R O M A N I A N REVIEW OF POLITICA L
S C I E N C E S A N D I NTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
VOL. II
No. 2
2005
CONTENT
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
HENRIETA ªERBAN, Lucian Blaga and Richard Rorty. The Historical Being
and the Ironist ...................................................................................................
ANA BAZAC, The analysis of Popper on Marx’s Method. Some nonconformist
remarks ..............................................................................................................
RÃZVAN PANTELIMON, Rawls, Nozick y Pettit. Una visión comparativa de la
teoría de la justicia ............................................................................................
3
13
24
POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY
LUIS RENÉ ORO TAPIA, Invocación de Max Weber al Soneto 102
de Shakespeare ..................................................................................................
FRANCESCO GUIDA, Idea di nazione e questione delle nazionalità nel pensiero
di Giuseppe Mazzini..........................................................................................
GHEORGHE LENCAN STOICA, L’évolution de la classe politique roumaine
au XXe siècle .....................................................................................................
RODICA IAMANDI, The cult of personality in Romania, during communism ...
35
43
54
64
ARGUMENTS AND POINTS OF VIEW
LUCIAN JORA, The Representation of history as a conflict prevention
strategy...............................................................................................................
ROBERTA MORETTI, Culianu in Italia ................................................................
CARMEN BURCEA, L’insegnamento del romeno in Italia fra le due guerre
mondiali .............................................................................................................
81
88
99
ISPRI’s ACADEMIC LIFE ....................................................................................
109
BOOK REVIEWS...................................................................................................
121
THE REVIEW OF REVIEWS................................................................................
127
Pol. Sc. Int. Rel., II, 2, p. 1–129, Bucharest, 2005.
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
LUCIAN BLAGA AND RICHARD RORTY.
THE HISTORICAL BEING AND THE IRONIST
HENRIETA ªERBAN
The question to pose in this comparative approach of two philosophical concepts
that at the first glance have nothing in common is the following: “Is ironism an
awakening from ‘the infinite sleep where our being floats’”? And the entire study
struggles to sustain a positive answer to this question. I consider that Blaga’s
architectural complex is a celebration of ironism avant-la-lettre. The parallel
between the historical being and the “ironist” has its importance in the very
contemporary relevance as in the hope it brings about: life brings about the
opportunity to be exposed to different vocabularies, to so interesting vocabularies
(read “worlds”, “ideas”) as either Blaga’s or Rorty’s. Both their thought and lives
speak volumes about ironism. Approaching the parallel between ironism and the
historical being, one understands that the tragic nature of the historical being is
therefore counter-balanced, in a very complex and tensioned way, by the chances
to live authentically as a (liberal) ironist and as an inherently creative being.
Lucian Blaga — a fugitive biography of a great being
Lucian Blaga (1895–1961), the Romanian philosopher who had his debut
as a poet, obtained his Ph.D. title in philosophy and biology in Vienna
(1916–1920). He continued to be a “complete” writer all his life, a poet and a
dramatist, a philosopher and a journalist.1 Meanwhile he was as well a professor2,
a researcher3 and a librarian.4 He gets inscribed into this great intellectual
tradition of connecting and reconnecting Romanian culture to the world as a
press attaché and counselor in Warsaw, Prague and Berna (1926–1936), as a
state vice-secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1936–1938), delegate
minister of Romania in Portugal (1938–1939). In 1935 Lucian Blaga is awarded
by the Romanian Academy the Great C. Hamangiu Prize “for his dramatic and
poetic work”. After the Vienna Diktate he lives at Sibiu, lectures for the Faculty
of Letters and Philosophy of the University of Cluj (1946–1948), researches at
the Cluj Institute of History and Philosophy (1949–1951) to become afterwards
the chief-librarian, at the Library of the Romanian Academy, Cluj section
(1951–1954) and then vice-director at the same institution until 1959, two years
before his departure for eternity in his natal village, the place where, in the words
of the poet, “eternity itself was born”.
Pol. Sc. Int. Rel., II, 2, p. 3–12, Bucharest, 2005.
4
HENRIETA ªERBAN
2
Lucian Blaga published, as a philosopher, several volumes of articles, essays
and studies. The first one was Culture and Conscience in 1922 and then many
more followed: The Philosophy of Style (1924), The Original Phenomenon and
The Faces of a Century (both in 1925), Colloured Windows and Daimonion
(both in 1925) The Dogmatic Aeon (1931), The Luciferic Knowledge (1933), The
Transcendent Censorship (1934), Horizon and Style, and The Mioritic Space
(both in 1936), The Eulogy of the Romanian Village, and The Genesis of Metaphor
and the Sense of Culture (1937), Art and Value (1939), Divine Differentials
(1940), About the Magic Thinking (1941), Religion and Spirit, and Science and
Creation (both in 1942), On the Philosophical Conscience (1947) Anthropological
Aspects (1948), Romanian Thought in Transylvania in the 18th Century (1966),
Horizons and Stages (1968), The Experiment and the Mathematical Spirit (1969),
Sources (1972), The Historical Being (1977), the last five volumes being published
post-mortem.
Lucian Blaga’s philosophy — the “historical being”
The concept of “historical being” that Lucian Blaga developed is an important
part of a larger philosophical architecture. Lucian Blaga himself presents his
system, about the totality of existence, in The Sketch of a Philosophical SelfRepresentation (1934).5 The main part of this architecture is composed of three
trilogies. The first one is The Trilogy of Knowledge, consisting in The Dogmatic
Aeon, The Luciferic Knowledge and The Transcendent Censorship. The second
one is The Trilogy of Culture formed by Horizon and Style, The Mioritic Space
and The Genesis of Metaphor and the Sense of Culture. The third part is The
Trilogy of Values concerning matters of art and value, matters of the philosophy of
biology and matters of pure metaphysics.
As a philosopher, Blaga wanted to build a system of a symphonic character, like
a “church with many cupolas”.6 Blaga’s philosophical construction, metaphysical
in nature, is not erected on the basis of one sole idea, but it relies on several,
completing and consonant ideas. Each idea grows on the meanings startled by
the others and triggers new horizons of meaning and understanding. Culture,
history and historicism, time and temporality, being and becoming of being are
only a few of the pillars of his architectural philosophy. The human being is a
historical being but not merely a historical being. When we tackle historicism at
Blaga we are in fact construing a being in a process of becoming, overcoming
past mysteries and preparing for the future ones.
The Historical Being (Fiinþa istoricã) is the final work of Lucian Blaga, published
in 1977, post-mortem. There the author’s intention was to prepare the philosophical
architecture for a “historical knowledge”, and eventually, for the ”metaphysics of
history”. In the final chapter of this work, Blaga pays attention to the metaphysical
aspects of a philosophy of history. He says that the historicism of the human
being is “conditioned” metaphysically, in the sense that the history of each human
has the core of a justification and a foundation of the permanent creative state of
the human being. While he was still working at The Trilogy of Values, in 1938,
3
LUCIAN BLAGA AND RICHARD RORTY
5
he gave a speech entitled “About historical plenitude”, where he capitalizes on
the Kantian tradition in the philosophy of culture, and as well on the “philosophy
of symbolic forms” of E. Cassirer. In the latter, Blaga finds a parallel to his
“metaphorizing being” in Cassirer’s7 expression “symbolic being” for the human
being. History is therefore interesting mainly in the ontological leaps and in the
ontological mutation that occasions and captures in any act of symbolic creation.
From this perspective, the history is the history of the creator of human creativity,
which is also the very human nature. The mechanisms and processes of human
action are at the same time mechanisms and processes of human creativity. It
seems that while he was preoccupied by the aspects of style, while he was
transforming his interest for the “stylistic matrix” into attention towards a more
complex and flexible notion of “stylistic field”, he was also developing a general
field of becoming interesting for its stylistic dimensions as for its diachronically
developments. Blaga keeps the pace with the cultural philosophy of his times
(present at Goethe, Nietzsche, Simmel, Riegl, Worringer, Frobenius, Spengler,
Keyserling…). In complementing the stylistic dimension with the historical
dimension of human creativity, Blaga wants to surprise and consider creativity
in its becoming and to surprise therefore the “medium” for an actualization of
the very humanity of the human being.
To analyze the historicity of the human being is at Blaga to understand the
dual inner structure of human being: an existence in the horizon of the given
world in the view of conserving his or her being (a “paradisiac” ontological mode)
and an existence in the horizon of mystery that is to be revealed (a “luciferic”
ontological mode). The later retains the core of historical existence of the human
being. And, at their turn the historical phenomena keep a stylistic stygmate that
defines them. Blaga’s historical being is forbidden access to absolute. But this very
limitation the human being is obtaining both relativity and creativity.
Mystery becomes a determinate and, at the same time, central philosophical
category at Blaga. The philosopher understands that mystery has an important
role to play into the constitution of the human knowledge. He states: “The
‘mystery’ exists for us as an original, irreducible horizon of our existence. Under
the pressure and operations of the process of knowledge, this mystery precipitates
itself in a multitude of ‘varieties’, that, logically, are very much determinable
precisely in their quality of mysteries. Here are several of these ‘varieties’”.8 As
the author explains, there is first of all the mystery as initial horizon of the
manner of existence specific to the human being. Then there is the variety of the
mystery that is “signaled” to us through our senses, an opened mystery, through
the very signs related to our empirical sensitivity. Here is also the variety of the
“revealed” mystery, at the constructive level of our knowledge, at the imaginary
level and at the level of the abstract visions of our knowledge. Blaga underlines:
“This mystery, both imaginary and revealed can be opened again as such and
submitted to a new ‘revelation’. The process is infinite”.9
This infinite process is the mark of the infinite creativity of the human being.
Philosophical thinking is called to unveil precisely this particular characteristics
of the manner of existing through creativity, characterizing the humans.
6
HENRIETA ªERBAN
4
“Philosophical thinking, through its buildings and its debris, through its
delusions and disappointments that it does provoke to us all, through the suspicions
and presentiments that it communicates to us, through the ever deeper inquiries
that occasions and invites, will mean therefore for the human genre an unlimited
surplus of lucidity, its different stages being equivalent to as many ‘awakenings’
from the infinite sleep where our being floats.”10
Richard Rorty — brief biography
Richard Rorty was born on the 4th of October 1931 in New York City, he was
educated at the University of Chicago and at Yale University and he spent his early
career complementing his personal interests and beliefs with the Platonic search
for truth. His doctoral dissertation, “The Concept of Potentiality”, and his first book,
The Linguistic Turn (1956) were part of the tradition of analytic philosophy.
Discovering the pragmatist John Dewey and the post-analytic philosophers such
as W.V. Quine and Wilfrid Sellars, he became a pragmatist, generally holding
that the worth of an idea should be measured by its usefulness or ability to cope
with a given problem, not by its correspondence to some antecedent “Truth”.
And Rorty takes this definition to its most extreme point.
In his major opus, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979), Rorty uses
Sellars, Kuhn and Wittgenstein arguing that epistemology, the study of knowledge,
is in fact the product of the mistaken view that the mind is a glassy essence, of
which the main function is to faithfully reproduce external reality. He attacks
“universal” philosophical investigations, such as the Mind/Body Problem, by
historicizing them and exposing their contingency. Rorty argues for hermeneutics,
the explaining of texts by other texts, rather than the search for an ultimate
interpretation that would be validated by a higher force.
Rorty is as famous for his other main work, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity,
published in 1989. In it, Rorty abandons the analytic attempt and creates an
alternative conceptual schema based on the belief that there is no “truth” higher
than the human being’s ability to recreate herself, a view that has been adapted
from Nietzsche. This book also marks his first attempt to consciously articulate
a political vision consonant with his philosophy, the vision of a diverse community
bound together by opposition to suffering, and not by abstract ideas such as “justice”,
“common humanity”, etc.
Rorty is one of the most widely-read and controversial contemporary
philosophers. Over the past fifteen years Rorty has published voluminously,
including three volumes of philosophical papers, Achieving Our Country, a political
manifesto partly based on readings of Dewey and Walt Whitman, and Philosophy
and Social Hope, a collection of essays for a general audience.
Having held teaching positions at Wellesley College, Princeton University
and the University of Virginia, Rorty is currently a professor of comparative
literature at Stanford University.
5
LUCIAN BLAGA AND RICHARD RORTY
Rorty’s “ironism”
7
Rorty’s ironism is a post-analytical notion created around a certain profile of
an individual, an ironist. After Rorty’s definition an “ironist” is “someone who
fulfills three conditions: (1) she has radical and continuing doubts about the final
vocabulary she currently uses, because she has been impressed by other
vocabularies, vocabularies taken as final by people or books she has encountered;
(2) she realizes that argument phrased in her present vocabulary ca neither
underwrite or dissolve these doubts; (3) insofar as she philosophizes about her
situation, she does not think that her vocabulary is closer to reality than others,
that is in touch with a power not herself. Ironists who are inclined to philosophize
see choice between vocabularies made neither within a neutral and universal
metavocabulary nor by an attempt to fight one’s way past appearances to the
real, but simply by playing the new off against the old.”11 So an ironist enjoys
creatively other vocabularies as a continuous inspiration to their own vocabulary,
continuously “under construction”. An ironist is still a philosopher either by training
or by orientation, but not an analytic philosopher and, more precisely, not a
“metaphysician”, that is, not someone who considers that “any term in his
vocabulary has as correspondent something of a real essence”. Both intellectual
types have in common the desire to know, but this has different manifestations
and outcomes, in the case of the ironist and in that of the metaphysician. For the
ironist the desire to know is not oriented to a unique and final vocabulary in the
detriment of the others.
Blaga in the light of “Rortian” ideas/Rorty
in the light of Blaga’s ideas
As Angela Botez has pointed out, Blaga’s modernity stays in interdisciplinarity
and in the method of “transfigured antinomy”, that is the dual manner of thinking,
characteristic for the entire 20th century. Then, Blaga’s postmodernity relays
on integrative concepts such as the mystery or the two types of knowledge
(“paradisiacal” and “luciferic”).12
Blaga’s metaphysics opens an avenue towards ironism.
As a relative and creative historical being, the human always hopes to reach
the absolute, in other terms to become substituted to the Great Anonymous and
always fails. In Rortian terms, the human being is always threatened by the
illusion to possibly get to a final vocabulary clear, true and definitive for all, but
hopefully, as an ironist, fails to give way to this illusion.
I came to observe that Rorty underlines in fact the static aspect of the
metaphysics its “conservatism”, its need for secure roots in a never changing
reality. At Blaga there is a dynamic element in his metaphysics. Actually to
explain this aspect we have to return to the two types of ontology in Blaga’s
philosophy. These types are strongly interwoven. First, there is an existence in
the horizon of the given world in the view of conserving his or her being (a
8
HENRIETA ªERBAN
6
“paradisiacal” ontological mode) and an existence in the horizon of mystery that
is to be revealed (a “luciferical” ontological mode). The latter retains the core of
historical existence of the human being and at the same time it explains the
dynamics of a more ironist-like thirst for knowledge.
Blaga was an ironist. He loved being exposed to different vocabularies, as a
poet and a playwright and a journalist and as a fervent reader, as a librarian.
It seems that Rorty said at a recent conference, or at least the latest issue of the
American literary journal “Off course”, quotes him so: “Our culture has not only
been carried upward by a bubbling fountain of puns and metaphors; it has been
increasingly conscious of itself as resting on nothing more solid than such a geyser.”
And Blaga is the philosopher of metaphors. For him, the human being is a
metaphor creating being. Knowledge comes through metaphors as through
rationalizing, demonstrating, or pragmatically perceiving and analyzing the
facts. The philosopher noticed at some point that even a corner stone thinker
as Heidegger could be read, as lacking meaning from a positivist or neopositivist standpoint, and that generally, not much would stand up from such a
perspective.
Only by our inherent creativity, we can hope to leap from the “enstatic” to the
“ecstatic” intellect, the one able to acquire knowledge beyond logic. Only from
going beyond what Blaga names the “fanic”, or the more or less raw material of
observation, within the “cryptic”, or, to make more sense in English, within the
encoded, intricated core of an open mystery. Our “minus knowledge” the one
that goes rather beyond than against general logic is the hope to leap into another
dimension, where other people experiences to us, where we encounter other
vocabularies, where the humanity of other people suffering and humiliation
becomes intelligible even in different vocabularies than our own.
I am as well interpreting in this paper that the exposure to different vocabularies
is like an exposure to mystery. But it is never easy; to understand different
vocabularies is to open yourself, oneself, to alterity and to the contextualism and
historicism of somebody else. Always something remains postponed, to be
understand later and always something awakens in us as we encounter through
(or behind?) vocabularies the complex ethical and almost religious experience of
suffering and humiliation. As Wordsworth said, in a fragment I have recently
discovered reading J. Sallis’ meditation on the subject of wonder and metaphysics:
“As if awakened, summoned, roused, constrained,/I looked for universal things;
perused/The common countenance of earth and sky.”13
In the light of Blaga’s ideas, Rorty is, paradoxically, a particular metaphysician,
because he is creating a world, a world where the ironist is not king, but some
sort of model. The relativism that Blaga explains as characteristic for the human
being, a tragic historical being attempting to go beyond relativism, on another
plan is as well characteristic for philosophy a plurality of metaphysics as “forms
of literary creation, fiction and myth”, after a formula proposed by A. Botez. Of
course, Rorty may have problems with this idea. The question to pose in this
comparative approach of two philosophical concepts that at the first glance have
7
LUCIAN BLAGA AND RICHARD RORTY
9
nothing in common is the following: “Is ironism an awakening from ‘the infinite
sleep where our being floats’”? And the entire study struggles to sustain a positive
answer to this question.
Blaga’s architectural complex is a celebration of ironism avant-la-lettre.
The international symposium in memoriam Blaga represented in fact as well
another celebration of human becoming via mystery, as an exposure to different
vocabularies, emerging outside the sleep of a comfortable universalism. For as
Ortega y Gasset later on Blaga understood that no metaphysics can be perfect as
to be the end of philosophy and that perfection is always postponed, belonging
to the absolute. All metaphysics are under the rule of the times; hence all form a
philosophical string of pearls of both wisdom and errors. Imposing even more
modesty on the perspective, Rorty reminds philosophers that, bottom line, they
contribute to philosophy mere vocabularies.
The parallel between the historical being and the ironist has its importance in
the very contemporary relevance as in the hope it brings about: life brings about
the opportunity to be exposed to different vocabularies, to so interesting vocabularies
(read “worlds”, “ideas”) as either Blaga’s or Rorty’s. Both their thought and lives
speak volumes about ironism. Approaching the parallel between ironism and the
historical being, one understands that the tragic nature of the historical being is
therefore counter-balanced, in a very complex and tensioned way, by the chances
to live authentically as a (liberal) ironist and as an inherently creative being.
NOTES
1. For instance, at the newspaper Voinþa where his
first theater play Zamolxe (Adamachi Prize for
debut, granted by the Romanian Academy), was
published in 1921, or, for example, he also wrote
for the publications “Patria”, “Gândirea”,
“Adevãrul literar ºi artistic”, “Cuvântul”.
2. At the Faculty of Letters and Philosophy, Cluj
University (1946–1948).
3. At the Institute of History and Philosophy, Cluj
(1949–1951).
4. Actually, he was the librarian-in-chief, at the
Library of the Romanian Academy, Cluj section
(1951–1954).
5. L. Blaga, Schiþa unei autoreprezentãri, Bucureºti,
Cartea Româneascã, 1934.
6. L. Blaga, Schiþa unei autoreprezentãri, in: A.
Botez, Dimensiunea metafizicã a operei lui
Lucian Blaga, Bucureºti, Editura ªtiinþificã, 1996,
p. 29.
7. As E. Cassirer said: “Man has, as it were,
discovered a new method of adapting himself to
his environment. Between the receptor system
and the effector system, which are to be found in
all animal species, we find in man a third link
which we may describe as the symbolic system.
This new acquisition transforms the whole of
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
human life. As compared with the other animals
man lives not merely in a broader reality; he
lives, so to speak, in a new dimension of reality.”
(An Essay on Man, 1944)
L. Blaga, Despre conºtiinþa filosoficã, Bucureºti,
Editura Humanitas, 2003, p. 207, my translation.
Ibidem, p. 208, my translation.
Ibidem, p. 21, my translation.
Rorty, R., Private Irony and Liberal Hope, in:
Walter Brogan, James Risser (eds.), American
Continental Philosophy. A Reader, Bloomington
and Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 2000,
p. 46.
For a more detailed account of integrative concepts
in Blaga’s philosophy see Botez, A., Concepte
integrative în Trilogia cunoaºterii, in: “Revista
de filosofie”, nr. 5–6/2001, Botez, A., Un secol
de filosofie româneascã, Bucureºti, Editura
Academiei Române, 2005, pp. 137–142 and Botez,
A., On Complementarity and Antinomy, in: “Revue
roumaine des sciences sociales”, nr. 4/1986.
Apud J. Sallis, Imagination, Metaphysics,
Wonder, in: Walter Brogan, James Risser (eds.),
American Continental Philosophy. A Reader,
Bloomington and Indianapolis, Indiana University
Press, 2000, pp. 15–41.
10
HENRIETA ªERBAN
8
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HENRIETA ªERBAN
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THE ANALYSIS OF POPPER ON MARX’S METHOD.
SOME NONCONFORMIST REMARKS
ANA BAZAC
The paper does not discuss the psychological roots of Popper’s theory about
Marx’s method. It only puts the arguments of Popper in front of some elements
of Marx’s method. Just because Popper did not change his opinion about Marx’s
method after his writings during World War II, these ones, expressed in his volume,
The Open Society and Its Enemies, are so important for the characterisation of a
special manner of social thinking.
A. As we know, Popper defined himself as critical rationalist. This means
“attitude of readiness to listen to critical arguments and to learn from experience”.
Concerning the human behaviour, the rationalist one means to follow his/her
own interests. The life/practice is what teaches us, and we can say that truth
issues just from this complex feed back between our behaviour and its results. It
is not here the place to discuss the conception of Popper about truth, but Popper
“argues that the adoption of rationalism as an approach to life generally is
something that should be advocated because it leads to a better society, but it can
advocated on grounds which are not only ethical, but ultimately irrational… not
only because we have no guarantee that rational methods will bring us to the
truth, but also because there is something paradoxical in the very attempt to
produce a reasoned defence of reason itself. So, for Popper, rationalism, however
desirable it may be, is ultimately a matter of irrational faith”.1
Popper was the heir of the long tradition of western philosophy which,
because of the historical conditions of the separation between the physical and
spiritual labour — and, at the same time, between the command and the execution2
— developed in “the interminable succession of philosophical dualisms and
dichotomies...: theory/practice; thought/being; subject/object; for-itself/in-itself;
world-views/factual knowledge; immanence/transcendence; noumenal/phenomenal;
essence/appearance; essence/existence; form/content; value/fact; ought/is;
reason/emotion; Reason/Understanding; freedom/necessity; individual/species;
private/public; political/social; state/civil society; de jure/de facto…”.3 For this
reason, and even if Popper did not want to separate the functional aspects of the
social system from its dynamics, he did not want to derive values from facts, to
put the system under question either.
Pol. Sc. Int. Rel., II, 2, p. 13–23, Bucharest, 2005.
14
ANA BAZAC
2
Rejecting the possibility of a “global alternative to the established order”4,
the pattern of conceiving the system was, with Popper too, to focus on the
instrumental/functional plane and, at the same time, to transfer the axiological
dimension to a separate realm of values.5 But, thinking he had a support in
Heisenberg’s principle of incertitude, Popper promoted ultimately a weak social
theory.
We could observe here the “malefic” sense of philosophy (and, concretely, of
political philosophy): just because of these separations and dichotomies, it was
and yet could be separated from the real processes and problems, neglecting
them by covering them with a dense curtain. Popper illustrated the tension, even
if he declared himself as a critical rationalist, between “the structural (or
‘synchronic’, ‘systematic’, ‘structural/functional’) and the historical (or ‘dyachronic’,
‘genetic’) aspects of theory”.6 Reducing everything to its present functionality,
Popper also ignored that the above-mentioned compartmentalization —
functional and axiological — is “an ideologically motivated reduction”.7
B. Demonstrating a high scientific sincerity, Popper began by underlining
that a return to the pre-Marx level of social science is unconceivable, after Marx
applied rationalist methods to the more pressing problems of social life. But
“Hegel’s and Marx’s historicist philosophies are characteristic products of their
time — a time of social change”. While Plato reacted to this situation by
attempting to arrest all change”, Hegel and Marx proved a great “love of
change”.8 This excessive love of change seemed to Popper ambiguous. He
decomposed Marx’s theory of change and showed its antagonisms, as he
understood them. But Popper did not go farther than Marx: even if he is situated
at the left of neo-liberalists like Hayek9, he remained inside the common
mainstream social perspective.
C. Popper developed an intellectual critique of Marx’s method. And he did so
neither as economist, nor as a researcher in social philosophy. His specialty was
philosophy of science. He did not spend as much time as the theoretical
economists to analyze the tendencies from the post-Marx economy and society.
For this reason, he took over the common right-wing type clichés: 1. the theory
of Marx = Marxism/vulgar Marxism10, 2. the theory of Marx involves dictatorship,
so 3. the theory of Marx would have been the ground of Stalinism.
These conclusions were drawn because Popper was convinced that “there is
a basic unity of method between the natural and the social sciences” and “that
the logic of explanation is the same in both”.11 And, for the object of the social
sciences is the study of unique phenomena, whose elements are the human
beings, these sciences do concentrate on “how people’s motives are partially
determined by the institutions and traditions …and second on the framing laws
which capture the way in which so much of what actually happens is due to the
unintended consequences of the actions of individuals”.12 Finally here, because
a rigorous science is based on a rigid determinism, and because society does not
admit this type of determinism, Popper arrived at the conclusion that the social
science studies the unintended consequences of people’s actions and, thus, this
science does not imply the moment of prognosis.
3
THE ANALYSIS OF POPPER ON MARX’S METHOD
15
Popper accused Marx to be a false prophet of the course of history, who made
people believe that the historical prophecy would be the scientific manner to
approach the social problems. Popper accused Marx of having made predictions
for the future, especially for revolutions, which did not come true, and that he
did not give the theoretical ground for this future, concretely for the Russian
revolution.
But: 1. Marx did not make any kinds of prophecies.
2. Especially Marx warned that the transformation of capitalism would last.
As far as in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts from 184413, Marx
said that communism, just because it will be the logical result of the
development of productive forces, and just because it will suppress the social
causes of the alienation of man, a. it will be a transformation of the economicsocial system, and not only of political regimes or forms of government, so b.
this transformation needs and will be only at the world scale (we do not discuss
here the problem of the local origin of the transformation), and c. if some local
concrete historical conditions generated a revolution — as in Russia in 1917 —
this revolution would not lead to communism; on the contrary, it would lead to
the crude communism, rather an attempt at communism than a phase of it, we
could now say, to Stalinism.14 For this reason, even if Marx was very impressed
by the French bourgeois revolution and sometimes, especially when he was
young, he abandoned himself to the idea that the structural contradictions of
capitalism already would have been aged, in his theoretical works never
followed this supposition. On the contrary, he stressed that a system never
disappears before the old one develops its contradictions to their ultimate
consequences and, at the same time and through this fact, it develops, involuntarily
and from its inner logic, some elements (bricks) of the new system. The logic of
Marx’s theory does not allow deducing the prediction of the coming of a revolution
in some years.
3. Moreover, we know, and professionals of the philosophy of science have
to know, that in science the verification can occur even after hundreds of years.
And we do not speak about revolutions as such, because these ones are phenomena
generated by past states of things, but about all the phenomena which constitute
the inherent transformation of the present system, as the past systems were
transformed too.
Popper admitted, with Marx, that there are sociological laws, but not the ones
concerning history as such. The future is open, as Marx also thought and wrote,
but Popper advanced only an abstract image of the improvements of democracy
and welfare as a result of the political intelligence of the ruling elite (under the
former pressures of trade-unions and with the help of the social-democrate
parties which alternate in a peaceful and honourable manner). The pattern of
Popper’s theory was the democracy in the developed countries. He took into
consideration neither the relationships between these countries and “the rest”
(there relationships being an essential condition of the level and living standard
in the Centre type countries) nor the historical conditions which permitted the
Western model of democracy and welfare, thus the historical character of this
16
ANA BAZAC
4
model. It is an irony that Popper, who criticised Hegel, took over the pattern of
the “end of history”, the last and highest level of social development as the Western
type democracy. Popper’s sociological laws happened inside this pattern.
But without considering the essential social interests and positions, which
move the actions and conscience of men (even if the latter are not conscious
about this), and without considering the dialectics of needs and productive
forces, which just configure the social interests and positions, the future is not
open: it simply is immobile, the same as it ever was, in a kind of éternel retour
which signifies that we can never understand history (not because it would be
created and directed by God, but) because everything is new and, at the same
time, the same as ever, the ceaseless running of individuals in the same manner
and in an incomprehensible world.
Popper suggested that Marx (this time equated with vulgar Marxists) would
have overrated the importance of economic conditions “in any particular case”
just because “the general importance of Marx’s economism can hardly be
overrated”.15 If we are to make a difference between the theory of Marx and the
vulgate, we observe that, as to the importance accorded by Marx to ideology and
the analysis of false and true conscience, many analyses of particular policies,
ideologies and culture show that Marx only stressed economy, which was not
considered before him as an explanatory factor of social behaviours and course
of history.
But, as many researchers in the field of politics do, Popper accused Marx that
his economism and theory about the economic structure and the juridical and
political superstructures annul the autonomy of politics and its power to govern
and manage things in a creative manner: “The most important consequence is
that all politics, all legal and political institutions as well as all political struggles,
can never be of primary importance. Politics are impotent. They can never alter
decisively the economic reality.”16 Or, Marx did not depreciate politics and, as
we saw, all sorts of ideology. On the contrary, he spent so much time to create
the First International just because he knew and theorised that workers had to
struggle for their rights, and first for political rights. But the analysis of Marx
showed — and not only because in his time the political regimes were authoritarian
and workers had no rights — that politics, even if it changed political regimes
and leaderships, could not go farther than the economic relationships.
Marx never neglected the importance of ‘formal liberty’, as Popper said Marxists
do.17 Stressing the importance and superiority of capitalism — even because it
gave rights to the bourgeoisie — Marx knew, through the analyses of the social
and political relationships in Louis Bonaparte’s France too, that the political
struggle leads to the conquest of liberties and this conquest is very dear. But
there is no political liberty which could change in a fundamental manner the
economic relations. The Western welfare state was an example of the high level
of political and social liberties, but capitalism does not mean at all only a country,
or the Western type capitalism.
D. Popper’s representation about capitalism was simple: because of fascism,
the democratic capitalism was the best type of social organization, in opposition
5
THE ANALYSIS OF POPPER ON MARX’S METHOD
17
to fascism=communism. He thus shared the theory which equates the socialeconomic system (for example, capitalism) and the political regime (democracy
and dictatorship). But these entities are not the same. In capitalism there were
both democracy and dictatorship. These political regimes were and are the result
of relations of forces inside the capitalist organisation.
Marx warned that if the objective conditions for communism — the high
level of productive forces everywhere — did not exist, neither the social system
would be communist, nor the political regime would be democratic. (It would
be, as it was, Stalinism). For this reason, Stalinism was not the result of Marx’s
theory (as Popper thought), but of the historical conditions of the 20th century:
the specific conditions of a huge but backward country like Russia, suffering
from the Centre-Periphery structural capitalist relations, and the conditions of
capitalism whose development of productive forces began to surpass the
capitalist frame of economic relations (the first World War being the proof).
Stalinism was an attempt to change a system which could not be changed yet.
There could have been an alternative to capitalism, but this alternative could be,
as Marx stressed, only communism.
On the other hand, fascism was just the capitalist solution to the deep
contradictions between the level of productive forces, including the labour force,
and the constraining frame of capitalist relations: because of the significant
pressure of the labour force for social and economic rights, the maintaining of
the system as such, as well as because of the need of some countries like Germany
to develop more rapidly to conquer a world dominant position, a dictatorial
political regime at its highest level, fascist totalitarianism, seemed indeed to
show the way. Thus fascism was the means to solve the problems of capitalism,
and at the ideological level it was the issue of radical/excessive capitalist theories
like racism, authoritarianism, elitism, individualism and irrationalism. By the
same token, even if Stalinism (as a political regime) and fascism had common
features — as the theorists of totalitarianism showed — they were not equivalent:
they did not derive from the same causes and had not the same aims. Moreover,
the concept of Stalinism does not cover only the Stalinist political regime but
also the Stalinist economic system: an isotope of capitalism, and not at all
socialism or communism.
E. Letting alone this aspect, Popper’s representation followed the common
theory of “capitalism in a single country” — if we can paraphrase the expression
of Trotsky about Stalinism as “socialism in a country” — i.e., the “model” of
capitalism was, obviously, the developed Western countries, by ignoring the fact
that capitalism was and is a world system which developed through the CentrePeriphery relationships in their whole complexity.
But not only did Popper make this type of design about society. The time he
wrote The Open Society… yet was the time of national capital: the time of
national relationships between capital and the labour force. From this type of
relationships derived all the other relations and institutions. Ultimately, the level
of productive forces — we must not forget that it was the time of the first
industrial revolution, even if in America the level of this revolution was already
18
ANA BAZAC
6
the one of Fordism — was the important cause which determined the need to
keep the compulsion of labour force and, from this need, the mystifying ideologies,
contradictory institutions and savage wars.
The image of Stalinists about society was just one of “capitalism in a single
country” type. The best ideologists of the left — excepting Trotsky — even if
highly preoccupied about the destiny of the workers, the poor and the social
problems, knew that all these could be approached only inside the homo homini
lupus relationships between countries.18 This deep contradiction between the
organisation of social relationships inside a country and, on the other hand, the
organisation of international relationships was the sign of the not yet “aged” time
for communism.
In that time, the efficient left was the one which fought for the welfare for its
own working class inside the nation-state. As we know, this tactics was victorious
in the western developed countries. But just for this type of victory, socialdemocracy had to support the general right-wing policies: the social-democrat
behaviour before World War I is significant.
Thus, from a theoretical standpoint, social-democracy was contradictory: on
the one hand, it waved slogans about the substitution of capitalism with a more
egalitarian and democratic system; on the other hand, it was “yellow”, interested
only about the level of living of those who voted it: the industrial workers of the
developed countries. Neither the famous internationalist slogan from the
Communist Manifesto: Proletarians from all the countries, unite! nor the dismantling
of capitalism — and this is possible, according to Marx, only at the world scale
— were yet of the day and, obviously, the goals of the efficient left.
Consequently, almost every one who thought of the social problems in a
realistic manner forgot (for the objective conditions pushed him/her to forget) a.
the systemic conception of Marx about society (and capitalism, of course), b. the
interdependences of Centre and Periphery (to use an easy but later expression),
c. the inner world logic of capital and d. the fact that any national working class
could not liberate itself without contributing to the liberation of the other
national working classes. So, if someone fought capitalism he/she fought capitalism
“in a country”, if someone defended capitalism he/she defended it “in a country”.
And, as we know, “capitalism” meant the advanced capitalism, the smiling face
of Janus, the beautiful shop-window of this system, which covered the dark one.
(But Marx himself paid attention mostly to the advanced countries: England
and America were his models, and not Eastern Europe, Russia, Latin America or
India, could someone say. Of course, we respond, but this happened not in order
to neglect the colonies and the lagging-behind countries — as did and do so
many “realist” theorists — nor to sing the model of “socialism in a single
country”, but to demonstrate 1. that the logic of capital and the logic of the
development of productive forces are the most visible in the advanced countries
— which serve as a theoretical model — because here the contradictions of
capitalism are deeper and liberated of any outmoded ballast (and also because in
these countries the illusions existed that the economic development would bring
welfare for all) and 2. that the logic of capital and the logic of the development
7
THE ANALYSIS OF POPPER ON MARX’S METHOD
19
of productive forces integrates the entire world, the colonies and lagging-behind
countries also, in a world, interconnected capitalism, from the viewpoint of
productive forces (of civilisation, even if yet at different levels) and from the
viewpoint of intertwined capitalist interests and relations. So, Marx never considered
capitalism “in a country”.)
It was, obviously, a concrete conditioning of the general conception about
“capitalism in a single country”, and rather in a western country. Popper and the
other thinkers grew up and lived in these countries when rulers transferred a part
of their benefices from the world economic relations, where they dominated, to
the ruled of these blessed advanced countries.
Popper could not be an exception to this entire post-Marx period. Only very
few thinkers — and between them the nomina odiosa Lenin and Trotsky19 —
conceived that, a. as Marx said, only when the past system have developed all
the conditions it could inside its structural relations a new system can rise (and
in the first moments, inside the old one), and that, b. people who are concerned
with the life of “the losers” have to be the most consistent they can: they have
not only to not support the inter-capitalist wars, to always emphasize the
interconnection between capitals but, on the other hand, between different
national working people, to always struggle for the human rights everywhere,
and not only at home. In the theory of these thinkers, the falling of Stalinism —
determined by the consensus of the Stalinist political bureaucracy and the level
of world capital — was a necessary fact (even if painful for many people), just
because without its enemy, the world capitalism could emphasize its inner
contradictions in an unveiled manner.
F. “Popper’s social science is an attempt to avoid various extremes. It is
individualistic without being psychologistic. It admits the autonomy of sociology,
in saying that men are formed by traditions and institutions, but attempts to
avoid holism by explaining events as the consequences of individual actions. It
attempts to unify the methods of natural science and social science, and so to
avoid the incursion of the mystical into social science, but admits the agent’s
perception of his situation as an essential part of any explanation.”20
Thus Popper did not pay attention to the interests which are, of course, not
only individual. The interests of every human being are very different rather
from the super-position of different kinds of interests at the same time: to have
an interesting and creative activity, to have a job, to have a family, children,
money to nurse them, to travel, to pay the housing, to be happy, to be healthy, to
be saved from catastrophes, and so on. Every interest enters into contact and
clashes with the interests of other people (and, naturally, even with other type of
interests of the same person).21 From these connections and clashes issue the
unintended consequences, which were studied, as Popper underlined, by Marx
as one of the first forerunners. But, at the same time, people have the same
position facing many criteria: many are wage earners and not employers, or live
in an advanced country or in a backward one, or live in a time when, to make
war, people are educated in the hate of foreigners, and so on. Thus, the general,
i.e., different social groups/classes, interests are not “superhuman factors” from
20
ANA BAZAC
8
which one could deduce that history would be determined in an automatic inherent
manner.
Every human being conducts him or, herself, in a rational manner, i.e., following
his or her interests in particular conditions and under the influence of particular
situations and institutions. But society is not a clash of atoms in a Brownian
movement, certainly not “individual + individual + individual”. It is the connection
between groups, each formed by unique and non-repeatable human beings, but
which have also common interests, plans and dreams. By denying that collectives
(states, nations, classes, etc.) do anything, Popper contradicted his conception
about the autonomy of sociology and the rejection of psychologism. Discussing
about institutions and traditions, do these ones not influence social groups, even
if it is possible that every man could perceive this influence in another way
because he is influenced also by other situations?
For this reason, and not being an economist nor a sociologist, Popper was not
interested in the social reproduction of these institutions, traditions and interests,
and nor in the inner contradictions of this complex process. Even if his main
objective was not the analysis of society, but of scientific knowledge, his model
of society was a puzzle of unintended consequences of clashes and co-existence
of human beings and the explanation of society was the reduction of the social
complexity to a puzzle of unintended consequences. Paradoxically, even if Popper
hardly criticised Heidegger, his philosophy of nothingness, anguish and fear of
death, the image of society in Heidegger philosophy and in Popper is similar enough:
many human beings, conscientious or not, even if rational, live, run, suffer, die
in the human anthill. Every one for his own reasons, for his own survival — this
is the only rule. It’s not too much: humans are reduced to matter, to dust, to nothing;
neither their conscience nor creations can change this senseless existence.
G. Popper was, however, contradictory: on the one hand, he said we cannot
deduce the future from the past — i.e., from the above-mentioned separations
and dichotomies —, even if, as Marx noted explicitly, society has no laws as in
nature but only tendencies, resulted just from the clashes of different social
groups.22 And Popper agreed with the tendencies. But, for him, the future is not
only open — we have to underline that, just because of the tendencies, and not
natural/mechanical laws, and because of the unexpected consequences23, the
future is also open for Marx: communism is not an ideal and “the end of
history”, but only “a real movement which suppresses the present status” — it is
absolutely accidental.24 On the other hand, the future is the result of a step by
step social engineering. And, from this one, communism could be possible25, but
what is important to Popper is rather to show the “historicism” of Marx.
History has no sense, “has no meaning”26, said Popper. There is “only an
indefinite number of histories of all kinds of aspects of human life”.27 It is true28,
and Marx did not say a different thing, neither from the standpoint of the
knowledge of society (and the above-mentioned opinion just about this
knowledge was) nor from the one of the objective social processes.
Popper’s critique on historicism — the manner of predicting future from the
past, on the basis of laws — was and can be seen from two standpoints: the one
9
THE ANALYSIS OF POPPER ON MARX’S METHOD
21
is the scientific will to do away with the dogmatic and mechanic manner of
thinking society, professed either by vulgar Marxist sociologists or by religion29
or even by liberalism, which repeats the pattern of Hegel’s thinking about “the
end of history” in the best of all possible worlds; this standpoint is very precious
for all of us, for Popper’s stressing on the responsibility of mankind, decisionmakers and social scientists; the other is the ideological position of both
liberalism and conservatism in front of the challenge of alternatives to the
capitalist system. As I showed, a critical rationalism — as was the one of Marx
— put under question the alternatives themselves, and not only the given system.
But if we start from the premise that there are no alternatives, and that we can
only deduce and produce better functioning hoping that this one will annul the
contradictions and consequences of the structural relationships of the system and
will improve it, our theory is not satisfactory.
H. The critique we made on Popper’s conception about Marx’s method
cannot, however, exclude his excellent observations about the fact that “class
struggle as such does not always produce lasting solidarity among the
oppressed”30 or that the coming of “the new ruling class of the new society”31,
or “that a whole host of possible historical developments may follow upon a
victorious proletarian revolution”, or that “we should also recognise that the
allegedly scientific prophecy provides, for a great number of people, a form of
escaping from our responsibilities”32, observations which left type politicians,
from the East European countries especially, would have taken into account. I
mentioned above that this new ruling class existed in Stalinism just because
Stalinism was not, and could not be, communism/socialism. But even a rightwing type critique should have been taken into account.
From a strict theoretical standpoint, nothing forbids in and with Marx’s
method to surpass it, to go farther. The fact that this did not happen was determined
by the historical conditions, and not by Marx’s method. Only after a more or less
long period, when many problems agglomerated and the contradictions of the
“normal functioning” were revealed, people and thinkers can analyse society
from a “radical” critical standpoint. But the taking over of the right-wing type
clichés from the most part of social theorists is a proof of weakness: if these
clichés seemed, at the time when Popper wrote The Open Society…, to be not
too harmful, even if at that time Popper defended the system which did not yet
offer welfare state, but only political democracy, nowadays, with all the
acquisitions in management, these clichés are the sign of crisis in social theory,
and also in society. But this aspect is no more the goal of this paper.
NOTES
1. Anthony O’Hear, Karl Popper, London, Boston
and Henley, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980,
p. 147.
2. See Aristotle and the labour force. Aristotle’s
tradition in the present-day industrial revolution
ideology, in: “Revue roumaine de philosophie”,
1–2, 2004, pp. 87–106.
3. István Mészáros, A key problem of method:
dualism and dichotomies in philosophy and
social theory in capital’s epoch, in: “Critique”,
22
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
ANA BAZAC
(Great Britain) no. 34, 2004, p. 73. These
dichotomies remain “unintelligible without the
manifold practical dualisms and antinomies of
the socio-economic order”, ibidem.
