THE MILITARY BALANCE 2013
Press Statement
Arundel House, London
14 March 2013
remarks by
Dr John Chipman
Director-General and Chief Executive
The International Institute for Strategic Studies,
London
INTRODUCTION
Welcome to the launch of The Military Balance 2013, the
annual assessment of global military capabilities and
defence economics from the IISS.
Joining me to answer your questions today are James
Hackett, Editor of The Military Balance; Nigel Inkster,
Director of Transnational Threats and Political Risk; Mark
Fitzpatrick, Director of the IISS Non-proliferation and
Disarmament Programme; Dana Allin, Senior Fellow
for US Foreign Policy and Transatlantic Affairs and
Editor of Survival; Toby Dodge, Consulting Senior Fellow
for the Middle East; Douglas Barrie; Senior Fellow for
Military Aerospace; Brigadier Ben Barry, Senior Fellow
for Land Warfare; Christian Le Mière, Senior Fellow
for Naval Forces and Maritime Security; Henry Boyd,
Research Associate for Defence and Military Analysis;
Giri Rajendran, Research Associate for Defence and
Economics; and Virginia Comolli, Research Associate for
Transnational Threats.
This year’s Military Balance sees continued
improvements to the book’s presentation, information and
assessments. We have reorganised and expanded the set
of defence policy and capability essays at the start of the
book, and have added a new section on ‘conflict analysis
and conflict trends’, this year focusing on the wars in
Afghanistan and Syria. We again analyse policy and defence
economics questions for the countries with the largest
defence budgets, and this year assess more countries. The
analytical summaries of national military capabilities,
introduced to some regions in the book last year, are
now complete. These country capability summaries are
designed to help inform readers’ understanding of the
numerical data within the book and are part of our effort to
build more qualitative analysis on to The Military Balance’s
renowned sets of quantitative data.
SYRIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST
This year’s Military Balance is published at a time
when global attention remains focused on the strategic
consequences of the Arab Spring, and particularly the civil
war in Syria.
Across that country, ethnic and sectarian faultlines
have deepened. It is likely that government capability
and support will further diminish. From a notional
strength of 220,000, the Syrian army’s effective
strength had fallen by autumn 2012 to about half that
number. Essentially, the regime could only be certain
of the loyalty of the mainly Alawite Special Forces, the
Republican Guard, and the elite 3rd and 4th Divisions –
perhaps 50,000 troops in total. The cumulative effect of
defections, desertions, battlefield losses and damage to
morale will weigh heavily in determining the outcome
of the conflict.
External support for the rebels is increasing, in terms of
non-lethal assistance, funding for weapons procurement
and, possibly in the near future, overt foreign supply of
combat-capable equipment. They are now able to acquire
some limited capabilities from foreign sources. Though a
notionally united opposition emerged after talks in Qatar
last November, concern persists about the sheer number
of rebel groups, their aims, and the presence of jihadists.
While the rebels’ capability is increasing, the embattled
Assad regime is aware of two things: on the one hand, the
many rebel groups share a common objective to remove it;
but on the other hand, they share little else, are disunited
and un-coordinated. Instances of rebel-on-rebel violence
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THE MILITARY BALANCE 2013
have been seen, as have confrontations between rebel
forces and ethnic militias.
The Assad regime is also aware that direct foreign
intervention remains unlikely, so long as no red lines
are crossed, for example through the use of chemical
weapons. Syria will not be another Libya. But events in
that country will provoke concerns about the aftermath
of a regime collapse. A year and a half after the fall of
Muammar Gadhafi, many Libyan rebel groups have still
to disarm. If Assad falls, there will be considerable focus
among regional states and international actors about the
intent of armed groups and the fate of government and
rebel weapons. There is a considerable risk that a rapid
end to the conflict is likely to be as destabilising as its
prolongation.
Elsewhere in the region, Egypt’s president Morsi
has recalibrated relations with the country’s military
leadership, but has not challenged the armed forces’
core corporate interests. Both Egypt and Tunisia saw
comparatively stable transitions, at least initially. But
extended civil deployments could have a negative effect
on the readiness of both states’ armed forces. In Tunisia,
there is concern that border security and the fight against
armed militants have been partly sacrificed to the need to
maintain civil order in cities.
