
its interpretation and application and with due regard to the explanations
referred to in the Charter, that set out the sources of those provisions.
2. The Union shall accede to the European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Such accession shall not
affect the Union’s competences as defined in the Treaties.
3. Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States,
shall constitute general principles of the Union’s law.
1.4.1. The original problem of the protection of fundamental rights
«Il richiamo a norme o nozioni di diritto nazionale nel valutare la legittimità di
atti emananti dalle istituzioni della Comunità menomerebbe l’unità e l’efficacia del
diritto comunitario. La validità di detti atti può essere stabilita unicamente alla luce
del diritto comunitario. Il diritto nato dal trattato, che ha una fonte autonoma, per
sua natura non può infatti trovare un limite in qualsivoglia norma di diritto nazionale senza perdere il proprio carattere comunitario e senza che sia posto in discussione il fondamento giuridico della stessa Comunità.
Di conseguenza, il fatto che siano menomati vuoi i diritti fondamentali sanciti
dalla costituzione di uno Stato membro, vuoi i principi di una costituzione nazionale, non può sminuire la validità di un atto della Comunità né la sua efficacia nel
territorio dello stesso Stato.
È tuttavia opportuno accertare se non sia stata violata alcuna garanzia analoga,
inerente al diritto comunitario. La tutela dei diritti fondamentali costituisce infatti
parte integrante dei principi giuridici generali di cui la Corte di giustizia garantisce l’osservanza. La salvaguardia di questi diritti, pur essendo informata alle tradizioni costituzionali comuni agli Stati membri, va garantita entro l’ambito della
struttura e delle finalità della Comunità.
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