Ibidem, p. 33.
Ibidem, p. 31: “where their confrontation cannot
endanger the practical functioning of the…
structure”.
Ibidem, p. 29.
Ibidem, p. 46.
Karl R. Popper, The Open Society and Its
Enemies (1945), volume II, The High Tide of
Prophecy: Hegel, Marx and the Aftermath,
Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University
Press, 1971, p. 212.
It is not unsignificant that The Open Society …is
dedicated to Hayek.
Even if he saw the difference between Marx and
the vulgar Marxism and criticised this one.
Anthony O’Hear, Karl Popper, London, Boston
and Henley, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980,
p. 161.
Ibidem, p. 162.
Unfinished, written by Marx in April-August
1844, the Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts
from 1844 were published for first time in 1927,
and after in 1932, in German, in Moscow.
„As such it appears in a two-fold form: on the
one hand, the dominion of material property
bulks so large that it wants to destroy everything
which is not capable of being possessed by all as
private property. It wants to disregard talent, etc.,
in an arbitrary manner. For it the sole purpose of
life and existence is direct, physical possession.
The category of the worker is not done away
with, but extended to all men. The relationship of
private property persists as the relationship of the
community to the world of things… The
community is only a community of labour, and
equality of wages paid out by communal capital
— by the community as the universal capitalist.
Both sides of the relationship are raised to an
imagined universality — labour as the category
in which every person is placed, and capital as
the acknowledged universality and power of the
community… The first positive annulment of
private property — crude communism — is thus
merely a manifestation of the vileness of private
property, which wants to set itself up as the
positive community system.”, Marx, cited work,
http://www.marxists.org/glossary/frame.htm
Popper, op. cit., p. 107.
Ibidem, p. 119.
Ibidem, p. 127.
This image was prefigured by More in his
Utopia (1516). As we remember, even if the
private property was seen as the main cause of
evils and was suppressed in that blessed special
island, the interest of utopians was to save their
status quo, even through perverse diplomacy and
10
wars, and not at all to develop it by “exporting”
utopia. See Thomas Morus, L’Utopie, Paris,
Lumen Animi, 1935.
19. Lenin wrote a lot and explicitly about the state
capitalism which had to be constructed in the
backward Russia, after October 1917: even if the
slogans and values were socialist — egalitarian
— the real productive relationships could be
only capitalist type; the compulsion of the labour
force, just for faster develop the country and
improve the living conditions (especially the
cultural ones), had to be hard, and only the
destruction of privileges of the political — state
and party — bureaucracy could have soothed
this compulsion. Why state capitalism and not
state socialism, as later Trotsky considered
USSR — as a degenerated worker state — ? Just
because:
1. Russia, being a so backward country, could
not transform at once into a socialist country,
only in the most advanced at that time form of
capitalism, the state capitalism, which did begin
first in the Soviet Russia, after in Sweden (where
the social-democrats gained the power in 1932
with the programme Gunar Myrdal did), then in
the Nazi Germany and later in Great Britain (of
Keynes) and in the United States of Roosevelt’s
New Deal.
2. Russia — but any other country — could
not construct socialism in a country without, if
not the world, at least the European milieu being
socialist. Just after it was clear that the revolution
in Germany revolution failed, Lenin was more
convinced that the only fate of the Soviet Russia
is to become a model of rapid but at the same
time democratic development of a welfare state.
As we yet know, that could not take place: Stalin
developed Russia with the help of political
bureaucracy and in a totalitarian manner. And the
“communist” Russia broke down not only because
of the non-democratic and bureaucratic political
regime which was no more tolerated by people,
and not only because of the political, economical
and ideological pressures from the West, but
because of the coincidence of the interests of the
world capital and, on the other hand, the ones of
the bureaucracy which desired remain a dominant
class and this could no more be without the help
of the western, world capitalism. Concerning
Trotsky, he did not see that Stalin — as the
representative of the political centre (of the
bureaucracy which wanted practical socialism
but Trotsky knew that the only fate of the
practical socialism is the new internationalism. If
the critique of Stalinism was not quite adequate,
the initiative of a fourth International, the
permanent underlining of the absolute need of
internationalism as the way to fight world
capitalism, made Trotsky the more important
descendant of Marx, nearby Lenin.
11
THE ANALYSIS OF POPPER ON MARX’S METHOD
20. Ibidem.
21. See, for example the often met motive, from the
old classical literature to the present movies, of
the clash between passion and reason.
22. Because, as Marx said, people make their own
history but only inside the conditions they live,
so under the influences of institutions and
traditions and through driving at theirs own
goals, but all these individual aims cannot unweave
their common specific goals, as different kinds
of groups. For Marx and for the logic of the
historical societies where were and are social
hierarchy, the most important division in groups
(classes) is the one of the position towards the
ownership of means of production. But this
division is not the single and, more, it manifests
also through other division — as gender, race,
nations, countries, different professional groups
— in different covered or explicit manners.
23. Just as the present theories of chaos, complexity
and bifurcation demonstrated with their
mathematical apparatus.
24. As we see, the present social organisation can
lead to the destruction of society and nature. But
there are also tendencies which oppose this.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
23
These tendencies are internal to the logic of
survival of the ruling classes, but also internal to
the entire humankind. The first tendency is also
internal to the logic of capital.
Karl Popper, op. cit., p. 139.
Ibidem, p. 269.
Ibidem, p. 270.
From the standpoint of the physics of universe,
Roger Penrose and Stephen Hawking demonstrated
the same thing: that there is an infinite number of
histories of universe, and only this representation
could explain, in a unitary manner the space, the
time and the matter.
The serious and determinate critique on the
religious historicism made from Popper an ally
of non-conformist thinkers. For this reason, the
mainstream political theory does not stop on and
neglect the uncomfortable alliance of Popper
with the heretical social theory. In fact, nor the
critical rationalism, assumed by Popper, is more
pleasant to the radical conservative theory.
Karl Popper, op. cit., p. 139.
Ibidem, p. 138.
Ibidem.
RAWLS, NOZICK Y PETTIT. UNA VISIÓN COMPARATIVA
DE LA TEORÍA DE LA JUSTICIA
RÃZVAN PANTELIMON
Voy a comenzar mi análisis con el libro de John Rawls, Una teoría de la
Justicia, uno de los más importantes libros de la teoría política del siglo XX.
Después voy a presentar la visión de Nozick, que es una crítica a la propuesta
de Rawls, pero en el mismo tiempo un intento de construir una nueva teoría de
una justicia retributiva. Al final voy a hablar sobre el libro de Phillipe Pettit,
Republicanismo, subtitulado Una teoría sobre la libertad y el gobierno.
A través de su libro A Theory of Justice, John Rawls enfoca la discusión sobre
la libertad en la zona de lo político: la justicia no es considerada una virtud de
los caracteres humanos o una calidad de las acciones individuales, sino es vista
como una calidad de una sociedad. Rawls no pone el problema si una persona,
una acción o el resultado de una acción son justos o injustos, sino una sociedad
es o no justa. El libro de Rawls argumenta a favor de una teoría de la justicia,
una teoría que debe explicar que denominamos una sociedad justa.
La primera parte del trabajo — Teoría — muestra brevemente el marco teórico
y después desarrolla los principales argumentos a favor de esto. La segunda —
Instituciones — demuestra como se puede aplicar la teoría a los casos particulares,
como la idea de tolerancia, la idea de merito moral o la idea de desobediencia
civil. La parte final — Fines — habla de la concepción de bien del individuo y el
papel de esta concepción en la justificación de la teoría de la justicia propuesta
en el comienzo.
La concepción sobre la libertad desarrollada por Rawls en Una teoría de
la Justicia debe ser el basamento de una sociedad bienordenada. Entonces
Rawls busca a encontrar los principios de la justicia social, es decir los principios
que son criterios de evaluación de la justicia de una sociedad, y no de la justicia
de los actos particulares de unos individuos particulares. Eso significa que
el objeto de los principios de la justicia es la estructura primaria de una sociedad,
es decir la manera de que se integran los principales instituciones sociales en
una esquema de cooperación. Esta concepción sobre la justicia se basa en
la visión de la sociedad como una asociación de personas que cooperan para
el bien mutuo. Resulta que es caracterizada por el conflicto y en el mismo
tiempo por una identidad de intereses. Es una identidad de intereses porque la
cooperación social hace que cada miembro de la sociedad tenga una vida mejor
Pol. Sc. Int. Rel., II, 2, p. 24–34, Bucharest, 2005.
2
UNA VISIÓN COMPARATIVA DE LA TEORÍA DE LA JUSTICIA
25
que la podría tener si vivía sólo. El conflicto de intereses aparece sobre la
distribución de los recursos obtenidos como resultado de la cooperación. Los
principios de la justicia son necesarios para determinar como se van distribuir
esos recursos.
La concepción general de Rawls sobre la justicia es: “Todos los valores
sociales — libertad y oportunidad, ingreso y riqueza, así como las bases sociales
y el respeto a sí mismo — habrán de ser distribuidos igualitariamente a menos
que una distribución desigual de alguno o de todos estos valores redunde en una
ventaja para todos. La injusticia consistirá entonces, simplemente, en las
desigualdades que no benefician a todos.”1
Pero esa concepción es mejor conocida como los dos principios de la libertad
de Rawls. El primer principio consiste en: “Cada persona ha de tener un derecho
igual al esquema más extenso de libertades básicas iguales que sea compatible
con una esquema semejante de libertades para los demás.” El segundo tiene dos
partes: “Las desigualdades sociales y económicas habrán de ser conformadas de
modo tal que a la vez que: a) se espere razonablemente que sean ventajosas para
todos, b) se vinculen a empleos y cargos asequibles para todos.”2
Los principios de Rawls parten de la suposición de que todos los miembros
de la sociedad, sin tener en cuenta sus herencias naturales o la posición social,
tienen el mismo derecho de gozar de los beneficios que resultan de la cooperación
social, porque en la definición de la sociedad todos son tratados como personas
libres y iguales. La conclusión que debemos extraer de aquí no es que una
distribución justa de los bienes primarios es una igual, sino que la distribución
igual de los bienes primarios no debe ser justificada. Debemos justificar una
distribución inegal, si aceptamos las desigualdades, esas deben ser justificadas,
debemos mostrar que son justas. Es lo que hacen los dos principios: el primero
se refiera a la distribución de la libertad, mientras que el segundo se refiere a la
distribución a) del ingreso y b) de los chances de ocupar una posición en una
institución.
Esta argumentación tiene un problema importante: ¿Qué se pasa en los casos
cuando la misma medida respecta un principio pero infringe al otro? Para resolver
ese problema necesitamos una regla de orden entre los principios que pueda
indicar que principio debemos respectar el primero. Para Rawls la prioridad la
tiene la libertad: debemos respectar en primer lugar el primer principio. La libertad
no puede ser restringida con la justificación del aumento de las ventajas económicas
o sociales. La restricción de una libertad puede ser justificada sólo si eso fortalece
todo el sistema de libertades.
Una segunda regla de prioridad indica que: a) la prioridad de la justicia sobre
la eficiencia y el bienestar y b) la prioridad de la igualdad de chances sobre el
principio de la diferencia: una desigualdad de chances es justificada sólo si tiene
como efecto el aumento de los chances de los mas desventajados.
Rawls imagina un procedimiento de justificación de esos dos principios,
procedimiento que hace que la teoría de Rawls pueda ser vista como una forma
del contractualismo, donde la idea básica es que los principios de la justicia son
objeto de un acuerdo original. Los principios que van a gobernar la estructura
3
RÃZVAN PANTELIMON
26
básica de la sociedad, deben ser elegidos en el correspondiente rawlsian del
estado natural y sólo en ese caso pueden ser justificados. En la visión de John
Gray, “El enfoque contractualista, que se encuentra en su forma más plausible y
sólida en el trabajo de John Rawls, aparta el rudimentario colectivismo moral de
Mill, y abandona la preocupación por el fomento del bienestar general. El enfoque
contractualista de Rawls es auténticamente individualista, ya que confiere al
individuo en la posición original un veto en contra de las políticas que
maximizarían el bienestar general a costa de limitar la libertad y dañar los intereses
de algunos.”3
Este estado natural en la teoría de Rawls es la posición original, la
interpretación filosófica privilegiada de la situación inicial. El argumento lógico
de Rawls a favor de sus dos principios es: a) como la posición original tiene algunos
aspectos que son razonables para aceptarlos y b) los principios elegidos en esta
situación original son los dos principios de la justicia, entonces c) los dos
principios de la justicia son justificados, siendo de verdad los principios de la
justicia.
Las características de la posición original son: las circunstancias de la justicia,
las restricciones formales del concepto de lo justo, el velo de la ignorancia, la
racionalidad de los partes. Las partes en la situación original deben elegir, de una
lista cerrada de principios, a aquellos que les parecen los mejores.
Las circunstancias de la justicia se refieren a las condiciones normales en las
cuales la cooperación humana no es sólo posible, sino necesaria. Son
circunstancias objetivas (el hecho de que en el mismo territorio viven al mismo
tiempo más individuos con características físicas y mentales aproximadamente
iguales en condiciones de limitación de recursos) y circunstancias subjetivas (el
hecho de que las partes tienen intereses y necesidades similares o complementarias,
así que es posible la cooperación mutualmente ventajosa en y el hecho de que
cada individuo tiene su propio proyecto de vida y metas diferentes, que tienen
como resultado las demandas conflictivas sobre los recursos).
Las restricciones formales del concepto de lo justo se refieren a las condiciones
que deben cumplir los principios de la situación original. Esos son: 1) la
condición de la generalidad (los principios deben ser formulados en términos
generales, no deben ser usados nombres propios y los predicados deben expresar
propiedades y relaciones generales); 2) la condición de la universalidad (los
principios deben ser aplicados universalmente, eso significa que deben ser
aplicables a cualquier persona); 3) la condición de la publicidad (los principios
elegidos van a servir como una concepción publica de la justicia, y todos van
a conocer cuales son esos); 4) la condición de la ordenación (los principios
deben ofrecer un ordenamiento de las pretensiones en conflitó); 5) la condición
de la definitividad (los principios deben servir como un tribunal supremo
de apelación). Sólo los principios que respectan estas condiciones pueden
aparecer en la lista de principios entre que deben elegir las partes en la situación
original.
Uno de los rasgos esenciales de esta situación de elección es el velo de la
ignorancia. El tiene en cuenta el hecho de que las partes en la posición original
4
UNA VISIÓN COMPARATIVA DE LA TEORÍA DE LA JUSTICIA
27
no conocen su papel en la sociedad, los dones naturales (inteligencia, fuerza
física etc.), la concepción sobre el bien, los rasgos psicológicos particulares o los
rasgos de su sociedad (la situación económica y política, el nivel de civilización
y de cultura). De esta manera, el velo de la ignorancia asegura que las partes esten
situadas similarmente y que los principios de la justicia sean el resultado de un
acuerdo correcto, un acuerdo formulado en una situación equitativa entre los
individuos como personas iguales desde el punto de vista moral. Esto es lo que
tiene en mente Rawls cuando denomina su teoría justicia como equidad. Las partes
tienen, sin embargo, unos conocimientos generales: ellas saben que la sociedad
es caracterizada por las circunstancias de la justicia y también conocen los datos
generales sobre la sociedad humana (sobre política, psicología humana etc.).
Las partes son caracterizadas por el tipo de racionalidad que usan para elegir;
una persona racional es aquella que ordena coherente sus opciones en función de
sus preferencias. Por eso es justificada la elección de bienes primarios en la
situación original, porque las partes son racionales y entonces en la elección de
principios buscan a mejorar sus propios intereses, pero no conocen sus propios
intereses, entonces prefieren más bienes primarios porque esos son las medidas
para alcanzar cualquier meta.
Una característica de la racionalidad de las partes es la presunción motivacional:
un individuo racional no va sufrir de envidia, las partes son mutuamente
desinteresadas4, ellas no son interesadas de los intereses de los otros y no buscan
tener más que otros, sino realizar mejor su propia concepción sobre el bien;
entonces las partes van a buscar tener la mayor cantidad de bienes sociales, no
tener más bienes que otros.
Los dos principios parten de la idea de que si la situación de elección es
caracterizada por algunos rasgos, entonces la elección se hace según la regla
maximin, o maximum minimorum. Conforme a esta regla la elección entre dos
variantes posibles se hace en función de los peores resultados que pueden tener
las variantes y vamos a elegir la opción que tiene el mejor resultado negativo.
En otras palabras el que raciona según esta regla prefiere evitar la peor posibilidad,
que buscar a obtener la mejor.
Si seguimos la regla maximin en la situación original entonces vamos a elegir
los dos principios de la justicia, y para probar eso es suficiente mostrar que
la situación original es caracterizada por esas características. Rawls explica que
las partes en la situación original: 1) no pueden calcular las posibilidades de
llegar a una posición social u otra (como resultado del velo de ignorancia),
2) las partes prefieren tener un mínimo satisfactorio más que perder el derecho
igual a las libertades y 3) piensan que los otros principios tienen consecuencias
intolerables.
La Teoría de la justicia de Rawls es considerada el más influyente libro de
filosofía política del siglo XX. No sólo fue la reformulación del principio liberal,
pero en el mismo tiempo fue responsable de la revigoración de las discusiones
normativas en la filosofía política en los años ’70.
En el mismo tiempo el libro fue el blanco de muchas críticas. Unas de ellas
han venido de las comunitaristas que piensan que esta teoría sufre de todas las
5
RÃZVAN PANTELIMON
28
faltas de las teorías liberales: no tiene en cuenta el hecho de que la sociedad es
una comunidad, que los miembros de la sociedad no pueden ser vistos sólo como
individuos aislados, con metas que son seguidas individualmente, sino que las
metas y los intereses de los individuos son influidos por la sociedad.
Otro tipo de criticas ha surgido de la parte de los liberales (aquí podemos
incluir como representativo el trabajo de Robert Nozick: Anarquía, Estado y
utopía) que piensan que la concepción de Rawls es un tipo de justicia redistributiva
y entonces sufre de todos las faltas de esta. Esos libertarios proponen un Estado
minimal, con la única meta de proteger a sus ciudadanos.
Pero podemos concluir en los términos de John Gray: “Ninguna de estas
dificultades compromete los logros de la teoría de Rawls en el desarrollo de una
defensa individualista del orden liberal en términos contractualistas.”5
Como he dicho antes, una de las más importantes críticas de las teorías
de Rawls son las de Robert Nozick en su libro Anarquía, Estado y utopía,
que es considerado una de las más originales y bien sostenidas argumentaciónes
productas en los últimos años en la filosofía política de orientación analítica.
De un principal interés goza especialmente la concepción original de Nozick
sobre la justicia distributiva como derecho (entitlement theory of justice) cuyo
cuadro general y elementos principales son desarrollados en el Capitulo 7, donde
hace una critica de la teoría de Rawls y sobre la cual me voy a concentrar en
continuación.
Anarquía, Estado y utopía contiene tres partes. En la primera Nozick demuestra
que el Estado de la teoría liberal clásica, “como Estado minimal, limitado a las
funciones de protección de todos sus ciudadanos contra la violencia, el robo y el
fraude y la de hacer cumplir los contratos, parece ser justificado”.6 En la segunda
parte Nozick afirma que todos los argumentos que tienen como meta justificar
un Estado más extenso del Estado minimal son falsos, porque cualquier Estado,
con atribuciones más grandes que las legítimas que el Estado minimal, viola los
derechos de los individuos. La conclusión de esta parte es que el Estado minimal
es el Estado con las más grandes atribuciones que pueden ser justificadas. El
libro se acaba con una tercera parte donde Nozick quiere convencernos que
el Estado minimal es, contrariamente a las apariencias de austeridad y extrema
pobreza, un ideal por el cual vale la pena luchar. Por eso Nozick habla de un
tema celebre en la filosofía política — la teoría de la utopía —, donde la parte
viable de esta, que puede ser guardada y desarrollada, se refiere a la estructura
del Estado minimal.
El punto de partida de Nozick es una clara afirmación de los derechos de los
individuos: “Los individuos tienen derechos, y hay cosas que ninguna persona o
grupo puede hacerles sin violar los derechos.”7 Esta clara afirmación de los
derechos de los individuos impone una reexaminación de cualquiera posibilidad
de toque de sus fuerza o legitimidad; entonces la provocación del anarquista
(que sostiene que el Estado, por el mantenimiento del monopolio sobre el uso de
la fuerza para la protección de los ciudadanos dentro de un territorio, acaba con
la violación de los derechos de los individuos, deviniendo por consiguiente
inmoral) debe ser analizada atentamente.
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UNA VISIÓN COMPARATIVA DE LA TEORÍA DE LA JUSTICIA
29
Los argumentos de la primera parte son pues orientados contra los anarquistas
que se oponen a cualquier tipo de Estado. Para que la argumentación en contra
de los anarquistas pueda ser convincente, el anarquista debe mostrar que: 1) el
Estado puede aparecer desde el estadio de anarquía mediante un proceso que
no tiene alguna etapa inmoral; 2) la producción del Estado no es el resultado de
la intención de una persona; 3) la gente en una situación social definida de
la existencia del Estado es en una situación mejor que la mejor situación
donde pueda llegar en una sociedad sin Estado. Para demostrar eso, Nozick
usa la teoría de las asociaciones de protección y de la mano invisible, que voy a
analisar.
Después de esta justificación del Estado minimal frente a los anarquistas, Nozick
construye una teoría sobre la justicia distributiva — la justicia retributiva. Una
característica del argumento de Nozick es que toda la demostración tiene un
rasgo muy intenso: el acento sobre los procesos, y no sobre estructuras o metas.
Su teoría del Estado puede ser caracterizada brevemente como un intento de
ordenar las diversas componentes de un proceso que puede dar lugar al
nacimiento de un Estado justificabil moralmente. También su teoría de la justicia
retributiva tiene la misma visión general procesualista.
La teoría de la justicia de Nozick introduce en la filosofía moral y en
las ciencias jurídicas un nuevo paradigma definido por un proceso de un
profundo carácter histórico y anti-estructural. La idea de Nozick es que “una
distribución es justa si surge de otra distribución justa a través de medios legítimos”.8
Para reparar las violaciones de ese principio, Nozick se sirve de un principio
de la rectificación. Este principio de la rectificación usa las informaciones históricas
sobre las situaciones pasadas y las injusticias que han pasado en estas situaciones,
y las informaciones sobre el Estado actual que es el resultado de estas injusticias.
La rectificación de las injusticias debe tener en cuenta la estimación de la
situación de hecho más probable, que es accesible desde el estadio actual y que
era muy probable haberse realizado ella misma, si en el pasado no se hubiera
producido la dicha injusticia.
Fuertemente opuestos a los principios del resultado final o de cualquier otro
Estado final “los principios históricos de justicia [retributiva] sostienen que las
circunstancias o acciones pasadas de las personas pueden producir derechos
diferentes o merecimientos diferentes sobre las cosas”.9 Así, guardando un crítico
pero estrecho vinculo con la teoría de Locke sobre la instalación de los derechos
de propiedad, la teoría de Nozick afirma que el origen de cualquier pretensión
legitima sobre la propiedad de una persona sobre un objeto que no pertenece a
nadie tiene su punto de partida en la combinación del trabajo de aquella persona
con aquel objeto; y en la satisfacción de la condición de Locke que, después de
la apropiación de aquel objeto y como consecuencia de dicha apropiación, los
que no tienen más la libertad de usar de aquel objeto, no se encuentran, como
resultado de esta circunstancia, en una situación peor que antes de la apropiación
del objeto.
También los principios de la justicia retributiva no son estructurados, lo que
significa que: “la distribución debe variar de conformidad con alguna dimensión
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RÃZVAN PANTELIMON
30
natural, con la suma de pesos de las dimensiones naturales de conformidad con
un orden lexicográfico de dimensiones naturales”.10 Es muy importante destacar
que aun la teoría de Nozick guarda la nota distintiva de Locke y hace del trabajo
un factor importante, él no habla de la cantidad-trabajo como se pasa en la teoría
marxista del valor-trabajo, porque este tipo de visión va a un principio histórico
estructurado de la justicia distributiva, principio que Nozick no acepta y quiere
eliminar. “Nozick puso de manifiesto agudamente las dificultades que afronta la
teoría lockeana sobre la adquisición original de los derechos de propiedad, cuando
en ellos se incluye el trabajo personal.”11
Si miramos las cosas más generalmente, casi cada principio de la justicia
distributiva que ha propuesto es un principio estructurado. O el blanco predilecto
de los ataques de Nozick es constituido por las teorías del Estado final o
las teorías estructuradas de la justicia distributiva, que incluyen las teorías
marxistas pero también la teoría de Rawls. Estas teorías son incompatibles con
su propia teoría retributiva, porque “los principios pautados de justicia distributiva
necesitan actividades redistributivas” mientras que “desde el punto de vista
de una teoría retributiva la redistribución es una cuestión verdaderamente seria,
que comprende, como es el caso, la violación de los derechos de las personas”.12
Si miramos desde ese punto de vista, todos los argumentos del Capitulo 7 son
contra la redistribución.
Un problema de las teorías de Nozick es: ¿en que medida la justificación moral
del Estado minimal, por su derivación de la situación natural, como resultado de
un proceso neintencionado y que no viola los derechos de los individuos, puede
ofrecer bastante argumentos para la justificación de los Estados reales? Porque
es poco claro por qué y especialmente como puede ser legitimado un Estado
existente, aunque minimal, por el intermedio de una explicación que demuestra
que un Estado minimal puede aparecer legítimamente como resultado de un
proceso de tipo de “mano invisible”. Mi respuesta a esa pregunta es que la teoría
de la justicia retributiva establece un estándar de la justificación moral, que es
muy alto para que los Estados reales lo puedan cumplir. Así podemos ver mejor
los problemas que analiza Nozick en su libro.
Anarquía, Estado y utopía es un libro con un profundo carácter teórico. El
autor desarrolla teorías y construye argumentos y contraargumentos muy
abstractos, que demuestran que Nozick se interesa a las virtudes formales de su
teoría y la posibilidad de imaginar situaciones posibles que pueden infirmar las
teorías de sus oponentes y confirmar sus propias ideas. Sin embargo el carácter
abstracto-formal de la mayoría de sus conceptos y argumentos es certificado por
la presencia de una única ciencia social que debe dar sustancia a sus teorías: la
teoría económica (ella misma muy abstracta y matématizada), y la casi falta de
la psicología o sociología.
Pero creo que de su teoría se pueden desprender unas consecuencias
problemáticas, también por el lado práctico de los problemas. Por ejemplo podemos
remarcar que la imagen global del Estado minimal contrasta fuertemente con el
funcionamiento y las características del Estado capitalista contemporáneo. Aquí
podemos tomar en cuenta una observación de Gray: “En la explicación de
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UNA VISIÓN COMPARATIVA DE LA TEORÍA DE LA JUSTICIA
31
Nozick el Estado existe únicamente para proteger los derechos lockeanos que
poseen los hombres en el estado de naturaleza. Entre estos derechos se encuentra
un derecho inviolable a la propiedad — violado por la imposición fiscal sobre
los ingresos, que Nozick caracteriza como algo semejante al trabajo forzado.
¿Cómo ha de financiarse, entonces, el Estado mínimo? No por medios no
coercitivos como el pago de servicios o loterías estatales, ya que, como señala el
propio Nozick, estos lograrían recaudar los ingresos necesarios sólo si fueron
monopolios e implicarían, por lo tanto, una violación de los derechos. De hecho
la explicación de Nozick del Estado mínimo es insuficiente porque no contiene
ninguna teoría de recaudación fiscal.”13
Otro problema es que si la teoría de la rectificación es aplicada a las situaciones
concretas, entonces es más que cierto que el principio de la rectificación debe ser
usado sobre la mayoría de los bienes y de las propiedades privadas existentes,
porque casi todos fueron obtenidos claramente como resultado de unas
injusticias. La inmensidad de ese proyecto muestra lo utópico e inoperacional
que es. Un mínimo realismo nos dice que esas cuestiones facticas son
irreparables. Pero el mismo Nozick escribe, sólo una vez, que algunos acuerdos
de asistencia social, incluyendo los de carácter altamente redistributivo pueden
justificarse por su acción rectificadora de violaciones previas a la justicia liberal.
En los últimos años Nozick ha reanalizado sus planteamientos, y su imagen
sobre la vida de los individuos y sobre el ser social parece ser diferente, porque
la antigua visión no tenia cuenta de la importancia simbólica de las preocupaciones
y acciones políticas con carácter oficial en el dominio de los problemas sociales
de interés mutuo que la gente quiere resolver.
Vamos a analizar ahora una visión un poco diferente: la visión de Phillipe
Pettit, una teoría que se inscribe en una tradición secular de Machiavello hasta
Hannah Arendt en nuestro siglo. Para comenzar voy a analizar unos planteamientos
generales de la teoría republicana, y después me voy a enfocar sobre su concepción
de la igualdad y comunidad.
Para caracterizar la tradición republicana vamos a usar las palabras de Pettit:
“La tradición republicana no es intrínsecamente populista, y no es particularmente
comunitarista. La libertad republicana es un ideal comunitario, en el sentido que
se verá en el Capitulo 4, pero el ideal es compatible con formas de sociedad
modernas y pluralistas. Y aun cuando la tradición republicana halla valiosa e
importante la participación democrática, no la considera un valor básico
inconmovible. La participación democrática puede ser esencial para la republica,
pero sólo porque resulta necesaria para promover el disfrute de la libertad
como no-dominación, no por sus atractivos intrínsecos: no porque la libertad,
según sugeriría una concepción positiva, no sea ni más ni menos que el
derecho a la participación democrática.”14 En la teoría republicana, en contrasto
con la imagen populista del Estado que representa al pueblo como amo y al
Estado como siervo, el pueblo es visto como fideicomitente y el Estado como
fiduciario.
Una concepción muy interesante de Pettit es su concepción de la libertad.
Usualmente existen dos concepciones de la libertad: una negativa — la libertad
9
RÃZVAN PANTELIMON
32
como no-interferencia y una positiva — la libertad como autocontrol. Pero Pettit
va a construir una tercera posibilidad que es la concepción de la libertad como
no-dominación, que “exige que nadie sea capaz de interferir arbitrariamente en
las elecciones de la persona libre”.15 Y eso fue también la concepción de la
libertad que abrazó la larga tradición republicana.
Esta no-dominación es vista como “una ausencia de dominación en presencia
de otra gente: se trata de un ideal social que exige que, existiendo otra gente que
podría ser capaz de interferir arbitrariamente en la vida de la persona en
cuestión, esas personas se vean impedidas de hacerlo”.16 Para promover y
guardar dicha no-dominación en una sociedad, hay dos posibilidades: todos
llegan a tener iguales poderes, o sea un régimen jurídico que frene las ansias de
dominación de la gente, sin convertirse él mismo en una fuerza de dominación.
La libertad como no-dominación tiene grados tanto de intensidad, cuanto de
alcance. Puede incrementar su intensidad, en la medida en que se reducen los
factores comprometedores de la libertad — las presencias dominadoras que
hacen ilibre a la gente — o puede incrementar su alcance, en la medida en que
disminuyen las influencias condicionantes — las limitaciones naturales, culturales
y jurídicas, que hacen a la gente no ilibre, pero sí no-libre.
Si pensamos en la no-dominación como ideal político, su mayor atractivo
viene del hecho de que “su maximización exige la promoción de tres beneficios,
que la mera maximización de la no-interferencia podría pasar por alto: la ausencia
de incertidumbre, la ausencia de necesidad de deferencia estratégica frente a los
poderosos y la ausencia de subordinación social a otros”.17 La conexión entre la
libertad como no-dominación y estos beneficios es tal, que esta libertad es un
bien primario, en el sentido de John Rawls; es algo que la gente tiene razones
para desear, con independencia del resto de sus deseos. Pero ese tipo de libertad
no es el tipo de bien cuya persecución pueda dejarse en las manos de la gente
para que lo persigan por sí mismas de manera particular, todo indica que lo mejor
es perseguirlo para cada uno mediante la acción política de todos: perseguirlo
por vía estatal.
Antes hemos visto dos puntos de vista sobre la justicia y la igualdad en las
obras de Rawls y Nozick, ahora me voy enfocar sobre la propuesta de Pettit en
lo relativo al problema de la igualdad en el Capitulo 4 de su libro. Inicialmente
critica las propuestas de los utilitaristas y de los adeptos de la libertad como nointerferencia, porque resultan desigualdades. “Eso lo reconocen implícitamente
los devotos de la libertad como no-interferencia (Rawls), que insisten en que el
objetivo no es tanto la libertad como tal, cuanto la igual libertad. No hay forma,
compatible con la lógica, de maximizar el disfrute de igual libertad, sin distribuir
la libertad en medidas iguales, cautela que tiene por efecto convertir la nointerferencia en un objetivo igualitario.”18
En la visión de Pettit a diferencia de la libertad como no-interferencia y de la
utilidad, la libertad como no-dominación revela una naturaleza considerablemente
igualitaria, porque es extremadamente improbable que este tipo de libertad
pueda ser maximizado con disposiciones como la del internamiento selectivo y
de la subprotección selectiva.
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UNA VISIÓN COMPARATIVA DE LA TEORÍA DE LA JUSTICIA
33
Un punto muy interesante de la teoría de Pettit es su distinción entre el
igualitarismo material y lo que él denomina igualitarismo estructural. “Sostendré
que un régimen republicano que trata de maximizar la no-dominación tiene que
evitar iniciativas que toleren una desigual intensidad de no-dominación, pero no
hay restricción alguna que impida tolerar el desigual alcance de la no-dominación,
tolerar las desigualdades de recursos materiales. Sin estar obligado, pues, a abrazar
un igualitarismo material, el consecuencialismo republicano está forzado a venir
en apoyo de lo que llamaré un igualitarismo estructural. Puede haber muchas
razones que lleven al republicanismo a tratar de reducir la desigualdad material,
obvio es decirlo. Pero la conexión con el igualitarismo material no es tan expedita
— no es tan independiente de contingencias empíricas — como la conexión con
el igualitarismo estructural.”19
Para defender su idea de igualitarismo estructural Pettit parte de la idea
que la intensidad de la libertad como no-dominación de que disfruta una persona
en una sociedad esta en función tanto del poder de otros, como de su propio
poder. El valor absoluto de la intensidad de no-dominación de que disfruta una
persona está en función del valor relativo a los poderes: está en función de su
tasa de poder en el conjunto de la sociedad. Por eso “cualquier iniciativa
contraria a la igualdad contribuirá a que, al menos, dos partes sean menos iguales
en su intensidad de no-dominación. Y contribuirá a ello, o bien incrementando
los poderes de los poderosos o disminuyendolos de otra parte, o bien haciendo
ambas cosas a la vez: en cualquier caso, empeorará la tasa de poder de la parte
en desventaja”.20 Porque, como la intensidad absoluta de no-dominación de la
parte débil está en función de sus poderes relativos, la iniciativa igualitaria no
puede sino rebajarla.
Aquí Pettit trae un argumento parecido a la teoría de maximin de Rawls: “una
iniciativa antiigualitaria puede lograr la maximización de la intensidad esperada
de no-dominación, sólo si las márgenes incrementales de la no-dominación
esperada de los aventajados compensan las márgenes decrementales de la nodominación esperada de los desaventajados.” Y eso tiene como consecuencia
que: “en el improbable caso de que partamos de una situación igualitaria en lo
que todos disfrutaran de la misma intensidad de no-dominación, tendría poco o
ningún sentido recurrir a iniciativas antiigualitarias con objeto de incrementar la
intensidad global de la no-dominación disfrutada. Lo más probable es que
esas iniciativas, al tiempo que redujeran la igualdad en la distribución de la
no-dominación, reducirían también su intensidad global”.21
La conclusión de Pettit es en la misma línea: “El paso más prometedor es
siempre el paso que contribuya a una mayor igualdad. […] el objetivo que nos
proponemos al abrazar el ideal republicano de libertad es la promoción de una
no-dominación igualmente intensa. Si tienen que mantenerse en substancias fieles
a la tradición republicana, tendrán que hacer con la libertad como no-dominación
lo que Rawls y muchos liberales hacen con la libertad como no-interferencia.
Tendrán que convertir la igual libertad — estrictamente hablando, la libertad
igualmente intensa — en su preocupación central. Por mi parte, yo no creo que
ese paso resulte necesario, dado el carácter igualitario del valor fundamental.”22
11
RÃZVAN PANTELIMON
34
En lo que concierne el igualitarismo material, Pettit piensa que es posible que
el nivel global de no-dominación en una sociedad se maximice en un punto en
que algunos disfrutan de unas pociones no-dominadas de mayor alcance que
otros, talvez porque trabajan con mayor empeño y tienen más recursos. Y por eso
“no hay razón para pensar que por la vía de igualar los recursos, y de igualar el
alcance de las opciones no-dominadas, el Estado pueda esperar maximizar el
nivel global de no-dominación en la sociedad; aun suponiendo que sus iniciativas
igualizadoras no cobren una forma dominadora, pueden traer consigo la imposición
de más limitaciones que las que eliminan”.23
Para concluir podemos decir que aunque el proyecto republicano de promover
la libertad como no-dominación implique la igual intensificación de la nodominación, no necesariamente entraña la igual extensión del alcance de las
opciones no-dominadas. Aunque el proyecto sea comprometido con lo que
hemos denominado igualitarismo estructural, no está esencialmente comprometido
con ningún tipo de igualitarismo material. “Pueden ser razones para instituir
ciertas igualdades materiales, pero se trata de razones más sujetas a contingencia
empírica que las razones que venían en apoyo de la institución de la igualdad
estructural: las razones para instituir la igualdad de intensidad con que la gente
disfruta de la libertad como no-dominación.”24
NOTAS
1. John Rawls, Teoría de la Justicia, México–
Madrid–Buenos Aires, Fondo de Cultura
Económica, 1978, p. 84.
2. Ibidem, p. 82.
3. John Gray, Liberalismo, Madrid, Movimento
Cultural Cristiano, 2000, p. 44.
4. John Rawls, op. cit., p. 171.
5. John Gray, op. cit., p. 45.
6. Robert Nozick, Anarquía, Estado y utopía,
México DF., Fondo de Cultura Económica,
1978, p. 7.
7. Ibidem, p. 7.
8. Ibidem, p. 154.
9. Ibidem, p. 158.
10. Ibidem, p. 159.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
John Gray, op. cit., p. 50.
Robert Nozick, op. cit., p. 170.
John Gray, op. cit., p. 60.
Phillipe Pettit, Republicanismo, Barcelona–
Buenos Aires–México, Paidós, 1999, p. 25.
Ibidem, p. 349.
Ibidem, p. 351.
Ibidem, p. 352.
Ibidem, p. 151.
Ibidem, p. 153.
Ibidem, p. 154.
Ibidem.
Ibidem, pp. 157–158.
Ibidem, p. 159.
Ibidem, p. 160.
POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY
INVOCACIÓN DE MAX WEBER
AL SONETO 102 DE SHAKESPEARE1
LUIS RENÉ ORO TAPIA
Este ensayo tiene por propósito identificar y explicitar cuáles son las ideas que
subyacen tras las imágenes que Max Weber utiliza para configurar su concepción
de la vocación política. Cuando Weber trata de esbozar tal noción, en las últimas
líneas de su conferencia Politik als Beruf, lo hace mediante un lenguaje que es
altamente estético y críptico a la vez. Atendiendo a tal peculiaridad este artículo
intenta, en la medida de lo posible, convertir las metáforas en conceptos. Ello, con
la finalidad práctica de ayudar al lector de Politik als Beruf a rescatar el sentido
del mensaje que Weber quiso transmitir a sus interlocutores. Si este ensayo alcanza
su objetivo, será a costa de deslucir la plasticidad de las imágenes de las que se sirve
el profesor de Munich para delinear sus planteamientos.
Contexto y Texto
¿Qué sentido tiene citar un poema de amor en un discurso que tiene por tema
principal la política? Más aún, ¿cuál es la pertinencia de un soneto que alude al
canto del ruiseñor, a la primavera y la alborada del estío en un contexto en que
se habla del Estado, la violencia y el carácter demoníaco del poder?
El texto es una partícula del contexto. Por eso, para desentrañar el significado
que tiene la segunda estrofa del soneto 102 de Shakespeare en la conferencia
Politik als Beruf de Max Weber2, es preciso aludir aunque sea brevemente al
ambiente en el que ella fue dictada.
Max Weber pronunció dicha conferencia aproximadamente ochenta días
después del término de la Primera Guerra Mundial. Alemania, como se sabe,
perdió la guerra. Las tropas del Káiser Guillermo Il capitularon en las cercanías
de Paris antes de que los ejércitos aliados ingresaran en suelo alemán. La derrota
convirtió a los sacrificios realizados para ganar la guerra en penurias absurdas.
Y no sólo la sangría demográfica (3,5 millones de jóvenes muertos), sino que
además los esfuerzos económicos para financiar la contienda, el padecimiento de
frío y hambre causado por la escasez de combustibles y alimentos y, en fin, todas
las incomodidades suscitades por las restricciones en el uso de aquellos bienes
que son indispensables en una incipiente civilización industrial.
Toda guerra en términos humanos es un desastre, pero lo es mucho más aún
para quienes son derrotados. Cuando los vencidos se sienten defraudados por la
conducción de la guerra exigen explicaciones a sus líderes y, si los resultados
Pol. Sc. Int. Rel., II, 2, p. 35–42, Bucharest, 2005.
36
LUIS RENÉ ORO TAPIA
2
son inexplicablemente adversos, no sólo buscan responsables sino que además
culpables. En Alemania el sindicado fue el Káiser. Por eso, la derrota contribuyó
a poner fin a la monarquía y su derrumbe suscitó un vacío de poder, con su
respectiva crisis de gobernabilidad. Ésta pronto devino en “revolución”. La sociedad
alemana estaba divida y se revolvía contra sí misma. Ello dio pie a acusaciones
y recriminaciones recíprocas, las que junto a otras variables políticas atizaron la
discordia hasta llevarla al umbral de la guerra civil.
Alemania comenzó a vivir un momento crepuscular. Para unos era el crepúsculo
del amanecer, para otros, en cambio, el del atardecer. Así, lo que estaba en
ciernes podía ser el luminoso comienzo de una nueva era o, por el contrario, un
naufragio nocturno en un mar bravío en una latitud en donde no se sabe si hay
tierra firme cerca. En tales circunstancias todo parece, paradojalmente, posible e
imposible a la vez. En ellas se tiene la sensación de que todo está por hacerse y
de que es factible de realizarse o, inversamente, que ya no hay nada más que
hacer, excepto conservar y defender a ultranza lo poco que va quedando.
Un protagonista crucial de ese tiempo crepuscular fue la juventud. Pero
ella distaba de constituir un actor político unitario. Ella, en efecto, no estaba
cohesionada en torno a una figura política indiscutida ni conformaba un grupo
ideológicamente homogéneo.
En ella había sectores anarquistas, nacionalistas, comunistas y pacifistas
cristianos y seculares. Ellos constituyen el grueso del público que asiste a la
conferencia de Weber. Pero no obstante su heterogeneidad tienen algo en común:
participan activamente en los acontecimientos políticos que están en marcha y
se sienten auténticos políticos de vocación, en cuanto dicen tener o creen tener
vocación para la política.
En seguida transcribiré el soneto 102 completo.3 La estrofa que cita Weber la
pondré cursiva. La traducción que aquí ocupo es ligeramente diferente de la que
aparece en las diversas ediciones en español de Politik als Beruf. En ellas los
traductores tratan de conservar el número de sílabas de cada verso, al costo de
forzar el mensaje del poeta. En cambio, la traducción que transcribo más abajo
es más libre en cuanto al “metro”, pero se ciñe más al mensaje que quiere transmitir
el hablante lírico.