Another regional country is in a later stage of its
transition, and provides a salutary reminder of the
possible outcome of regime change. As noted in our recent
Adelphi book ‘Iraq: from war to a new authoritarianism’,
heavy investment in the reconstitution of Iraq’s security
forces since 2004 has left the country again subservient
to a military machine. The Adelphi says that the way the
armed forces are now used by Prime Minister Maliki
‘makes Iraq comparable not only to the repressive Arab
regimes of the pre-spring Middle East, but also to the
country’s own history, from its independence in 1932 to
regime change in 2003’. Beyond political interference, a
broad set of problems continue to plague the Iraqi army
and challenges remain for the armed forces to protect Iraqi
airspace, the borders and deal with continuing terrorist
campaigns.
DEFENCE SPENDING
While the Middle East region is clearly in a state of flux,
all around it the global redistribution of military power
is continuing. Reflecting the subdued global economic
climate, total defence spending actually fell in real terms
in 2012 for a second year running. However, real increases
were seen in the Middle East and North Africa, Russia and
Eurasia, Latin America and in Asia, while real declines
were seen in North America and Europe. As we predicted
this time last year, 2012 saw nominal Asian defence
spending overtake that of NATO European states for the
first time.
Planned Global Defence Expenditure by Region 2012†
Latin America and
the Caribbean Sub-Saharan Africa
4.4%
1.2%
Middle East and
North Africa
North America
10.5%
42.0%
Asia and
Australasia
19.9%
Pla
Other
and No
Saud
Other Eur
Rus
Other As
Australas
Ind
Ja
Russia and Eurasia
4.4%
N
Europe
17.6%
†
Figures do not sum due to rounding effects
©IISS
This is not simply a result of Asia spending more;
it is as much a result of states in Europe spending less.
In 2012, European NATO members’ defence spending
was, in real terms, around 11% lower than in 2006. This
reduction continues to shape military capabilities, and
especially in the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy
and Spain which account for almost 70% of European
spending. According to our data, total military personnel
in European NATO states have reduced from 2.51 million
in 2000 to 1.86m for the same set of states now, a decline
in excess of 25%. The intention was that reduced numbers,
when combined with structural reforms, would produce
an increase in the usability of armed forces. But in many
European countries, this has not happened. The budget
crisis exacerbates the trend. Regardless of their strategic
intent to maintain forces suited to present-day needs,
defence ministries are playing ‘catch-up’, adjusting force
structures to match immediate financial priorities.
In 2011, European capability gaps were underscored
by the war in Libya. The 2013 operation in Mali again
highlighted shortcomings in airborne refueling, airlift and
ISR. Discussions on pooling, sharing and role specialisation
continue, and NATO promotes its ‘smart defence’ initiative.
But progress towards better cooperation remains limited,
with national capitals concerned about loss of sovereignty
and jobs. This is occurring as it becomes ever more clear
that Europe should not presume that the US will provide
the same level of operational support. The restricted
nature of the US role in Libya, and again this year in Mali,
could be seen as an incentive for European countries to
work together to develop a wider spectrum of capabilities.
But there is little sign of this happening.
Defence spending is also in decline in the United States.
The Pentagon was already implementing cuts of $487
billion over five years, and as a result of sequestration will
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©IISS
now need to make additional reductions of $600bn over
ten years. The inflexible design of sequestration and the
exemption of military personnel accounts from the process
limit the DoD’s room for manoeuvre.
It needs to be remembered, however, that the defence
budget of the United States still equals that of the next
14 nations combined and the United States still intends
to remain engaged globally. Although much has been
said about ‘rebalancing’ to the Pacific, in military terms
there is less to this than first appeared. It will of course
be important in the longer term, but the rebalance should
mainly be seen as a signal that the US will remain engaged
in Asia-Pacific security, reflecting not just US economic ties
to the region but also the emergence of China as a regional
competitor in both economic and military terms.
China’s indigenous capacity to produce advanced
equipment is gradually transforming the People’s
Liberation Army. China’s rise, and its growing strategic
reach, was illustrated by the commissioning of its first
aircraft carrier in September, and the first at-sea landing
of the J-15 combat aircraft two months later. But China
is still learning how to operate carriers, the J-15 remains
largely developmental and the PLA Navy’s ability
to carry out integrated carrier task group operations
remains embryonic. Attention should also be paid to the
new Type-052D destroyer, possibly designed to provide a
blue-water air-warfare destroyer capability, the modular
Type-056 corvettes, and new maritime patrol aircraft as
well as recent developments in China’s guided weapons
systems.