Mi amor es más fuerte, aunque más débil en apariencia;
no amo menos, aunque parezca que amo menos.
Es amor mercantilizado el que es pregonado
a toda voz por su poseedor.
Nuestro amor era lozano y primaveral,
cuando yo acostumbraba a celebrarlo con mis rimas,
pero ahora es como el del canto del ruiseñor al acercarse el estío
que termina por apagarse al avanzar los días maduros.
No es que el estío sea ahora menos apacible
que cuando sus hermosos himnos hacían callar la noche,
pero ya discorde rebalsa de todas las ramas la música,
y las cosas dulces, al vulgarizarse, pierden su apreciado deleite.
Así como él yo guardo mi flauta
porque no quiero seguir ajando vuestra alegría con mi canto.
3
INVOCACIÓN DE MAX WEBER AL SONETO 102 DE SHAKESPEARE
Amor y Política
37
El motivo del soneto es el amor. En él se contrapone el ímpetu del amor juvenil
a la serenidad del amor maduro. Weber al apropiarse del soneto retransmite el
mensaje del hablante lírico a los jóvenes, pero en clave política.
Así, el motivo del soneto ya no es el amor erótico, sino que ahora es la
política. En efecto, el destinatario del mensaje ya no es una pareja de jóvenes que
disfruta de la embriaguez del deleite amoroso, sino que ahora se trata de la
fascinación que la juventud siente por la política.
En ambos casos se trata de la embriaguez, fascinación y arrobamiento que
suscita el objeto amado. Y en ambos casos los sujetos que experimentan
intensamente las pasiones son personas jóvenes. A partir de tales similitudes se
puede establecer un paralelo entre el ímpetu amoroso y el entusiasmo por la
política. Así establecida la ecuación, queda claro, entonces, que los destinatarios
inmediatos del mensaje son los jóvenes que proclaman tener, o que creen tener,
vocación para la política, en cuanto se sienten fascinados, atraídos o encantados
por ella.
La pregunta que implícitamente está haciendo Weber a los jóvenes es si la
pasión que sienten por sus respectivas amadas es de similar índole a la pasión
que sienten por la política. Si la respuesta a esta pregunta es afirmativa surgen
otras interrogantes. En primer lungar, ¿si la continuidad de una actitud está
garantizada por el sólo hecho de sentir intensamente una emoción en un momento
dado? Y ésta remite a otra, ¿qué tan estables son los sentimientos?
El llamado de Weber es a no confundir el enamoramiento con el amor. Uno
es intenso, abrasador y fugaz. El otro recatado, apacible y duradero. Quienes
están más expuestos a incurrir en tal indistinción son los jóvenes que experimentan
pasiones intensas, pero evanescentes. El ímpetu de ellas los induce a sobrestimar
la magnitud y consistencia de sus sentimientos y simultáneamente los impulsa a
realizar actos temerarios de los que después son reacios a hacerse responsables.
Así como es necesario distinguir el enamoramiento del amor, análogamente
es indispensable distinguir el entusiasmo de la vocación.
¿Qué es la vocación? Como punto de partida hay que señalar que la vocación
es algo más que un estado de ánimo que predispone favorablemente a realizar un
determinado tipo de quehacer. En efecto, es algo más que un entusiasmo
pasajero por aquello que resulta atrayente. La vocación es una motivación
persistente en el tiempo, en cuanto permanece lozana a pesar del paso de los
años. Ella, por cierto, no se marchita con las vicisitudes de la vida, ni es mutilada
por los vaivenes anímicos, ni es amagada fácilmente por la adversidad.
En el primer verso que está en cursiva se habla de un amor idealizado que se
perpetúa en una eterna primavera, que se traduce en un perenne bienestar. En él
no se hace alusión a los días difíciles y menos aún a la manera de cómo afrontarlos
cuando ellos sobrevengan. El llamado de Weber es a evitar ver la realidad a
través de un visillo de idealizaciones y ensoñaciones. Es una invitación a
abandonar el romanticismo político. No hay correspondencia entre la vida
política real, menos aún en una situación revolucionaria que por definición es
violenta, y el lugar apacible que describe el soneto. En el segundo verso (en
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4
cursiva) se refiere a la celebración de la situación descrita en el verso anterior,
que análogamente corresponde a la exaltación del proceso revolucionario, a la
euforia que produce la pasión política que ha suscitado “este carnaval al que se
le embellece con el orgulloso nombre de revolución”.4
La vida política no tiene nada de poética. Menos aún durante un proceso
revolucionario. Las revoluciones no estallan en lugares apacibles ni en
sociedades donde reina el amor. Por eso Weber, con cierto dejo de ironía,
advierte a los jóvenes que se sienten arrebatados por el ímpetu revolucionario
que “sería muy bello que las cosas fueran de tal modo que se pudiera aplicar el
soneto 102 de Shakespeare”.5 Sin embargo la vida real dista del talante anímico
que trasunta el soneto. Más aún durante el transcurso de una revolución, pues en
ellas las relaciones humanas se tornan más tensas y abrasivas e incluso violentas.
Mientras ella dure, la violencia permanece al acecho y la irrupción de ésta puede
traer consigo devastación, sufrimiento y muerte.
En efecto, “lo que hay fuera” — en la calle, en la manifestación, en la barricada
— es una realidad diferente de la que esboza el soneto. La política tiene sus
cuotas de incertidumbre y ciertas dosis de coerción y antagonismo. Ellas aumentan
su intensidad durante una revolución. Así por ejemplo el antagonismo verbal
deviene en conflicto existencial, con lo cual la palabra es reemplazada por la
fuerza y el espacio del antagonismo se traslada de la tribuna a la calle. En efecto,
las luchas callejeras entre las facciones en pugna ponen en riesgo la vida de los
antagonistas y si la intensidad del conflicto sigue creciendo puede alcanzar el
umbral de la guerra civil. Así, el quehacer político cuando está impregnado de
tensiones y antagonismos se asemeja más a la frialdad de una noche polar que
cobra sus víctimas que a la apacible calidez de una mañana primaveral. La
actividad política no tiene nada de poética en el sentido estético del término.
En conclusión, Weber quiere establecer un contrapunto entre la realidad que
describe el soneto, especialmente en sus dos primeras líneas, y el mundo externo.
Incita a los jóvenes a admitir las circunstancias concretas en las que ellos están
insertos: un país devastado, una revolución en marcha y un futuro incierto. En
ella no hay primaveras ni trinos de aves mañaneras. Por el contrario, más bien
parece estar incubándose el advenimiento de una noche polar.
Desengaños y Política
Weber no pretende sugerir a los jóvenes que dejen de soñar. Su mensaje es
otro: que lo hagan, pero sin perder de vista la realidad factual. Más aún, los insta
a perseverar en sus sueños. Con tal propósito les recuerda que la historia
demuestra que no se hubiese alcanzado lo posible si no se hubiese intentando
una y otra vez lo imposible.6 Sin embargo, quien quiera proponer ideales de
perfección primero debe mirar al mundo tal cual es y al hombre en su desnuda
realidad, con sus potencialidades y debilidades, porque solamente atendiendo a
ellas se pueden elaborar ideales que sean factibles de materializar.
Si algunos intentos por cambiar el mundo efectivamente han tenido éxito se
debe a que quienes los llevaron a cabo estaban conscientes de las peculiaridades
de la materia con la que operaban y supieron en qué momento actuar. Si pudieron
5
INVOCACIÓN DE MAX WEBER AL SONETO 102 DE SHAKESPEARE
39
alcanzar sus metas fue porque persistieron en su empeño, actuaron de manera
prudente y conocían a cabalidad los recovecos del alma humana. Por cierto,
disponían de vocación, talento y sabiduría. La primera incita a perseverar en las
metas que se quieren alcanzar; el segundo sugiere de manera prudente los cursos
de acción a seguir; la tercera brinda un conocimiento razonable de orden práctico.
La conjunción de tales cualidades permite incrementar las probabilidades de
tener éxito en el mundo de la política. Entendido éste como el logro de los fines.
Tales exigencias y complejidades quedan en evidencia cuando Weber les recuerda
a los jóvenes que “la política consiste en horadar lenta y profundamente unas
tablas duras con pasión y distanciamiento al mismo tiempo”.7 En efecto, para
alcanzar las metas, y así el éxito, es necesario saber de qué fibra, de qué madera,
está hecho el hombre que es la materia sobre la que se opera. También es
necesario no cejar frente a la adversidad, ni dejarse amilanar por las dificultades
y la magnitud de las tareas a realizar. Asimismo se debe tomar distancia de la
pasión puesto que obnubila a la razón, pero teniendo el cuidado de que permanezca
siempre viva, porque ella es el motor de la acción. Si ella se extingue muere la
vocación y sobreviene el desgano, la apatía y el inmovilismo. Sin embargo se
corre el riesgo de que la persistencia se transforme en tozudez. El empecinamiento
que ésta suscita, al no poner reparo en los efectos colaterales que genera, puede
terminar desacreditando las metas que ella misma quiere alcanzar. Para evitar tal
estropicio, la persistencia debe estar asistida por la prudencia. Ésta es quien
determina en qué momento es oportuno actuar y discierne sobre la pertinencia
de los medios que se deben emplear para insistir, una vez más, en el fin que se
pretende alcanzar. La elección de los medios es clave, porque si ellos no son los
adecuados se puede poner en riesgo la existencia misma del ideal en cuanto tal.
Por cierto, se debe evitar que los medios desacrediten, difamen e incluso lesionen
gravemente el prestigio del ideal que se desea implementar.8
¿Cómo van a reaccionar los jóvenes, en el ocaso de la primavera, cuando
tengan las primeras sospechas de que la política es un conflicto de intereses que
se disfraza como lucha de principios? Al final del verano, cuando ya estén
cayendo las primeras hojas, comenzará a escucharse el inquientante palpitar de
la verdad fáctica que se oculta atras el follaje semántico. Ella con su muda
presencia interpelará la retórica de los políticos que dicen actuar inspirados por
valores sublimes. Es el momento en que comienza a insinuarse el rostro duro de
la realidad y su acceptación o rechazo constituye la prueba de fuego para
discernir si alguien tiene vocación para la política o no. Es la hora del despertar
atónito, del parpadear incrédulo y del preludio que anuncia el ocaso de las
ensoñaciones. Ese preludio es como el canto del ruiseñor al acercarse el estío
que termina por apagarse al avanzar los días maduros. Esta imagen del derrumbe
de las ilusiones y del declive del brío estival, de la armonía bucólica orquestada
por el ruiseñor, dará paso a una realidad grisácea que no tardará en tornarse
macilenta y en suscitar una sensación de desconsuelo aun en el alma de los más
optimistas.
¿Qué sucederá cuando despunte el alba, cuando haya quedado atrás la magia
de la noche, y la luz matinal permita ver claramente el contorno y el dintorno de
las cosas? Cuál irá a ser nuestra actitud cuando dejemos atrás las ensoñaciones
40
LUIS RENÉ ORO TAPIA
6
nocturnas y observemos la realidad a plena luz del día, ¿cambiaremos nuestro
juicio acerca de la realidad? ¿Aceptaremos la realidad con sus testarudas
imperfecciones o insistiremos en seguir viéndola como algo potencialmente
bello y perfectible? ¿Intentaremos cambiarla o renegaremos de nuestros ideales
de la noche anterior?
¿Qué sentimentos irán a experimentar los jóvenes entusiastas en las últimas
horas del día al final del verano? ¿Sentirán nostalgia por lo que se fue y no
volverá? ¿Se quederán con sus miradas ancladas en el pasado? Si las respuestas
a estas interrogantes son afirmativas, es porque fueron incapaces de asumir la
realidad en su cotidianidad, tal cual ella es. Al negarse a aceptarla se evaden de
ella. ¿A dónde? Hacia el pasado o el futuro. Y tal huida los incita a refugiarse en
idealizaciones, creando así mundos de fantasía acorde a sus ensoñaciones. En el
fondo, entonces, carecían de la fuerza de voluntad y la dureza de alma necesaria
para sobreponerse a los continuos desencantos y frustraciones que suscita la
lucha politíca.9 Por consiguiente, habría que sacar la conclusión de que no tenían
vocación para la política.
De Pie en Medio de las Ruinas
La política gradualmente comienza a perder su encanto y a causa de ello van
desapareciendo los políticos que viven para ella y no de ella. Los escasos hombres
que ingresan a la política guiados por nobles motivos pronto ven truncados sus
sueños por el propio funcionamiento del campo de la política. Las entrañas de la
política están hechas de asperezas, fricciones y resquemores y no todos los que
a ella ingresan son capaces de afrontarlas sin costo alguno para sus ilusiones.10
La desilusión es un capítulo muy avanzado de la ilusión. Sólo puede sentirse
desencantado de la política aquel que una vez se sintió encantado por ella.
¿Quiénes estarán menos expuestos a experimentar tales decepciones? Los que
han nacido con los ojos abiertos. Ellos han asumido el mundo tal cual es, con
todas sus asperezas, por consiguiente, no requieren de ideales acorde a sus
ensoñaciones para cobijarse de sus inclemencias. Ellos pueden prescindir de los
visillos románticos y mirar cara a cara la realidad sin sentir pavor, por eso son
inmunes a los sortilegios que tienen por misión encantar el mundo y hacerlo más
llevadero.
Se suele decir que el paso de los años va amagando la capacidad de soñar y
va apagando la sed de ideales. Pero no todos los hombres son iguales. También
es posible encontrar ancianos soñadores. Quizás sería más justo decir que todos
los hombres son ilusos y realistas al mismo tiempo. Sin embargo, ello no significa
en modo alguno que todos sean igualmente ilusos o realistas en un mismo
dominio de la realidad ni respecto a las mismas cosas al interior de ese dominio.
Pero si existe algún dominio de la realidad en que es indispensable ser un
realista, lo que en última instancia significa ser un perspicaz conocedor de la
naturaleza humana, ese dominio es el de la política.11 La mayoría de las veces se
trata de un conocimiento intuitivo o por connaturalidad que tienen algunos
inviduos respecto de sus congéneres.12 Generalmente se trata de una aprehensión
espontánea y profunda de un determinado segmento de la realidad.13 Por cierto,
7
INVOCACIÓN DE MAX WEBER AL SONETO 102 DE SHAKESPEARE
41
tal conocimiento rara vez se adquiere de manera teórica, sin embargo, tampoco
está asociado invariablemente a la longevidad ni al haber tenido un determinado
tipo de vivencias.
La experiencia no implica necesariamente el haber vivido cierta cantidad de
años. Sólo adquieren el estatus de experiencias aquellas vivencias que han sido
previamente reflexionadas y asimiladas. Por cierto, el acta de nacimiento no
garantiza por sí misma la posesión de la experiencia necesaria para evitar dejarse
encandilar por el éxito ni para sobrellevar la adversidad con entereza. La
experiencia, por el contrario, supone un cierto tipo de actitud que se caracteriza
por “haber aprendido a mirar sin reservas las realidades de la vida y la capacidad
para soportarlas y para estar interiormente a su altura”.14
Pero no todos los hombres están echos de la misma madera. Por eso Weber
interpela a sus auditores15 y los invita a que imaginen que va a ser interiormente
de cada uno de ellos cuando abran los ojos, cuando asuman la realidad factural.
Por eso, desde el punto de vista humano, la pregunta sigue en pié ¿qué va a
suceder con el optimismo de los jóvenes cuándo descubran que tras los “valores”
se ocultan los intereses? Irá a ser ese el instante en que definitivamente se
desvanecerán las ilusiones primaverales o por el contrario irá a ser el momento
en que ellas se aquilaten. Si sucede esto último el calor del verano será su crisol
y el frío invernal la fuente en la que serán templadas. Así, los jóvenes se
trasmutaran en viejos. Pero la palabra “viejo” aquí significa ser poseedor de
cierto temple de ánimo y éste no necesariamente supone tener una cifra abultada
de años. Es la capacidad de mirar con desenfado al mundo, pero sin claudicar a
él. Por eso Eduardo Ortiz dice con toda razón en mi opinión, que el realismo
político es básicamente una actitud frente a la vida y el mundo.16 La vejez
supone conocer los pliegues de la naturaleza humana, los laberintos del alma, las
motivaciones, ambiciones y miedos ocultos que propulsan y direccionan el
comportamiento de cada uno de nosotros. En tal sentido Maz Weber afirma —
probablemente rescatando el tenor de las palabras que Dostoiewsky pone en
boca de El Gran Inquisidor17 — que si “el demonio es viejo; haceros, pues,
viejos para entenderlo”.18
El ruiseñor, como ave de la hora del crepúsculo, simboliza el despertar y el
declive de una pasión; representa el paso del enamoramiento al amor; el tránsito
del entusiasmo por la política a la genuina vocación política. Así la auténtica
vocación política resulta ser ajena a los aspavientos, pues ella comienza a
afianzarse en la medida que el ruiseñor va callando. Este es el sentido que tienen
los cuatro primeros versos del soneto: Mi amor es más fuerte, aunque más débil en
apariencia; no amo menos aunque parezca que amo menos. Es amor mercantilizado
el que es pregonado/a toda voz por su poseedor. En efecto, el soneto relata
metafóricamente una transición emocional, desde un ánimo alegre y optimista
suscitado por el entusiasmo que generan las ilusiones políticas, hasta su posterior
declive cuando ellas pierden su vigor y comienzan a desfallecer tras ser
sobreexplotadas por la retórica sentimental. Ellas, finalmente, expiran a causa de
la apatía, el hastío y la decepción. De hecho, el tedio deviene rápidamente en fastidio.
Y es así como las cosas dulces al vulgarizarse pierden su apreciado deleite. Pero
aquellos que permanecen inmunes, en lo esencial, a tal proceso de desvanecimiento
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LUIS RENÉ ORO TAPIA
8
de los ideales, de evaporación de las ilusiones, y que son capaces de mantenerse
de pie en medio de las ruinas y que pueden decir “dennoch, no obstante, a pesar
de todo, sólo ésos tienen vocación para la política”19, concluye Weber.20
NOTAS
1. En memoria de los veteranos de los ochenta, de
los setenta y de los sesenta. “¿Dó están? ¿Que se
ficierón? ¿Fabrán desquijado los robustos leones?
¿A qué río fueron a parar” (Jorge Manriquez).
2. Existe casi una decena de traducciones de dicha
conferencia al español. De ellas hay dos que
sobresalen por su precision y claridad. Una es la
de Francisco Rubio Llorente que lleva por
rúbrica La política como vocación, y está incluida
en el libro El político y el científico (Editorial
Alianza, Madrid, 1967). La otra es la de Joaquín
Abellán, publicada con el título La política como
profesión (Editorial Espasa Calpe, Madrid, 1992).
En esta minuta ocuparé la traducción de Joaquín
Abellán, porque es la de más fácil acceso en
nuestro medio.
3. Probablemente el soneto era parte del acervo
cultural de la juventud de la época, o estaba de
moda, cuando Weber pronunció su conferencia.
De ser así, se puede presumir entonces que el
auditorio lo conocía a cabalidad y en virtud de ello
Weber se sirvió de él para aumentar la eficacia
comunicativa del mensaje que intentaba transmitir.
4. Cf. Max Weber, La política como profesión,
Madrid, Editorial Espasa Calpe, 1992, traducción
por Joaquín Abellan, p. 145.
5. Ibidem, p. 163.
6. Ibidem, p. 164.
7. Ibidem, p. 164.
8. Un buen ejemplo de ello es la alusión que Weber
realiza sobre las condiciones de paz leonina que
se le impusieron a Alemania al término de la
Primera Guerra Mundial. Al respecto sostiene
que con el tiempo no quedará desacreditada la
guerra sino que la paz como efectivamente
después de hecho ocurrió. Cf. Max Weber, op.
cit., p. 152.
9. Por cierto, la política no solamente es fuente de
satisfacciones, sino que además de “continuas
decepciones” y frustraciones. Cf. Max Weber,
op. cit., p. 144.
10. La pregunta que Weber de manera implícita le
realiza a los jóvenes es ¿si sus tiernos ideales en
flor serán capaces de sobrevivir a los fríos de la
otoñada? Por eso, les dice: “me gustaría saber
qué ha sido interiormente de aquellos de ustedes
que se sienten ahora como políticos de
convicciones y que participan de la embriagues
que significa esta revolución”. Cf. Max Weber,
op. cit., p. 163.
11. Un político profesional — esto es, con vocación
y talento a la vez — debe estar familiarizado con
las sinuosidades de la naturaleza humana. El
estadista, según Butterfield, debe “conocer a los
seres humanos tal como verdaderamente son y
entendérselas con ellos como tales”. Herbert
Butterfield, Conflicto internacional en el siglo
XX. Una visión cristiana, Buenos Aires, Ediciones
Peuser, 1961, p. 23. También hay una reflexión
similar en el trabajo de Eduardo Spranger
titulado Formas de vida, Editorial Revista de
Occidente, Madrid, 1966, p. 262 y siguientes.
12. Cf. Jorge Eduardo Rivera, De asombros y
nostalgias. Ensayos filosóficos, Valparaíso,
Ediciones de la Universidad de Playa Ancha,
1999, pag. 145 y siguientes.
13. Cf. Isaiah Berlin, El sentido de la realidad,
Madrid, Editorial Taurus, 1998, p. 79 y siguientes.
14. Cf. Max Weber, op. cit., p. 162.
15. Cf. Max Weber, op. cit., p. 163.
16. Cf. Eduardo Ortiz, El estudio de las relaciones
internacionales. FCE, Santiago de Chile, 2000,
p. 100.
17. Cf. Max Weber, op. cit., p. 155.
18. Cf. Max Weber, op. cit., p. 161.
19. Cf. Max Weber, op. cit., p. 164.
20. Al momento de cerrar este artículo conviene
recordar al lector el tenor de la apertura de la
exposición de Weber: La conferencia que por
deseos de ustedes he de pronunciar hoy les
defraudará por diversas razones. Con tales
palabras, en efecto, inició su intervención. En
ellas hay una advertencia: la conferencia
defraudará. Los primeros decepcionados serán
aquellos que esperaban oír palabras dulzonas del
maestro. La conferencia, por el contrario, es de
un realismo descarnado. ¿Por qué habrá optado
por tal enfoque? Personalmente, creo que lo hizo
para incitar a sus oyentes a asumir con
responsabilidad el juego de la política. Por tal
motivo, es indispensable que aquellos que se
autodenominan políticos de convicciones acepten
el carácter enrevesado y paradojal de la realidad
factural. Pero si Weber insiste demasiado en ello
corre el riesgo de amagar el idealismo de sus
estudiantes. Entonces, ¿no será mejor que guarde
silencio para evitar que se disipen las ilusiones
restantes? Si opta por ello, su mutismo será
como el del ruiseñor. En efecto, él — al igual que
el ave mañanera — se abstendrá de enrostrar
toda la verdad a los idealistas por respeto a sus
ilusiones. Por eso, invocando al ruiseñor, también
pudo haber concluido su intervención con las
últimas palabras del soneto: Así como él guardo
mi flauta/porque no quiero seguir ajando vuestra
alegría con mi canto.
IDEA DI NAZIONE E QUESTIONE DELLE NAZIONALITÀ
NEL PENSIERO DI GIUSEPPE MAZZINI
FRANCESCO GUIDA
Nell’affrontare una ricerca sull’influenza che il pensiero e l’azione politica di
Mazzini ebbero in diversi Paesi europei ed extraeuropei è facile correre il rischio
di amplificare ciò che è di scarsa importanza, di dare corpo alle ombre e
deformare la realtà storica. A volte, nel leggere i saggi dei numerosi collaboratori
che hanno parlato in particolare del problema delle nazionalità e dell’influenza
mazziniana sulle singole rinascite nazionali, la sensazione è appunto che
qualcuno abbia forzato la mano ai fatti o che abbia scritto pagine dettate da
eccessivo entusiasmo. Il compito di questa relazione, ma anche del nostro intero
colloquio scientifico è proprio di ridurre l’impressionante massa di materiali
frutto della ricerca di decine di studiosi al minimo comune denominatore della
credibilità scientifica. Il dibattito sulle singole relazioni senza dubbio fornirà un
ulteriore contributo in tal senso. Non deve stupire che gli organizzatori (ai quali
va il mio ringraziamento) abbiano scelto uno studioso di Storia dell’Europa
orientale per trattare del problema delle nazionalità in seno a un convegno di
studi dedicato a Giuseppe Mazzini. Credo non sfugga a nessuno che tale problema
nodale per il Genovese, come per gli altri osservatori del tempo, nonché per gli
studiosi in seguito, riguardasse principalmente il continente europeo e in
prevalenza la sua parte centro-orientale. Simile avvertimento venne da Angelo
Tamborra1 già nel 1972 quando nel XXVI congresso di Storia del Risorgimento
introdusse il gruppo di studio su Mazzini e l’Europa centro-orientale. Le vicende
della zwischen Europa non esauriscono tuttavia la questione delle nazionalità,
come provano ad esempio i saggi dei colleghi provenienti dalla Penisola iberica,
Casassas e Ribeiro. Esse per restano al centro non solo dell’argomento, ma anche
delle iniziative cospirative, propagandistiche e politiche dello stesso Mazzini
attraverso più decenni. E se anche relazioni specifiche torneranno a trattare di
questo, come ne trattano molti dei saggi la cui pubblicazione è stata già avviata
dalla Domus mazziniana2, mi sia consentito di accennare qua e là nell’esposizione
ad alcuni dei nessi esistenti tra pensiero e azione mazziniana, da una parte, e,
dall’altra, le vicende della Polonia e dell’Ucraina, come dell’area danubiana o
dei Balcani.
Un primo quesito: il pensiero e l’azione di Mazzini influirono sull’esito delle
vicende risorgimentali degli altri Paesi europei e in particolare dell’Europa
Pol. Sc. Int. Rel., II, 2, p. 43–53, Bucharest, 2005.
44
FRANCESCO GUIDA
2
centro-orientale? Dalla comparazione degli avvenimenti occorsi nei più diversi
Paesi e da quanto ci hanno saputo dire gli studiosi dovremmo concludere che
influenza vi fu, ma restò limitata al campo dell’ideologia e delle idealità, solo in
subordine attingendo quello della tattica e degli esiti politici. Ciò avvenne perché
il messaggio mazziniano fu recepito con aggiustamenti e variazioni dettati dalle
esigenze locali, ma anche e soprattutto perché l’indirizzo e la conclusione dei
singoli movimenti risorgimentali vennero condizionati da numerosi altri fattori,
sia interni sia (forse prevalentemente) esteri. Insomma l’equilibrio tra le potenze,
l’azione delle diplomazie, gli interessi economici pesavano sulla bilancia ancor
più dei principi mazziniani, incluso lo stesso principio di nazionalità, fatto
proprio da parte di tanti che mazziniani non erano, compresi gli uomini di
governo. E’paradossale che la narodnost’ sia (con la samoderzavie e la pravoslavie)
uno dei punti del programma ideologico preparato dal ministro Uvarov per lo zar
Nicola I, il vero “gendarme d’Europa”.
Già molti anni fa Jože Pirjevec (allora firmava ancora Giuseppe Pierazzi)
aveva individuato nei movimenti dei Giovani Sloveni e nei Giovani Boemi,
come in alcuni esponenti del Risorgimento serbo e croato (anche di convinzioni
per niente omogenee) coloro che ereditarono nel mondo slavo almeno parte
dell’ideologia mazziniana. Di più, egli affermò che “la sua costante e ferma fiducia
nella capacità dei popoli slavi di sollevarsi a dignità nazionale, il più valido
legato che Mazzini abbia loro trasmesso”.3 Di più facile individuazione e di
notevole peso la corrente mazziniana in senso al Risorgimento romeno, come gli
studi di Delureanu4 hanno ripetutamente evidenziato e come la stampa romena
lasciava trapelare anche in momenti non di massima libertà (e lo abbiamo letto
in un saggio di Alberto Basciani).5 Frammenti di Mazzini troveremo persino in
Tolstoi, mentre i saldi legami con i patrioti polacchi e ungheresi — al di là delle
divergenze ora tattiche ora strategiche — non hanno neppure bisogno di essere
ricordati.6
Dopo aver risposto a questo primo quesito, sia pure in forma approssimativa
e riservandomi di aggiungere ancora qualcosa al riguardo un po’ più avanti,
veniamo alle idee. Come è stato di recente ribadito autorevolmente da Salvo
Mastellone7, il pensiero politico mazziniano si forma e si formula in maniera
organica tra 1831 e 1848; gli anni successivi serviranno soprattutto a confermare
la coerenza del personaggio, nonostante il mutare degli eventi, inclusa
l’unificazione d’Italia che certo era il sogno che più gli stava a cuore. In questo
processo di formazione ideologica, di progettazione giocata di continuo tra
contingenza tattica e credo irrinunciabile, un grande ed essenziale spazio ebbe
l’idea di nazionalità. Meglio sarebbe dire di nazione. Non spetta a me soffermarmi
su di essa in modo ampio ed esauriente, ma è opportuno almeno ricordare che
per il Genovese il cosmopolitismo di matrice illuministica settecentesca aveva
attaccato e forse sconfitto una vecchia idea di nazione, di origine medievale;
un’idea tutta legata alla figura del monarca o — nella migliore delle ipotesi — a
una oligarchia nobiliare. Tale opera di demolizione era servita per esaltare i
diritti fino allora conculcati dell’individuo: aveva insomma avuto una funzione
positiva in una determinata epoca storica. Con il XIX secolo però si era aperta
3
IDEA DI NAZIONE N EL PENSIERO DI GIUSEPPE MAZZINI
45
una nuova epoca, che avrebbe avuto al suo centro non più l’individuo e la
semplice libertà, bensì la nazione e la sua indipendenza (una più alta libertà) in
opposizione agli imperi e al partito della “resistenza”, quindi all’ordine sancito
nel congresso di Vienna, ma in armonia fraterna con le altre nazioni già formate
o in formazione. Il passo successivo avrebbe visto tutte le crisalidi divenire
farfalle e constituire insieme una grande unione, prima continentale, poi
mondiale il che aveva un indubbio sapore millenaristico e mistico. Come il
marxismo ha il socialismo, cioè la dittatura del proletariato, come fase ben
intelligibile e criticabile, cui segue la più vaga epoca del comunismo, in cui si
potrà fare a meno dello Stato, il mazzinianesimo propone la fase dell’affermazione
delle patrie, delle nazioni di cittadini, concetto fruibile e applicabile almeno
parzialmente nella realtà, per far seguire ad essa la meno concretizzabile
realizzazione della piramide che vada dalla terra al cielo. Se questo punto di
arrivo del pensiero mazziniano (passando per un governo democratico mondiale?)
ci pare più vago e, tutto sommato, meno interessante, invece attrae tutta la nostra
attenzione l’organamento di quel pensiero per la specifica fase dell’Ottocento,
così come attrasse l’attenzione degli intellettuali dell’epoca, tanto all’Ovest
quanto — e questo attiene maggiormente al mio intervento — all’Est.
La nazione mazziniana doveva essere universale e democratica, non una
natio nobiliare né il popolo di Berchet, borghesemente e orgogliosamente
diverso dai molli parigini e dai selvaggi ottentotti.8 La nazione doveva essere
composta da uomini che “formano un solo gruppo, riconoscono uno stesso
principio, e si avviano, sotto la scorta d’un diritto comune, al conseguimento di
un medesimo fine”.9 In presenza di masse contadine in Italia così come in tante
altre regioni d’Europa l’universalità sembrava una generosa illusione, ma aveva
in sé una carica attrattiva fortissima per chi agisse in nome di un interesse
generale e non di classe o personale. A Mazzini non doveva sfuggire questo
limite che potremo dire culturale, nel prefigurare una nazione di cittadini.
Sapeva bene che le coscienze delle masse (spesso anche le conscienze dei ceti
medi ed intellecttuali) non erano preparate e per questo insistette moltissimo per
la loro educazione. Nei fatti tale opera si poté esercitare soltanto verso la classe
operaia e in presenza di una forte concorrenza delle correnti socialiste, ma
teoricamente essa doveva avere come destinatari tutti i futuri cittadini. Qui troviamo
una congrueza del tutto spontanea tra l’opera mazziniana (non solo pensiero
dunque come per il Genovese era norma costante) e la più remote esperienze di
tardive rinascite nazionali. Penso alle biblioteche popolari e alle scuole serali da
lui volute, che sembrano fare il paio con i čitaliste o gabinetti di lettura della
Bulgaria. Lo scopo è semple lo stesso: formare la coscienza nazionale delle
masse. Parallelamente l’invito lanciato durante l’esilio in Svizzera a credere
nell’unità e a lavorare per essa, preparandole la via con il parlarne “au cultivateur,
au paysan”10 ricorda fortemente l’andata al popolo dei populisti russi, anche se
questi intendevano istruire le masse sui temi della giustizia sociale e del
progresso civile, senza insistere sulla determinazione della coscienza nazionale.
Ed eccoci in presenza di un nodo centrale del mazzinianesimo come delle
diverse ideologie nazionali europee. Risorgimento è anche Nation-building.
46
FRANCESCO GUIDA
4
Certo non un’invenzione di intellecttuali o di mercanti attenti a construirsi un
mercato più ampio e controllabile per le proprie merci (questo è solo un interesse
che concorre alla crescita del consenso intorno alle correnti nazionali). Si
construisce la nazione partendo da qualcosa che preesiste. Mazzini — e non è il
solo — parla di riscoperta della nazione: la comunanza di lingua e di costumi,
l’appartenenza alla stessa razza — insomma la nazione etnica — forniscono i
mattoni per costruire la nazione in senso più nobile, la nazione “storica”. Un
concetto di ben più ampio respiro, anche se di più difficile assimilazione: in esso,
nella nazione “storica” possono rientrare elementi alloetnici. I vincoli che la
storia comune crea, le comuni convinzioni democratiche, le regole che insieme
i cittadini scelgono a suffragio universale sono la malta che lega i mattoni etnici.
Un acuto osservatore della realtà odierna e del fenomeno secessionista o
parasecessionista della Lega Nord, Gian Enrico Rusconi11 ha osservato non a
caso che in esso scarso peso ha l’ethnos (peraltro di difficilissima identificazione),
mentre si insiste molto sullo sfruttamento figlio del malgoverno centrale, romano
e sulle capacità frustrate dei popoli del Nord (che se lasciati soli saprebbero
governarsi molto meglio). Questo elemento che sembra accomunare Bossi a
Mazzini naturalmente pesa molto meno di tutti gli altri che invece distinguono
nettamente i due (ammesso e non concesso che una comparazione sia lecita sul
piano intelletuale e morale). Per il Genovese se la nazione dei cittadini si
costruisce, le sue basi sono già ben disegnate dai secoli: una nazione non si
inventa dal niente; però se essa non è l’ethnos, non ne può prescindere, anche
quando afferma (con atteggiamento che oggi potremmo definire antidarwinista):
“nous ne croyons pas à l’eternité des races. Nous ne croyons pas à l’éternelle et
tout puissante influence des climats sur le développement de l’activité humanitaire”.
Infatti “la langue c’est le verbe d’un peuple; c’est sa pensée, l’idée qu’il est
chargé de représenter dans le monde, le signe de sa mission”.12
Di più, un’insurrezione — egli lo ripete mille volte — che porti al successo
della rivoluzione nazionale in una parte soltanto dell’Italia e, addirittura,
dell’Europa, va contro il suo progetto politico, snaturandolo, sviandolo. Il Regno
del Nord è per lui solo un piano dinastico dei Savoia, né si può pensare a liberare
l’Italia (al congresso di Parigi del 1856 come nel convegno degli imperatori a
Varsavia nel 1860 e nelle trattative diplomatiche degli anni Sessanta) a prezzo
dei Principati danubiani da offrire come offa al molosso absburgico. Sia che
guardi alla realtà nazionale italiana sia a quella europea resta per lui valida l’idea
della rivoluzione sincrona e sinfonica — come diceva un uomo considerato forse
a torto suo seguace, cioè Marco Antonio Canini.13 Mi pare particolarmente
illuminante una considerazione di Mazzini a proposito della situazione spagnola
dove non sembrava esistere un problema etno-nazionale, nonostante l’antica
tradizione autonomista. “La révolution espagnole est bien une révolution
nationale”14 — egli dice indirizzandosi agli uomini del “Propagador de la
libertad” — perché opera la fusione del popolo, rende le genti “omogenee”. Par
questa sua natura essa dovrà puntare all’umanitarismo mazziniano e non
piuttosto al cosmopolitismo. Questo mira al trionfo dell’umanità attraverso
l’individuo, l’umanitarismo attraverso la patria. E’ la stessa differenza che passa
5
IDEA DI NAZIONE N EL PENSIERO DI GIUSEPPE MAZZINI
47
tra semplice libertà piena, realizzata entro e attraverso l’associazione. Il cosmopolita
rischia di restare passivo e non ottenere il suo scopo, oppure addirittura di
accettare il dispotismo, confondendo fine e mezzi (i diritti individuali) e
applicando l’egoistico ubi bene, ibi patria. Si osservi che il Genovese era
contrario anche al cosmopolitismo dal basso, quello degli operai italiani
all’estero che entravano in associazioni o sindicati stranieri e non italiani,
sottraendo energie alla lotta patriottica, fase preliminare e imprescindibile per la
vittoria dell’Umanità. Insomma, contrariamente a quello che venne critto nel
Manifesto comunista, per il nostro i lavoratori avevano una patria. Curiosamente
una tesi che di recente si ritrova in un intervento polemico di un acuto
intelletuale di estrema sinistra, Luciano Canfora, il quale15 — parlando (si pensi
un po’) della plutarchea Vita di Alcibiade — osservava che il vero internazionalismo
apatriottico è da sempre quello classi agiate e dirigenti. Qui sembra opportuno
ricordare anche un’osservazione di Marco Clementi sul recupero che del
pensiero mazziniano si fece nella Russia di inizio Novecento (sottraendolo alla
precedente censura) proprio in fuzione antisocialista.
Dunque, proprio perché anche caso spagnolo vi è una patria in fieri, Mazzini
può asupicare che di essa entri a far parte anche il Portogallo, nel contesto della
Repubblica iberica. Tocchiamo così un altro punto dell’ideologia mazziniana
che gli storici più volte hanno considerato con severità. La considerazione
privilegiata nei confronti della nazione “storica”, cioè constituita liberamente
attraverso una serie di eventi e scelte politiche, finisce talora per valere per la
nazione storica tout court. Così vediamo il genovese accettare l’idea di una
ricostituzione della Polonia quale era prima del 1772, cioè uno Stato sicuramente
multietnico, comprendente elementi nazionali che avrebbero dovuto naturalmente
scendere prima o poi. Più controverso il suo pensiero riguardo alla Corona
magiara di Santo Stefano. Egli vorrebbe che una forte e vasta Ungheria continuasse
a esistere quale maggior esponente di una Confederazione comprendente altri
Stati. Di fronte alle resistenze di Kossuth e altri ungheresi a cedere alcuni
territori storicamente, ma non enticamente magiari, si piega a riconoscere nel
1856: “La Transilvania dunque non sarà mai rumena? Non dico questo: credo
anzi che la sarà. Ma credo che insistervi adesso sia fatale e impolitico.”16 Proprio
questa frase poco in linea con il tono tranchant dell’oratoria mazziniana ci
illustra chiaramente comme Mazzini fosse pienamente a giorno dei contrasti
nazionali che impedivano una soddisfacente collaborazione tra le nazionalità
oppresse. Egli non fece in tempo a vedere l’epoca di quello che ho definito una
volta “irredentismo circolare” (io voglio liberare i miei compatrioti soggetti al
tuo dominio, tu consideri irredenti i tuoi compatrioti sottomessi a un terzo e
questi vuole unire al proprio Stato una minoranza compresa nel mio Stato),
tipico dell’Europa centro-orientale; però conobbe bene e criticò il duro scontro
tra nazionalità avvenuto nel biennio rivoluzionario 1848–49, scontro che giocò
a tutto favore degli Absburgo e in genere delle potenze conservatrici. Contro
quelle scelte controproducenti per le rivoluzioni nazionali egli cercò anzi di
operare, non diversamente dai governanti piemontesi o dagli esuli polacchi
radunati intorno a Czartoryski.17 Tutto fu vano e persino post res perditas, in
48
FRANCESCO GUIDA
6
attesa di una nuova più fortunata occasione, non gli riuscì di conciliare
pienamente le avverse élites nazionali, per lo più riparate dalla propria terra. I
progetti confederali successivi al 1849, in parte nuovi rispetto agli anni Trenta e
Quaranta, restarono tutti sulla carta, sia per l’influenza determinante della
politica internazionale dettata in genere dalle grandi capitali europee, sia per
l’impossibilità di arrivare a un accordo generale tra le parti, per tutte soddisfacente.
Lo stesso Mazzini peraltro, nel progettare Confederazioni atte a risolvere appunto
i problemi connessi con la convivenza di diversi popoli nelle medesime regioni,
commise alcuni errori. Quando, ad esempio, attribuziva alla nazione greca ampi
territori abitati da popolazioni slave non si comportava diversamente da
Napoleone I che alcuni decenni primi aveva parlato di sette milioni di greci18,
sottovalutando uno dei problemi cruciali dell’equilibrio europeo del Novecento:
parlo della Macedonia, centro della considdetta “polveriera d’Europa”. Non poteva
imaginare che proprio in Macedonia si sarebbe dato il caso più eclatante di
Nation-building, grazie a un pungo di pervicaci intelletuali19, alle divergenze
serbo-bulgare e alle scelte politche, infine, di Tito. Sapeva per che anche nei
Balcani stava privilegiando una nazione storica, la Grecia, che aveva avuto
inoltre il merito di essersi risvegliata e ricostituita in Stato nazionale (benché
incompleto) per prima. Erano anni in cui ancora non venivano percepite in
Europa occidentale le prime avvisaglie di una rinascita bulgara (quella macedone
non era neppure ipotizzabile, quella albanese non si era avviata concretamente e
quella serba non era ancora collidente con il Risorgimento ellenico). Mi chiedo
anche se egli fosse influenzato dal progetto confederale risalente addirittura al
tardo Settecento del protomartire ellenico Rigas Fereos, il quale aveva
immaginato uno Stato multietnico in cui la nazione greca avrebbe avuto un
ruolo di prima inter pares e soprattutto di educatrice delle altre, più arretrate.20
Soltanto negli anni Sessanta e soprattutto con il noto incontro del 1869 con una
delegazione dei Giovani bulgari (di recente ricordato dalle studiose Genova e
Šarova21) la sua visione mutò, almeno in parte.
Al di là di queste sbavature, è di grande importanza la convinzione mai
venuta meno in Mazzini che la questione orientale fosse strettamente connessa a
quella italiana, al punto che eventuali iniziative per risolvere una non dovevano
e non potevano essere separate o indipendenti rispetto ad azioni per sciogliere
l’altra. Gli eventi italiani del 1859 e soprattutto del 1860 era necessario, a suo
parere, che trovassero un naturale seguito oltre Adriatico. Non era solo a pensarlo
se Bixio a Cosenza arringò le camicie rosse come soldati europei e Garibaldi si
farà coinvolgere in molteplici progetti lungo tutti gli anni Sessanta di sbarchi in
Dalmazia o in Epiro, per colpire al cuore l’Austria o la Turchia e se persino il
governo piemontese prima e italiano poi (per non dire della politica personale di
Vittorio Emanuele II) coltivarono e sostennero idee del turro simili. Ma su
questo capitolo di storia molto è stato scritto da Kerofilas a Maturi, da Tamborra
a Liakos, da Koltay-Kastner a Caccamo22, ad altri ancora.
Il nesso tra questione italiana e questione orientale non è solo dettato da
esigenze tattiche nella lotta contro le potenze conservatrici. Vi è dietro una
convinzione dottrinale. “Un peuple qui s’isole, est un peuple suicide”.23 Fare
7
IDEA DI NAZIONE N EL PENSIERO DI GIUSEPPE MAZZINI
49
politica estera è un obbligo morale di ogni nazione; non avere iniziativa
internazionale significa essere soggiogato, averne in misura eccessiva non si
armonizza con la missione della nazione. No, insomma, alla nazione-Arpagone
ma anche e quella capitan Fracassa. Questi concetti furono suggeriti a Mazzini
soprattutto dalla sua permanenza in Isvizzera. Egli che credeva che si potesse
fare della Confederazione elvetica una vera, più ampia nazione (articolata lungo
l’intero arco delle Alpi), condannava decisamente la sua tradizionale politica di
neutralità, controprova di immaturità nazionale e, possiamo dire oggi a posteriori
alla luce delle scoperte sull’oro trafugato dai nazisti, modo per difendre il proprio,
anche più gretto interesse.
Molto alto è anche il rifiuto della paura del panslavismo, cosi diffusa
nell’Europa dell’Ottocento. Gli slavi non sono tutti legati ai “moscoviti”. Anche
a voler tralasciare il clamoroso caso della grande ribelle, la Polonia (“tribu
repoussée, et qui porte en son sein les germes d’un monde”)24, Mazzini è
convinto che persino gli slavi balcanici o dell’Europa centrale i quali hanno
manifestato simpatie per la politica russa verso l’impero ottomano, nutrono tale
russofilia soltanto per ragioni tattiche. Essi saranno pronti a prendere in mano i
propri destini quando gli altri popoli d’Europa li coadiuveranno in tal senso,
dando inizio alle rivoluzioni nazionali. Lo stesso impero russo alberga in sé
fermenti di grande importanza manifestatisi già con i decabristi e testimoniati
dagli esuli come Herzen. Esso probabilmente finirà per dividersi in più parti, il
giorno in cui fosse scosso dalla rivoluzione. Quanto scrive nel suo saggio
Mykola Varvarcev25 sembra in parte confermare tale auspicio-previsione. Allora
il grande mare slavo non costituirà più un impero aggressivo e in espansione,
pericoloso per la libertà dell’intero continente europeo, bensì una grande
confederazione di popoli liberi. E i grandi russi, il più numeroso popolo slavo
orientale, volgeranno la loro opera alla civilizzazione dell’Asia. Qui il Genovese
riprendeva un vecchio tema caro alla cultura europea: esso si ritrova a partire da
quella controriformistica di un uomo che fece in parte la politica esteuropea
dello Stato della Chiesa, il gesuita Antonio Possevino, il quale — sostenendo
anch’egli fortemente la causa polacca — parla della Russia come “ponte lanciato
verso l’Oriente”26, sino alle proposte che Molotov si senti fare a Berlino
nell’autunno del 1940, di dirigere l’espansionismo sovietico verso il subcontinente
asiatico. Se, dunque, questa sorta di invito rivolto ai russi di scegliere l’eurasismo
(per usare una terminologia novecentesca) può lasciare forti dubbi, anche se
l’impero zarista era di fatto una potenza distesa su due continenti, più fondato è
il convincimento mazziniano che Pietroburgo e Mosca, lo zar e la Santa Sinodo
non potessero condizionare ogni futuro gesto dei dirigenti dei popoli slavi
occidentali e meridionali, ma che questi si sarebbero regolati di caso in caso
secondo il proprio interesse. Mazzini non fece in tempo a vedere come si
realizzasse a pieno la sua profezia a proposito del popolo che più dovette la
propria liberazione alle armi russe, il bulgaro: già pochissimi anni dopo la nascita
del Principato auatonomo di Bulgaria esso si mostrò estremamente ribelle agli
intendimenti di Pietroburgo; uno dei protagonisti di quella ribellione, Stefan
Stambolov, aveva mazziniamente ipotizzato una confederazione balcanica
50
FRANCESCO GUIDA
8
(Romania, Serbia e Bulgaria) forte a sufficienza per fare da sentinella alla
Russia.27 Di nuovo la Bulgaria si schierò contro la Russia addirittura in guerra,
al tempo del primo conflitto mondiale. Naturalmente ancora più clamoroso è il
caso odierno dell’Ucraina, per estensione il secondo Paese del continente, gelosa
della sua indipendenza pur in seno alla CSI, dopo essere uscita dall’URSS non
soltanto per contestarne il regime totalitario, ma anche per motivazioni nazionali.
L’ottimismo di Mazzini riguardo anche allo spauracchio panslavista non
stupisce eccessivamente quando si ricordi la sua affermazione (questa si fondata
su una visione troppo rosea) che “tous les membres de la famille européenne
sont assez avancés pour être libres”.28 In modo del tutto parallelo egli credeva
che anche il pangermanesimo poteva essere tenuto a bada proprio grazie a quella
confederazione slava o centroeuropea che avrebbe reso non pericolosi i russi.
Anche nella sua posizione rispetto al problema delle nazionalità, Mazzini —
come si è già visto di sfuggita — non rimase immobile, pur in una coerenza di
fondo. Cosi fu riguardo all’illirismo di Ludevit Gaj, dapprima non valutato come
un fenomeno di grande significato, quando invece dovette accorgersi che esso,
lavorando sul versante culturale, rafforzava il sentimento nazionale già vivo tra
i croati, e allo stesso tempo preparava il terreno per l’incontro con l’altra
importante nazione slavomeridionale, quella serba (che godeva di una
semiindipendenza), sulla strada dello jugoslavismo.29 Si osservi che parliamo di
una idea che, prima vincente poi sconfitta, ha avuto un ruolo importante nella
storia europea del nostro secolo, di fatto costituendo l’unica concreta
applicazione di quei progetti federali o confederali dello stesso Mazzini e di altri
uomini dell’Ottocentro. Il lavoro culturale degli illiristi era in perfetta sintonia
con un cardine del pensiero mazziniano: non basta l’indipendenza per avere la
nazione. “Si l’amour de l’indépendance” — scrive Mazzini — pouvait être lui seul
le principe de l’existence nationale, la moindre tribu du désert constituerait une
nationalité”.30
Resta da dire più distesamente come presso i singoli popoli le idee mazziniane
lasciarono il loro segno: non dappertuto la loro presa fu egualmente salda, anche
se impressiona la loro diffusione. Di più, come capitò persino in Italia, quelle
idee furono talora addomesticate oppure “selezionate”. Tra i croati esse furono
tenute presenti da due uomini di opinioni del tutto diverse come Imbro Tkalac31
e Eugen Kvaternik, nonché più tardi da Frano Supilo. I già ricordati Giovani
Cechi e Giovani Sloveni espunsero il credo essenziale dell’Austria delenda,
influenzando anche altri giovani intellettuali slavo-meridionali. Al volger del
secolo con il rafforzarsi delle tesi favorevoli alla rottura con Vienna e la costituzione
di associazioni volte a porre fine al dominio austro-ungarico anche quel pilastro
del progetto mazziniano venne recuperato. Lo testimonia l’esperienza della
Giovine Bosnia che allineò gli uomini che compirono l’attentato di Sarajevo,
organizzazione fortemente influenzata da letture mazziniane.32 Nel volume già
apparso dedicato a “il Mazzinianesimo nel mondo” è illustrato molto chiaramente
come l’influenza mazziniana anche in Ispagna, nazione già formata territorialmente
prima dell’epoca dei Risorgimenti, andò mutando atraverso i decenni con il
prevalere di tendenze più o meno radicali nel repubblicanesimo spagnolo.33
9
IDEA DI NAZIONE N EL PENSIERO DI GIUSEPPE MAZZINI
51
Naturalmente l’elenco potrebbe continuare. Già si è accennato al caso romeno in
cui uomini (come i fratelli Brætianu o Rosetti)34 che rivestirono cariche ai massimi
livelli politici furono schiettamente mazziniani o vicini a Mazzini nei suoi
progetti di comitati o partiti transnazionali, che raccogliessero le forze democratiche
dell’intero continente. I rapporti con Kossuth35 e con Mickiewicz sono tra le
pagine più interessanti della vicenda mazziniana, come i suoi rapporti con altri
esuli magiari e polacchi hanno fortemente caratterizzato per decenni le sue
iniziative politiche. In particolare alcuni polacchi furono tra i suoi più fedeli
seguaci, anzi suoi agenti in varie parti d’Europa.36 In alcuni casi questi
interlocutori stranieri giocarono persino il ruolo di mediatori tra Mazzini e altri
italiani; cito solo due esempi: la riconciliazione (peraltro effimera) con Garibaldi,
favorita da Herzen37 e la mediazione di Klapka tra il Genovese e il re d’Italia.38
E’ idea piuttosto diffusa che nel pensiero mazziniano vi fossero i germi del
nazionalismo anche deteriore: lo stesso Romeo39 autorevolmente era incline a
crederlo, asserendo che il concetto di nazione di Mazzini non fosse solo di
stampo francese o italiano, cioè che la nazione fosse essenzialmente una scelta,
piuttosto che di matrice tedesca, cioè che la nazione fosse marcata da alcuni
caratteri oggettivi indiscutibili (razza, lingua, territorio). Ho già detto la mia
opinione all’inizio della relazione; aggiungo che si fa torto a Mazzini attribuendo
a lui lo svilupparsi in senso negativo di potenzialità che nel suo pensiero avrebbe
dovuto incanalarsi in tutt’altro senso. L’Europa centro-orientale sembra essere la
più patente dimonstrazione di come la creazione-riscoperta delle nazioni e il loro
costituirsi in Stato nazionale (cioè il nucleo stesso del mazzinianesimo) siano
processi estremamente pericolosi che implicano necessariamente lo scontro — e
non il mazziniano abbraccio — tra le nazioni dopo che esse si sono manifestate.
Tra i suoi seguaci alcuni furono fautori di una Grande Croazia o di una Grande
Serbia, o di uno Stato-nazione che si desse confini non più giustificabili nell’era
delle nazionalità, dopo che lo erano stati in epoca medievale o moderna. Tuttavia
proprio a un simile indesiderato evolversi del processo nazionale, Mazzini
voleva ovviare con i progetti confederali, ma non solo. Se la nazione è una scelta
e un sentire comune, lo strumento del suffragio liberamente espresso può
effettivamente sciogliere in buona misura il grave, ancor attuale problema dei
contrasti nazionali. Voglio citare un esempio: nel 1922 a Sopron la popolazione
tedescofona optò per l’appartenenza allo Stato magiaro piuttosto che all’Austria,
preferendo richiamarsi a vincoli tradizionali e storici piuttosto che a legami
etnici.40 Sarebbe anche interessante oggi chiedere agli altoatesini se desiderano
separarsi dall’Italia. Purtroppo molto raramente le popolazioni sono state libere
di pronunciarsi sull’appartenenza a uno o a un altro Stato e a questo criterio non
perfetto, ma sufficientemente sano e corretto, si è preferito quello dell’annessione
per motivi di ordine militare, economico e quant’altro, oppure lo scambio delle
popolazioni o, infine, la pulizia etnica, a tutti noi oggi ben nota.
Qualcuno avrà già notato che sinora non ho toccato un altro campo in cui le
iniziative di Mazzini facilmente hanno attirato le critiche degli storici. Mi
riferisco alla teoria della guerra di popolo, alla fiducia nella forza del numero dei
patrioti contro quella degli eserciti regolari. Credo che sia un tema su cui poco
52
FRANCESCO GUIDA
10
si possa aggiungere: effettivamente le azioni di bande armate dall’Italia alla
Bulgaria non diedero mai grandi esiti con l’eccezione della spedizione dei Mille
che però fa storia a sé per molti motivi. Proprio il suo successo restituì smalto
alle tesi mazziniane riguardo alla guerriglia, forse confondendo un po’le acque.
Il fenomeno infatti non si ripeté così come non ve ne era stato unor uguale nei
decenni precedenti in nessun angolo del continente. Il dibattito sulla validità
delle spedizioni di volontari proseguì ancora a lungo sino alle dure parole che il
socialista Mussolini riservò a Ricciotti Garibaldi all’epoca delle guerre balcaniche.41
Resta assodato ce in assenza del concorso anche indiretto di un esercito amico
la guerra di popolo aveva poche chances di successo. Proprio nel nostro secolo
si è assistito tuttavia al fenomeno delle resistenze (anche di grandi dimensioni)
che conseguirono spesso importanti successi, sempre per nel contesto di un
conflitto più generale. Tanto è vero che le resistenze molto meno note del
dopoguerra (in Ucraina e in Polonia contro il regime comunista) non ebbero esiti
altrettanto positivi. Peraltro, al di là dell’affermazione puramente teorica di fede
nella guerra di popolo, non bisogna dimenticare che, soprattutto negli anni
Sessanta, Mazzini presupponeva che alcuni eserciti regolari (italiano, serbo,
forse ungherese e polacco, o persino quelli inglese e francese) si muovessero
all’unisono o almeno in conseguenza delle insurrezioni e delle spedizioni
progettate dai Balcani alla Galizia. Il Genovese in quel torno di tempo — come
è noto — non esitò a trattare con lo stesso re d’Italia.
Spero di aver affrontato almeno i principali temi attinenti la forte relazione
esistente tra la teoria mazziniana della nazione e le iniziative di Mazzini, da un
lato, e le vicende delle nazionalità europee, principalmente esteuropee, dall’altro.
Era, come si è visto, una relazione forte perché estremamente naturale, quasi
scontata. Oso dire che se Mazzini fu un ideologo le cui idee furono comprensibili
e condivisibili in qualsiasi Paese, in particolare il suo pensiero era adatto alla
condizione di quei popoli che non avevano potuto ancora, nel secolo passato,
realizzare un proprio Stato nazionale. Se egli non fosse esistito, quei popoli, che
si trovavano al di qua ma ancor di più al di là dell’Elba, avrebbero dovuto
cercare un altro iluminatore, un altro apostolo.
NOTE
1. Angelo Tamborra, Introduzione al gruppo di
studio su Mazzini e l’Europa orientale, in:
“Mazzini e il mazzinianesimo”, Atti del XLVI
congresso di Storia del Risorgimento, Roma,
1974, pp. 287–300.
2. Il mazzinianesimo nel mondo, I–II, a cura di G.
Limiti, Pisa, 1995–1996.
3. Giuseppe Pierazzi, Mazzini e gli slavi dell’Austria
e della Turchia, ivi, p. 407. Questo saggio resta
essenziale per la conoscenza delle relazioni
ideali e materiali tra Mazzini e le diverse nazioni
dell’Europa centro-orientale.
4. Ci limitiamo a citare ªtefan Delureanu, Mazzini
e la Romania, ivi, pp. 413–479.
5. Alberto Basciani, Mazzini nella stampa romena
dell’Ottocento, in: “Il Mazzinianesimo nel
mondo”, I, cit., pp. 259–327.
6. Cfr. Marco Clementi, Mazzini, Tolstoj e Gandhi,
in: “Rassegna Storica del Risorgimento”,
LXXXVII, 2000, III, pp. 393–410. Dello stesso
autore si veda Mazzini e la Russia, in: Il
mazzinianesimo nel mondo, I, cit., pp. 143–209.
7. Salvo Mastellone, Il progetto politico di Mazzini
(Italia-Europa), Firenze, Olschki, 1994.
8. Giovanni Berchet, Sul ‘Cacciatore feroce’ e sulla
‘Eleonora’ di Goffredo Augusto Bürger, Lettera
semiseria di Giovanni Grisostomo al suo figliuolo
(1816): “Basti a te per ora di sapere che tutte le
11
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
IDEA DI NAZIONE N EL PENSIERO DI GIUSEP PE MAZZIN I
presenti nazioni d’Europa (l’italiana anch’essa
né più né meno) sono formate da tre classi
d’individui: l’una di Ottentotti, l’una di Parigini;
e l’una, per ultimo, che comprende tutti gli altri
individui leggenti ed ascoltanti [...] A questi tutti
io do nome di popolo.”
Giuseppe Mazzini, Nazionalità. Qualche idea su
una constituzione nazionale (1835), in: “Edizione
nazionale degli scritti”, VI, pp. 123–158.
Idem, Nazionalità. Unitari e federalisti (1835),
in: “Edizione nazionale degli scritti”, VI, pp.
3–41.
Gian Enrico Rusconi, Se cessiamo di essere
una nazione. Tra etnodemocrazie regionali e
cittadinanza europea, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1993.
Giuseppe Mazzini, Humanité et patrie, in:
“Edizione nazionale degli scritti”, VII, pp.
201–218.
Marco Antonio Canini, Vingt ans d’exil, Paris,
1868.
Giuseppe Mazzini, De la nationalité au
Propagador, in: “Edizione nazionale degli scritti”,
VI, pp. 331–351.
Luciano Canfora, in: “Il Corriere della sera”,
1996.
Giuseppe Mazzini, lettera a N. Fabruzi, 21 aprile
1856, in: “Edizione nazionale degli scritti”, LVI,
p. 192.
Angelo Tamborra, Pasquale Fornaro, Risorgimento
italiano e questione ungherese (1849–1867),
Soveria Mannelli, Rubbettino, 1995.
Francesco Guida, Problemi del risveglio delle
nazionalità balcaniche durante l’epoca
napoleonica, in: Il risveglio delle nazionalità nel
periodo napoleonico, Pisa, Giardini editori 1982,
pp. 119–146.
Marco Dogo, Lingua e nazionalità in Macedonia.
Vicende e pensieri di profeti disarmati.
1902–1903, Milano, Jaca book, 1985.
Rigas Fereos, La rivoluzione, la Grecia, i
Balcani, a cura di L. Marcheselli, Trieste, Lint.
1999.
Liudmila Genova, Krumka Šarova, Il movimento
nazionale rivoluzionario bulgaro e le idee di
Mazzini, in: Il mazzinianesimo nel mondo, II.
Costas Kerofilas, La Grecia e l’Italia nel
Rosorgimento italiano, Firenze, La Voce, 1919;
Domenico Caccamo, Angelo Tamborra, Garibaldi
e l’Europa, Roma, SME; Antonis Liakos,
L’unificazione italiana e la Grande idea. Ideologia
e azione dei movimenti nazionali in Italia e in
Grecia, 1859–1871, Firenze, Aletheia, 1995.
Giuseppe Mazzini, Nazionalità. Qualche idea su
una constituzione nazionale (1835), in: “Edizione
nazionale degli scritti”, VI, p. 127.
Idem, Un mot sur la question polonaise, in:
“Scritti editi e inediti”, VII, p. 232.
Mykola Varvarcev, Mazzini e l’Ucraina
nell’Ottocento, in: Il mazzinianesimo nel mondo,
II.
53
26. Francesco Guida, Antonio Possevino e la
Livonia: un episodio della Controriforma
(1582–1585), in: “Europa orientalis”, II, 1983,
pp. 73–105; Idem, Ivan il Terribile e Antonio
Possevino: il difficile dialogo tra Cattolicesimo e
Ortodossia, in: Le origini e lo sviluppo della
Cristianità slavo-bizantina: il battesimo del 988
nella lunga durata, Roma 1992, pp. 261–275.
27. Idem, Nascita di uno Stato balcanico. La
Bulgaria di Alessandro di Battenberg nella
corrispondenza diplomatica italiana (1879–1886),
Napoli, Edizioni scientifiche italiane, 1988, 508
p. (con A. Pitassio e R. Tolomeo).
28. Giuseppe Mazzini, Nationalité et propagande,
in: “Edizione nazionale degli scritti”, XII, pp.
252–257.
29. Giuseppe Pierazzi, loc. cit.
30. Giuseppe Mazzini, Nazionalità. Qualche idea su
una costituzione nazionale, in: “Edizione nazionale
degli scritti”, VI, 1835, p. 150.
31. Angelo Tamborra, loc. cit.
32. Giuseppe Pierazzi, loc. cit., p. 412.
33. Jordi Casassas, Albert Ghanime, Josep Pich,
Teresa Abellò, La influencia de Mazzini en el
republicanismo español, in: Il mazzinianesimo
nel mondo, I, cit. pp. 77–142; Isabel Pascual
Sastre, Mazzini y los republicanos españoles, in:
Il mazzinianesimo nel mondo, II, cit.
34. ªtefan Delureanu, loc. cit.
35. Koltay Kastner.
36. Giuseppe Monsagrati Tomassucci, Mazzini e
la Polonia “sorella combattente”, in: Il
mazzinianesimo nel mondo, II. cit.
37. Fu Aleksandr Herzen a descrivere l’incontro tra i
due più noti esponenti del Risorgimento italiano
in casa sua a Londra, nelle pagine oggi raccolte
nella Polnoe sobranie socinenie, Moskva, Nauka;
ma anche la breve antologia Aleksandr Herzen
(episodio intitolato Camicia rossa), Mazzini e
Garibaldi, Roma e/o, 1955.
38. Giuseppe Pierazzi, loc. cit., p. 382.
39. Lo nota Gennaro Sasso, Rosario Romeo e l’idea
di “nazione”. Appunti e considerazioni, in: Il
rinnovamento della storiografia politica. Studi
in memoria di Rosario Romeo, Roma, Istituto
dell’Enciclopedia Treccani, in particolare p. 126.
40. Marta Petricioli, La questione dell, Ungheria
occidentale nei documenti diplomatici italiani,
in: Italia e Ungheria (1920–1960). Storia, politica,
società, forti, a cura di F. Guida e R. Tolomeo,
Consenza, Periferia, 1991, pp. 1–30.
41. Saint Jorios, Francesco Guida, Ricciotti Garibaldi
e il movimento nazionale albanese, in: “Archivio
storico italiano”, CCCXXXIX, 1981, 1, pp.
97–138; Idem, L’ultima spedizione garibaldina
in Grecia (1912), in: Indipendenza e unità
nazionale in Italia e in Grecia (Atti del convegno
di studi tenuto in Atene nell’ottobre 1985),
Firenze, Olschki 1987, pp. 191–220.
L’ÉVOLUTION DE LA CLASSE POLITIQUE ROUMAINE
AU XXe SIÈCLE
GHEORGHE LENCAN STOICA
Pour parler de la classe politique roumaine, aujourd’hui, on a besoin avant
tout de comprendre ce que la classe politique signifie, puis, on doit observer ce
qui s’est passé dans ce pays dans les années ’90 et par conséquent la manière
dont les institutions roumaines fonctionnent.
En ce qui concerne le premier problème, ce que la classe politique représente,
on doit entreprendre quelque chose de plus en rapport avec ce qu’on a appris des
classiques italiens Mosca, Pareto, Michels, pour clarifier le sens et la signification
du concept ayant comme point de départ la bibliographie assez riche concernant
la thématique existante dans la pensée politique contemporaine.
Par conséquent, dans l’opinion de Gaetano Mosca, la classe politique représente
tout simplement une classe spéciale — un groupe de personnes qui accomplissent
certaines fonctions politiques au sens strict. Un ensemble qui est constitué des
personnes qui occupent des positions dominantes dans les différentes branches
de la hiérarchie économique, intellectuelle et sociale. Elles sont les personnes
qui contribuent à la distribution du pouvoir et, ce qui est très important, de la
richesse. En même temps, ces groupes exercent le commandement politique
«substantiel» au sens le plus simple de l’expression. Il s’agit donc de la classe
dominante de point de vue économique, des riches, des groupes d’intellectuels,
du clergé, des techniciens, des opérateurs économiques, des professionnels, des
leaders de syndicats et en général de l’entière capacité dirigeante d’un pays,
matérielle ou morale, civile ou religieuse, spontanée ou coercitive1.
Mais pour comprendre le second problème il est nécessaire de faire un court
historique concernant la classe politique roumaine et la situation de Roumanie
et, en particulier, on doit parler de l’ainsi-dite «révolution roumaine». Pour cette
raison, on peut dire que tous les problèmes d’aujourd’hui, avec leurs complications
et leurs difficultés, ont comme point de départ la révolution roumaine. On pourrait
dire, ainsi, que «la révolution roumaine» est vraiment comme «un péché originaire»
à cause des conséquences politiques et du fonctionnement des institutions roumaines
actuelles.
Il est bien connu qu’aujourd’hui, particulièrement après la chute du mur
de Berlin, on parle presque partout d’un processus «d’expansion» de la
Pol. Sc. Int. Rel., II, 2, p. 54–64, Bucharest, 2005.
2
L’ÉVOLUTION DE LA CLASSE POLITIQUE ROUMAINE AU XXe SIÈCLE
55
démocratie au monde, une véritable offensive du système démocratique sur
notre entière planète, un processus plus visible maintenant au début de notre
siècle. L’institution des régimes politiques démocratiques dans les pays de l’Europe
Centrale et de l’Est a été peut-être l’événement le plus résonant et discuté2 des
années ’90.
Un pas en avant, dans le cadre d’un tel processus ont connu, apparemment,
les pays groupés sous la dénomination de «groupe de Visegrade, par comparaison
aux autres pays de l’Europe de l’Est parmi lesquels la Roumanie représente un
cas particulier. Mais, à la fin de l’année 1996, avec les élections parlementaires et
présidentielles, on a réalisé en Roumanie l’alternance au pouvoir, un fait qui, en
ce qui concerne les élections parlementaires, s’est passé pour la première fois
après une période d’environ 70 ans, et avec la transformation de la Roumanie en
État semi-présidentiel*; le phénomène est considéré unique.
Ce relatif délai dans l’accomplissement du processus démocratique dans la
Roumanie d’aujourd’hui a eu et a encore plusieurs causes objectives et subjectives,
qui se dissimulent dans la profondeur des réalités sociales spécifiques roumaines
(sédimentées pendant presque cinquante années de dictature de type stalinienne),
avec des racines qui se perdent au début du XIXe siècle.
On doit faire avant tout une précision: à partir de l’année 1938, en Roumanie
on n’organise plus d’élections vraiment démocratiques, et la vie politique roumaine
n’a plus possédé un réel caractère parlementaire.
Un tel phénomène a été analysé et présenté d’une manière ample et brillante
par Lucreþiu Pãtrãºcanu dans ces célèbres ouvrages: Sous trois dictatures et
Problèmes fondamentaux de la Roumanie3.
De tels aspects et états de choses, présentés ci-dessus, expliquent, croyonsnous, même partiellement, pour quoi l’on parle, aujourd’hui d’un retard du
processus d’institution d’une démocratie parlementaire en Roumanie. On peut
poser, d’une manière naturelle, une autre question: y a-t-il vraiment une démocratie
dans la Roumanie contemporaine? La réponse est, certainement, affirmative.
Mais pour comprendre les vicissitudes d’une naissance si difficile (de la
démocratie dans la Roumanie postcommuniste), il s’impose la nécessité d’une
courte incursion historique. Et pour anticiper et comprendre mieux tout ce qui
s’est passé en Roumanie sous l’aspect de la démocratie parlementaire, les mots
d’Antonio Gramsci — «l’ancien meurt, et le nouveau n’est pas encore né» —
expriment, peut-être de la plus suggestive manière, comment se sont passées les
choses dans cette période-là.
Donc, est-ce que la Roumanie a eu une démocratie parlementaire pendant les
décennies de l’entre-deux-guerres? On peut donner à une première analyse une
réponse affirmative. Mais, à une investigation plus profonde, on va arriver
immédiatement aux conclusions devenues communes d’un personnage de Caragiale,
notre démocratie «est admirable, sublime même, mais elle manque totalement». À
* Le professeur Sartori, un observateur attentif et avisé de la vie politique roumaine actuelle, n’est pas
d’accord avec cette caractérisation (voir la revue “Studia Politica”, no. 1, 2002).
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la même conclusion est arrivé un excellent analyste de la période de l’entre-deuxguerres, à savoir le sociologue français d’origine roumaine Matei Dogan. Il
affirmait, dans un livre paru au cours de l’année 1946: «On ne peut pas soutenir
qu’en Roumanie pendant la période de l’entre-deux-guerres il a existé un régime
démocratique authentique»4. En faisant référence au même contexte, cet
analyste politique précisait d’une manière plus détaillée: «On doit... reconnaître
que n’importe quelle démocratie présente un décalage entre la théorie et la
réalité. Pourtant, on peut dire que nulle part ce décalage n’a été plus profond
qu’en Roumanie, le pays qui n’a pas connu une démocratie réelle. La souveraineté
populaire a existé seulement du nom et le droit électoral n’avait rien d’un régime
représentatif... On a lutté trop peu pour les libertés pour les comprendre. Le
peuple est resté calme tandis qu’à la surface on a fait une délicate révolution.
L’éducation politique manquait (elle manque même aujourd’hui — n.s. G.L.S.).
Il y avait plusieurs principes, mais on ne réalisait aucun progrès5.
Comment se présente en réalité le système démocratique parlementaire dans
la Roumanie de l’entre-deux-guerres, ou plus précisément, en quoi consiste
l’originalité de la démocratie appliquée dans cette période, nous explique toujours
le professeur Dogan dans son ouvrage L’analyse statistique de la démocratie
parlementaire de Roumanie. Il parle de la période antérieure à l’institution des
dictatures, de la période d’avant 1938.
Ainsi, dans le parlement roumain — nous dit-il — il n’a pas existé une
majorité et une minorité, mais une majorité gouvernementale dominante
qui anéantissait l’opposition. Une telle majorité gouvernementale était
constituée des membres appartenant à un des deux partis de gouvernement qui
occupaient alternativement le pouvoir et procédaient à l’organisation des
élections parlementaires.
Dans le parlement roumain la majorité gouvernementale n’a pas collaboré
avec l’opposition, même si les deux partis au gouvernement n’ont pas eu de
programmes tellement différents et leur collaboration aurait été possible.
En outre, cette majorité gouvernementale du parlement ne représentait pas la
majorité du corps électoral. Une minorité du corps électoral représentée au parlement
par une dominante majorité, disposait, par l’intermédiaire de l’exercice du
gouvernement, d’un pouvoir dictatorial. La majorité gouvernementale alternait
au parlement avec une autre majorité gouvernementale qui n’entendait pas de
collaborer avec l’opposition. Le régime n’était pas dictatorial, mais autoritaire:
il procédait à la consultation du corps électoral, une consultation pourtant forcée
et formelle dans le contexte où le corps électoral n’était pas caractérisé par la
maturation politique. C’était un régime parlementaire démagogique.
Ce régime était d’ailleurs fortement critiqué, dans cette période, par toutes les
forces politiques et par les grands esprits du temps. Mis en doute, contesté directement
par les légionnaires, le régime parlementaire a reçu le coup final de leur part.
Pour comprendre mieux l’originalité d’un tel système on doit souligner que,
pendant cette période, même s’il existait une Constitution démocratique, une
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57
généralisation du suffrage universel, en Roumanie l’organisation des élections a
été réalisée d’une manière difficile. D’abord on désignait le Premier ministre,
membre d’un des deux partis dominants, puis celui-ci organisait les élections et
il les gagnait.
C’était le roi qui, en réalité, detenait la «clé» du pouvoir réel en Roumanie de
l’entre-deux-guerres. Cet état de choses a été exprimé d’une manière symbolique
a été paraphrasé par un politicien comme Petre Carp qui avait prononcé, au parlement,
les mots suivants: «Donnez-moi le pouvoir et je vous donnerai le parlement»6.
«C’est banal de constater, mais c’est triste en même temps, affirmait S.S.
Danielopol, que les changements du gouvernement n’ont été jamais faits avec
l’accord du parlement, qu’a peu près tous les gouvernements qui abandonnaient le
pouvoir disposaient, dans l’assemblée représentante du pays, d’une majorité
accablante... il n’est pas exagéré de dire qu’en Roumanie il n’existe pas un
pouvoir des lois...»7 la séparation des pouvoirs était seulement inscrite dans la
Constitution, mais elle n’existait pas en réalité; en réalité un seul pouvoir existait:
le pouvoir du gouvernement.
Les principaux pouvoirs politiques dans la Roumanie de l’entre-deux-guerres
qui concourraient à une telle rotation gouvernementale étaient le Parti National
Paysan et le Parti National Libéral. C’est très intéressant de rappeler, dans ce
contexte, que ces partis — nommés aussi «historiques» — reviendront au premier
plan de la scène politique après les événements de 1989.
De la sorte, la démocratie roumaine de cette époque, avec ces ingérences
fréquentes de la Couronne dans la vie politique, avec l’inversement des rapports
entre le gouvernement et le parlement dans le fonctionnement du régime représentatif
et l’institution d’une prime électorale majoritaire excessive pour le parti qui
obtenait de cette manière 40% des suffrages, a été beaucoup surestimée.
Dans la Roumanie des années ’90, il semblait que les partis «historiques» aient
voulu «restaurer» la situation qui caractérisait la période de l’entre-deuxguerres. Ce fait ne s’était passé nulle part dans les autres pays de l’Europe
Centrale et de l’Est. La forme de démocratie politique roumaine de l’entre-deuxguerres y compris celle parlementaire, a été considérée comme une démocratie
incomplète, «mimétique». La plupart de la population n’a pas perçu ce régime
parlementaire comme un réel régime démocratique.
Les élites roumaines affirmaient souvent leurs intérêts de classe, d’ordre
économique et social, intérêts asymétriques par rapport à la réalisation d’un
régime effectivement démocratique8. Se passe-t-il, aujourd’hui, la même chose
dans la société roumaine? Est-ce que l’histoire se répète dans l’espace carpatodanubiano-pontique?
Il s’agit de quelques questions auxquelles on s’est proposé de répondre, dans
cette analyse, même si de manière partielle. Comme l’on a rappelé auparavant,
la démocratie de l’entre-deux-guerres a été perçue de manière incorrecte par la
population. Cet aspect a été «exploité» intensément après 1944, lorsqu’on a beaucoup
usé des formules de propagande telles que: la «large concentration démocratique»,
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«le bloc national démocrate», etc., mais on ignorait souvent les libertés et les
droits de l’homme les plus élémentaires. On est arrivé, on sait, à la destitution des
partis et des institutions démocratiques, à la destitution effective du régime
parlementaire en Roumanie.
Il s’agit des années où le régime de type communiste stalinien a été instauré,
régime qui ne peut pas être qualifié de démocratique. La vie politique a commencé
son développement autour du parti unique (du parti-Ètat), parti qui était dirigé
par un groupe restreint de personnes qui étaient à leur tour soumises au leader
unique, etc. Il faut quand-même souligner le fait que le régime s’est basé sur un
consensus social assez fort, sur l’existence de quelques droits sociaux véritables
et sur l’accès large des à l’instruction. De tels «droits» sociaux ont assuré au régime
de type stalinien (tel est le cas dans tous les pays où le regime communiste s’est
développé) une certaine stabilité et une autonomie relative, fortement conditionnées
cependant par le contexte des relations internationales.
Beaucoup d’analystes et d’interprètes du phénomène politique roumain perdent
totalement de vue de tels faits et ignorent l’existence de ce «consensus social» à
l’intérieur de l’ancien régime communiste.
Mais pendant les événements de la fin de l’année 1989 et du début de l’année
1990, il y a eu au moins deux tendances en Roumanie9, très différentes, concernant
l’institution d’une nouvelle société; il y a eu même une troisième tendance, qui
s’est pourtant manifestée d’une manière tacite.
La première tendance a été celle «restauratrice» qui visait — tel qu’on a
essayé de le mentionner plus haut — le retour à la pratique et à la conception de
l’entre-deux-guerres, et qui ignorait en même temps presque tout ce qu’il y a eu
de positif (surtout dans le plan culturel et social dans les années du «socialisme»).
Il s’agit de la tendance représentée par les «partis historiques» (P.N.Þ–C.D. et
P.N.L., et dans une certaine mesure le P.S.D. aussi). Cette tendance a été pourtant
sérieusement amendée aux urnes (les premières élections démocratiques sous le
contrôle international), à cause de leur faible prestation politique. Il faut rappeler
ici un slogan célèbre utilisé par les représentants d’un certain «parti historique»:
«chassez les loups» (allusion à la derise d’un parti rival). Une autre explication,
beaucoup plus nuancée, serait celle que, avant les élections de 1990, P.N.Þ. et
P.N.L. n’ont pas fonctionné dans l’espace public en tant que partis politiques,
mais seulement en tant que symboles faciles à reconnaître, représentants d’une
bipolarité idéologique qui mimait la fonction politique. Ce qui explique, en bonne
partie, leur échec devant un électorat qui n’avait pas de motifs pour comprendre
l’enjeu de la dispute idéologique10.
Une deuxième tendance, qui a eu finalement la primauté et a dominé longtemps
la scène de la vie politique roumaine, a été celle représentée par «les élites» qui
se sont formées et préparées durant le régime communiste. Ces «élites» connaissaient
mieux les réalités du pays, par leur qualité d’anciens directeurs d’entreprises,
«élites» de l’ancien régime communiste, contestateurs de Ceauºescu, parfois même
dissidents, et impressionnaient le public par leur grande réceptivité au nouveau.
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Il s’agit du groupement de forces politiques qui s’est revendiqué de l’acte du
22 décembre et qui a compris alors le mieux la réalité du pays, qui s’est mieux
adapté à la situation nouvelle et a gagné de point de vue électoral. Cette tendance
s’est groupée autour du F.S.N., une sorte de front populaire (qui est resté comme
tel même après sa rupture en plusieurs factions et sa transformation en parti) qui
trouvait son liant dans la personnalité de Ion Iliescu.
F.S.N., et plus tard P.D.S.R., s’est proposé l’institution du régime parlementaire
démocratique, cette revendication étant un des premiers points énoncés dans la
Déclaration–Programme du C.F.S.N., dans la nuit du 22 décembre 1989.
Il y avait des tensions aiguës entre les deux tendances et on réalisait très
difficilement des ententes politiques pour pouvoir bâtir le régime parlementaire
roumain. On trouve ici les causes de beaucoup d’erreurs passées durant ces
années, de retards et même d’involutions.
«Les partis historiques» ont refusé la participation au gouvernement en 1992,
fait qui a rendu encore plus difficile le processus de modernisation et restructuration,
avec des implications qui touchaient même à notre processus d’intégration
européenne, sur la question de la mise en place de la réforme en général.
D’autre part, le P.D.S.R. a s’est parfois caractérisé par des actions étranges,
pleines d’arrogance, se contentant de son statut de «parti» de la majorité relative,
en collaborant seulement avec des partis mineurs de point de vue de la
représentation parlementaire et jouissant d’un prestige très bas au niveau de toute
la population.
Il y a eu, tel qu’on l’a dit plus haut, une troisième tendance, moins représentée
au plan politique et parlementaire, mais beaucoup plus diffuse et plus répandue
dans l’ensemble de la société roumaine. Cette tendance est manifeste chez les
«véritables» nostalgiques du régime à peine disparu.
J’ai mis ici en relief, de manière succincte, l’existence des forces politiques,
car la réalisation d’un consensus politique en Roumanie a dépendu en grande
partie de celles-ci, aspect qui a été conditionné à son tour par le processus
d’institution du cadre démocratique parlementaire dans notre pays.
Il est bien évident qu’en l’absence des partis politiques, il n’y a pas de
démocratie. Or, dans le cas de notre pays, même si à un moment donné il y avait
plus de 200 partis, peux d’entre eux étaient dignes d’un tel titre, et parfois ceux
ayant une majorité relative au parlement avaient encore besoin d’un long chemin
jusqu’à ce qu’ils deviennent des partis dans le vrai sens du mot.
En tout cas, à partir des premières années après 1989 et jusqu’à présent, il y
a eu en Roumanie un pluripartisme ample. Mais l’expérience roumaine plus
récente (son caractère d’exception, d’une certaine manière) est significative aussi
d’un autre point de vue, qui est cependant trop peu mentionné aujourd’hui. On
doit tenir compte du fait qu’en Roumanie la domination écrasante du totalitarisme
de Ceauºescu a déterminé son écroulement par une «destruction» de l’État
(ancien, socialiste), y compris des nombreux liants de l’administration publique
et de quelques institutions essentielles. «Le vide» de pouvoir qui a été créé ainsi
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a été accompagné ensuite par une crise d’autorité prolongée du nouveau pouvoir,
des nouvelles institutions qui se voulaient démocratiques, de l’État de droit, dont
l’articulation a commencé avec les élections de 1990.
Les effets de cette grave crise d’autorité de l’État sont encore aujourd’hui
ressentis. La crise d’autorité de l’État a fait qu’en Roumanie, peut-être plus que
dans les pays voisins, l’évolution vers la mise en place et la formation d’un
régime démocratique soit marquée par des phénomènes amples d’anarchie
sociale — on souligne ici les phénomènes et non pas les simples actes —, par
des actions antisociales amples en plan économique et civique, qui ont affecté
encore plus et de manière négative la fortune nationale, en traumatisant la
société civile.
On a tout simplement méconsidéré beaucoup de lois antérieures, qui continuaient
par leur objet à être nécessaires, parfois même sans les normes élémentaires de
la vie sociale dans l’ensemble, sans mentionner quelques décisions du nouveau
pouvoir d’État.
Cependant, la constitution graduelle d’un État démocratique (un parlement
bicaméral), l’élaboration et l’approbation de la Constitution par le référendum de
décembre 1991 sont seulement les prémisses obligatoires de la formation d’une
société démocratique, sans que les deux processus s’identifient. Entre les deux il
y a cependant un manque de synchronie réelle, une asymétrie, car le développement
d’une société démocratique représente un objectif beaucoup plus complexe que
le simple bâtiment des institutions de l’État de droit.
La réalisation d’une société démocratique est liée à la stabilité et au progrès
dans le domaine économique de la société, sans lequel réaliser l’intégration
sociale authentique ne peut pas devenir possible. Une société démocratique est
conditionnée aussi par la création et l’existence d’une vaste tradition démocratique
et de la société civile, des groupes sociaux qui la composent, d’une conduite
sociale meilleure et des mœurs sociales. Une société démocratique implique,
en même temps, non seulement le bon fonctionnement des institutions
parlementaires, le respect des droits de l’homme et des libertés du citoyen, mais
aussi l’implémentation active des valeurs et des normes de la démocratie dans
les mentalités collectives et individuelles.
Dans la Roumanie d’aujourd’hui, on peut donc dire que l’on a jeté les bases
institutionnelles d’un fonctionnement adéquat d’un régime démocratique
parlementaire. On respecte, autrement dit, les normes et les règles qui rendent
possible le jeu démocratique, de la manière dont l’a précisé récemment dans
l’ouvrage Règles et valeurs de la démocratie le professeur Umberto Cerroni: la
règle du consensus, de la compétition, de la majorité, de la minorité et de
l’alternance, du contrôle, de la légalité11. Il n’y manque qu’une, qui est d’ailleurs
la plus importante: la règle de la responsabilité.
Cette situation fait que chez nous la démocratie paraisse être une façade et,
ce qui est beaucoup plus grave encore, qu’en Roumanie le consensus social ait
manqué et manque encore. C’est un aspect qui met souvent en danger le
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61
fonctionnement de la démocratie parlementaire roumaine. En même temps, la
classe politique roumaine est soumise au changement. Mise à l’intersection entre
le monde extérieur — la civilisation européenne et la globalisation l’affectent
dans une mesure plus grande que n’importe quel autre composant de la société
— et celui intérieur d’où elle provient et dont les caractéristiques elle tend à
reproduire, la classe politique roumaine a été, probablement, la plus agitée et la
plus dynamique partie de la période de transition12. Dans son évolution deux
choses ont été importantes: d’un côté, le besoin de répondre aux besoins du
contexte, parfois convergents et plus souvent contradictoires. Ce besoin a été
une leçon que les nouveaux politiciens roumains ont apprise au moment où l’on
a prouvé que n’importe quel élément du contexte pouvait décider, d’une manière
directe ou indirecte, le destin des groupes ou des partis politiques. L’électorat
roumain a réussi à le faire par les élections qui ont eu lieu. Le fait que certains
partis ou groupes de politiciens ont disparu de la scène politique a obligé les
hommes politiques à tenir compte de la population.