China’s military developments are fuelled by
continuing increases in defence spending, witnessed by
the 10.7% rise in its official defence budget announced
last week. China now spends more on defence than
©IISS
US defence spending trajectory under various
proposals
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THE MILITARY BALANCE 2013
neighbouring Japan, South Korea and Taiwan combined.
When might Chinese spending rival that of the United
States? If the 15% average annual increases in China’s
official defence spending seen over the past decade
continue into the medium term, Chinese defence outlays
could rival US base defence-budget spending by 2025. If
additional elements of military spending widely believed
to be excluded from the official PLA budget are included,
convergence could occur in 2023, just a decade away. A
graph on page 42 of The Military Balance 2013 shows a
comparison of China–US defence spending projections
under various assumptions.
FLASHPOINTS AND CONFLICTS
In the Asia-Pacific, potential flashpoints and smouldering
conflicts continue to threaten peace and stability. In North
Korea, it is clear that the ‘military first’ policy remains intact
despite the change of leadership at the top. Following a
failed effort last April, Pyongyang successfully launched
a rocket to space in December then, in February, for the
third time tested a nuclear device. Pyongyang claimed the
test was of a miniaturised nuclear bomb, and the yield was
estimated to be around 6–7kt. A test of a smaller device
would be expected if North Korea wanted to be certain
that it had a workable warhead to fit the nosecone of its
Nodong missiles.
Continuing tensions in the South China Sea have
unnerved several Southeast Asian governments,
particularly the Philippines and Vietnam, further
motivating their attempts to improve their military
capabilities. The IISS analyses these issues in its next Adelphi
book ‘Regional Disorder: The South China Sea Disputes’.
Territorial disputes are also flaring in Northeast Asia, with
tension rising between Japan and China following a radar
lock-on incident in January.
Across East Asia, advanced military systems such as
anti-ship missiles, new submarines, advanced combat
aircraft and cruise missiles are proliferating in a region
lacking security mechanisms that could defuse crises.
Bilateral military to military ties are often only embryonic.
There is a tangible risk of accidental conflict and escalation,
particularly in the absence of a strong tradition of military
confidence-building measures.
Iran’s expanded uranium enrichment capacity, as well
as continuing construction of the Arak reactor, with the
plutonium production route this will provide, means that
for Western powers there is a more urgent need for progress
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in diplomatic talks. Fear of Iran is an important influence
on the Gulf states’ military programmes. Meanwhile,
Iran appears to have upgraded old air defence systems
supplied originally by the US and the Soviet Union, and
is believed to have acquired a licensed production line for
anti-ship missiles. The creation of hybrid systems based
on outdated weapons, but supplemented with modern
subsystems, and deployed using asymmetric tactics, has
the potential to surprise adversaries.
In Afghanistan, the insurgency is not expected to have
been eliminated by the end of 2014. Rather, the hope is that
it can be reduced to such a level that it no longer poses an
existential threat to the state and can be contained by Afghan
forces. The most likely situation in Afghanistan in 2015 is a
patchwork of insurgent activity, suppressed in many areas
but still important in others, particularly in the east.
CONCLUSION
This year’s Military Balance is, as you would expect, rich in
detail and broad in its analytical reach, with an updated
graphics section, essays on European defence industries,
anti-access/area denial, trends in land, sea and air
capabilities, Russian defence policy, and Latin American
security challenges as well as the regions I have mentioned.
As usual, it includes the wall-chart on global conflict.
We analyse in great detail emerging trends in the
development of defence capabilities and assess more
deliberately capacities in new areas such as cyber. A number
of countries have embarked on acquisition programmes
that will in time provide them with genuinely new
capacities previously the preserve of Western powers and
Russia. The nature and quality of submarine proliferation
in Asia is a case in point.
For western states traditionally seen as net providers of
security, responses to crises are complicated by declining
finances for defence, as well as for diplomacy and aid.
While the US, even in the current difficulties, stresses its
commitment to Asia, it will be difficult to see how its most
important partners in Europe will be able credibly to pivot
with the US to this part of the world.
The Military Balance 2013 in no way describes a world
that is egalitarian from a defence point of view. Over the
next decade, understanding how the newly rich acquire
genuinely important military capacities, and how long
it takes for some established powers to lose certain key,
especially expeditionary, abilities, will be an important
task for all defence and strategic analysts.
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