La reconstruction de la classe politique roumaine a été faite, dans l’opinion
d’un chercheur avisé de la vie politique roumaine (à savoir Sorina Soare), ayant
comme point de départ la reconstruction et l’évolution des partis politiques
roumains après 1990.
De la sorte, si l’on observe la typologie des partis politiques roumains apparus
après les événements des années ’89–’90, ceux-ci ont peuvent être considérés comme:
— des partis héréditaires (formations politiques qui ont eu des liaisons avec
le P.C.R.): F.S.N., P.D.S.R., P.R.M. et d’autres;
— des partis de l’ainsi-dite «page blanche» (qui n’ont eu aucune liaison avec
le passé): A.P.R;
— des partis ou le groupe des dissidents: P.A.C.;
— des partis historiques (P.N.Þ.–C.D., P.N.L., P.S.D.).
En fonction de leurs intérêts spécifiques ou de combinaisons originales, on a
vu se configurer la classe politique en Roumanie. Donc, c’est ainsi que s’explique
pourquoi la scène politique postdécembriste est caractérisée par cette agglomération
de partis qui ont affiché parfois de graves confusions terminologiques au niveau
de la doctrine et du langage des leaders.
Toutes ces choses expliquent le comportement des leaders et de la classe
politique dans la Roumanie postcommuniste. Mais, en étroite liaison avec un tel
comportement des leaders et de la classe politique roumaine, il faut mettre en
évidence le caractère des institutions de Roumanie.
Sur ces territoires, entre le Danube et les Carpates, depuis 150 années on
parle de modernisation. D’une façon ou d’une autre, la modernisation signifiait
une adaptation des formes d’organisation institutionnelle aux formes de
l’Occident européen, la création ou la fondation de certaines institutions et un
règlement constitutionnel. C’était un genre de transition vers l’Europe et depuis
un siècle et demi chez nous on a eu... une permanente transition. On a parlé
beaucoup dans la culture roumaine «des formes sans fond», «du retard historique»
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des institutions roumaines, de ces formes nouvelles «inadaptées au fond roumain»
et même des conditions «du dépassement du retard». Dans cette période-là,
l’adaptation aux institutions européennes équivalait à un processus de
synchronisation. La Roumanie désirait , et a toujours désiré, être contemporaine
avec l’Europe. Enfin, n’a-t-on pas chez nous on en a beaucoup parlé — fait qui
est bien connu — et des ouvrages célèbres illustrent cette réalité.
Tous connaissent Caragiale et les répliques de certains de ses personnages
d’Une lettre perdue. Le grand dramaturge ironisait l’existence d’une obsession.
Mais une transition et une modernisation des institutions politiques ont eu
pourtant lieu dans une première période, jusqu’aux années ’30. Durant la période
de l’entre-deux-guerres il a existé chez nous une modernisation et une certaine
stabilité institutionnelle. L’interrogation qu’on peut formuler sur cet aspect serait
la suivante: pourquoi on n’a pas maintenu une telle stabilité? En ce qui concerne
ceci, il s’imposerait le besoin d’une clarification.
Nous tentons aussi de présenter un point de vue. Mais d’abord on doit
souligner que la réponse pourrait être donnée même après une première analyse et
elle est souvent répétée: les étrangers sont les coupables, les Turcs, les Russes
(les bolcheviks) et d’autres. Et si au XVIIIe siècle, les traditionalistes, les
conservateurs et d’autres transformaient notre retard historique dans un argument
de l’indigénité, pendant le siècle suivant tous les faits historiques négatifs étaient
liés à l’étranger. Et peut-être les choses se sont-elles expliquées de la sorte, au
moins partiellement.
Mais ce n’étaient pas les communistes et ni une force étrangère qui’ont
annulé les Constitutions de 1923 en 1938. C’est vrai, ils l’ont fait dix ans plus
tard. Mais le processus d’instabilité constitutionnelle a des origines plus anciennes.
Ainsi, nous-pouvons passer à l’analyse proprement dite de notre intervention.
Une «traduction» plus moderne des mots du grand Florentin peut être exprimée
de la manière suivante: «Personne n’est au-dessus la loi». Et à cause du fait que
personne n’est au-dessus la loi on doit avoir un bon fonctionnement des institutions.
C’est d’ailleurs l’essence de la politique: «L’objet de recherche de la politique
n’est pas l’homme mais les institutions», soutient John Plamenatz, les institutions,
il est bien connu, supposent des normes et des lois. Pour cette raison, on a besoin
des lois fondamentales. Au début, chez nous il y avait les règlements (organiques),
tout comme chez les Italiens (toujours au début) c’était le statut qui réglementait
la vie politique, et je fais référence à la période du Risorgimento.
Mais jusqu’à présent notre pays a connu environ dix Constitutions, règlements ou
lois fondamentales, quel que soit leur nom. On croit que l’instabilité constitutionnelle
trouve son origine ici. Chaque régime qui s’instaurait imposait sa propre
Constitution. L’ancien régime, celui d’avant 1990, a eu trois Constitutions et par
comparaison il est nécessaire de mentionner que les États-Unis ont eu une seule
Constitution dans une période de plus de 200 ans (1787).
Les institutions accomplissent une fonction socialisante dans la mesure où
elles orientent et réglementent les comportements des individus et la société
10
L’ÉVOLUTION DE LA CLASSE POLITIQUE ROUMAINE AU XXe SIÈCLE
63
qu’ils composent. Elles développent un rôle préceptorial (dans le sens
d’imposition d’un précepte, d’une norme, d’une règle), selon le politologue
américain Ch. Lindblom (en 1997). De cette manière, les bons citoyens font les
bonnes institutions, et les bonnes institutions sont bonnes dans la mesure où elles
produisent et forment de bons citoyens, et ceux-ci les trouvent appropriées, ne
les perçoivent pas comme «étrangères», ne sont pas aliénés par rapport à elles.
Les «bonnes» institutions développent un sens de la loyauté et contribuent à
l’adoption et à la consolidation de ces «attentes cognitives ou institutions
morales» dont elles-mêmes (en tant qu’institutions) tirent leur origine. La
fonction «préceptoriale» ou hégémonique que les institutions (qui opèrent avec
succès) développent a, grosso modo, un caractère négatif (Claus Offe): elles
encouragent chez les acteurs sociaux une auto-imposition de la discipline du
comportement qui fait que soient tenues sous contrôle les actions opportunistes.
Une telle appréciation peut trouver des références également dans la Roumanie
d’aujourd’hui. D’autre part, les institutions fournissent aux acteurs sociaux des
standards sociaux validés concernant les préférences et les objectifs autorisés et
qui attendent leur autorisation (approbation). La présence ou l’absence des deux
liaisons opératives de feed-back — discipline et autorisation — représentent le
premier examen par l’intermédiaire duquel on peut voir si un cadre social ou
politique extérieur ou autre est une institution. Je lance, dans ce sens, une
invitation à réfléchir sur les «institutions» de chez nous.
La qualité des institutions peut être bien reprise de la perspective d’un autre
examen: les institutions ne doivent pas suivre seulement des tâches que l’on
pourrait nommer «socialisation congruente», elles deveaient fonctionner et celà
d’une manière convenable, c’est-à-dire suivre des tâches ou missions établies par
elles-mêmes ou être compétentes à fournir des ressources dont elles dépendent.
Une institution qui fonctionne décharge ses acteurs des considérations finalistes
ou bien stratégiques, dans la mesure où on fait confiance au fait qu’un cours
institutionnel de l’action prescrite peut mener à des résultats bénéfiques ou moins
tolérables. Une fois avoir atteints ces paramètres, les institutions fonctionnent en
tant que pilote automatique.
Mon idée de base est que toutes ces aspirations peuvent devenir réalité
seulement (ou bien surtout) en partant de la réalisation d’une bonne Constitution,
en harmonie avec les exigences européennes.
«Les types idéaux» d’institutions que l’on a présentés plus haut sont-ils en
parfaite consonnance avec les valeurs européennes, peuvent-ils être implantés
sur le terrain roumain aussi?
Je dirais, pour conclure, que le système constitutionnel de Roumanie n’est
pas encore très bien fondé. Sa fonctionnalité est mise en danger par les
nombreux changements institutionnels qui ne favorisent pas du tout la stabilité
politique de notre pays. L’instabilité du législatif est encore présente. Le Conseil
Supérieur de la Magistrature (C.S.M.), à peine constitué, va être l’une des institutions
les plus discutées. Une telle instabilité politique et institutionnelle favorise et
64
GHEORGHE LENCAN STOICA
11
n’empêche point l’existence de la corruption. Les investisseurs étrangers qui sont
intéressés au milieu d’affaires en Roumanie réclament, très soucieux, justement
un tel chaos législatif.
Dans la situation donnée, la faiblesse évidente de la classe politique de Roumanie
influence beaucoup un tel chaos législatif et institutionnel. Même dans ces jours
(juillet 2005) il y a un fort conflit entre la Cour Constitutionnelle et le gouvernement,
entre le Parlement et le Président. Le seul facteur orientatif peut venir (comment
il se passe toujours en Roumanie) de l’étranger. Aujourd’hui une telle fonction
est accomplie par les Commissaires Européens.
NOTES
1. Giorgio Sola, La teoria delle élites, Bologna, II
Mulino, 2000, p.68.
2. Ralph Dahrendorph, Revoluþiile în Estul ºi
Centrul Europei, Bucureºti, Editura Humanitas,
1993, p.137.
3. Lucreþiu Pãtrãºcanu, Problemele de bazã ale
României, 1946, p. l19.
4. Antonio Gramsci, Quaderni del carcere, Torino,
Editura Einaudi, 1975, p. 1130.
5. Matei Dogan, Analiza statisticã a democraþiei
parlamentare din România, Bucureºti, 1946,
p. 109.
6.
7.
8.
9.
Ibidem, p. l 10.
Ibidem, p. 108.
Ibidem, p. 106.
Damian Hurezeanu, Democraþia azi, Bucureºti,
Editura Noua Alternativã, 1995, p. 135.
10. Ibidem, p. 136.
11. Daniel Barbu, ªapte teme de politicã româneascã,
Bucureºti, Editura Antet, 1997, p. 98.
12. Ibidem, p. 99.
THE CULT OF PERSONALITY IN ROMANIA,
DURING COMMUNISM
RODICA IAMANDI
The Cult of Personality: Theoretical Foundations and Forms
of Manifestation
From the very beginning a warning is necessary, about the difficulty of the
attempt to define the phrase “the cult of personality”.
First of all, because in the present, the common sense, “adulation of a
personality”, substituted itself to the much more complex meaning that this highly
ideologically loaded expression had over the time. This is probably the reason
why in the Romanian specific literature from after 1989, the cult of personality
is defined as a political practice attributing an exaggerated role to a political
personality within the evolution of society, producing a deformation of the whole
political life of the country1 or as a systematic attitude provoked and controlled
concerning a leader (or a personality) considered gifted with special qualities as
intellectual, as sensitivity, as manager, as visionary etc., such as were considered
to be Hitler, Stalin, Mao Zedong, Ceauºescu, Bokassa, Idi Amin2. An inventory
of the definitions before 1990 (even if they were conceived from the perspective
of Leninist-Marxist philosophy) brings along a plus of nuances on the topic. The
theoreticians of the communist period noticed something that I have encountered
myself, precisely that the name does not capture the whole complex of economical,
social, political, ethical, ideological, etc. matters it refers to3.
Second, in the literature in all the cases of exploitation and oppression of
masses corresponding to the concentration of power in the hands of one a cult of
personality is identified (as with the Pharaon in the ancient Egypt, the emperor
in China, the absolute monarch in feudal Europe, the “Führer” in nazi Germany).
Plus, in these works there is a theoretical foundation of the cult of personality
within the cult of the “genius”, or of the “hero”, or of the “critical personality” as
in the works of the romantics F. Schelling and Th. Carlyle, or in those of young
hegeliens such as B. Bauer and N. Stirner, in the case of the Russian peasant 19th
century revolutionaries, the Narodnics, or in the works of F. Nietzsche4. Finally,
in the literature the idea that the cult of personality generates in the life of society
a chain of phenomena contrary to the general human moral norms is underlined,
since the ware attitude of the people towards accomplishing their social duty is
replaced by the bind compliance to the will of the deified leader, to whomever
Pol. Sc. Int. Rel., II, 2, p. 65–80, Bucharest, 2005.
66
RODICA IAMANDI
2
bears the supreme authority, contributing to the spread of amoral methods of
defense for the existing order5.
The essential contribution to bringing the meaning of “the cult of personality”
into shape had Nikita Sergheevici Khrushchev, when at the 20th of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU, from now on) 1956 Congress, has
condemned the cult of comrade Joseph Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili, called
Stalin. In the official report, presented at the Congress, Khrushchev says: “the
C.C. has taken a determined attitude against the cult of personality, foreign to the
spirit of Marxism-Leninism, cult that transforms this or that activist into a hero
working wonders, at the same time minimizing the role of the party and of
popular masses, leading to diminishing their creative activity. The spread of the
cult of personality has decreased the role of collective rule within the party and
often it has brought about serious deficiencies in our work”6, and the C.C. shall
analyze in June 1956 the objective conditions that were in favor of the spreading
of the cult of personality, along with the subjective factors, resulted from the
personal qualities of Stalin, in a decision entitled “On doing away with the cult
of personality and with its consequences”. Apparently, in the “Secret discourse”7,
to which foreign delegates had no access to, Khrushchev was much harsher,
denouncing Stalin’s crimes. It is due to this specific association between the
cult of personality and the name of Stalin that many political analists consider
“the cult of personality” a “ideological euphemism for the entire system of lies,
corruption, mass crimes and universal fear”8.
To understand better how stalinism was built, the analysis of Raymond Aron
is extremely useful. The author identifies five phases in the history of the
Russian Bolshevik Party. “During the forth phase, that of the absolute power of
Stalin, all major decisions are taken by a single man. This man is surrounded by
his comrads with whom he discusses within the Politburreau, but to whom he is
incapable to impose his will and whom, starting 1934, begins even to terrorize,
the factions are eliminated with no mercy, not only politically, but also physically.
The oponents, either real or vitual, within the party, are considered traitors; they
are killed either after they were solemnly trialed and this sentence was pronounced
following their ‘confession’, or they are eliminated in prison.”9
Within such a system, it is obvious that the power is situated at the top of the
party hierarchy and that a single man has it. “A person and that person alone was
deciding the fate of all others, covering them in glory or shame, transforming the
servants of the régime into fiddles or into traitors.”10
After Khrushchev, the beginning of Stalin’s cult of personality is marked by
the terrorism of the years 1934–1938, oriented against party members, at first to
end the life of Stalin’s already defeated adversaries, then to strike the most
devoted of the Stalinists. “Why was terrorism directed against the very militants
of the communist party who did not deviate from the line of the party? To
this question, Khrushchev offers only one answer, one single interpretation: the
cult of personality. Or, all one can say is that this is actually no answer, no
explanation.”11 It seems that Stalin was at the origin of the notion “enemy of the
people” and that this expression made possible the use of the most terrible
3
THE CULT PERSONALITY IN ROMANIA, DURING COMMUNISM
67
oppression, against anyone who would in any manner whatsoever disagree with
Stalin. “When Stalin said that this person or the other had to be arrested, it had
to be admitted on word basis that it is about an enemy of the people, and then
Beria’s clique, in charge of the state Security organs, would go above themselves
to prove the guilt of the person arrested and to sustain the documents they forged.
What kind of proofs they provided? The convicts’ (were provided) confessions,
and the judges were taking these seriously. And how can be confessed crimes
never committed? In only one way, after applying physical forms of constraint,
tortures generating lack of conscience, intellectual confusion, of deprivation of
human dignity”12 — as it was said in a fragment of Khrushchev’s text.
According to Raymond Aron’s opinion, The Secret Report of Khrushchev’s
offers a singular illustration for the theory of Montesquieu on despotism, the
theory according to which the principle of despotism is fear — an insidious fear
— progressively taking over all individuals inside a collectivity. To the question
“Why didn’t we do anything?” Khrushchev answers “with sincerity and naïvety”:
“it was impossible for us to undertake any action. Whenever we were convoqued
by the supreme leader, we never knew if it was in order to consulte us concerning
an important decision, or to throw us away in Lubianka prison”13.
Whichever the theory of history adopted at some point, we have to take the
individuals into consideration a well. In order to go from potential to real, from
the intelligible functions of epuration to the lack of measure within the real,
ample process of epuration, it was needed an unique ingredient, a man, Stalin
himself. One should not minimize the role this person/personality has played due
to that absolute power that he has possessed. At the same time, the phenomena
called “the cult of personality” are not indebted only to the particularities of an
unique man, but also to the technique of organisation and action of a certain
party, which explains the apparison of the cult of personality within the satellite
communist countries and around the leaders of those states, as well.
After some historians, the cult of Stalin appeared in the period 1926–1927. In
many of the speache given by the “left-wing” oposition leaders, there was even
then present the protest against Stalin’s cult of personality. Thus, at the 14th
Congress of the Bolshevik Communist Party of the Soviet Union, by the end of
December 1925, L. Kamenev has warned about the danger of amplification of
the cult of some leaders and especially of Stalin’s: “We are against the creation
of the theory of ‘the leader’, we are against the creation of ‘the leader’. We are
against the Secretariate, in fact reuniting the politics and whole organisation,
situating itself above the political organ… Personally I consider that our general
secretary is not a personality to gather around a polarized old Bolshevik headquarters… Especially because I have told these personally and repeatedly to
comrade Stalin, especially because I have told about these things repeatedly
to the group of Leninist comrades, I repeat what I have said here at the Congress:
I have reached the conclusion that comrade Stalin cannot fulfil the role of
polarizing agent for the Bolshevik head-quarters.”14
This was though only the beginning of Stalin’s ascension. Apparently he
manifested a heavy democratism, almost in contrast with the “aristocratic” Trotsky.
68
RODICA IAMANDI
4
Stalin was realtively accessible, rude and simple. He walked around free through
the C.C. building and Kremlin, almost without any guard. Sometimes he stopped
by unanounced at the Institute of Red Professors to talk to the students. If at
the beginning of the third decade in most official institutions there could be
seen portraits of Lenin and Trotsky (after 1924, Trotsky’s protrait was
taken down everywhere), Stalin’s portrait would not appear anywhere; it started
to be displayed everywhere only from 1930 on, after in 1929, with a pomp
unnatural for the times, Stalin was celebrated at his 50 anniversary. In the
messages received to congratulate him would not make presence only words as
“wonderful”, “top”, but also words like “grand” and “genius”. The collection of
articles and memories about Stalin, issued in 1929, contained many exagerations
and deformations of the facts. The idea that “during Lenin, comrade Stalin, one
of his disciples”, was at the same time his greatest help, who, different from
others, in all the important phases of the revolution, in all the decisive moments
of activity of the party led by Vladimir Ilich “went side by side with him, without
any hesitation”15.
Some of the authors of this collection attempted to prove that even though
Stalin was more of a practician within the party, in reality he was an important
theoretician of Marxism-Leninism. In an article entitled Stalin and the Red
Army, K.E. Voroshilov attributes to Stalin not existent merits in the Civil War.
Thus, in 1931, in the preface to the six volumes edition of Lenin’s works, the
editor, V.V. Adoratski, to affirm that Lenin’s works have to be studied with a
Stalin perspective in mind. E. Iaroslavski and A. Bubnov, the authors of the history
books of the Bolshevik Communist Party of the Soviet Union, have included
pages consecrated to Stalin’s merits.
The eulogies, that have considerably increased in number after the C.C.
plenary meeting of January 1933, were not, maybe, totally lacking sincerity; but
they were essentially full of the zeal of flattery, carefully stimulated. The fact
that the first to resort to limitless eulogy were the members of his Political Bureau,
especially Molotov and Kaganovich, confered those eulogies imediately the
character of an official political line to be followed as well by those who have
never considered Stalin infailible.
Stalin’s flattery chorus was added with voices of former oposition leaders,
whose voices were at times even louder that those of the others. Zinoviev and
Kamenev, for example, were publishing articles where they were admitting their
mistakes and recognizing how right is “the great leader of workers worldwide —
comrade Stalin”. In the first issue of 1934’s “Pravda” an article of H. Radek
spoke of Stalin only in superlatives. After a couple of days the article became a
brochure, edited in 225,000 copies.
Stalin’s cult did not do it for his great vanity, but also for his thirst of power,
situating his singularly, above the party and beyond any critique, fact obvious at
the 17th Congress of the Bolshevik Communist Party of the Soviet Union, were
each and every speaker was evoking the “greatness” and the “genius” of Stalin.
Then, through Comintern, the cult of the Stalin was implemented within all
communist parties from abroad. At the same time, the example of the Bolshevik
5
THE CULT PERSONALITY IN ROMANIA, DURING COMMUNISM
69
Communist Party of the Soviet Union stimulated the cult of the local leaders
within the satellite communist countries.
Forms of the Cult of Personality
in Communist Romania before 1965
In Romania, the first signs of a cult of personality, in very shy forms in
comparison to what it was yet to come, is noticed from the period when the
communist party was not an unique political force within society, and they were
dedicated especially to Ana Pauker. She came from Moscow along with the Red
Army tanks, fact that gave her, in that specific pro-Soviet sate of mind of the
time, a peculiar aureole; plus the intervention of the party propaganda that, overestimating her merits and revolutionary qualities, as it will next be the case with
Dej, and, especially, with Ceauºescu — these factors made her a second Passionaria
(after the name of Dolores Ibaruri). Along with her adulation a style was inaugurated,
that will be continued also in the decades to come. “As she used to say herself,
all happens because she expresses the highest knowledge, made accessible to all.
Listening to them at the meetings, with the clear and determined voice, vibrating
at her high wisdom, at her great love for people, each felt her close, as if she
would speak only to them, about their lives, about their needs, and each listens
to her all ears, absorbing every word and every thought.”16 Even in that time were
manipulated notions like freedom, independence and sovereignty, as the idea of
love for the country: “the ardent love for the country goes through as a red wire,
all her activity, all her fight.”17 Thus, Ana Pauker arrives next to Gheorghiu-Dej
and Lucreþiu Pãtrãºcanu, one of the main aspirants at the leadership of the party,
dispute within which she counted on her links with the circles near Stalin, as on
the support of certain key emigration comrades (Vasile Luca, Teohari Georgescu,
Iosif Chiºinevski) with who she formed the so-called “external group”. Therefore,
this acerb fight for supremacy within the party has dominated the history of
Romania in the first decade after war, a fight conducted mainly between the
exponents of the two groups — Gheorghiu-Dej, from the inside and Ana Pauker,
from the outside, each trying to enter the grace of Stalin (the principal referee of
this dispute). The minority ethnic origin of Ana Pauker (who has succeeded to
win the trust and appreciation from Stalin and from the majority of persons in
her entourage) has determined Moscow dictator to give the “winning cup”,
eventually, to Gheorghiu-Dej, who had all the required qualities for a communist
leader in that historical context, and, also, he was one devoted to Stalinism with
all his being. Motivating his option Stalin addressed Molotov who sustained Ana
Pauker: “Dear Viaceslav Mihailovici, Ana is a good comrade, trustworthy, but,
the Romanian Party needs a leader from the working class, a true Romanian.”18
Hence, starting actually October 1945, at the National Conference, for almost two
decades he will be — with short intermittence — the almighty character in
Romania, both in what concerns the party and the state.
Far from offering a solution to the fight for power once and for all, the
dispute between the two teams continued, gaining often-tensioned accents. Dej’s
70
RODICA IAMANDI
6
anxiety was even bigger since the external group kept close links with Soviet
institutions, especially with the N.K.V.D. of Beria; at the same time the group
(Pauker, Luca, T. Georgescu) recognized the first secretary of the party at the
plenary meeting from 1961 and they acted “as a group constituted singularly,
outside the elected organs (…), most important matters of party leadership and
of state being resolved by the secretariat and not by the Political Bureau (my
note) where they had majority and where the secretary general, in many matters
of great importance, was placed in a weaker position, left by himself”19. Given
all these, Dej will be on the top of this situation, due to his less obvious qualities,
untill that point — political ability, tact and diplomacy — waiting for favorable
conditions for the final confrontation to appear, especially since he had Stalin’s
accept, who, unsatisfied with the tensioned atmosphere within the party, said
bluntly to Dej: “if they get in your way, scare them away!”20
The opportunity came along with the C.C. plenary meeting in 26–27 May
1952, met to discuss the serious deviations from party’s line of the former
leadership of the Finance Ministry and of Popular Romania’s Bank, realizing
that Vasile Luca “has separated himself from the party… has surrounded himself
with party’s enemies, has stood up against the general line of the party”; that
Teohari Georgescu “manifested conciliatory attitude related to the rightwing
deviations of Vasile Luca”. Serious accusations Dej have for Ana Pauker, as
well, saying that “the deviation from the party line in matters of agriculture and
collections”, that “she has cultivated unprincipled relations within the party”.
Considering all these, the plenary meeting reaches the conclusion that the
exclusion of Vasile Luca21 from the C.C. and of Teohari Georgescu from the
Political Bureau and from the C.C. secretariat are necessary, as later from the
functions of vice-presidents of the Council of Ministers. Ana Pauker is sanctioned
only with a warning, but the plenary does not elect her again as member in the
secretariat and in the Political Bureau of the C.C., as a first step towards her final
elimination from the leadership of the party22.
The disparaging and removal of the “anti-party” group, of the “fraction” group
Pauker-Luca-Georgescu from the leadership of the Romanian Worker’s Party
and afterwards, entirely the elimination from the party has overcome, through the
implications and consequences the sphere of a power struggle, given that
with this decision internal political disputes were ended within the communist
party that becomes hence a real “monolith party”, dominated in an authoritarian
manner by a group with an unique political orientation and, in fact, by a single
man who shall obtain thus the monopoly of personal power. Gheorghiu-Dej’s
dictatorship over the party was exercised without mediation over the country
as well and the cult of personality he generated was nothing else but a local
Stalinism.
Even if the cult of personality of Dej and his power inside the party got a
considerable extension, he couldn’t yet consider himself entirely mastering the
situation, as long as he felt his position within the party threatened by his eternal
rival — Lucreþiu Pãtrãºcanu. The solution that he has chosen — at the advice
and with the support of his obedient and zealous subordinate — Alexandru
7
THE CULT PERSONALITY IN ROMANIA, DURING COMMUNISM
71
Drãghici (minister of Internal Affairs) — was the harshest, that is the physical
elimination of his adversary. As a consequence, Lucreþiu Pãtrãºcanu was arrested
under the false accusation of “spionage in the service of imperialism” and “crime
of high treason”. Then, he was tried, sentenced to death and executed in a great
hurry, in the night of 16th to 17th of April 1954, “shot from behind”.
Without any doubt, Gheorghiu-Dej and his minister of internal affairs,
Drãghici, bear the main reponsability for this murder, but guilty and responsible
was the entire leadership of the party at the time (the members of Political Bureau
and of the C.C.). The latter could not exonerate themselves for initiating,
encouraging and supporting the proliferation of the cult of personality of Dej,
with unfortunate consequences for the entire Romanian society. They also have
overlooked, encouraging a condemnable complicity, many abuses and illegalities
to which the entire intellectual Romanian elite (many from the intellectually
flourishing period between the two World Wars, but also other prominent figures
in our science and culture) has fallen a victim to, given the inhumane regime of
physical and moral extermination within that Romanian gulag.
Even more, while in the Soviet Union stalinist crimes were uncovered and
therefore society there was going through a profound process of conscience, in
Romania there were very few signs of change, the Romanian Worker’s Party
continuing to patronize a “society with rigid forms, leaded by perified dogmas,
‘stalinizing’ everything as an automat device that once started is impossible to
be stopped, insulating all the possible niches through which the wind of thaw
that, blowing throughout all Eastern Europe, could have blown inside Romania
as well”23. The disappearance of Stalin, instead of giving Dej and his fiddels the
opportunity of long awaited normalization of the domestic life, considered it an
internal affair of the Soviet Union, ignoring the similar de-stalinisation process
taking place within the most of the satellite countries from the center and southeastern Europe (the Hungarian revolution of 1956 being the most violent form
of manifestation of this “political thaw”). Dej felt master of the situation both within
the party and in the country, fact that permitted him to overcome succesfully the
moment of Hungarian revolution, namely all the turmoil generated as consequence
within Romanian young generation.
Interior stability, plus the experience gained from the “Hungarian lesson”
have decided Dej to take the next step, decisiv in what concerns foreign politics
(that would bring him great popularity) — the parting with Moscow’s influence.
The international context, dominated by the politics of relaxation generated by
Khrushchev, was in his favor and his tactics of overstating the “RomanianSoviet friendship” and of the fidelity towards Moscow was as absurd as efficient.
One has to notice that the ability and diplomacy have characterized the whole
political career of the communist leader. This way Dej has obtained what no
other satellite of Moscow has succeeded: the withdrawal of the quota of
participation at “sovroms” and mainly the “miracle” of June1958, that is, the
withdrawal of the Soviet troops that were stationed in Romania since 1944.
These successes have consolidated internal stability bringing about a bonus
of popularity to the communist leader, more than all party propaganda and more
72
RODICA IAMANDI
8
than the exacerbation of the cult of personality have accomplished. Starting the
detachment from Soviet taking care of was a great merit of Dej, but unfortunately
this did not mean for him de-stalinisation as well, as that started by Khrushchev
at the 20th Congress of the Soviet Union Communist Party. For Gheorghiu-Dej
— as Silviu Brucan recognized — soviet experience that he had piled up before,
now has become an à la table menu, that is he was choosing from it just what
suited him. It was a de-satellisation to save stalinism and not to reform it, as tried
Khrushchev in the Soviet Union24.
Dumitru Popescu says in a memoirs book that: “Our Stalin was not dead, our
Stalin was defending himself”25, in relation to Dej’s attitude during 1958 campaign,
when under a front of hits against those contaminated by the events in Hungary
and Poland, was a hit against the critics of stalinism seen as a reaction to the cult
of Stalin aimed at Dej, eventually. Even if only Miron Constantinescu and Iosif
Chiºinevski were found scape-goats, according to Dumitru Popescu, “behind
them were large categories of party activists eager to open a public political
process of stalinism, including a process of the way Stalin reflected himself in
our social reality and continued to reflect himself there because the generative
factors were not removed”26.
Under such circumstances, appears understandable the equivocous attitude of
Dej towards the re-launching of the process of de-stalinisation in the Soviet
Union at the 22nd Congress of the Soviet Union Communist Party, in October
1961. He could not afford neither to situate himself in a position of frond
towards the orientation of the Congress and Khrushchev, nor to sustain openly
the cult of Stalin. With charateristic ability he has found an “original” way to
expose stalinism by taking it against his old oponents from the exterior group,
during the plenary of C.C., from 30th of November – 5th of December 1961.
The report presented by Dej at the plenary meeting considered fully justified
“the measures taken by the Soviet Union Communist Party to end the cult of
personality and its consequences”, under that influence “methods and practices
contrary to leninist norms have taken place, oversteping the democratic rules in
party life”, “but he added, the methods generated by the cult of personality and
by its consequences did not have the extent they had in other countries”, because
the party, his activists guarded “the fundamental principles of the party”, did not
give way to presures* and unhesitatingly protected the life and the dignity of the
party members27. The main attack was directed again towards “the anti-party
group Pauker-Luca” and towards his supporters (Teohari Georgescu, Iosif
Chiºinevski and Miron Constantinescu) — supposedly the main exponents of
stalinist cult and practices, with old and new accusations, exposing for the first
time their ill-fated role in cooperativisation of the agriculture, the fact that in
spite of the indications of Ana Pauker to Teohari Georgescu “in the name of the
struggle against kulaks, over eighty thousands of peasants, most of them working
peasants were sent to trial”, under the accusation that they did not respected their
obligations towards the state.
* Neither internal, nor external — author’s note, R.I.
9
THE CULT PERSONALITY IN ROMANIA, DURING COMMUNISM
73
Transferring the responsibility for all inequalities and abuses to the “fraction
groups”, Dej considered “a fortune for our party that their pressions did not result
inequalitie, so there were no serious injustices done to be repared and no one
was to be reabilitated post-mortem”28. In the same vein of falsifying the history,
spoke many of the superior party leadership, among them excelling in demagogy
and servility his successor at power, leader of the Romanian Communist Party
(R.C.P.), Nicolae Ceauºescu. How sincere he was, showed seven years later, when
he has launched a virulent critique aimed at the former leadership part of which
he was too, as an opening act to the process he was going to intent to Dej. Ceauºescu
was not concerned by the fate of the party or by the fate of Dej’s victims, but
for personal reasons and mainly irritated by the fact that the parting with
Moscow was initiated by Dej with good consequences seen already from 1964.
“For a long while — declared Ceauºescu shortly after the plenary meeting from
April 1968 — we used to think and to declare publicly with satisfaction that we
have nothing to reabilitate, that in Romania abuses, violations of party
democracy or of socialist legislation did not take place. Even more, it was said that
it was a great happiness for us that we have had someone to protect the party and
state activists.”29
Beyond the cynicism of the appreciations Dej made was the easy way he
distanced himself from the responsibilities for many illegalities committed under
his lead, saying: “we have nothing to rehabilitate”, ignoring knowingly the victims
of the genocide of 1937–1938 including R.C.P. members, including the assassinates
of ªtefan Foriº and Lucreþiu Pãtrãºcanu, ignoring knowingly the thousands of
victims of the Romanian gulag after 1948.
The reforming action triggered by Khrushchev at the 20th Congress of the
Soviet Union Communist Party and developed at the 22nd, with all the positive
effects for the new Soviet domestic politics encouraged same actions in the satellite
countries from the eastern Europe, with first manifestations in Albania and Hungaria.
Paradoxically, especially now when stalinism and the cult of personality were
denounced, when profound changes were taking place, Dej and Romanian
Worker’s Party were dominating the Romanian political scene. Dej was favored
also by his united team of collaborators, consisting of specialists in varied fields
and of devoted political men. Under his leadership there are accomplishments
like the diplomatic solution to the Soviet-Chinese ideological conflict, from an
appearently neutral standpoint, or the parting with Moscow*), or the general
amnisty for political prisoners — surprising political decision even for the most
ardent supporters of the régime. This amnisty was the unique liberating opportunity
for many leading personalities of Romanian science and culture. All these events
were the apogee of his career and brought about his large political support.
An objective evaluation of Gheorghiu-Dej’s activity as leader of state, cannot
omit the fact that in spite of the errors committed as consequence of his cult of
personality, that has captured the masses due to his fermity in politics, he also
led Romania to the general renewal path that has contained eastern Europe at the
* With its climax marked by the Declaration from April (1964) — author’s note, R.I.
74
RODICA IAMANDI
10
beginning of 1964. As a benchmark for the new historical epoch for Romania,
the Declaration from April (1964) was conceived by this party leader as a
perspective program, but it became his political testament. There were stated two
priorities: external political life stabilisation and internal stabilisation of the
political life. He succeeded to accomplish only the first, obtaining with many
risks the authonomy of the party, its inalienable right to manifest itself as a
national political force, and especially, the relative independence of the country
and its national sovereignity. “Even partially realized on this exterior dimension
of it — notices Victor Frunzã — this work (left halfway) contributed to a different
reception of Gheorghiu-Dej by the history, from, let’s say, the reception if he
would have disappeared in 1956, not only with his hands tainted by the blood of
thousands of victims, but with qualities that make him an important complex
personality for our contemporary epoch… Most certainly Dej cannot be in trial
for what he wanted to, but he did not succeed to accomplish. Posterity has to be
grateful for what he has done good for the country and for the Romanian
people.”30 Beyond these attainments there are errors that remain, though, very
serious ones, like the crimes initiated and patronized for almost two decades,
while he was gathering in his hands the entire power within the party and state.
For this he was examined by a stern history and found guilty without any hesitation.
The Cult of Personality practiced and imposed
under Nicolae Ceauºescu
The successes obtained by Gheorghiu-Dej, especially, on the level of the relative
independence of the country and of the national sovereignity, were subordinated
by his successor, Nicolae Ceauºescu, to his personal interest. The two deziderates
became the leit-motif of an absurd propaganda campaign that would lead step by
step towards setting up a dictatorship and a cult of personality without precedent
in Romanian history. Ceauºescu’s road towards personal dictatorship was much
more opressive than that of Dej, while it was set in place gradually by a chain of
apparently inoffensive measures, but with dangerous implications for democracy.
Although there were only three years since his confirmation at the 9th Congress
of the party as secretary general of the C.C. of R.C.P., Nicolae Ceauºescu has
accumulated already power. In December 1967 he has assumed for himself the
function of president of the Council of State, so he was head of the state, too. He
used it first to uncover the abuses and illegalities of the former leadership (except
himself), aiming his attacks mainly at his rival Alexandru Drãghici and at
Gheorghiu-Dej. The action was not ostentatious, all taking place in the second
part of the C.C. of R.C.P. plenary meeting of April 1968, consecrated to the
development of education at all levels and he did not himself even took the floor
for this point in the order of discussions. He talked about this subject at another
meeting (a meeting of the activists of Bucharest) in 26th of April.
That plenary has represented, after Dumitru Popescu, “the climax of
destalinization in Romania, its pick”31. Security was placed at its suited infamous
place due to the role played on that stage of development of the socialist régime
11
THE CULT PERSONALITY IN ROMANIA, DURING COMMUNISM
75
(abuses, illegalities, crimes). Ceauºescu considered that those practices could not
by blamed on the cult of personality as others did, but they are characteristic of
“the states of economic, political, social and educational low level of the people
and due the backward mentality of those who have committed all these crimes”,
as phenomena outside socialism that should be left outside32. The plenary
meeting has rehabilitated Lucreþiu Pãtrãºcanu, ªtefan Foriº and other victims of
the cult of personality, as those condemned and executed in the Soviet Union at
the order of Stalin during “Great Terror” years, 1937–1938. Also, eliminating the
main culprit in Pãtrãºcanu’s case, Alexandru Drãghici, Ceauºescu gave a signal
for the removal of all inconvenient people, all Dej close people, namely.
His intransigent attitude in all matters of interest for the party and for the
country, such as those tackled at the plenary from April 1968, or his firm position
in the Czechoslovakia matter, condemning the Soviet intervention and that has
propelled him in the posture of a national hero, as the population saw in him an
ideal, more liberal leader, more democratic and more open to renewal than his
predecessor. At the same time he became famous internationally, great leaders
like Harold Wilson, de Gaulle, and Richard Nixon, rushing to visit him officially
at Bucharest. The so-called liberation was only a relative one, though. Within the
party he only did the traditional “rotation of the staff” to minimize or eliminate the
influence of the “old guard”. Hence, in the party there was not possible to form
a real opposition to the old Stalinist methods, to the ascension of a new cult of
personality, but only singular voices were heard*.
An eyewitness of the time considers that Czechoslovakia’s invasion was the
decisive moment for the creation of a cult of personality for Ceauºescu: “in those
moments a certain attitude imposed itself towards Ceauºescu within the party.
As the word went back then, the man who established this attitude as a necessity
within the Permanent Presidential Council was Maurer. His reasoning was solid
and clear. He would have said: “Now Romania is personalized by Ceauºescu.
Ceauºescu, by the nature of his function has to face all dangers confronting the
country. We have to give him a bigger say, a bigger political force, to prove he
has his back covered that he is assured, that there is no niche into the leadership
of Romania, into the communist party, that someone could ever speculate to hit
the positions promoted by Ceauºescu in the name of the party and of the country.
This action imposes an obvious solidarity with Ceauºescu, an unconditioned
support of his positions, a definition of these positions as totally expressing the party,
the country, the people.”33
During this first period, 1965–1971, Ceauºescu succeeded to assure himself the
popularity. The people saw in him the “providential man”, the leader restituing them
the dignity, expressing their own hopes and dreams. They could not imagine that he
would use this popularity to ease his way to a total accaparation of the power. And
nothing, no one, has impeded the application of his plan. All started with the
changes in the mechanism of power, operated at the 9th Congress of the party from
1965 when the Romanian Worker’s Party became the Romanian Communist
* And those soon were silenced by propaganda and then by Security — author’s note, R.I.
76
RODICA IAMANDI
12
Party and Romanian Popular Republic became Romanian Socialist Replubic, when
the congresses were re-numbered and a new constitution was adopted. At the
Congress in 1969, and the following ones, the changes in the mechanism of power
became much obvious, and more precisely aimed. Very important was the change
of the name of the supreme function within the party, from secretary general of the
C.C. of R.C.P., into that of secretary general of R.C.P. At the time he was already
president of the Presidential Council and that was as I have said, the supreme
function in state. From now on Ceauºescu was to be elected not by the plenary of
C.C. but directly by the Congress of the party. Thus he became the only inamovable
person in the party, protected under the simulacrum of party democracy.
The measure affected the entire party, diminishing the importance and role of
the other leadership organs, especially that of the Political Bureau to which even
Dej has payed attention, because it used to be the main form of expression of the
principle of collective leadership. Otherwise Ceauºescu himself declared the
importance of this principle at the 9th Congress, as supreme principle of party
leadership34. He defied elementary norms of party democracy. He arrived to be
elected by a show were simply hands were risen and then cheers would fall
unceasingly. Mind that the choice of the delegates at a Congress as such was
preceeded by a carefull staff selection, monitored by Ceauºescu himself and with
time, by Elena Ceauºescu, his wife, head of the terrible “Cabinet no. 2”. Even more,
now, all the members of C.C. were from the ranks of these same delegates, to
complete the image of a grotesque show.
Ceauºescu’s thirst for power grew bigger in time. When he has visited China
and North Coreea in 1971 he was seduced by the dimensions and by the forms
of manifestation of the cult of personality there. He saw meetings of adulation
of the leader, fascinating spectacles of light and sound and decided to import
more of such a political and cultural system.
“In Romania we are in error in what concerns the matter of the cult of personality,
says Dumitru Popescu. As it is commented upon now is seems that it consisted
of festive events only*. For Ceauºescu festivism was totally unsatisfactory and
lame, much less than what he wanted. “A few voices singing osana were small
potatoes. He was way beyond such tiny satisfactions. He would look over the
newspapers, find phrases with eulogy and not be thrilled at all. For him, essential
was the mass hysteria, millions’osana, over-enthuziastical collectives’adhesion,
the rumble of the meetings in the public square, the huge crows of workers with
their arms streched to reach him, the live ques anlong his car rides for kilometers,
the scanning from hundreds chests. He has built as a lucid and calculated architect
the complicated frame of mass delirium (...) He has organised periodically gigantic
congresses and conferrences. He has institutionalized the grand country tours, the
pompous work visits in the counties, plants, towns, villages and the so-called
dialogue with the people were hundreds of thousands participated.”35
Thus, in a second phase, 1971–1980, Romania gets a “minicultural revolution”
leading to the oversized cult of personality. After assuming the function of supreme
* Although it may be considered an excuse — the note of the author, R.I.
13
THE CULT PERSONALITY IN ROMANIA, DURING COMMUNISM
77
commander of the armed forces he transforms the un-prestiged Political Bureau
into the Political Executiv Committee controlling politically the activity of the
government. I. Gh. Maurer, head of the government faces Ceauºescu’s acts with
ever greater difficulty. His successors will have a solely decorative role. After
1974 Elena Ceauºescu launches herself into politics and gains one leadership
function after the other, up to “prime vice-primeminister”. At this time, Ceauºescu’s
controll over all acts of internal and external politics is entire. Differences start
to show, in matters of form and content, especially from Maurer’s part, but his
honorable attitude is not followed as an example by many others. Therefore,
many politicians oposing imposture and megalomania of Ceauºescu’s political,
social and economic life leave their functions “willingly” or are set aside.
The “shadow directors” of such personality cult set on stage congresses, public
gatherings and homage shows, training impressively large masses, in a Chinese
and North Coreean style. Masses almost never gather willingly. The “shadow
directors” invent and intitutionalize all types of National Councils mimiting
democracy, only to elect as their head with exaggerated pomp, Nicolae Ceauºescu.
Finally, the plenary meeting of March 1974 proposes to the Great National
Assembly the institution of the function of president of Romania and for that
function is unanimously elected Nicolae Ceauºescu.
Through this new function, Ceauºescu reaches the climax of political power,
with 1974, the dictatorial régime stepping into a new historical phase. In only
nine years he has become the most powerful man in Romania, “an absolute
monarch”36, after Silviu Brucan, and the following association at power of his
wife Elena Ceauºescu makes of Romanian a “communist two-headed monarchy”37.
He succeeded to build an almost perfect model of a personal dictatorship political
system, permitting him to control Romania, in every way, and the life of the
23 millions Romanians, as well, for almost a quarter of a century.
The public opinion assisted perplexed to the metamorphosis of the leaders
they put so many hopes in. He was the one who promised at the tribune of the
9th Congress not to admit “any forms of overstepping the principle of work and
collective leadership”, and he has as well proposed the introduction of procedure
in conformity to which “no party member can have more that one function of
leadership, either within the party or within the state”38.
During the period that entered history as the “Golden Epoch” or as “Nicolae
Ceauºescu Epoch”, shaped into form after 1971, the cult of personality gathers the
most absurd forms of expression and the totalitarian power is finally consecrated,
as a direct consequence of this cult. Any act of internal or external policy is
under the thumb of the general secretary, any action takes place under his
“direct supervision and guidance”, given his “pretious indications” — expressions
obsessively usual with party propadanda of the epoch. At the same time, a cult
of personality of Elena Ceauºescu was carefully installed, motivated by her
alledgedlly exceptional merits during the revolutionary times in Romania. Like
it was not important that Ceauºescu himself has asked from the tribune of the 9th
Congress the objective presentation of the place and role of any personality in
history. He considered damaging “the exaggeration of the merits of some
78
RODICA IAMANDI
14
militants”. “No leader, no matter how proeminent, said Ceauºescu then, cannot be
preented as the only agent of the historical events, without deifying that person,
to denying the role of the masses, of the people… Would be wrong to exaggerate
past merits of some leaders only to put the history ‘in accord’* with the present.”39
With the demagogy characteristic for his political discourse at this time, he
said after the plenary meeting of 1968, that in the activity of any party member
to start from “an objective and lucid analysis of the facts and not from the myths.
We do not need idols. We do not need to transform people into flags”40. Bending
the historical truth, party propaganda has put into circulation facts and appreciations
over the limit of the verosimility ment to create an hero aura for Nicolae
Ceauºescu, to increase his domestic and foreign prestige. In reality propaganda
harmed as none of the following were believable: the presence of Nicolae
Ceauºescu, aged 12 into the revolutionary movement, at 15 in the party, or his
important contribution to the activity of the National Anti-Fascist Committee
(1933) and the arrangement of the 1st of May 1939 demonstration with Elena
Ceauºescu, or even the episode of his presence in the forced camp at Târgu Jiu…
In direct relation to the development of the communist totalitarianism is the
proliferation of the cult of personality of Nicolae Ceauºescu and in the 80s the
cult of personality of Elena Ceauºescu, to grotesque formes of expression. Thanks
to a perfect functioning propaganda mechanism and to a rhetoric overstating the
merits of the secretary general, forcing the superlatives of the Romanian language
over decent limits, the cult flourished. No less useful proving to be the actions
of renamed artists, writers, plastic artists, who, from conviction or opportunism
made all possible to set him high on a pedestal of power. Thanks to those as well
Ceauºescu believed himsefl that he is the “Carpathians’genius”, that the history
of this people begins and ends with him. “The newpapers, said in 1983 Vlad
Georgescu, one of the opponents of the régime from abroad, see him as ‘the icon
of a prince’, referring to him as ‘Man’, written with capital letter, as once was
written ‘God’ with capital letter and they use formula ‘his people’ as it was used
with the kings, but no prince or king in Romania, not even those with the biggest
egos did not arrive at these unnatural forms of expressions, none practiced to
such an extent their cult or their families’cult. Only Stalin has been genius and
profet and father of many nations.”41
The appropriation and manipulation of the national and patriotic feeling,
invoking obstinately the historical past under the pretext that it restitutes to the
people the true national dignity were diversions in the service of the cult of
personality. The festive meetings the pompous festive shows to alledgedlly
honour the actions of the forefathers were just pretexts to inoculate into the
public opinion the idea that R.C.P. was in fact the person continuing the traditions
of fight for social justice, independence and national sovereignity of the Romanian
people. By relationship, as relatives, the secretary general, personifies all the
aspirations of Romanians. It came to the point were the name and figure of
Nicolae Ceauºescu were situated next to legendary symbols of Romanian history
* Author’s underline.
15
THE CULT PERSONALITY IN ROMANIA, DURING COMMUNISM
79
— from Burebista to Decebal, Bãlcescu and Cuza. From here to associating the
party and Ceauºescu with the name of the country in a popular slogan of “the
golden epoch”, “the party, Ceauºescu, Romania”, was just a step. Within such a
context it is easy to understand that any criticism to dictatorship and to the cult of
personality, or directed to the absurd economic and social policies was immidiately
qualified as anti-Romanian and sanctioned as such by the opressive régime.
Without any doubt, the cult of personality carefully cultivated was supported
by a wise foreign policy, of independence and sovereignity. Such foreign policies
were aproved by all Western powers, as well, since the principles of these
policies were most of them part of Helsinki Treaty. Mind that many were the
same as those formulated by Dej in Declaration of April 1964.
Thus the president of Romania, speculating the games of Western leaders,
came to consider himself (due to so many mouthpieces, as well) one of the great
personalities of the contemporary world.
A retrospective view on the last quarter of century of communism rises the
question of possibility for this absurd cult of personality of Ceauºescu and his
despotic régime, especially after the sad experience of Dej. Such a state of things
that brought Romania on the brink of disaster was born at the confluence of three
factors: the stalinist model, the will of the leader and the either active or pasive
acceptance of the population42. The active support was offered by the communist
higher activists (“the nomenclature”), mainly the admierers and councils always
surounding Ceauºescu and local activists. The passive support was offered by
the resigned, humble or indiferent masses, in front of dictatorial decisions even
when those were not in their best interest, affecting their hopes and their human
dignity and freedom. The stand up reaction was almost inexistent, not to be
explained by cowardice attitude, but rather by a temporarily compromise, given
that the cult of personality and the dictatorship both were considered temporary
by their fragility, artificiality, demagogy and lack of truth. Ceauºescu has a syncretic
nature, combining elements of the cult of Mussolini and Hitler, Mao and Kim Ir
Sen (weaving in the same fabric the Asian traditional elements of cult, with the
Sovietic elements of the cult of personality)43.
NOTES
1. Sergiu Tãmaº, Dicþionar politic. Instituþiile
democraþiei ºi cultura civicã, Bucureºti, Editura
Academiei Române, 1993.
2. *** Dicþionar enciclopedic, vol. I, A.C., Bucureºti,
Editura Enciclopedicã, 1993.
3. Ovidiu Trãsnea, Nicolae Kallos (coord.), Micã
enciclopedie de politologie, Bucureºti, Editura
ªtiinþificã ºi Enciclopedicã, 1977, pp. 111–112.
4. O.G. Drobniþki, I.S. Kon (coord.), Mic dicþionar
de eticã, Moscova, Editura de Stat pentru
Literaturã Politicã, 1965, pp. 25–26 (C).
5. Ibidem.
6. N.S. Khrushchev, Raportul de activitate al
Comitetului Central al Partidului Comunist al
Uniunii Sovietice la Congresul al XX-lea al
Partidului, Bucureºti, Editura de Stat pentru
Literaturã Politicã, 1956, p. 134.
7. “Discursul secret” of Khrushchev at the 20th
Congress of CPSU, immediately taken over in
the western press, and in Tariq Ali, The Stalinist
Legacy, Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin
Books, 1984, pp. 256–270, apud Vladimir
Tismãneanu, Reinventarea politicului. Europa
rãsãriteanã de la Stalin la Havel, Iaºi, Polirom,
1997 and A. Rossi, Autopsie du stalinisme, Paris,
1957, apud Raymond Aron, Democraþie ºi
totalitarism, Bucureºti, Editura ALL Educaþional,
2001, pp. 204–220.
80
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
RODICA IAMANDI
Vladimir Tismãneanu, op.cit., p. 74.
Raymond Aron, op. cit., p. 194.
Ibidem, p. 212.
Ibidem, p. 219.
A. Rossi, Autopsie du stalinisme, Paris, 1957,
p. 10, apud Raymond Aron, op. cit., p. 209.
R. Aron, op. cit., p. 211.
Apud Roy Medvedev, Despre Stalin ºi Stalinism,
Bucureºti, Editura Humanitas, 1991, p. 56.
Ibidem, p. 133.
Victor Frunzã, Istoria stalinismului în România,
Bucureºti, Editura Humanitas, 1990, p. 491.
Ibidem.
Silviu Brucan, Generaþia irositã, Bucureºti,
Editura Univers&Calistrat Hogaº, 1992, p. 59.
Gheorghiu-Dej, Darea de seamã a delegaþiei
P.M.R. la cel de-al XX-lea Congres al P.C.U.S.,
în: “Scânteia”, anul XXXI, nr. 5371, 7 decembrie,
1961, p. 1.
Florin Constantiniu, O istorie sincerã a poporului
român, Bucureºti, Editura Univers Enciclopedic,
1997, p. 471.
Not after long, Vasile Luca was arrested, trailed
and at 10th October 1954, sentenced to his death,
sentence changed after the appeal, to a sentence
for life.
“Scânteia”, anul XXI, nr. 2360, 29 mai, 1952, p. 1.
Victor Frunzã, op. cit., p. 423.
Silviu Brucan, op. cit., p. 95.
Dumitru Popescu, Am fost ºi cioplitor de himere,
Bucureºti, Editura Expres, 1994, p. 50.
Ibidem op. cit., p. 153.
Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej, op. cit., p. 1.
Ibidem.
Nicolae Ceauºescu, Cuvântare la adunarea
activului de partid al municipiului Bucureºti, 26
IV 1968.
16
30. Victor Frunzã, op. cit., p. 459, 461.
31. Dumitru Popescu, op. cit., p. 133.
32. Nicolae Ceauºescu, România pe drumul
desãvârºirii construcþiei socialiste, vol. III,
Bucureºti, Editura Politicã, 1969, p. 194.
33. Dumitru Popescu, op. cit., p. 153.
34. Nicolae Ceauºescu, România pe drumul
desãvârºirii construcþiei socialiste, vol. I,
Bucureºti, Editura Politicã, 1968, p. 74.
35. Dumitru Popescu, op. cit., p. 234.
36. Silviu Brucan, op. cit., p. 145.
37. Florin Constantiniu, op. cit., p. 515.
38. Nicolae Ceauºescu, op. cit., vol. I, p. 74.
39. Ibidem, p. 337.
40. Nicolae Ceauºescu, România pe drumul
desãvârºirii construcþiei socialiste, vol. III,
Bucureºti, Editura Politicã, 1969, p. 194.
41. Vlad Georgescu, Politicã ºi istorie. Cazul
comuniºtilor români 1944–1977, München, Jon
Dumitru Verlag, 1983, p. 91.
42. Florin Constantiniu, op. cit., p. 516.
43. See Lavinia Betea, Psihologie politicã. Individ,
lider, mulþime în regimul comunist, Iaºi, Polirom,
2001, pp. 176–177, 188–190, for a development of
this argument, as for a competent identification
and analysis of the propaganda directions that
have built the cult of personality of Nicolae
Ceauºescu: the falsifying of biography, the
identification of the leader with the party, the
people and the country, the appropriation of the
mission of the “saviour” of the nation, the
appropriation of the role of a visionary and
unrested guide for the destiny of the masses, the
appropriation of the status of an international
politician.
ARGUMENTS AND POINTS OF VIEW
REPRESENTATION OF HISTORY
AS CONFLICT PREVENTION STRATEGY.
ARGUMENTS FOR A RESEARCH AGENDA
LUCIAN JORA
Within the international system most countries tend to view the EU as a trade
giant. In a lesser extent EU is considered as a valuable model of regional integration
and security community.
A potential research agenda would examine the EU as an integration model
and security community in relation with East Asia (Japan, China, Korea, ASEAN)
and the Middle East, with the major prospects for regional cooperation.
On the case of EU the regional political agenda among the member states was
followed by programs and projects design to implement it at the grass roots level
within the member state societies. Sometimes it succeeded to achieve the wanted
results and sometimes not. However, during the years European Commission
accumulated trough the implemented projects a valuable experience. This
experience may be useful for the implementation of the East Asian policies of
reconciliation and regional integration. As a known example, the events of World
War II continue to divide many parts of the world, because each country
memorializes the period differently. These contrasting ways of remembering can
be observed in World War II museums, schoolbooks, etc. throughout the region.
Would be useful to assemble data on how war and peace museums and history
school books in key, representative countries for a particular regional system
have chosen to portray this controversial period and to compare them with the
data in key European Union countries, France, Germany, UK. On this sense the
European accumulated experience may be used to reveal the way in which zones
of fracture and conflicts in can be presented not only in their often-dramatic
historical authenticity, but also in terms of their contributions to the identity of
different nations1.
As a general hypothesis we may say that the cultural presence with a display
of nationality as a label is no longer the exclusive precinct of national governments
and their agencies. It occurs widely, driven by all types of transnational interests,
emanating from politics, economy, education, science, culture and civil society,
in a diversity of exchanges and collaborative forms. The trends towards globalization
and localization are increasing the complexity of this trend. Teaching history in
a certain manner can be a tool for encouraging students to be critical, and think
Pol. Sc. Int. Rel., II, 2, p. 81–85, Bucharest, 2005.
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LUCIAN JORA
2
about how they can tolerate a plurality of views about what is right and what is
wrong. This is essential in creating security communities at the grass roots level.
As general theoretic background research themes we propose the following:
The Process of Reconciliation: From Diplomatic to Educational Initiatives; The
challenges to teach tolerance towards historical enemies; The Impact of Democratic
Development on Contested History2.
Having in mind the European approach we are meant to ask and find answers
to the questions like: What constitutes the local national approach? How does
one interpret the historic heritage in local national terms? What constitutes the
basis for a plural reading of the city and its history in the European versus the
local extra-European respective case? The suitable techniques dedicated to bring
the historic heritage and experience of a particular country to the world; what is
the place represented by academia as source of public policy initiative involving
the representation of history? Having in mind that trough the European Heritage
Days, efforts have been made to propose subjects common to many countries at
the same time (heritage and society, industrial heritage, etc.).
Equally important are the means to insure visibility and social impact for the
research findings For instance we consider that cultural discourse must connect
with economic, political and media discourses or risk being ignored by the decision
makers.
The link between culture (representation of history) and development is not
yet properly studied. I hope to set up the foundations for a research agenda on
this crucial connection. Within the present research it may apply by finding ways
to integrate the academic approach of historians with the contemporary approach
of cultural industries and public policies. The convergence of culture and trade
interests is leading to new relationships between cultural institutes and the private
sector, though many annalists are considering unclear whether this new agenda
will impact adversely on cooperation between the institutes or other national
players3. Equally important are the means to insure visibility and social impact
for the research findings For instance we consider once more that cultural discourse
must connect with economic, political and media discourses or risk being ignored
by the decision makers.
For example the use of cultural investments for increasing the prestige and
for improving international image of a place are methods currently applied by
cities like Paris, Barcelona, Frankfurt, Bilbao, etc. Analyzing the connection
between the cultural infrastructure and development in East Asia may reveal a
way to insure visibility for the theoretical findings which otherwise are usually
ignored by the decision makers.
The research results will be the raw material to design a project design
submitted first to further universities and then to international organizations of
the region. Once agreed at the international level those structures may persuade
the national structures toward concrete national policies regarding cultural and
educational initiatives.
The same research agenda need to debate the medium of representation.
In our historiographic practices, we are inclined to use visual images as a
3
REPRESENTATION OF HISTORY AS CONFLICT PREVENTION STRATEGY
83
complement of our written discourse, rather than as components of a discourse
in its own right, by means of which we might be able to say something different
from and other than what we can say in verbal form. We are inclined to use pictures
primarily as “illustrations” of the predications made in our verbally written
discourse.
We have not on the whole exploited the possibilities of using images as a
principal medium of discursive representation, using verbal commentary only
diacritically, that is to say, to direct attention to, specify, and emphasize a
meaning conveyable by visual means alone. Some things — the cites landscapes,
sounds, strong emotions, certain kinds of conflicts between individuals and groups,
collective events and the movements of crowds — can be better represented on
film (and, we might add, video) than in any merely verbal account. “Better” here
would mean not only with greater verisimilitude or stronger emotive effect but
also less ambiguously, more accurately.
Every written history is a product of processes of condensation, displacement,
symbolization, and qualification exactly like those used in the production of a
filmed representation. It is only the medium that differs, not the way in which
messages are produced.
As a theoretic model we rely on the concept first pioneered by Karl Deutsch
and developed nowadays by Emanuel Adler: security communities4. Basically
a security community is a regional system, where trough continuous dialog,
diplomacy, communication, shared prosperity, common economic interests, the
military means to settle an interstate dispute become unthinkable. The European
Community was design as a security community. It started as a mean to prevent
a further war between France and Germany trough common economic interests,
mutual control over the strategic industries and regional integration. The success
of EC as a model of regional integration and security community determined
leading scholars to examine security communities in various historical and
regional contexts: in places where they exist, where they are emerging, and where
they are hardly detectable. This kind of approach is based on the constructivist
theory. It is an approach to international relations, security and development
studies opposite to Hans Morgenthau Realist approach. It may prove more suitable
to the 21st century international system.
Within the study the terms memory and historical memory are used
interchangeably to mean the manner in which the past is socially interpreted:
Such memories are communicated via all manner of cultural products, including
programmatic political statements, popular journalism, film, literature, high art,
as well as historiography itself. Ultimately, they contribute to the self-identification
of individuals, together or as separate groups.
The term Representation of History (see Graphic ) is understood as the way
we use to valorize the products of historical research to the general public.
It is a matter of skills, and specific lobby with cultural, politic and economic
implications. After all any historic fact is a complexity and the manner a
historian represent it to the public may create bridges of communication, or
grow enemies.
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LUCIAN JORA
Culture
Representation
of
History
4
5
REPRESENTATION OF HISTORY AS CONFLICT PREVENTION STRATEGY
85
NOTES
1. Interarts and EFAH, Study on Cultural
Cooperation in Europe — June 2003. See also:
Report on cultural cooperation in the European
Union, 2000/2323(INI), Committee on Culture,
Youth, Education, the Media and Sport,
Rapporteur: Giorgio Ruffolo, 2001.
2. Related research projects active at the present or
recently finished:
– Carnegie Council on Ethics and International
Affairs, The History and the Politics of
Reconciliation Program.
– Laura Hein and Mark Selden, In Censoring
History: Citizenship and Memory in Japan,
Germany and the United States, M.E. Sharpe,
2000.
– Takashi Yoshida (Western Michigan University),
History Education and Reconciliation: The
Choice between Examining Japanese Wartime
Aggression and Revitalizing Nationalism;
Remembering the Pacific War WWII Museums in
China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.
– Roland Bleiker (University of Queensland),
and Yong-ju Hoang (Pusan University of Foreign
Studies): From Confrontation to Cooperation in
the Two Koreas, The Role of History Education
in Promoting Reconciliation.
– Carolyn Kissane (Columbia University),
Lessons from the Classrooms of Kazakhstan:
Teaching Reconciliation and Understanding in a
Time of Transition.
– Alison Kitson (University of Warwick), History
Textbooks in Northern Ireland.
– Thomas D. Sherlock (United States Military
Academy), Secondary School History Texts: The
Case of Russia.
3. MKW Wirtschaftsforschung GmbH, Exploitation
and development of the job potential in the
cultural sector in the age of digitalisation,
Brussels, Directorate-General for Employment
and Social Affairs, European Commission, 2001.
For the entire problematic see also:European
Parliament, opinion on the communication from
the Commission entitled Cohesion policy and
culture:a contribution to employment, rapporteur.
L. Vecchio, p.8, PE 222.345.
4. Emanuel Adler, Michael N Barnett (editors),
Security communities, London, Cambridge
University Press, 1998.
CULIANU IN ITALIA
ROBERTA MORETTI
Le tappe italiane
L’Italia ha avuto un posto speciale nella vita e nell’itinerario intellecttuale di
Ioan P. Culianu. I suoi studi sulla gnosi sono legati al periodo trascorso come
borsista all’Università Cattolica di Milano (1973–1976), dove segue le lezioni di
Ugo Bianchi. Il trasferimento in Olanda, dal 1976 al 1986, non aveva interrotto
il dialogo con amici, colleghi e alcuni editori italiani. In Italia aveva pubblicato
la monografia su Mircea Eliade (Cittadella, Assisi, 1978), e i seguenti altri libri:
Gnosticismo e pensiero moderno: Hans Jonas (L’Erma di Bretschneider, Roma,
1985), Religione e potere (Marietti, Torino, 1981), Iter in Silvis (Sfameni, Messina,
1981). E se le opere successive: Expériences de l’extase (Payot, Parigi 1984),
Eros et Magie à la Renaissance, 1484 (Flammarion, Parigi, 1984), Les gnoses
dualistes d’Occident (Payot, Parigi, 1987) usciranno in Francia e Out of This World
in USA, (Shambhala, Boston, 1991), esse avranno non di meno edizioni italiane.
Alcuni intellettuali e studiosi italiani cominciarono ad accorgersi di Culianu
abbastanza presto. Elémire Zolla negli anni Settanta lo notò come autore di
alcuni articoli specialistici, quei testi — scrive — “mi imponevano una ressa di
quesiti: il tono era di chi ha accumulato una conoscenza vastissima e quindi
opera sulle varie questioni religiose ordinandone gli elementi con calma infinita
e anche con un sottile divertimento”1.
Eros e magia nel Rinascimento aveva ottenuto, come riconosce Paola Zambelli,
studiosa della scuola fiorentina di E. Garin, un “notevole successo”, anche se le
tesi di Culianu di rado venivano condivise2. Anche P.O. Kristeller, l’autorevole
specialista americano di studi sul Rinascimento, si era accorto di quell’opera di
Culianu. Nell’edizione riveduta de Il pensiero filosofico di Marsilio Ficino3,
Kristeller cita nella bibliografia Eros e Magia nel Rinascimento dopo averne
consultate le versioni inglese e francese. Né gli fu ignota la prima tesi di laurea
(non pubblicata) che Culianu discusse a Bucarest nel 1972.
Un altro attento autore italiano di Culianu era stato Giovanni Casadio,
docente di storia delle religioni all’Università di Salerno. Autore, tra l’altro,
di “Vie gnostiche all’immortalità” (Morcelliana, Brescia, 1997). Nell’articolo
Ricordo di Ioan Petru Culianu (1950–1991) pubblicato nel n. 16 di “Religioni e
Società” (maggio-agosto 1993), Casadio sottolinea il riavvicinarsi dello studioso
romeno all’Italia: “Dal 1987 — scrive Casadio — riprendono — e diventano
Pol. Sc. Int. Rel., II, 2, p. 86–96, Bucharest, 2005.
2
CULIANU IN ITALIA
87
progressivamente sempre più stretti — i rapporti con l’Italia, il paese, in fondo
al quale il nostro è spiritualmente più legato, dopo la patria rumena”4.
Il legame speciale con l’Italia è ribadito da L.E. Sullivan quando dice:
(Culianu) “amava l’Italia, anche se le circostanze difficili, in cui ºi dibatté,
lo fecero soffrire... Per lui però Italia era anche il posto dove era stato ben
accolto, in cui aveva potuto riprendere gli studi. L’Italia era la «casa» dei
pensieri per cui nutriva più ammirazione, Ficino, Bruno ed altri esponenti del
Rinascimento occulto fiorentino... Penso che le sequenze storiche che
maggiormente lo interessavano, anche dal punto di vista dell’immaginazione
letteraria erano italiane... L’Italia era stata per lui come una porta, che ha
attraversato per entrare in un mondo altro, un luogo di passaggio per entrare in
altre dimensioni”5.
Nel 1987 Culianu e Hillary passarono due settimane nella città di Firenze
visitando i monumenti. Culianu era già stato a Firenze quindici anni prima
quando arrivò per la prima volta in Italia con la borsa di studio per seguire i corsi
all’Università per stranieri di Perugia. Per lo studioso romeno Firenze aveva una
forte valenza d’anima, riflessa nei suoi studi sul Rinascimento, una città che
alimentava altresì la sua immaginazione narrativa. Ted Anton in Eros, Magic,
and the Murder of Professor Culianu (Northwestern, 1996, p. 149 ss.) scrive che
“per Culianu, Firenze era prima di tutto, la città di Sandro Botticelli, l’artista le
cui sculture e pitture celebravano la potenza delle dee. Ioan e Hillary — scrive
Anton — ritornarono più volte agli Uffizi per vedere La Primavera di
Botticelli...”. Secondo Anton, Culianu condivideva con Botticelli l’ossessione
per le figure di dee, e Hillary, dallo studioso innamorato veniva associata alla
Venere botticelliana.
Casadio, a sua volta, ricorda la “visita-lampo a Firenze nel gennaio 1987 [che
Culianu fece] per familiarizzarsi con i luoghi dove voleva ambientare il suo
secondo romanzo (inedito), una sorta di giallo che narra delle oscure trame che
al tempo del Savonarola «cercano di cancellare l’immagine della bellezza, di
distruggere un quadro del Botticelli»...”6
Nel 1989 quando Culianu è professore all’Università di Chicago, riceve un
invito da Grazia Marchianò dell’Università di Siena per un giro di conferenze.
La prima nel febbraio 1989 alla biblioteca di Palazzo Pretorio ad Arezzo. Il tema
concordato è La sacralità femminile; il secondo incontro è a Siena dove parla su
La magia del Tasso; a Roma nel Dipartimento di Letterature Comparate tiene
una lezione sull’esoterismo nell’opera di Carlos Castaneda; a Firenze all’Istituto
Stensen dialoga con Zolla sull’eredità di Eliade; ad Assisi nella libreria “Oriente
e Occidente” illustra il pensiero di Mircea Eliade.
Alla Facoltà di Lettere di Siena l’invito gli viene da Sandro Briosi (m. 1998),
che Culianu aveva conosciuto all’Università di Groninga, dove Briosi insegnava
prima di ricevere l’incarico di professore di letteratura italiana a Siena. Informato
da Grazia Marchianò dell’arrivo di Culianu gli chiede di tenere una conferenza
su La magia nel Tasso.
Le due conferenze ad Arezzo e ad Assisi furono registrate in due cassette
audio da 60 minuti e ci è stato perciò possibile ascoltarle.
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ROBERTA MORETTI
3
In entrambe le conferenze Ioan Petru Culianu è introdotto da Marchianò. Ad
Arezzo era venuto ad ascoltare Culianu Ugo Bianchi e ad Assisi era presente
E. Zolla.
Nella conferenza di Assisi (12 febbraio 1989), Mircea Eliade e il suo pensiero,
G. Marchianò ricordava quando anni indietro si era imbattuta nel nome di
Culianu, a proposito dell’articolo: La femme céleste et son ombre, pubblicato su
“Numen” 23 (1976): “Ricordo che mi colpì questo studioso e mi chiesi chi potesse
essere. Poi l’episodio si è eclissato nella mia mente, sono passati anni finché di
recente, seppure non ricordi lo spunto immediato, scrissi a Culianu a Chicago
proponendogli di venire in Italia per una serie di conferenze in varie università.
Lui fu amabile e disponibilissimo: «Si mi capita di venire in Olanda in febbraio
— le rispose —, si può senz’altro combinare».” Grazia Marchianò ad Assisi
sottolineava alcuni aspetti della personalità di Eliade, e l’eredità intellettuale
raccolta dal discepolo Ioan P. Culianu.
Ad Arezzo il tema della Sacralità femminile è trattato da Culianu a partire da
un dettaglio dell’abbigliamento della donna, la scarpa col tacco alto. Culianu
fece scorrere delle diapositive su un gran numero di calzature femminili di molte
epoche e tradizioni, e una certa sorpresa si diffuse in sala. Un taglio interpretativo
di questo genere era nuovo al pubblico che lo ascoltava. Il Prof. Conci riconosceva
che Culianu “ci ha mostrato come leggere oggetti, segni culturali in una chiave
che francamente non la si riteneva prima di lui così idonea a mostrare antiche
stratificazioni culturali”. Il Prof. Dini che, con Conci e altri colleghi, stava all’epoca
effecttuando ricerche antropologiche nel territorio aretino, in particolare sulle
matres locali, cercando di comprendere come certi elementi di origine arcaica
tendono a riproporsi, era rimasto colpito dal modo in cui Culianu, aveva accostato
“questa continuità sacrale attraverso certe immagini”. Le reazioni di altri furono
critiche, a voltre polemiche. Tra gli intervenuti, la Dott.ssa Bertini, il Prof. Ricci,
la Prof.ssa Tasinato, il Prof. Bucci, il Prof. Lieberg.
Nel 1989 sulla rivista romana “Abstracta” esce un profilo di Mircea Eliade, nella
serie “Invito alla lettura di...”, a cura di Grazia Marchianò7. Culianu tratteggia
quelle che definisce le «sette anime» di Mircea Eliade e le sfaccettature della sua
complessa personalità. Culianu scrive: “Profonda è in Eliade la convinzione che
l’esperienza religiosa degli «specialisti del sacro» — lo yogin, lo sciamano,
l’alchimista — è ripetuta da ognuno di noi, ma in modo incosciente”.
Elémire Zolla ricordava il soggiorno italiano di Culianu in un articolo su
“Panorama” (aprile 1989), quando i due studiosi avevano dialogato tra di loro.
L’arrivo in Italia di I.P. Culianu aveva coinciso con l’uscita della versione
italiana della tesi di Dottorato alla Sorbona: I Miti dei dualismi occidentali (Jaca
Book, Milano, 1989), un’opera le cui conclusioni suscitarono qualche sconcerto,
ma anche un’attenzione critica vibrante, come nel capitolo iniziale dell’opera
Sugli orienti del pensiero di Grazia Marchianò, construito sul contrappunto tra
mitologie dell’Occidente e mitologie dell’Oriente8.
Nel 1989 Culianu parla sullo Gnosticismo all’Università «La Sapienza» di
Roma su invito di Ugo Bianchi, e al congresso dell’AAR–SBL (American
Academy of Religion – Society of Biblical Literature), tenutosi quell’anno ad
4
CULIANU IN ITALIA
89
Anaheim in California. Lo stesso anno tiene delle trasmissioni in romeno su
Mircea Eliade per la BBC, ed è poi a Dublino per parlare della “Religione tra
spiritualismo e la Fisica dei Quanti” e la “Religione come Sistema”.
Il 1989 e 1990 sono gli anni più italiani della coppia Culianu – Wiesner. Nella
primavera del 1990 Grazia Marchianò invita Culianu come professore a contratto
per il trimestre dal 1° marzo al 1° giugno (A.A. 1989–1990), ad Arezzo dove tiene
un seminario per la cattedra di Estetica. Il tema di questo ciclo di lezioni
riguardava Faust: un mito alle radici dell’Occidente. Assegna esercitazioni
sull’argomento a varie studentesse. Il suo italiano è fluente, i modi semplici e la
naturale simpatia attenuano la soggezione di chi lo ascolta conquistato dalla sua
erudizione.
In febbraio esce un articolo su “Panorama” (n. 18, 1990), dal titolo E’morto
il re — occhio all’erede, in cui Culianu analizza gli ultimi eventi della politica
romena. Tiene altre conferenze: il 3 maggio è all’Università di Salerno su invito
di M. Oldoni e R. Rusconi, dove parla delle Correnti dualistiche medievali; il 4
maggio è all’Istituto Suor Orsola Benincasa a Napoli, dove presenta insieme a la
narratrice Elisabetta Rasy, Marchianò, Conci e Trione l’opera di Zolla, che era
uscita nel febbraio del 1990: Verità segrete esposte in evidenza. Sincretismo e
fantasia. Contemplazione e esotericità (Marsilio, Venezia)9.
Il 1990 è un anno fervido di iniziative che nascono in territorio italiano.
Marchianò e Culianu stilano un progetto che trae ispirazione dall’approssimarsi
del centenario del “Parliament of Religions”10, in programma a Chicago nel
1993. Il progetto prevedeva una conferenza internazionale, una sorta di piccolo
parlamento delle religioni in Italia, simmetrico al grande evento a Chicago. I due
studiosi decidono di proporre il progetto all’allora direttore dell’Istituto Suor
Orsola Benincasa di Napoli, il Prof. Villani. L’occasione fu data dalla presentazione
del libro di E. Zolla tenuta dallo stesso Villani all’Istituto Suor Orsola. Quella
stessa sera il progetto fu esposto a Villani, ma la sua reazione fu tiepida e non se
ne fece nulla. Fu così persa l’occasione di ricordare in Italia un evento che negli
Stati Uniti rappresentò un nodo cruciale nella storia delle religioni. (Traggo
questi commenti da una conversazione con la Sig.ra Marchianò).
Va invece a buon fine il progetto di un volume per i sessantacinque anni di
Elémire Zolla. Grazia Marchianò ne parla a Culianu che accetta con entusiasmo
di contribuire con un suo saggio11. L’editore Red di Como accetta di pubblicarlo.
Culianu ne incontra il Direttore Rosenberg Colorni in occasione della partecipazione
a un incontro con Roberto Calasso e Michele Placido alla Fiera del Libro a
Torino (maggio 1990).
Nel giugno del’90 esce un altro articolo su “Panorama” dal titolo La realtà?
Sono due. La rivista “Abstracta”, n. 50 (luglio-agosto ’90), pubblica il racconto
breve dal titolo Il pentimento tardivo di Horemheb, già pubblicato negli Stati
Uniti sulla “Harvard Review”. Anche questo racconto viene concepito durante
un viaggio con Hillary al Cairo, a Gerusalemme e in Spagna. Hillary all’epoca
preparava la sua tesi di dottorato a Harvard sulla filosofia di al-Kindi. Un altro
racconto breve esce su “Leggere” (n. 18/1990) si intitola La Sequenza Segreta,
ed è presentato da E. Zolla. In America La Sequenza Segreta esce sulla “New
90
ROBERTA MORETTI
5
York Review of Science Fiction”, con una simpatica presentazione di poche righe
di Hillary Wiesner.
Questi due anni italiani sono ricordati anche dall’amico Giovanni Casadio, il
quale osserva come essi vedano “anche il saldarsi del suo sodalizio con un
maestro del paradosso come Zolla, al quale lo legavano da tempo affinità elettive
e che può del resto considerarsi il suo terzo mentore dopo Eliade e Bianchi...12”
Casadio ricorda anche un saggio di Grazia Marchianò in cui i due studiosi sono
messi a confronto: Le aure di un tempo concluso in La religione della terra13.
Molti impegni aspettano Culianu negli USA dopo il periodo italiano: le lezioni
alla Divinity School, i progetti concordati con Eliade da portare a termine, l’avvio
della rivista “Incognita”, la pubblicazione dei Miti dei dualismi occidentali in
versione americana, e un altro libro, l’ultimo, su i viaggi ultraterreni in una
prospettiva comparativa.
Murato nel suo appartamento a Chicago — dove nell’inverno del 1990–1991
aveva subito il furto del computer — Culianu scrive fino a notte fonda. Le
telefonate con la fidanzata a Harvard gli danno fugaci momenti felici. Di giorno
lavora alla Divinity School, gli studenti si affollano nel suo studio al terzo piano.
Sembra che nella primavera del 1991 ricevesse minacce di morte. Ne parla
distrattamente con Hillary, ma prosegue per la sua strada fino a quel 21 di maggio.
Verso le ore 19,30 ora italiana, Grazia Marchianò, ancora nel suo studio ad Arezzo,
riceve una telefonata da E. Zolla che le riferisce di una chiamata di un amico da
Chicago: Giovanni Culianu è stato assassinato.
Il 5 giugno del 1991, anche all’Università di Arezzo si commemorava la figura
di Ioan Petru Culianu:
“Caro Preside — scriveva Marchianò al Prof. D.A. Conci — Ioan P. Culianu,
Professore di Storia delle Religioni all’Università di Chicago, fondatore e
direttore della rivista «Incognita», ...studioso illustre del mondo accademico
internazionale, è morto il 21 maggio a Chicago, come riferito nella stampa nazionale
e internazionale. Aneva 41 anni.
Culianu è stato professore a contratto presso la Cattedra di Estetica, nella nostra
Facoltà nel trimestre marzo-giugno 1990.
Suggerisco che nel prossimo Consiglio di Facoltà del 5 giugno, la Sua figura
venga brevemente ricordata, e un minuto di silenzio sia osservato alla Sua memoria”.
La conferenza aretina di Culianu
La conferenza sul tema “La sacralità femminile”, illustrata da varie diapositive,
si svolse nella sede della Biblioteca Comunale di Arezzo ai primi di febbraio
1989 nell’ambito dei “Colloqui interdisciplinari di Estetica”, organizzati presso
la Biblioteca dalla Prof.ssa Marchianò. Da Roma vennero ad ascoltare il Prof.
Culianu, il Prof. Ugo Bianchi, col quale Culianu si era rilaureato alla Cattolica
di Milano, la Signora Bianchi e il Prof. Giovanni Casadio. Alla trascrizione del
testo, facciamo precedere un breve commento.
Culianu dirige il suo sguardo sulla semiotica del corpo femminile e con perizia
e pazienza, rintraccia i “camuffamenti” moderni di una sacralità antica di millenni.
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91
Una sacralità che investe il corpo femminile, un tempo venerato per la sua forza
creatrice, associato alla terra madre, fecondata dalle piogge e dall’aratro, e immagine
della fertilità.
Questo tipo di sacralità, e insieme ad essa la figura femminile, è però mutata
con le varie culture e epoche che si sono traversate. Culianu osserva il percorso
dell’immagine femminile nella storia, a partire dalle veneri steatopigie (dai grandi
fianchi) fino alle modelle di Vogue con corsetti, rossetti e tacchi.
Dopo il Cinque-Seicento “la sacralità femminile — dice Culianu — compie
un passo, per così dire, miracoloso, scende completamente in terra coinvolgendo
la stessa donna; coinvolgendola nel sacro più che nel passato”. Culianu si
riferisce qui ad un meccanismo complesso che non sembrerebbe coinvolgere
nessuna sacralità, ma invece — dice — “ci porta quanto mai vicino alla dimensione
sacrale perché ci spiega come essa si formi e nasca”.
L’uomo moderno “areligioso” si libera del sacro diventando un soggetto che
interviene in modo attivo nella storia. Culianu esamina qui un aspetto di questa
libertà manifesto nella figura femminile depurata dall’idea che per millenni le
era stata associata di incarnare una “ierofania della vita”. La sacralità femminile
è dunque soggetta a mutamento, il fatto che non riusciamo più a riconoscere e
decifrare i segni ierofanici non significa però che essi siano scomparsi. In un
articolo su Abstracta (marzo, 1989), Culianu scriveva che “sebbene la oerofania
sia in un certo senso intemporale, essa conosce mutamenti a seconda del tipo di
cultura materiale di cui si tratta... Primordiali e fuori da ogni condizionamento
culturale sembrano essere lo «spazio» e il «tempo» sacri, vale a dire la visione
sacrale dello spazio e del tempo”.
La sacralità femminile sarebbe cambiata dal momento in cui la donna,
liberata dalle funzioni misteriose legate alla vita e alla morte, scende dal piano
divino nel proprio corpo. L’espressione della sua autonomia si manifesterebbe
nell’ambiguità del monstrum, una combinazione di forme che, specifica Culianu,
si riscontrano già nel mondo antico14, soprattutto tra uomo e animale. Ed è
proprio nella combinazione del corpo umano con il corpo equino che Culianu
rintraccia un aspetto rilevante probabilmente all’origine dell’apparizione della
moda del tacco alto.
Culianu nella sua conferenza sottolinea un fatto inquietante: che la sacralità
“scende ora nel corpo femminile come se questo non fosse altro che un’astrazione
la cui realtà è negoziabile”. L’ipotesi che la realità sia negoziabile e prenda
forma mediante astrazioni (l’idea del corpo è un’astrazione), sposta la questione
sul processo mentale. Sono le idee a generare la realtà, ed essa è quanto mai
instabile, mutevole, e soprattutto il prodotto delle nostre menti:
“Non esiste un concetto di realtà stabile — dice Culianu — la realtà la facciamo
noi, la producono le nostre menti... non esiste un corpo di donna ma esiste uno
strumento la cui realtà è negoziabile, nel senso che lo si può cambiare e rendere
visualmente diverso in sommo grado, e in varie epoche lo si è fatto e in modi
molto diversi”.
La donna è un’astrazione che cangia a seconda della cultura materiale in cui
è inserita e a seconda delle idee che l’hanno generata. A seconda della cultura da
92
ROBERTA MORETTI
7
cui è pensata, prende forma, si modella, si mostra. Il concetto di sacralità in
questi termini sembra perdersi, ma non è di questo parere Culianu che invece
sottolinea il lato oscuro, complesso e ambiguo della donna.
Il suo significato, dice Culianu, “è talmente intricato da essere stato trascurato
finora quasi del tutto”. Perciò decifrarlo non è facile, e richiede un’immensa
pazienza. Il tacco non è che un aspetto di questa transformazione, un segno la
cui dimensione profonda è sacrale, il suo aspetto è sfuggente e occorre una
sensibilità tutta speciale per coglierne i tratti.
L’attenzione spostata sul processo mentale permette di cogliere la potenza
generatrice e creativa della realtà. L’immaginazione solitamente considerata un
ingrediente letterario, viene in tal modo ad agire su un aspetto delle realtà comune
e ordinaria: l’abbigliamento e la sua dinamica sociale, la moda. Culianu nella
sua esposizione si addentra decisamente a fondo in questo fenomeno.
“La sacralità femminile non appartiene solo al passato ma si trova letteralmente
in mezzo a noi, ovunque ci sia almeno un essere umano, quale che sia il suo
sesso, ma comunque consapevole dell’esistenza dell’altro sesso. La sacralità
femminile appartiene alla struttura del mondo perché non c’è un mondo senza di
noi, e se noi non ci fissimo, non ci sarebbe alcun mondo15.
La sacralità femminile, in quanto relazione dinamica, credo non si possa
definire come un fatto (ted. Tatsache), ma tutt’al più come un accadere (ted.
Geschehen). Penso inoltre che essa faccia parte della costituzione del mondo ad
un titolo paragonabile a quello dell’elemente idrogeno, carbone o zolfo.
Una sacralità femminile allo stato puro non esiste: essa è volatile, sfuggente,
non la si ritrova se non in combinazioni e perciò descriverla è innanzitutto il
mestiere dello storico. Ma siccome, non sempre fortunatamente, lo storico è un
mestierante, neanche un bricoleur ma un mestierante, un collezionista di scatole
vuote e di cicche già spente, può non sapere dove rivolgersi per trovarla.
(...) Come loro forse sanno, in un suo celebre libro Le Dee e gli Dei dell’antica
Europa, Marija Gimbutas presenta un ipotesi sulla religione dell’antica Europa.
Durante il neolitico e l’età del rame ... dalla metà del V millennio a.C. fino alla
metà del III millennio a.C., si delinea attraverso i reperti archeologici una cultura
dai tratti unitari. (...) Secondo questa tesi l’antica Europa prima delle invasioni
indoeuropee ha conosciuto, dalla fine del paleolitico fino al neolitico, una cultura
che Gimbutas non definisce matriarcale, secondo la terminologia di Bachofen,
bensi matrifocale. (...) Essa appare pacifica e sedentaria, in un territorio che si
estende dal litorale orientale del Mar Nero e del Mediterraneo fini all’Egeo e
l’Adriatico. In tutti i reperti archeologici della zona, che sono moltissimi, la
Gimbutas rinviene statuine di una dea rappresentata come la corpulenta venere
paleolitica. A volte ha le fattezze di un uccello acquatico, a volte come una donna
serpente; queste figurine inoltre presentano spesso la particolarità di rappresentare
sia una donna poderosa, dai glutei pronunciati, e sia la forma di un fallo. A questa
dea spesso si accompagna qualche animale...
Dopo che le invasioni indoeuropee ebbero imposto una cultura patriarcale
violenta, di pastori seminomadi, il culto della dea sopravvisse probabilmente
nell’antica Grecia e nell’Anatolia occidentale dove la dea ha ormai preso le
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CULIANU IN ITALIA
93
forme delle possenti divinità Ecate e Artemide, poi imparentate con le dee
anatoliche...
(...) Talvolta dove c’è una grande madre da venerare, c’è anche un grande
fallo, e l’accento può cadere su un’infinità di aspetti della sacralità che mai si
escludono a vicenda. Non c’è un modello fisso tale per cui la grande madre
escluda un dio maschile. A Mohenjo Daro e Harappa nella valle dell’Indo, verso
il duemila a.C. fiori una civiltà il cui culto domestico era incentrato sulla matrona
divina, mentre il culto pubblico prendeva di mira il fallo di un animale potente.
Nello stesso modo in cui la terra senza aratro e senza seme non produce virgulti,
così donna e uomo non sono contrari ma complementari, come le due facce di
una moneta o di un foglio di carta.
Nell’opera di Carmela Borgery, The God’s Obscured, l’autrice ha tracciato la
metamorfosi delle dee in sante durante il medioevo cristiano. La sua tesi, che è
stata poi abbracciata da vari rappresentanti della corrente femminista non
radicale americana, evidenzia che c’è una continuità tra l’antica Europa e l’Europa
medievale. Il cristianesimo è una religione chiaramente patrifocale eppure nel
basso medioevo, come sappiamo, Maria ritorna con onore nella sacra famiglia
celeste in qualità né più né meno di madre di dio e non di semplice generatrice
di Cristo.
(...) Il più possente ricettacolo cristiano dell’antica dea madre è la vergine
Maria. Come la dea Demetra essa è capace di influire sulla produzione dei cereali
e, se è ben disposta, il grano cresce subito nei campi, in caso contrario appassisce.
(...) Ora compierò un passo pericoloso lanciandomi nel vuoto, perché ormai
la grande dea dopo Giordano Bruno, dopo il ‘600, il Cinque-Seicento, non è più
visibile... La sacralità femminile compie un passo, per così dire, miracoloso,
scende in terra coinvolgendo la donna; coinvolgendola nel sacro più che nel
passato. Ovviamente non voglio dire che non ci fossero prima molte categorie di
sacerdotesse, profetesse, sciamane o streghe che partecipavano direttamente alla
dimensione del sacro, né penso alla sacralità di funzioni tipicamente femminili
come la gestazione, il parto e la nutrizione... penso qui invece ad un meccanismo,
che poi cercherò di illustrare con l’aiuto di qualche diapositiva, molto complesso,
e che per natura non sembrerebbe coinvolgere nessuna sacralità, invece ci
conduce quanto mai vicino alla dimensione sacrale perché probabilmente può
darci una spiegazione di come essa si formi e nasca. Mi spiego: le funzioni
misteriose della donna, le sue possibilità di accogliere e generare una nuova vita
sono state oggi desacralizzate..., uno dei risultati di questa liberazione è stato lo
spostamento della sacralità che non mi sembra più così incentrata sui misteri
della vita e della morte. E’interessante notare che da una parte, il culto della dea
scende dalle sue altezze, dalle alture celesti e metafisiche e investe la donna
medesima, e d’altra parte la donna non è più vista, e riporto qui un’espressione
cara a Mircea Eliade, come “ierofania della Vita”, ma come un essere di cui o in
cui si creano e si coltivano certe ambiguità, un monstrum, etimologicamente una
creatura per essere mostrata.
Questa è l’ipotesi che cercherò di illustrare, e cioè che la sacralità scende ora
nel corpo femminile come se questo non fosse altro che una astrazione la cui
94
ROBERTA MORETTI
9
realtà è negoziabile. A riguardo mi vengono in mente quei lobbisti che portano
dei bottoni con delle iscrizioni buffe, una delle quali dice: reality is negotiable
(la realtà è negoziabile).
Non esiste un concetto di realtà stabile, la realtà siamo noi a farla, la producono
le nostre menti e in effetti, come si vedrà tra poco, non esiste un corpo di donna
ma uno strumento la cui realtà è negoziabile, nel senso che lo si può cambiare e
rendere visualmente diverso in sommo grado; da un’epoca all’altra lo si è fatto
e in modi molto diversi.
(...) Mi occuperò di un solo aspetto di questa transformazione, ed èquello
dell’apparizione e continuazione della moda del tacco alto.
(...) Il fenomeno del tacco alto è di solito associato, sia storicamente che
tipologicamente, al trattamento cosmetico delle labbra e delle unghie femminili,
ma io dovrò qui limitarmi soltanto ai tacchi. (...) Prima di cominciare vorrei
aggiungere una cosa, e cioè che qui la sacralità non è palese, tutt’altro, essa è
rinchiusa all’interno di mille gusci che non hanno apparentemente nulla di sacro.
Se però leggiamo i segni come si deve, realizzeremo di quanto sia seria e profonda
la dimensione del fenomeno e di quanto questa dimensione coinvolga le medesime
facoltà che noi associamo con la venerazione e il culto delle divinità.
Cominciamo con un po’ di storia, parlavo prima della donna come monstrum,
una combinazione che si riscontra già nel mondo antico come quella che
combina il corpo umano e quello equino. Questa combinazione ha una parte
importantissima nella costituzione, accettazione e successo della moda dei tacchi
alti; qui comincia la storia vera e propria, a partire dallo zoccolo.
Gli zoccoli furono probabilmente introdotti a Venezia nel XV secolo. Il primo
paio fu descritto nel 1494 da un viaggiatore sbalordito, un toscano che andava a
Gerusalemme e fermatosi a Venezia vide e descrisse ciò che poi verrà ripetuto
ad nauseam fino al XVII secolo: degli zoccoli che rendono il camminare
problematico. Le cortigiane venete che avevano adottato questi zoccoli non
potevano più camminare senza l’aiuto di due serve, e anche in questo caso a
grande fatica.
A questo punto ci sarebbero varie cose da dire: sebbene l’origine storica degli
zoccoli sia orientale e la moda sia stata ripresa dagli Arabi, essa è stata incoraggiata
sia localmente che in altre parti d’Italia dal clero. Il Vaticano ha incoraggiato nel
‘500 questa moda degli zoccoli perché metteva fine ai balli e nascondeva le parti
inferiori del corpo femminile. A Venezia questa moda veniva incoraggiata sia da
laici intorno al Doge che dal clero, per far sì che la donna non uscisse più tanto
di casa.
Il coturno greco ad esempio, simile ai sandali a piattaforma, serviva agli
attori sul palcoscenico per impersonare divinità, in quanto le divinità dovevano
essere più alte dei comuni mortali. Esisteva poi una leggenda greca secondo
cui la moda degli zoccoli ricevesse, similmente al consiglio veneto, l’assenso e
l’incoraggiamento dei sapienti per far sì che la donna rimanesse a casa il più
possibile.
Qui incontriamo tutti i fondamentalismi religiosi basati sull’idea che la donna
debba essere una casalinga chiusa tra quattro mura. La più pazzesca conseguenza
10
CULIANU IN ITALIA
95
di questo principio si manifestò all’inizio dell’XI secolo quando il califfo
fatimide del Cairo Al Hakim il pazzo, prese delle misure che proibivano a tutte
le donne di uscire dalle loro case. Alle vedove che non avevano nessuno da
mandare a comprare loro il vitto, il califfo faceva andare dei negozianti ambulanti,
ai quali però non era consentito valicare la soglia di case né di vedere in viso la
donna; per questo motivo disponevano di una specie di scopa mediante la quale
consegnavano il vitto e si facevano pagare.
A partire dal 1490 circa, la moda degli zoccoli si estese in tutta Europa.
Nel’500 in Inghilterra alla corte Elisabettiana si portavano zoccoli estremanente
alti, potevano arrivare ad un’altezza di più di un metro. La moda dei tacchi alti
compare e scompare, si potrebbe ricostruirla in un ritmo sinusoidale (...) fino alla
fine dell’800 primi del’900, quando si stabilizza e da allora non ci saranno più
interruzioni.
Dopo questa breve scorsa alla storia della moda degli zoccoli resta il quesito
fondamentale del perché mai essa sia stata adottata, e a quale bisogno profondo
risponda. Il corpo è flessibile, malleabile, la cultura prevale sulla natura
transformando attraverso la moda, il corpo in qualcosa di strano. Se pensiamo ad
esempio alla moda del corsetto, potremo forse farci un’idea di certe caricature
dalla vita stretta. In tale situazione non era possibile neppure sedersi, ma la moda
imponeva alla donna di portare il corsetto per mostrare la vita sottile. (...)
Il mio intento è di mostrare come la moda possa transformare il corpo femminile
in un monstrum, e alla base di tutto sta certamente un processo sacrale da
individuare. Ed è proprio in questa trasformazione che, secondo me, si cela oggi
una delle fonti maggiori della sacralità femminile, nel tipo di processo, seppure
esso sia storicamente difficile da leggere e scoprire. Un tipo di processo che
andrebbe inoltre collegato, come hanno mostrato vari antropologi, alle teorie
odierne della ominizzazione. L’odierna antropologia mette in risalto le interazioni,
il processo mimetico fra uomo e animali, specialmente predatori. In conclusione
tale vicenda, secondo me affascinante, mette a nudo il processo di secolarizzazione
della sacralità femminile”.
NOTE
1. Elémire Zolla, Ioan Petru Culianu 1950–1991,
Tallone, 1994, p. 11.
2. Paola Zambelli, L’ambigua natura della magia,
Mondadori, Milano, 1991, p. 286.
3. Paul Oskar Kristeller, Il pensiero filosofico di
Marsilio Ficino, Le Lettere, Firenze, 1988
(edizione riveduta).
4. Giovanni Casadio, Ricordo di Ioan Petru Culianu
(1950–1991), in “Religioni e Società”, 16 Anno
VIII, maggio-agosto 1993.
5. Intervista rilasciata alla scrivente dal Prof. L.E.
Sullivan nell’aprile del 1997, quando fu invitato
dalla Prof. ssa Grazia Marchianò ad Arezzo per
una conferenza che si è tenuta in Facoltà il
23/1/1997 sul tema: Spazio e sacralità nelle
culture umane. Frammenti primordiali.
6. Ricordo di Ioan Petru Culianu (1950–1991), in
“Religioni e Società”, 16, maggio-agosto 1993.
7. “Abstracta”, Marzo 1989, n. 35.
8. Grazia Marchianò, Sugli orienti del pensiero. La
natura illuminata e la sua estetica, vol. I, II
Rubbettino, Mesina, 1994.
9. Gli interventi a questa presentazione furono poi
pubblicati in E. Zolla, Tre discorsi metafisici
1989–1990, Guida, Napoli, 1991.
10. I cui Atti sono stati pubblicati in due volumi: The
World’s Parliament of Religions. An Illustrated
and Popular Story of the World’s First Parliament
of Religions Held in Chicago, (Rev. J.H. Barrow
a cura di), in coincidenza con l’esposizione
colombiana del 1893, “Reviews of Reviews”,
London, 1893. Nel 1993 si tiene a Chicago il
96
11.
12.
13.
14.
ROBERTA MORETTI
Parliament of the World’s Religions. Declaration
toward a Global Ethic, gli atti vengono pubblicati
prima in tedesco nel 1995 poi in inglese con il
titolo: Yes to a Global Ethic, (Hans Kung, a cura
di), SCM Press, London, 1996.
Ioan P. Couliano, Alcune riflessioni sulla magia
e la sua fine, in La religione della terra, Grazia
Marchianò (a cura di), Red, Como, 1991.
Ricordo di Ioan Petru Culianu (1950–1991), in
“Religioni e Società” 16, maggio-agosto 1993.
Ivi.
Vedi ad esempio Jurgis Baltrusaitis, Il medioevo
fantastico. Antichità ed esotismi nell’arte gotica,
11
Milano, Adelphi, 1973. (Il edizione 1993). Ed
anche Francesco Zambon (a cura di), Il fisiologo,
Milano, Adelphi, 1975 (3° ed. 1990).
15. Questo enunciato richiama un principio della
fisica: il “principio cosmologico antropico”, vedi
John D. Barrow e Frank J. Tipler, The Anthropic
Cosmological Principle, Oxford University Press,
1998. Secondo questo ragionamento l’universo in
cui ci troviamo presenta determinate caratteristiche
posto che l’uomo o altro essere senziente, sia li
presente a osservarlo (n.d.r.).
L’INSEGNAMENTO DEL ROMENO IN ITALIA
FRA LE DUE GUERRE MONDIALI
CARMEN BURCEA
Chiarimento
Premesse – Propositi – Fonti
Nel prendere in esame l’argomento del presente saggio, abbiamo individuato
alcuni punti di partenza: un articolo dell’Egregio Professor G. Lãzãrescu
in occasione del centenario dalla fondazione del primo lettorato di lingua
romena in Italia1; la conferenza del docente T. Onciulescu sugli “Inizi e sviluppo
dell’insegnamento del romeno in Italia”2; lo studio firmato da M. Ruffini3,
panoramico ma privo di documenti d’archivio o di legami di tipo politicodiplomatico, che attualmente si rivelano impegnativi ecc.
La nostra indagine, orientata a valorizzare e a collocare nel giusto periodo
storico i suddetti documenti, è parte di un progetto di studio di ampio respiro
sulla diplomazia culturale italo-romena fra le due guerre, in seno alla quale il
tema dell’insegnamento reciproco delle due lingue costituisce un capitolo per
nulla trascurabile. Focalizziamo l’attenzione sul periodo interbellico, che segna
la fase più intensa dei rapporti italo-romeni; fase indubbiamente dominata dalle
tematiche culturali4. Proprio questi anni vedono sorgere (o risorgere) i lettorati
di lingua romena nella penisola italica.
Va detto però che il nostro saggio non si avvale di fonti italiane, esistenti
probabilmente negli archivi delle varie università (salvo quello dell’Ateneo
patavino), ma fa riferimento agli archivi del Ministero della Propaganda Nazionale
(Mpn), della Cultura Nazionale e dei Culti (Mcnc), dell’Istruzione Pubblica
(Mip) ecc. conservati nell’Archivio Nazionale Storico Centrale di Bucarest
(ANSC). Si è dimostrato utile anche il Fondo Italia, custodito nell’Archivio del
Ministero degli Affari Esteri (AMAE).
Talvolta, abbiamo arricchito le notizie qui individuate con fonti italiane,
recuperate nella Direzione Generale per la Propaganda (Dgp) dall’Archivio
Centrale dello Stato Italiano (ACS) oppure da quello Scuole (AS) e Affari Politici
(AP) dell’Archivio Storico del Ministero degli Affari Esteri (ASMAE).
Certamente, non ci sarebbe stato possibile prescindere dai carteggi dei maestri
di lingua romena riferiti al periodo in esame. Quelle pagine, malgrado la lenta e
irreparabile corrosione del tempo, conservano ancora i riverberi del loro passato.
Abbiamo perciò intrapreso un percorso di documentazione anche nella Biblioteca
dell’Accademia Romena (BAR), Servizio Manoscritti.
Pol. Sc. Int. Rel., II, 2, p. 97–106, Bucharest, 2005.
98
CARMEN BURCEA
Lettorati – Centri di cultura
Significato dei Lettorati – Genesi – Regolamenti
Criteri di selezione – Compensi
Ruolo dei lettori – Pilastri
2
Dagli echi risorgimentali all’effervescente periodo interbellico, dai depositari
di questa tradizione fino ai rappresentanti dei giorni nostri, i lettorati di lingua e
civiltà hanno costituito forse il mezzo più efficace della propaganda culturale
romena in Italia.
L’analisi della propaganda romena svolta in Italia ci ha agevolato l’approccio
ad un tale argomento5. La Legazione romena di Roma ed i vari consolati, gli addetti
stampa e i consiglieri culturali, i professori e gli studenti, sono stati coinvolti
tutti quanti in questa rete di trasmissione/emissione di informazioni concepita
dal Centro. Per quanto fossero tutti dotati di competenza professionale, alcuni
dei nostri rappresentati all’estero vennero morsi dall’invidia, dalla superbia,
dall’avidità e, sfortunatamente, si lasciarono corrodere dai loro vezzi. Di
conseguenza, scivolarono in secondo piano gli aspetti davvero rilevanti della nostra
propaganda. Così, accadde che i docenti di lingua romena ricoprirono con frequenza
quel ruolo al loro posto, diventando un punto di riferimento.
Le relazioni su ogni lettorato avviato in Italia sono molto diverse tra loro. Il
fatto è dovuto soprattutto all’intervallo storico in cui i lettorati sono stati attivi e,
poi, in misura minore, ai lettori stessi. Alcuni lettori ci presentano resoconti
formali, mentre altri si spendono in ricche descrizioni. Alcuni si limitano alla
cattedra, laddove altri si fanno coinvolgere anima e corpo nella loro professione.
Per alcuni gli strumenti specifici del lavoro sono sufficienti, mentre per altri
i metodi per attrarre sempre più studenti sono inesauribili e spesso inediti:
musica, folclore, storia, politica contemporanea — tutte queste ingegnosità
didattiche sono documentate. R. Ortiz per esempio, chiedeva all’Ufficio Stampa
delle riproduzioni dei discorsi dei più noti politici, affinché i suoi studenti
acquisissero dimestichezza con la pronuncia della lingua romena. Cl. Isopescu,
invece, era dell’idea che gli studenti italiani dovessero arrivare amarci in modo
“non mediato” e perciò si impegnava per ottenere delle borse di studio affinché
potessero usufruire di soggiorni di studio in Romania, a Vãlenii de Munte. M.
Ruffini, nello stesso tempo, organizzava delle serate di musica tradizionale romena
al giradischi.
Tra i docenti di lingua romena in Italia c’è stato un vero e proprio spirito di
emulazione. In genere, si sono reciprocamente apprezzati e hanno collaborato
fra loro, condividendo affanni e successi. Comune denominatore tra tutti è il
rapporto splendido che hanno sviluppato con lo storico letterario I.E. Torouþiu
(1888–1953), il quale conosceva le loro richieste — donazioni di libri per le
biblioteche romene, la pubblicazione di qualche studio loro oppure dei loro
discenti ecc — meglio di chiunque altro. Non a caso, I.E. Torouþiu aveva alle
spalle un’esperienza come assistente universitario di lingua romena
all’Università di Francoforte, prima della Grande Guerra (1911–1913). Anche i
glottologi italiani (G. Bretoni, M. Batoli, C. Tagliavini, A. Schiaffini, C. Merlo,
3
L’INSEGNAMENTO DEL ROMENO IN ITALIA
99
A. Monteverdi, C. Battisti, G. Devoto, B. Migliorini, A. Parducci, E. Levi, G.
Serra etc.) gli hanno dato il loro appoggio. I docenti o i propagandisti ungheresi
inseriti in altre strutture, al contrario, lo hanno guardato come un loro rivale, un
perpetuo termine di paragone6.
Il rapporto con le autorità romene sul suolo italico (la Legazione ed i
consolati) comunque non fu dei migliori. Di debolezze, tensioni, incomunicabilità
e buone intenzioni mai realizzate ce ne furono molte. Dal Centro proveniva
l’ossessivo richiamo alle “ragioni del budget” stanziato per la propaganda all’estero.
Questo disagio fu peraltro controbilanciato dallo zelo dei docenti. E’ proprio loro
che dobbiamo ringraziare se furono frequenti le notizie riguardanti i romeni
nella stampa italiana dell’epoca e se oggi, di conseguenza, possiamo disporre di
una così ricca bibliografia. Grazie a loro, abbiamo accesso a un patrimonio dal
quale partire per la “riconquista” il presente.
I lettorati di lingua romena hanno avuto efficacia come indicatori
dell’espansione della cultura romena all’estero, agendo al contempo come basi
di lavoro sul terreno della diplomazia romena. A mano a mano, essi diventano
strumento di mediazione e consueta modalità operativa della nostra politica
culturale. In queste due queste caratteristiche risiede il loro valore.
Per ciò che riguarda la loro genesi, annotiamo una distinzione tra i lettorati
storici, di eco risorgimentale (a Torino — G.V. Ruscalla; a Venezia — M.A.
Canini), e quelli sorti nel periodo fra le due guerre — punto di partenza per la
situazione che oggi ereditiamo7. La loro comparsa non è caotica né casuale,
anche se le apparenze potrebbero facilmente condurre ad una tale conclusione.
L’istituzione dei lettorati non é dovuta tanto all’entusiasmo o all’idoneità di uno
o più professori o ad altri fattori individuali, quanto alla compartecipazione e al
pieno coinvolgimento dello Stato nel sostenere l’iniziativa con mezzi propri.
L’insegnamento del romeno all’estero era infatti connesso alla propaganda.
La creazione dei lettorati era funzionale alle esigenze della propaganda romena
all’estero. Di conseguenza, i più importanti saranno costituiti in Germania, seguita
da vicino dall’ Italia e poi dalla Francia. Il loro ordinamento era regolato dalle
convenzioni culturali concluse con i vari paesi, sulla base del principio della
reciprocità8.
In Italia, le cattedre di lingua romena hanno vissuto più che altro due momenti
di espansione ragguardevoli dal punto di vista politico: nel periodo del governo
N. Iorga (1931/2), quando si svolgono delle trattative in questa direzione-anche
se i risultati tardarono di qualche anno- e nella congiuntura venutasi a creare con
l’Accordo culturale italo-romeno, firmato l’8 aprile 1943, dopo una gestazione
assai lunga. I lettorati preesistenti saranno obbligati a rispettare le nuove normative.
La questione della paternità dei lettorati non è tuttora risolta. Claudio Isopescu
si aggiudica il merito di aver creato i lettorati di Milano e Torino, Firenze e
Napoli, e ancora di quello sorto a Padova. Indubbiamente, Isopescu fu un fervido
sostenitore di questi e si mosse verso il suo obiettivo attraverso l’Associazione
Italo-Romena di Roma, anche se siamo del parere che gli mancasse il potere
effettivo per essere il vero fondatore. Tanto più che le formule tipo “sono troppo
piccolo e la mia voce risuona nel deserto” sono ricorrenti nei suoi carteggi.
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CARMEN BURCEA
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Il lettorato di Milano debutta sotto gli auspici del Consolato Romeno. Il fatto
è confermato proprio da Gino Lupi: “Dalla mia iniziativa e con l’appoggio del
console A. Ricci e del Sig. Monti, segretario della Camera di Commercio, ho
aperto nel 1931 il mio corso di romeno all’Università Reale di Milano”9. Il
professore italiano era sostenuto in questa sua impresa anche da Aron Cotruº,
sotto il consiglio del quale tradusse, proprio in quell’anno, il dramma “San
Francisco” di Nicola Iorga. Da Torino M. Ruffini affermava esplicitamente di
essere stato incaricato da N. Iorga10. A Firenze, le cose erano state stabilite
durante il ricevimento dello stesso N. Iorga nel febbraio 1935, come indica anche
il professor Carlo Battisti (1882–1977) della Scuola di Glottologia11. A Napoli,
la questione della fondazione di una cattedra di lingua romena aveva trovato un
sostenitore nella persona del professor Ezio Levi (1884–1944), titolare della
cattedra di filologia romanza. Per ciò che riguarda il lettorato di Padova, il merito
va esclusivamente all’azione svolta da Ramiro Ortiz.
Nonostante cio, nel 1937, Isopescu scriveva a Liviu Rebreanu (1885–1944),
presidente della Società degli Scrittori Romeni e direttore del Teatro Nazionale
di Bucarest:
“Il mio travaglio è diventato ancor più grande: ho fondato dei corsi di romeno
a Turin, a Milano, a Firenze e a Napoli. Quei posti sono occupati da miei ex allievi
e loro non fanno niente senza domandarmi.”12
Nello stesso anno 1937, a Camil Petrescu (1894–1957), all’epoca redattore alla
“Revista Fundaþiilor Regale”, scriveva:
“Forse avrai saputo che sono riuscito a fondare una conferenza di romeno a
Turin e un lettorato alle università di Firenze e Napoli”.13
Nel 1938 scriveva a Cezar Petrescu (1892–1961), all’epoca segretario generale
nel Ministero delle Arti e direttore del giornale “Romania”:
“Sono riuscito su iniziativa propria di creare, io, un uomo semplice, il primo
insegnamento di romeno a Roma e in 10 anni di fondare sempre io i lettorati di
Napoli, Firenze, Padova, Milano e Turin. A Padova, Ortiz è professore di letteratura
romanica e la signorina Nina Façon (richiesta da Ortiz) è lettrice di lingua romena.”14
Se da parte dello storico N. Iorga15 i documenti non abbondano (ci pervengono
implicitamente), per l’anno 1942 c’é un documento che contiene tutto ciò che
potrebbe interessarci. Si tratta del decreto No. 58.108 / 16 marzo 1942, emanato
dal Ministero della Cultura Nazionale; in pratica la normativa dei lettorati di
lingua romena presso le Università straniere16.
Quali erano i criteri di selezione dei lettori? Per quanto riguarda la loro
specializzazione, si specificava che non dovevano essere soltanto dei linguisti,
ma anche storici, etnografi e giuristi (l’area di studi umanistici). Tra le condizioni
di reclutamento, esposte nel decreto, ma anticipate dal progetto di regolamento17,
si nota la competenza scientifica, la conoscenza della lingua, la cultura generale
ecc. Si appezzavano come tratti essenziali del loro profilo “la possibilità d’azione,
lo spirito d’iniziativa, le qualità sociali per rappresentare il paese”.
La stragrande maggioranza dei lettori romeni (Claudiu Isopescu, Gheorghe
Caragaþã, Teodor Onciulescu, Petre Ciureanu, Petru Iroaie, Marina Vlasiu Lupaº)
vennero in qualità d’ex soci della Scuola Romena di Roma. L’impiego da parte
5
L’INSEGNAMENTO DEL ROMENO IN ITALIA
101
dello stato romeno di coloro che aveva aiutato a perfezionarsi in Italia (creando
il quadro giuridico e consegnando il sostegno materiale) si dimostrava veramente
proficuo per ambo le parti. L’investimento dello stato romeno si dimostra,
quantomeno in questo caso, a lungo termine.
Una circolare del febbraio 1944 rendeva nota la disposizione del ministro
della Propaganda Nazionale Al. Marcu, il quale valutava inopportuno attribuire
il titolo alle donne, portando come motivazione l’alto valore strategico delle
cattedre per la nostra propaganda all’estero18. L’unica bocciata fu Iolanda Eminescu,
laureata in Legge, aspirante all’incarico di lettore nell’Istituto Romeno di Madrid.
In Italia però non si verificarono casi di questo tipo.
Sempre nel decreto No. 58.108/942 si specificava che potevano esser accreditati,
col titolo di “lettore d’onore” e sulla base di un contratto, anche quei cittadini di
nazionalità diversa che avessero dimostrato di svolgere un’attività leale ed
incessante a beneficio della Romania. In conformità con l’articolo 80 della Legge
sull’organizzazione dell’insegnamento superiore del 23 maggio 1942, il contratto
si faceva sulla base di un resoconto motivato del professore, precedentemente
sottoposto al dibattito e al voto del consiglio. I “lettori d’onore” erano stipendiati
dal budget del Ministero della Cultura.
La Facoltà di Lettere di Bucarest centralizzava il processo di selezione dei
candidati. Qui si presentavano le candidature e si organizzava il concorso. I
lettori erano incaricati dal Ministero della Cultura con il consenso della Propaganda
Nazionale per un anno e con diritto d’essere riconfermati ogni due anni, in base
alle raccomandazioni inoltrate dalle istituzioni culturali romene esistenti in quel
paese. Dopo l’investitura, ogni lettore riceveva la conferma dall’Università presso
la quale era delegato.
Sin dal 1941 si era auspicato un criterio standard per stabilire lo stipendio dei
lettori, ma ciò non avvenne. Le grosse differenze di retribuzione creavano sempre
delle “rivalità inutili” tra i lettori, senza considerare il fatto che gli stipendi non
venivano pagati regolarmente. Le retribuzioni dei lettori erano a carico dello
Stato, solo che alcuni venivano pagati da Ministero della Propaganda Nazionale
e altri da quello della Cultura Nazionale.
Il ruolo dei lettori non si limitava però a quello cattedratico. Loro erano i
rappresentanti culturali dello Stato romeno e si trasformavano in portavoce del
punto di vista nazionale nelle questioni tanto dibattute in quel periodo, che
riguardavano principalmente i dissidi tra i romeni ed i magiari, spesso manifestati
nello spazio italiano. Si specificava proprio che:
”La loro condizione didattica era soltanto il biglietto da visita. In realtà la
missione era più complessa e delicata. Questa richiedeva, al di là dell’addestramento
intellettuale, una grande abilità e solo essa poteva legittimare la loro presenza nel
paese in cui si trovavano.”19
In conformità col articolo 13, i lettori avevano l’obbligo di compilare relazioni
mensili sulle attività, d’informare i due ministeri ed il dirigente dell’ufficio
102
CARMEN BURCEA
6
diplomatico dall’Italia sull’andamento della loro attività accademica. Le
comunicazioni non erano dirette. La Scuola Romena di Roma faceva da tramite.
Non sempre le cose avvenivano in questo modo. Scarlat Lambrino lamentava
l’ingerenza della nostra Legazione:
“Imbarazzato, P. Ciureanu mi ha confessato che non lo possono fare, perché
hanno ricevuto ordine formale da parte della Legazione Romena a Roma di non
indirizzare i loro rapporti che alla Legazione.”20
Grazie a queste relazioni siamo in grado adesso di ricostituire le tematiche, i
manuali, gli orari delle lezioni, i nominativi degli studenti, gli argomenti delle loro
tesi di laurea, le manifestazioni culturali ecc.
Quali erano le fondamenta di questa costruzione? Una volta costituiti, i lettorati
venivano appoggiati dall’Accademia di Romania a Roma21 e dall’Associazione
culturale italo-romena22, capeggiata dall’accademico Giulio Bertoni23, assecondato
dal professor Claudio Isopescu. Dalla Romania invece, come già detto, i Ministeri
della Cultura e della Propaganda Nazionale gestivano, controllavano, agevolavano
l’attività dei lettorati.
I manuali più utilizzati del periodo furono la Grammatica24 e l’Antologia25 di
C. Tagliavini, il Compendio di N. Cartojan26, il Manualetto27 di R. Ortiz, il
dizionario28 di Al. Marcu, l’Antologia di M. Ruffini29. Tuttavia, dalle materie di
insegnamento di questi anni spesso scaturiscono le tracce dei libri che saranno
pubblicati negli anni successivi dai lettori stessi, a volte per crearsi nuovi strumenti
di lavoro, altre volte per venire incontro agli interessi mostrati dagli studenti.
Accanto ai lavori dei maestri appariranno anche alcune tesi di laurea dei discepoli30.
Durante la guerra, lo sbarco delle truppe alleate nel sud dell’Italia, dei
bombardamenti, del crollo del fascismo, i docenti di lingua romena si confrontarono
con i problemi della società italiana: prezzi massimali, mercato nero, il sistema
delle cartelle alimentarie (150 gr. pane/giorno, 1 uova/settimana, 150 gr. carne/
settimana). Per un periodo le università e le scuole rimasero chiuse. In queste
condizioni avranno scandito pure loro, come gli italiani, “Pace e Pane!”.
I trattati di pace, a guerra conclusa, contenevano i germi “della guerra fredda”,
che consacra la divisione del Europa in due blocchi (Est-Ovest) inconciliabili dal
punto di vista ideologico. In questo contesto, i lettori romeni saranno richiamati
in patria. La maggioranza rifiuta di eseguire l’ordine. Specialmente dopo il richiamo
dei direttori dell’Accademia di Romania a Roma (1 aprile 1947), i lettorati cessarono
di rappresentare una costruzione romena. Un primo passo era stato già fatto nel
1946 con la soppressione d’alcuni lettorati (il posto di assistente a Roma, i lettorati
di Napoli, Genova, Venezia, Bari)31.
Non meno priva d’asperità fu l’evoluzione postbellica dei lettorati rappresentati
da docenti italiani. Il cambiamento del regime politico determinò inchieste ed
epurazioni. La Commissione d’inchiesta del Ministero Italiano dell’Istruzione
Pubblica analizzò i casi di M. Ruffini e G. Lupi, “esonerati alla fine da qualsiasi
colpa”32.
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103
A fatica alcuni lettori riusciranno a mantenere i loro posti universitari e saranno
attivi nell’ ambito dell’alta cultura italiana distinguendosi nei decenni successivi
come l’elite romena in esilio33.
Rappresetanti
Dove ci sono stati e chi sono quelli che hanno raffigurato i lettorati di lingua
romena in Italia?
Claudiu Isopescu34 (1894–1956) insegnò per primo la lingua romena
all’Università di Roma (1926). Nel 1929 divenne conferenziere e dal 1936 fu
titolare di cattedra fino alla sua scomparsa35. Per un periodo il suo ruolo di
docente venne ampliato con gli incarichi ufficiali conferiti dallo stato romeno —
come addetto di stampa oppure culturale, sempre a Roma.
A Torino, dopo Giovenale Vegezzi Ruscalla36 (1799–1885) — reputato il più
illustre filoromeno dell’epoca, che inaugurò il 15 dicembre del 1863 il primo
corso libero di Lingua e Letteratura Romena37 durato fino nel 1879 — e dopo
Romeo Lovera38 all’ Istituto Superiore di Studi commerciali di Torino fu Mario
Ruffini a rappresentare l’insegnamento del romeno tra il 1931 e il 1967.
Il primo ad insegnare la lingua romena a Milano fu Romeo Lovera39, del quale
magistero non ne abbiamo purtroppo sufficienti notizie. Proseguirono sulla sua
strada Gino Lupi, dal 1931 all’Università Statale, e dal 1943 Marcello Camillucci40,
al quale venne affidato il lettorato romeno presso l’Università Cattolica Sacro
Cuore di Milano41.
La fondazione del lettorato romeno a Padova42 segna una nuova tappa nella
vita di Ramiro Ortiz43. Nel 1937 fu creato un lettorato di lingua romena, rappresentato
inizialmente da Nina Façon (1 ottobre 1937–1 febbraio 1939). Revocata, a causa
della situazione generata dalle leggi razziali, la Façon sarà sostituita da Alexandrina
Mititelu44.
Nel 1936, con l’iscritto No. 73 851/1936, Gheorghe Caragaþã (1907–1978)45,
venne nominato lettore di lingua romena a Firenze, dove si dedicò a questo
apostolato per ben quarant’anni.
Teodor Onciulescu46, investito lettore di lingua romena a Napoli a partire il
1937, insegnò per quasi 30 anni nella Facoltà di Lettere e all’Istituto Universitario
Orientale.
A Bologna, dopo il 1943, si avviò un lettorato di lingua romena raffigurato
da Nicolae Moldovan e poi da Constantin Vicol.
Petre Ciureanu47 fu incaricato come lettore di lingua romena nel 1942 presso la
Facoltà di Economia e Commercio di Genova e dopo la guerra vi insegnò il francese.
A Palermo Petru Iroaie (1907–1984), debuttò come lettore di romeno alla
fine del 1942 ed insegnò fino alla sua scomparsa.
Marina Vlasiu Lupaº48 inviata all’Università di Bari nel febbraio 1943, rinunciò
all’incarico dopo soltanto un anno49 essendo assunta dal Istituto Sud-Est Europeo
104
CARMEN BURCEA
8
di Bucarest. A sostituirla saranno Nina Façon (1909–1974) e, successivamente,
Demetrio Marin.
Depositari della tradizione
Rappresentanti d’oggi
Prospettive adeguate ai presenti traguardi
Quali sono i depositari di questa tradizione? Dopo la generazione rappresentata
da Al. Niculescu a Udine, Silvio Guarnieri a Genova, George Lãzãrescu e Manlio
Coppeti a Pisa, Ovidiu Drâmba a Torino, Rosa del Conte e Emil Turdeanu a Roma,
Pasquale Buonincontro a Napoli, ne é sorta un’altra. Quali i docenti di lingua
romena dell’Italia odierna? Marco Cugno* a Torino, Teresa Ferro50 a Udine,
Roberto Scagno a Padova, Bruno Mazzoni a Pisa, Luisa Valmarin e Gheorghe
Carageani a Roma, tutti quanti a confermare una continuità. Lo stato romeno ha
sancito la loro benemerenza51 e dimostra una tendenza alla crescita del numero
dei lettorati romeni all’estero appoggiati dall’ Istituto di Lingua Romena52 e dall’
Istituto Culturale Romeno53.
La lingua romena, anche se preceduta da altri idiomi più internazionali (inglese,
francese, tedesco, spagnolo)54, non cessa di interessare gli studenti italiani,
facendo germogliare tra loro i futuri filo-romeni55.
Concludiamo il nostro studio con la convinzione che i lettorati romeni
all’estero, ovunque essi siano collocati, potrebbero significare tuttora non
solo un mezzo di diffusione della lingua romena in veste accademica, ma anche
un’opportunità di rappresentanza, un centro di propaganda di grande
responsabilità per l’immagine che proiettano, un luogo di alta produzione
culturale e di informazione sulla Romania e sui rapporti bilaterali, nonché un
sostegno essenziale allo sforzo di integrazione in Europa. Chiaramente, l’eco
delle sue manifestazioni non potrebbe mai essere quello vagheggiato, in assenza
dell’apporto e della totale corrispondenza con le istituzioni culturali e
diplomatiche esistenti nei vari paesi. Prendiamo allora esempio dal passato.
NOTE
1. Gheorghe Lãzãrescu, Giovenale Vegezzi
Ruscalla, primul profesor de limba românã în
Italia, Estratto da Analele Universitãþii Bucureºti,
Secþia ªtiinþe Sociale – Filologie No. 28, Anno
XII, 1963, Bucarest, 8 p.
2. O manifestaþie a secþiei din Italia a Societãþii
Academice Române, in: “Revista Scriitorilor
Români”, no. 2, 1963, p. 189.
3. Mario Ruffini, L’insegnamento del rumeno in
Italia, “Il Veltro”, XIII, 1969, No. 1–2, pp. 305–312.
4. Pasquale Buonincontro, La presenza della
Romania in Italia nel secolo XX. Contributo
bibliografico 1900–1980, Napoli, De Simone
Editore, p. 14.
5. Vedi Carmen Burcea, Propaganda româneascã
în Italia în perioada interbelicã, in: “Revista de
ªtiinþe Politice ºi Relaþii Internaþionale”, no.
1/2005, pp. 94–108.
6. La prima cattedra universitaria di Lingua e
letteratura magiara fu fondata nel 1927 a Roma,
i titolari essendo i direttori dell’Accademia
d’Ungheria (Tibor Gerevich, Gyula Miskolczy,
Eugenio Koltay Kaster). Ulteriormente,
l’insegnamento di lingua magiara fu esteso alle
* Preside dell’Associazione Italiana di Romenistica.
L’INSEGNAMENTO DEL ROMENO IN ITALIA
9
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
università di Milano, Padova, Bologna, Napoli e
Bari. Cf. Péter Sarközy, La “fortuna” della
letteratura ungherese in Italia e di quella
italiana in Ungheria, in: Italia e Ungheria.
Storia, politica, società, letteratura, fonti, a cura
di Francesco Guida e Rita Tolomeo, Atti
dell’incontro di studio tenuto a Roma il
9–11novembre 1989, Edizioni Periferia, 1991,
p. 237.
M.O., parte I, No. 790/30.X. 2002. Programma
di collaborazione culturale italo-romena per gli
anni 2002–2005.
Il problema dell’insegnamento italiano in
Romania è assai complesso. Ci limitiamo ora a
ricordare soltanto le cattedre più importanti:
Ramiro Ortiz, Umberto Ciancialò, Bruno Manzone
(Bucarest), Giandomenico Serra (Cluj), Silvio
Guarnirei (Timiºoara), Mariano Baffi (Braºov),
Paolo Soldati (Craiova), Giuseppe Petronio,
Liberale Netto (Iaºi), Leonardo Salemi (Chiºinãu),
Edgardo Giorgi-Alberti (Cernãuþi) Cf. ASMAE,
Archivio Scuole (1936–1945), Romania, Pacco
109.
Limba ºi Literatura românã în Italia. Bibliografia
d-lui Gino Lupi, in: “Viaþa”, 31 dicembre 1941.
A.N.S.C., Mip, Dossier 530/1932, f. 36. M.
Ruffini a Gh. Gh. Mironescu, Ministro di Finanze,
13 settembre 1932.
A.N.S.C., Mcnc, Dossier 2500/1943, Carlo Battisti
al ministro dell’Istruzione Pubblica, 10 febbraio
1936.
B.A.R., Corisp., S 45 (47)/CMLXIV, Cl. Isopescu
a Liviu Rebreanu, 30 noiembrie 1937.
Scrisori cãtre Camil Petrescu, vol. I, Ediþie îngrijitã,
prefaþa, note ºi indici de Florica Ichim, Bucureºti,
Editura Minerva, 1981, p. 42. Cl. Isopescu a Camil
Petrescu, 6 aprile 1937.
B.A.R., Corisp., S 40 (35)/ DCCXCVIIII, Cl.
Isopescu a Cezar Petrescu, 9 augosto 1938.
“L’Italia”, a. XX, No. 300, 18 dicembre 1931,
Milano: “L’inizio di corsi romeni nelle università
italiane corrisponde all’interessamento dei romeni
per i corsi d’italiano introdotti nelle università di
Bucarest, Cernautzi e Cluj per opera di S.E.
professor Nicola Iorga”. Vedi anche Gino LUPI,
Un romeno studioso dell’Italia: Nicola Iorga,
“Rassegna Italo-Romena”, a. XIX, nov. 1940,
pp. 4–5.
Nell’incidenza del nuovo regolamento entravano
anche i lettorati rappresentati da Emil Turdeanu
a Sofia e poi Parigi; Eugen Tãnase – Montpellier;
Constantin Velichi – Sofia; Ionel Grigoriu –
Heidelberg; Al. Ciorãnescu – Sorbone e Grenoble;
Octavian Vuia – Francoforte; Ion Popinceanu –
Leipzig; Al. Dima – Viene; Victor Buescu –
Lisabona; Al. Busuioceanu — Madrid ecc.
A.N.S.C., Mpn, Informazioni, Dossier 813,
f. 106–109.
A.N.S.C., Mcnc, Insegnamento Superiore, Dossier
1560/1944, f. 48.
105
19. A.N.S.C., Mpn, Studi e Documenti, Dossier 167,
f. 18.
20. A.N.S.C., Mcnc, Insegnamento Superiore, Dossier
2638/1943, f. 32.
21. A.N.S.C., MAE, Protocol, Dossier 14: legge No.
55/20 marzo 1944 [Riguardante la fondazione
delle Scuole romene e gli Istituti culturali
all’estero, le Borse di Stato] riconferma e completa
la Legge no. 440 del 1941 per l’organizzazione
delle Scuole Romene di Roma e Parigi. L’Articolo
32 precisa: “I Direttori delle Scuole Romene
all’estero guidano e coordinano l’attività dei
lettori di lingua romena all’estero. Laddove non
ci sono tali scuole o istituti l’attività dei lettori
sarà controllata dal capo missione.”
22. A.N.S.C., Mpn, Propaganda, Dossier 906. Fondata
nel dicembre del 1931, codesta si auspicava di
contribuire alla divulgazione della Romania in
Italia attraverso serate culturali, conferenze,
audizioni di musica romena.
23. ªtefan Cuciureanu, Un prieten al Românismului:
Giulio Bertoni, in: “Convorbiri Literare”,
LXXV/1942, no. 7–8, pp. 385–401; Th. Capidan,
Giulio Bertoni, in: “Revista Fundaþiilor Regale”,
9, no. 8, 1942, pp. 436–437; Umberto Cianciolò,
Giulio Bertoni ºi filosofia romanicã, Cartea
Româneascã din Cluj, 1944, p. 28.
24. C. Tagliavini, Grammatica della lingua rumena,
Bologna 1923, XX, p. 410.
25. Idem, Antologia rumena, Passi scelti ed annotati di
autori rumeni, Heidelberg, G. Gross, 1923, p. 320.
26. N. Cartojan, Breve storia della letteratura
romena, Roma, 1926 [Estratto da “L’Europa
Orientale”, VI, p. 379–404].
27. R. Ortiz, Manualetto rumeno, Bucarest, Bucovina,
1936, pp. 240+XXXIV.
28. Al. Marcu, Dicþionar roman-italian, Bucarest,
1929–1933, p. 337; a II-a edizione, Bucarest,
Editura Alcalay, 1938, 624 pp.; a III-a, Bucarest,
Atelierele Grafice Socec, 1941, p. 624; a IV-a,
1943, Bucarest, Atelierele Grafice Socec, p. 624.
29. M. Ruffini, Antologia Romena. Testi moderni,
Modena, Soc. Tip. Modena, 1940, p. 164.
30. [Recensioni] M. Camillucci, L. Santangelo,
Giorgio Coºbuc nella vita nelle opere, Roma,
1934; A. Colombo, Vita e opere di Ion Luca
Caragiale, Roma, 1934, in: “Europa Orientale”,
XVIII/1938, pp. 435–438; G. Lupi, W. Roccato,
I. Al. Brãtescu – Voineºti novelliere, Roma,
Signorelli, 1939; Lena Maria Bevilacqua, E.
Gârleanu nella vitae nelle opere, Roma, Signorelli,
1939, in: “Europa Orientale”, XX/1940, pp.
147–151. F[ortunescu] C.D, Trei teze de doctorat
italieneºti. Note, in: “Arhivele Olteniei”, XIV,
nr. 79–82, maggio–dicembre 1935, p. 478–482.
31. A.N.S.C., M., Ed. Naz., Insegnamento Superiore,
Dossier 680/1946, f. 29–30. Rapporto del 12
febbraio 1946 al ministro ªtefan Voitec.
32. Ibidem, f.111. Rapporto di Scarlat Lambrino a
ªtefan Voitec, 24 settembre 1946.
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33. Vedi Florin Manolescu, Enciclopedia exilului
literar românesc.1945–1989, Bucarest, Editura
Compania, 2003.
34. George Lãzãrescu, Prezenþe româneºti în Italia,
Bucarest, Editura Didacticã ºi Pedagogicã, 1995,
pp. 122–148; Luigi Tonelli, Claudio Isopescu,
Rassegna Nazionale, LIII, 1931, S. III, vol. XIV,
pp. 105–109; T. ªoimaru, Cultura româneascã în
Italia. Un pionier: prof. Claudiu Isopescu, in:
“România Literarã”, I, 1939, nr. 20, p. 22.
35. Dal 1943, Franco Cardinalli, il figlio del Decano
della Facoltà di Lettere e Filosofia dell’Università
di Roma, diventa suo assistente. Suo successore
diretto alla cattedra dell’Università di Roma, fu
Mariano Baffi.
36. Vedi Teodor D. Onciulescu, Contributo alla storia
della filologia romanza in Italia. Giovenale
Vegezzi-Ruscalla, Napoli, 1937.
37. G.V. Ruscalla, Prolusione al libero corso di
lingua, letteratura e storia rumana nell’Università
di Torino, detta il 15 dicembre 1863, Torino,
Derossi e Dusso, 1863, 20 pp.
38. Vedi Note Italo-Romene. Per la cultura romena
in Italia, in: “Romania. Rassegna degli interessi
italo-romeni”, (II, 5), rivista diretta da
M. Silvestri (1920–1922). Romeo Lovera,
L’insegnamento della lingua romena nel R.
Istituto Superiore di studi commerciali di Torino,
Casale Monferrato, 1921.
39. Romeo Lovera, Grammatica e vocabolario della
lingua rumena, Milano, Hoepli, 1892, pp. IV –
200; ed. a II-a 1906, p. 183; ed. a III-a 1917,
p. 211; ed. IV-a 1933; ristamp. Milano, CisalpinoGoliardica, 1976, pp. VIII+213.
40. Marcello Camillucci si era addottorato con la tesi
su La vita e l’opera di Panait Cerna, pubblicata
a Roma [Istituto Europa Orientale, 1935, 169
pp.] per la quale aveva ricevuto, sempre tramite
Isopescu, una sovvenzione di 500 Lire. Cf.
A.N.S.C., Mpn, Propaganda, Dossier 957, f. 1.
41. A.N.S.C., Mcnc, Insegnamento Superiore, Dossier
2500/1943, f. 44.
42. A.N.S.C., Mpn, Propaganda, Dossier 1108/1933
–1943, f. 70.
43. Rimandiamo a Carmen Burcea, Ramiro Ortiz,
Bucarest, Editura Noua Alternativã, 2004, p. 144.
10
44. Vedi Alexandrina Mititelo, Grammatica romena,
Padova, Cedam, 1947, XII+248 pp.; Letteratura
romena antica. Cenni storici – Breve antologia –
Glossario, Padova, Liviana Ed. 1961, p. 155.
45. Vedi Gheorghe Caragaþã, Breve sguardo sullo
sviluppo della letteratura romena, Roma, Istituto
Europa Orientale, 1943, 24 pp.; Letteratura
romena, 1955, Ed. Vallardi, coll. Istoria literaturilor
strãine ale Europei ºi Americii.
46. A.N.S.C., Mpn, Propaganda, Dossier 1955, f.
1–6.
47. Vedi Petre Ciureanu, Corso di lingua romena,
Genova, Casa Editrice “San Giorgio”, 1946, p.
511 (Univ. di Genova, Facoltà di Economia e
Commercio); La poesia romena contemporanea,
Genova, Di Stefano, 1944, p. 206; Saggi e ricerche
su scrittori francesi, Genova, Editrice Italica,
1955.
48. Vedi Marina Vlasiu-Lupaº, Aspecte din istoria
Transilvaniei, pref. di I. Moga, Sibiu, Institutul
de Istorie Naþionalã, 1945.
49. A.N.S.C., Mcnc, Insegnamento Superiore, Dossier
2500/1943, f. 4.
50. Carmen Burcea, Despre romanisticã...cu patru
filologi italieni, (intervista con Teresa Ferro,
Roberto Scagno, Lorenzo Renzi, Alvaro
Barbieri), in: „Litere, Arte, Idei”, anno VIII, No.
42 (298), 24 novembre 2003, p. 8.
51. Decreto no. 47/15 gennaio 2003 riguardante le
onorificenze nazionale conferite a docenti italiani.
Cf. M.O. no. 38/23 gennaio 2003.
52. H.G. no. 34 del 21 gennaio 1999 per la fondazione
del’Istituto della Lingua Romena, M.O. no. 30
del 27 gennaio 1999.
53. Fondato in base alla Legge 356/11 luglio 2003,
tramite la riorganizzazzione della Fondazione
Culturale Romena.
54. Angela Tarantito, L’insegnamento del rumeno
nel nuovo ordinamento didattico, in: Romania e
Romània, Lingua e cultura romena di fronte
all’Occidente, a cura di Teresa Ferro, Atti del
Convegno Internazionale di Studi, Udine, 11–14
settembre 2002, p. 314.
55. Carmen Burcea, Filoromânii din “Portul
Cocorilor”, in: “Curierul Românesc”, Anno XV,
no. 4 (195), 2003, p. 26.
I S P R I ’s A C A D E M I C L I F E
TACKLING CONSERVATISM TODAY
The conference took place at the Institute of Political Science and International Relations on
the 24th of November 2005. The event started with the communication of Professor Ion Bulei, Ph. D.,
director of the institute, who mentioned the huge diversity of personalities that can be affiliated
with contemporary conservatism — from Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, to the late John
Paul II —, given the rich and wide range of characteristics and definitions for this wide cultural
trend. First of all, the speaker has shown that conservatism stands against the idea that a
personality or a group can offer the solutions to the complex problems of our modernity. The
institutions are compelled to have better answers to such problems. It is not that freedom should
be erased; it rather should be “dissolved” in a more institutionalized manner, in order to meet the
challenges in (or posed to) society. From the very beginning it was stated the intriguing and
important role of a dimension of the ethics of responsibility, that should be correlated with this
topic of conservatism. Another characteristic of contemporary conservatism is the accent put on
abiding the law, the only appropriate context for accepting the evolutionism and the
experimentation of the new. A brief historical approach to the subject has served the purpose of
underlining the various brands and tendencies of conservatism in time. E. Burke and the French
Revolution were the most important “stations” of this intellectual “route”. The “journey” helped
depict the proper context for a very important distinction for the future analyzes, that one between
“conservatism” and “traditionalism”. The former is a phenomenon specific for modernity, a
concept used both in history and sociology to refer to a modern historical phenomenon, and a
political current with roots in the French Revolution, that was also a reaction to that revolution, as
a political reformism (and conformism) with respect for the pragmatic, for present, for the facts,
for property. The latter is a permanent human trait, a more psychological dimension in its nature.
Preferred by M. Weber in his writings, it means the resistance to all that is new, the refusal to
adhere to whatever is new. The speaker ended his presentation with the importance for the
conservatism of the modern political institutions of the state, today.
The evolution of conservatism as political philosophy, and as political practice in the last two
decades, was the topic of the second conference, sustained by Gabriela Tãnãsescu, researcher at
the Institute of Political Science and International Relations, the department of political
philosophy. The assumption of this presentation was the powerful impact on the British political
conservatism of the intellectual currents gathered under the label of the ample movement of the
American New Right: the economic libertarianism, the social traditionalism and the antiCommunist militancy, the first two lacking unity and compatibility under the philosophical,
political and doctrinaire aspects. The specific of the British conservatism under the Thatcher
government, as that of the American conservatism promoted by the Reagan administration, was
presented as the result of a process of adapting of the consecrated principles of conservatism to
those of the New Right, and especially to the hegemony of the free market principle. The lever of
adopting and applying by the agents of conservatism of such a mixture of classic liberalism and
libertarianism — by the end of a stage of economic stagnation and social conflict in the case of
Great Britain — was assuring a sustained rhythm for the development, and, especially in the case
of the USA, also for the economic expansion. As an answer to globalization, the use of this (AngloSaxon) model of competitiveness and efficiency — considered as well the “engine” of the
European Union, that is dominated by a quite different French and German model of social
economy — considered a success in terms of economy, triggered the transformation of the British
political culture. Until 1979 the political culture in the Great Britain was co-extensive with a
cultural conservatism faithful to consolidated communities, to the intermediary institutions and to
Pol. Sc. Int. Rel., II, 2, p. 109–120, Bucharest, 2005.
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the shared values, but answering globalization it has became for the most part individualistic. The
presentation analyzed the profound mutations suffered in the corporatist politics, in the macroeconomics of the “complete use of the labor force”, in the traditional forms of life, in the
institutional heritage, and in the mechanism of reproducing cultural identity, in Britain, since 1979,
too. In such an interpretation, the libertarian individualism adopted in the Great Britain under the
government of M. Thatcher is considered to de-legitimize traditions and conventions central to the
British culture and to undermine the “human post-war liberalism” (in the phrasing of John Gray), in
the views of a Tory paternalist manifestation and in those of a more communitarian tradition, yet,
adapted to the conditions of the industrial society of late modernity. The discussions brought forth
the issue of differentiation between conservatism and neo-conservatism, “conservatory revolution”
in Germany in the 20s and 30s (I. Goian), the relationship between post-liberalism and conservatism
(F. Müller), the doctrinaire relaxation/elasticity of contemporary conservatism (G. Tãnãsescu, I. Bulei),
the problematics of the third way in relationship with conservatism, the absence of conservatism in
Romania, the orange revolutions as conservatory reformism (R. Iamandi), the difference of
conservatism in developed countries and in less developed countries of perifery (I. Goian, H. ªerban).
Henrieta ªerban
FUTURE CONFERENCES
The Japanese Political Science Association invites interested scholars to participate at the 20th
World Congress of the International Political Science Association (IPSA) in Fukuoka, Japan. Join
us for this stimulating meeting on the theme “Is Democracy Working?” that will be held from July 9
to 13, 2006.
Main theme Sessions:
Panels and special sessions related to the main theme will be grouped under 6 major sub-themes:
• The crisis and capacity of democracy: Chair: DirkBerg-Schlosser.
Comparative perspectives: panels in this section will seek to explore dissatisfaction with the
functioning of established democracies, incorporating issues such as declining voter turnout, financial
scandals, political cynicism, populist and extremist appeals; sub-types of “defective” democracies,
such as “delegative”, illiberal, “clientelistic”, among others; criteria and measurements of the “quality”
of democracy including transparency, accountability, and inclusiveness in democratic states; the
capacity of democracy for conflict resolution in, for instance, multi-ethnic and multi-cultural societies;
the prospects for further democratization in various regions of the world, including Central Asia,
and the Middle East.
• Democracy and the new world order: Chairs: Luc Sindjoun & Bertrand Badie.
International relations analysis clearly excluded democracy from its vision. Structured by
power politics, the international arena was construed as being free of any democratic concerns.
This approach was challenged by wilsonian idealism, the position peace theory and then by the
increasing trends of individuals and social actors to create a debate on, and participate in,
international issues. In this Main Theme, our aim would be to evaluate the ability of democratic
values and practices to reshape the international arena, and investigate the ways of democratization
in IR. This process could imply a more effective participation of the weak or small states to the
international concert, their growing capacity to balance the hegemonic powers, a better efficiency
of multilaterialism, an increasing relevance of common goods in managing global governance, a
more performant mobilization of non-state actors which would entail a higher level of social
participation in the international decision-making processes, a monitoring function of the
international public space on the state action and a fading role of the secrecy in IR.
• Institutional legitimacy, interest representation and democratic practice Chair: Leonardo Morlino.
Some of the classic topics in political science need to be revisited in the present era of change
and diffusion of democratic practice. For established democracies, recently built democratic
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regimes and transitional hybrid regimes, the key aspects still are legitimacy and representative
actors. But they present new forms and ways of working in the contemporary democratic practice,
where the role of supranational and international organizations also has to be taken into account.
The panels may address either theoretical issues or empirical themes; they may be either comparative
or centered on a case-study; they may be grounded in different approaches, methodologies or
empirical techniques; however, they should give an idea of the depth of the change by covering a
large span of time and should focus on the connections between legitimacy and representation in
democratic practice.
• Participation and the politics of identity Chair: Hideo Otake.
In an era of neo-liberal ascendancy, we are witnessing the resurgence of various social movements,
spearheaded by the anti-globalization movement and the protests against U.S. military intervention
in Iraq. Other social movements, commonly called “new social movements” whose origins date
from the late 1960s and 1970s, continue to play important roles in awakening public awareness
and influence on governmental policy making in areas such as disability, ecology, gender, and
ethnic minorities. In addition, extreme right groups are increasingly making themselves heard in
the political process in many nations. Panels in this section are expected to address the causes and
consequences of those social movements broadly defined, analyze their characteristics in comparison
with the traditional social movements such as the trade union movement, and explore their
relationship with established political parties (domestic as well as foreign), government institutions,
and business corporations.
Public policies, bureaucracies and the performance of democracy: Chair: Lourdes Sola.
For various reasons uncertainty is inherent in public policy-making, especially in contemporary
democracies — there is a normative dimension, as goals and standards of judgment are a matter
of political preference and culture; criteria of performance are being reassessed in tandem with
changing political relations and with learning processes prompted by globalization; policy-makers
operate in an environment of increasingly “bounded rationality”, that is, with limited knowledge with
reference to new actors and instutitional/technological innovations such as forms of ‘direct’ democracy,
e.democracy, and others. In addition, integration of emerging market democracies into the global
order creates serious constraints for the task of reconciling legitimacy and effectiveness as guiding
principles: while local populations associate democracy with economic welfare, equality, and
political stability, policy makers are bound to deliver public policies with an eye to financial
credibility as well as to the electorate. “Good government” and “good governance” are thus reduced
to simpler and often simplistic notions of “good economic management”. The panels in this section
will take stock of much experimentation and theorizing, in order to reassess under which conditions
democracy may be said to be an enabling constraint to the effectiveness and legitimacy of public
policies.
• Political Knowledge, Theory, and the Design of Democratic Institutions Chair: Henry Milner.
Citizens’ knowledge of politics is a key component of democracy. Political theorists have long
identified the possession of political information as a precondition for taking part in democratic
decision-making. They have drawn our attention especially to elites blocking or distorting political
knowledge. These continue to be important concerns.
But what of the dissemination of political knowledge? We know that it is the informed citizen
that votes and is civically engaged. Yet the informed participating citizen is proving elusive:
empirical studies show a low and apparently declining level of political knowledge. But what do
citizens in a democracy know — and need to know — about their political institutions and actors,
and what is the role of the political science profession in this process? There is great need for
comparative analyses that consider political knowledge from a variety of angles, empirically and
theoretically. Brought together, such work can help both long-standing and new democracies to
identify institutions and policies that affect, and thus potentially boost, political knowledge.
Further informations regarding participations are available at the following web address:
www.fukuoka2006.com
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With a view to enhancing the quality and diversity of participation in its world congress, the
IPSA has instituted a series of awards in the following categories:
i. Karl Deutsch Award,
ii. Stein Rokkan Fellowships,
iii. Francesco Kjellberg Award,
iv. IPSA travel grants,
v. Special travel grants
vi. IPSA Prize for Lifetime Achievement in Political Science Awarded by the Foundation Mattei
Dogan.
Lucian Jora
CONFERENCES AND CALLS FOR PAPERS1
Please find below the details regarding the following events:
— Summer School Berlin 2006 (Berlin,Germany)
— The Streit Council for a Union of Democracies (Paper Competition)
— 7th Biennial Conference of ECSA (Canada) (Victoria, Canada)
— State, Conflict and Democracy Symposium (Lund, Sweden)
— International Political Economy Society 1st Conference (Princeton, United States)
— 3rd Prato International Community Informatics Conference (Prato, Italy)
— Globalisation & Political Theory of Welfare State and Citizenship (Denmark)
— 1st ECPR Graduate Conference (Essex, United Kingdom)
Publications including calls for articles:
— Journal of Contemporary European Research (new issue now online)
— New UACES/Routledge Book Series “Contemporary European Studies”
Jobs, Grants & Prizes:
— PhD Fellowships: “Foreignness and Integration in the Baltic Region” (Germany)
— Council for European Studies 2006 Fellowship Program (Columbia University, NY)
— Research Assistants (x2) European University Institute (Florence, Italy)
— Lecturer B/Senior Lecturer In Contemporary European Studies (Sussex, UK)
— Australian European University Institute Fellowships Association Inc. Fellowships
— Lecturer in Political Studies (University of Auckland, New Zealand)
— 2006 PhD Prize, European Consortium for Political Research
— “Sciences Po” Scholarship for Masters Program in Political Sciences
— HEIRS Essay Prize 2006, History of European Integration Research Society
— Graduate Teaching Scholarship (for PhD) (University of Glasgow, UK)
— Erasmus Mundus Courses
— Fellowships, European University Institute (Florence, Italy)
Call for Papers:
Summer School Berlin 2006, Berlin, Germany, 24–30 July 2006
Closes 1 January 2006
The Research Centre for East European Studies at the University of Bremen, together with the
German Association for East European Studies in Berlin requests applications to an international
Summer School on Justice as a societal and political matter. Equality, social and legal security as
conditions for democracy and the market funded by the Volkswagen-Stiftung, Hannover.
The Summer School: This conference is the first of three Summer Schools for young academics
doing research on Eastern Europe. The Summer School “A Changing Europe” is a follow-up project
of the Conferences of Young Experts on Eastern Europe (1995-2005) which provided the foundation
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for a tight network of young researchers and other experts concerned with Eastern Europe and the
social sciences. The Summer Schools aim at extending this concept to researchers in Central and
Eastern Europe.
Paper proposals: Paper proposals must be based on original research and should not exceed
200 words. They have to be drafted in English and outline the most important theoretical and empirical
aspects of the planned contribution. Please include a short CV, information about institutional
affiliation, status, address etc. In order to be selected it is of central importance to connect an
empirical question with a theoretical approach and concept. Comparative approaches (inter-as well
as intra-regionally) are encouraged. An international review panel will assess the papers for the
conference in an anonymous review process.
The deadline for receipt of paper proposals is 1 January 2006. Please submit your proposal to
Dr. Sabine Fischer ([email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>).
Costs: Funding by the Volkswagen-Stiftung covers travel costs as well as accommodation and
conference fees.
Location: The Summer School will take place at the Club House of the Freie Universitaet Berlin,
Berlin-Dahlem, Goethe str. 49, near U-train station Krumme Lanke.
Information: Further information about the Summer School as well as the conference project
“A changing Europe” in general will be available from 1. December 2005 at www.changing-europe.de.
Call for Papers:
The Streit Council for a Union of Democracies, Paper Competition Inter-Democracy
Integration and Federalism
Closes 10 January 2006
Theme: Institutional Prerequisites for Effective Cooperation among Democracies
Deadline for Papers: 10 January 2006
Eligibility: MA and PhD students in history, political science and international relations. We
are inviting submission of proposals from MA and Ph. D. candidates on topics within the theme
of the institutional prerequisites for furthering the integration of democracies internationally. We
have a particular interest in papers that take a risk and put forward new approaches to foster closer
cooperation among democracies, at the same time providing practical and theoretical grounding
for their proposals.
Further information on procedures for submitting papers is available online at:
http://www.streitcouncil.org/main.cfm?r1=17.00&r2=2.00&ID=177&level=2
Papers for the competition should be submitted by January 10, 2006.
to: [email protected] and copied to [email protected]
For inquiries please contact: Dr. Tiziana Stella by email, [email protected] or
check the website: http://www.streitcouncil.org.
Amended Call for Proposals:
7th Biennial Conference of European Community Studies Association Canada (ECSA-C)
“What Kind of Europe? Multiculturalism, Migration, Political Community and Lessons from
Canada”, Victoria, Canada Friday 19 Saturday 20 May 2006
Closes 31 January 2006
Europe is going through fundamental and vital changes and faces new challenges. The future
of the constitutional convention, the 2004 enlargement by 10 countries and the negotiations with
four prospective new members have created unprecedented challenges. These challenges to
governance include: the numbers of people migrating within and from without the EU, major
social and cultural differences among those peoples, the geo-strategic importance and interests of
the states of the enlarging EU, the new decision making procedures in the field of Justice and
Home affairs, the need for trade policies which take into account the growth of new economic
powers (China and India) and, last but not least, the new power relationships in the world.
The ECSA-Canada Biennial will be held in Victoria to allow practitioners and
researchers (professors and graduate students) to exchange views on the ramifications of these
scenarios and momentous changes. Lawyers, political scientists, economists, historians, social
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scientists, geographers, linguists and others from all over the world are invited to meet and present
their views.
If you wish to participate, please send by e-mail, a one-page summary of your proposed paper,
together with a brief CV to both programme chairs, Dr. Edelgard Mahant (Mahant@glendon.
yorku.ca), Dr. Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly ([email protected] ) Proposals for panels of related papers
are also welcome. Panels should be composed of up to four related papers, and, if possible, a
chairperson and a discussant.
Subject to availability of funding, ECSA Canada can finance up to 50% of travel expenses of
selected paper givers. Preference will be given to graduate students, postdocs, persons from
Central and Eastern Europe, and others who can demonstrate financial need. The payment, at the
discretion of ECSA-C, will be made only on presentation of the original tickets, receipts and
boarding passes.
Deadline for the submission of abstracts is 31 January 2006. Applicants will be informed of
the acceptance (or otherwise) of their abstract during February 2006.
State, Conflict and Democracy Symposium
Lund University, Sweden
12–13 May 2006
Closes 31 January 2006
How can the interest of peace and democracy be jointly served in post-conflict processes of
state-building and reconstruction? In practice, representatives of a range of international agencies
and organizations have to deal with this question on a daily basis; theoretically, the literature
addressing this question is sparse, disjointed, and unsystematic. With the support of the Bank of
Sweden Tercentenary Foundation the undersigned are arranging a symposium on these issues.
Papers are not a requirement for participation. However, three workshops will provide opportunities
to present papers for those of you that are interested.
There will be an opportunity to present a limited number of papers during the three workshops.
It will also be possible to upload papers to this site. We envisage that all papers will be published,
either as contributions to a special issue of a journal, or as conference proceedings.
If you would like to present a paper or upload a paper, please provide an abstract of no more
than 250 words by 31 January 2006. Send your abstract as an attachment to: [email protected]
Information on the workshops and the call for papers can be found online at: www.svet.
lu.se/conference/index.html
International Political Economy Society, First Annual Conference Princeton University,
Princeton, New Jersey, United States, November 2006
Closes 1 February 2006
We write to announce the inaugural meeting of the International Political Economy Society
(IPES), and to invite you to submit a proposal for a paper to be presented at the first annual
conference to be held at Princeton University, 17–18 November 2006.
Rationale: The purpose of this Society and conference is two-fold. First, we hope to highlight
the best new work in international political economy and to promote this exciting field of research.
Second, the larger association meetings (e.g., APSA, ISA) have grown somewhat diffuse. Following
the example of several smaller societies that have developed in related fields, such as the Public
Choice Society, Peace Sciences Society (International) and the International Society for New
Institutional Economics, the conference will focus on a smaller number of carefully selected
papers. With participants who share a common background and field expertise, we expect the
quality of the presentations and discussions to be very high.
Expenses:
In addition to organizing and hosting the conference, the Center for Globalization and Governance
has contributed limited amounts of money to help defray hotel expenses for those attendees who
do not have travel funds of their own. Priority in distributing these funds will be given to graduate
students and junior faculty presenting papers at the meeting. If you wish to be considered for these
travel funds, please indicate this at the end of your paper proposal (see below).
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Further information about registering for the conference and logistics (i.e., hotel reservations)
will be forthcoming in May 2006 with the preliminary program and posted at our website (The
website is available at http://polisci.ucsd.edu/ipes/).
Proposals: For purposes of the conference, appropriate papers will include some international
component (i.e., either the independent or dependent variable must be “international” in some
meaningful sense), and should either focus on some area of economic policy or use economic
methods to analyze political phenomena. Although we expect the conference to be centered on
political scientists working on IPE, we would also welcome submissions from economists and
other scholars from cognate fields. One important goal of IPES is to provide an outlet for up-andcoming IPE scholars to increase their visibility. For that reason we will give some priority to
presentations by advanced graduate and recent Ph.D.’s. Nonetheless, proposals from scholars at all
stages of their careers are encouraged.
Proposals for papers should be submitted by 1 February 2006. Proposals need not be long, but
should be sufficiently detailed to allow a full understanding of the contribution of the paper.
Graduate students should also submit a letter of support from their dissertation advisors. All
proposals will be vetted by the program committee. Participants will be notified by May 2006 and
a preliminary program will be released at that time. Please submit your proposals to: [email protected]
If you have any questions or concerns, please contact any of the committee members or write
to us at [email protected]
Call For Papers:
Constructing and Sharing Memory — Community Informatics, Identity and Empowerment,
3rd Prato International Community Informatics Conference Prato, Italy October 2006
Closes 1 February 2006
We are seeking abstracts from academics, practitioners and PhD students for a conference and
workshop event at the Monash University Centre, Prato, Italy, 9–11 October 2006. The Centre for
Community Networking Research, Monash, in conjunction with the Community Informatics
Research Network, has held highly successful events in 2003 and 2004 in Prato. The Prato campus
is an exceptional environment in which to exchange ideas. The Centre is just off the main piazza
of a small Tuscan city. It is close to Italian transport hubs.
There are also a limited number of workshop slots available. If you believe that you can offer
an engaging and relevant workshop, please submit a short proposal as soon as possible. If you have
other innovative ideas for events at the conference, please don’t hesitate to contact us!
Because of the likely strong demand for acceptance, your early submission is strongly encou
aged. You are also encouraged to submit early to meet your accommodation needs.
A draft program and further information on the conference topics as well as potential themes
for papers and presentations can be found online at the conference website. A brochure for
distribution and noticeboards can also be downloaded from the website.
Contact: [email protected]
Website: http://www.ccnr.net/prato2006
Globalisation and the Political Theory of the Welfare State and Citizenship International
Conference - Aalborg University, Denmark
May 2006
Closes 1 February 2006
The conference is organised by the Danish Network on Political Theory, Aarhus University,
Department of History, International and Social Studies and Department of Economics, Politics
and Public Administration, Aalborg University. The purpose of this conference is to analyse how
Western welfare state values, citizenship and conceptual foundations are challenged by globalisation.
Confirmed keynote speakers are:
Professor Will Kymlicka (Queen’s University, Kingston, Canada)
Professor Ruth Lister (Loughborough University, England)
Professor Bryan Turner (University of Singapore, Singapore)
Professor Jørgen Goul Andersen (Aalborg University, Denmark)
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The conference is organised around four themes, which represent new challenges to Western
we fare states and social and political citizenship:
1. The tension between trans-national politics, equality and social rights;
2. The tension between universalism and particularism;
3. The tension between citizenship rights and human rights;
4. The tension between welfare solidarity and migration.
An overview of the conference and detailed information on the conference themes and
registration can be found at the conference website: http://www.ihis.aau.dk/freia/ocs/index.php?cf=2
Abstracts: 300 word abstracts are due on 1 February 2006.
Call for Papers:
Panel Proposals 1st European Consortium for Political Research Graduate Conference
University of Essex, United Kingdom September 2006
Closes 1 March 2006
Graduate students from ECPR member institutions are welcome to submit paper or full panel
proposals for the first ECPR Graduate Conference. For further information, please see:
http://www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/events/graduateconference/index.aspx
The call for papers can be found at: http://www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/events/graduateconference/
call_papersandpanels.aspx
Publications
• “Journal of Contemporary European Research”, Volume 1 Issue 2 now available online
The latest Issue of JCER: “Journal of Contemporary European Research” is now available
online at http://www.jcer.net
• New UACES/Routledge Book Series “Contemporary European Studies”
The new UACES/Routledge book series “Contemporary European Studies” is inviting proposals
for high quality research monographs in all sub-fields of European Studies. We are particularly
keen to publish interdisciplinary research, but all proposals will be given serious consideration.
For further advice and information, or to submit proposals, please contact one (or all) of the
series editors:
Tanja Boerzel ([email protected])
Michelle Cini ([email protected])
Alex Warleigh ([email protected])
Jobs, Grants & Prizes
PhD Fellowships-Graduate Programme 619: “Contact Area Mare Balticum: Foreignness
and Integration in the Baltic Region“
Closes 31 December 2005
In May 2006, the Ernst Moritz Arndt University, Greifswald, will continue the graduate programme
“Contact Area Mare Balticum: Foreignness and Integration in the Baltic Region“, subject to final
authorisation by the German Research Foundation. Its goal is to enhance students’ enthusiasm for
the issue of foreignness and integration in the Baltic region, while training them in the
skills required for a productive research career. The programme is designed for Ph.D. students in
Philosophy, Political Sciences, Psychology, Scandinavian and Germanic Languages, Slavic
Literatures, Baltic Languages and Literatures, Art History, History and Law, and examines
foreignness as an intellectual, cultural and social phenomenon. Key questions are: foreignness in
(Baltic) thought, and factors of integration, perception of foreigners/foreignness and cultural
transformation in historical perspective.
The graduate programme will award 12 Ph.D. fellowships. Fellows receive financial support
in the form of scholarships of 1,000/month. In addition, every fellow will receive 103/month for
books and other study materials. Fellowships are for two years in the first instance and they can
be extended for one more year.
To apply for a fellowship, please send your Curriculum Vitae copies of examination certificates
(English or German translations).
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Project Proposal (not to exceed 7 pages).
Letter of Recommendation by a referee to the coordinator of the Graduate Programme:
Professor Dr Michael, North Ernst Moritz Arndt University, Department of History, Chair of
Modern History- Domstrasse 9 a D-17487 Greifswald Germany
Additional information about the Graduate Programme is available in the Web: www.unigreifswald.de/~marebalt/Startseite.htm, by phone +49 (0)3834 86-3308 or mail [email protected].
Council for European Studies — 2006 Fellowship Program
Closes 15 January 2006
Graduate students are invited to participate in the Council for European Studies 2006
Fellowship Program. The CES Fellowship Program has granted more than 500 awards over the
last thirty-five years, providing doctoral students with the opportunity to travel to Europe to test
the feasibility of their dissertation topics.
The application must be received in the Council’s office via postal mail by 15 January 2006.
The address is as follows:
Council For European Studies-Columbia University, 420 West 118th Street, MC New York,
NY 10027, United States of America.
The 2006 application form can be downloading from our website http://www.
councilforeuropeanstudies.org/awards/awards.html.
Research Assistants(x2), Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European
University Institute, Florence, Italy
Closes 15 January 2006
Ref: RSC 12/2005 (please quote in all correspondence)
Contract Details: Up to 4 years, start date to be agreed, but not later than 1 March 2006. Salary
according to German Bat IIa/halbe (50% of full-time position, up to 19.25 hours/week, ca. 1,239
per month).
Director of project: Prof. Dr. Adrienne Heritier (in collaboration with Prof. Dr. Tanja A.
Boerzel / Free University Berlin)
Title of project: “Fostering Regulation? Corporate Social Responsibility in Countries with
Weak Regulatory Capacity”.
The project is part of the Berlin-based Sonderforschungsbereich SFB 700 (see www.sfb700.
fu-berlin.de in German). We are interested in research questions such as: To which degree do selfregulatory initiatives of Multinational Corporations (MNCs) or Public Private Partnerships (PPPs)
that promote Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) foster the regulative capacities in developing
countries? Under which conditions do MNCs support the enforcement of state regulations? Which
New Modes of Governance emerge thereby?
Our Case Studies will be located in South Africa. (See for further project descriptions: http://
www.sfb700.fu-berlin.de/forschung/projektbereiche, in German); however, this Advertisement for
two appointments of Research Assistant is not yet posted on the project’s website).
Job description: Developing of questionnaire, collection of data, (mostly qualitative) data
analysis, data interpretation, reporting of data, field research, literature analysis. Research Assistants
are encouraged to work part time on a thematically related PhD project.
Qualifications: You should have an excellent degree in Political or Social Science (M.A. or
equivalent degree, like the German Diplom or Magister), training in theoretically guided qualitative
(or quantitative) empirical research on governance, and a very good command of the English
language.
Applications with the usual documents — including a curriculum vitae — must be addressed
to the Academic Service, for attention of Dr. A. Frijdal, at the following e-mail address:
[email protected]. If you require specific information about the position, please contact Dr.
Frijdal at [email protected]. The deadline for application is 15 January 2006.
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Lecturer B/Senior Lecturer
In Contemporary European Studies From 1 Sept 2006 (Ref 248) Sussex European Institute,
University Of Sussex, United Kingdom
Closes 20 January 2006
The Sussex European Institute wishes to make a permanent appointment at Lecturer B/Senior
Lecturer level. The post will be at the core of SEI and entail involvement across SEI’s teaching
and research activities and will contribute to managing these activities. You will have a research
record and experience that shows your potential to be an authority in the field of European political
integration. Depending on experience, you will have, or show the potential to develop, an
outstanding research record with a focus on issues of direct policy concern, be an excellent teacher
and supervisor, and have experience of, or show the potential to undertake, research management.
Potential candidates are encouraged to speak to Professor Jim Rollo (01273 877265) or Professor
Aleks Szczerbiak (01273 678443)
Salary: £28,829 To £36,959 Or £38,685 To £43,850 PA
Closing date: Friday 20 January 2006
Application details are available from and should be returned to the Human Resources
Division, Sussex House, University of Sussex, Falmer, Brighton, BN1 9RH. Tel 01273 678706,
Fax 01273 877401, email [email protected]. Details of all posts can be found via the
University website: www.sussex.ac.uk/jobs
Fellowships, Australian European University Institute, Fellowships Association Inc.
Florence, Italy
Closes 25 January 2006
Applications are now invited for Australian European University Institute Fellowships which
provide the opportunity to carry out research for three months at the European University Institute
in Florence. Two postgraduate Fellowships will be offered for the period September–December 2006.
(Please note: a six-month postdoctoral Fellowship will be advertised from 25 March 2006 for
January–June 2007).
The postgraduate Fellowships are available to postgraduates currently undertaking research in
history, law, economics, and social and political sciences who are at an advanced stage of their
research and are able to identify a direct benefit for their research from a period of residence at the
EUI.
The Fellowships cover EUI fees for three months and provide a one-off payment of $7,000 to
contribute to travel and subsistence. The successful candidates will also have access to the
facilities of the Monash University Prato Centre and are encouraged to participate in its activities,
and at the conclusion of the award period, will have the opportunity to present a paper at the
Monash University London Centre.
All applications are to be emailed to [email protected]
Further information on the AEUIFAI is available at: http://www.arts.monash.edu.au/history/
aeuifai; on the European University Institute at: http://www.iue.it/; and on the Monash University
Prato Centre at http://www.ita.monash.edu/; or from the Secretary, Dr. Peter Howard, e-mail:
[email protected].
Applications close 25 January 2006. (The successful applicants will be notified by mid-May
2006).
Lecturer in Political Studies, Department of Political Studies University of Auckland,
New Zealand
Closes 27 January 2006
The Department of Political Studies is seeking to appoint a permanent academic position in
international relations at the lecturer level. We wish to appoint someone whose work is
theoretically informed and contributes to the study of a) world politics with a focus on conflict and
security issues and/or b) the politics of regional integration, with a focus on Europe.
The successful candidate(s) for these positions would be expected to teach in at least two of
the following areas: international political economy, global governance, international security,
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119
and/or the European Union. Successful candidates will be expected to take up their positions by 1
July 2006.
Qualifications: PhD in Political Science; experience in lecturing to large classes would be an
advantage.
Enquiries of an academic nature should be directed to Professor Jack Vowles, Department of
Political Studies, telephone 64-9-373 7599 ext 88644, email: [email protected].
2006 PhD Prize
European Consortium for Political Research
Closes 31 January 2006
The deadline for nominations for the 2006 PhD Prize is 31 January 2006.
Please note that the guidelines for nominations and the judging procedures have been updated
to make the prize more accessible for candidates whose theses are written in languages other than
English. Please see the web site for more information: http://www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/funding/prizes.
HEIRS Essay Prize 2006
History of European Integration Research Society
Closes 31 March 2006
The History of European Integration Research Society is launching its Essay Prize Competition
2006. This year we especially encourage contributions from all post-graduate students and young
researchers that tie European integration history to any aspect of the Cold War broadly defined.
The winning essay will be submitted for publication in the journal Cold War History, published by
the Taylor & Francis Group and housed by the LSE Cold War Studies Centre. The winning paper
will be published after having gone through the peer-review procedure.
Papers will be short-listed by the HEIRS Committee and the best four papers will be forwarded
to a panel of leading historians. For this year’s competition, the judges are: Prof. Gérard Bossuat
(Université de Cergy-Pontoise), Prof. Robert Gildea (University of Oxford), Dr Piers Ludlow
(London School of Economics) and Prof. Wolfgang Schmale (Universität Wien).
The deadline for submission is Friday, 31 March 2006. Manuscripts should be submitted in
rich text format as an email attachment to [email protected].
The result will be announced on Monday, 15 May 2006 and publication will take place in due
course.
Format and style: All manuscripts must be written in English or in French. While under
consideration for the HEIRS Essay Prize, papers should not be under consideration for any other
publication. If another version of the article is under consideration by another publication, or has
been, or will be published elsewhere, authors should clearly indicate this at the time of submission.
Manuscripts should be between 7,000 and 10,000 words (including endnotes and references).
The article should begin with an abstract of around 100 words, which should describe the main
arguments and conclusions. To facilitate the typesetting process, notes should be grouped together
at the end of the file. A short biographical note of around 50 words (including the author’s
institutional affiliation and current and forthcoming projects) should be submitted in a separate
file. In addition, full contact details (including postal address), any acknowledgements, and a note
of the exact length of the article should be included in that file. It will be the authors’ responsibility
to ensure that where copyright materials are included within an article the permission of the
copyright holder has been obtained. Confirmation of this should be included with the submission.
Graduate Teaching Scholarship (for PhD)
University of Glasgow Glasgow, Scotland, United Kingdom
Closes 1 May 2006
The Department of Politics University of Glasgow (rated 5 in the last 3 RAEs) will offer ONE
Graduate Teaching Scholarship commencing in September 2006.
Value: Home/EU fee waiver (c£3500) plus £2000 contribution to maintenance, for three years.
The scholarship is open to non UK/EU students but there will be a fee short-fall, which may
be met via other funds such as ORS (see below).
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Eligibility:
a) Candidates must first have been accepted by the Department to do a Ph.D, that is, they must
have been judged to possess [i] the requisite standard of qualifications [ii] a doctoral research topic
that falls within the capacious remit of the Department to supervise (including EU politics and
policy). In their application to undertake research they should indicate their desire to be considered
for one of the scholarships.
b) Candidates will typically possess a Masters degree (or equivalent) or be expected to complete
one in 2005/6.
c) Candidates will be expected to apply for funded scholarships (such as ESRC, AHRC, ORS
and including those offered by the Faculty of Law, Business and Social Sciences, University of
Glasgow). If successful the candidate must accept such an award.
d) Candidates must, in the judgment of the Department, be able satisfactorily to offer seminar
teaching, primarily at pre-honours (years 1 & 2) level.
e) The closing date for applications is 1 May 2006 (later applications may be considered and
placed on a “reserve”).
Terms & Conditions: a] Scholars will undertake teaching allocated up to but not exceeding
6 hours a week, averaged across the academic year.
b) The award of the scholarship in years 2 and 3 is dependent on a positive report of the annual
progress review.
c) Termination of studies will result in termination of the scholarship.
d) Suspension of studies will normally lead to suspension of payments.
Erasmus Mundus Courses
Various Institutions, deadlines vary according to course
The Erasmus Mundus programme is a co-operation and mobility programme in the field of
higher education which promotes the European Union as a centre of excellence in learning around
the world. It supports European top-quality Masters Courses and enhances the visibility and
attractiveness of European higher education in third countries. It also provides EU–funded scholarships
for third country nationals participating in these Masters Courses, as well as scholarships for EUnationals studying in third countries. Students interested in applying for Erasmus Mundus courses
can check out the Erasmus Mundus programmes at the European Commission’s website: http://
europa.eu.int/comm/education/ programmes/ mundus/ projects.
Further information on eligibility and conditions and Frequently Answered Questions are
available at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/education/programmes/mundus/index_en.html
Fellowships at the European University Institute, Florence, Italy
The European University Institute in Florence, Italy, offers three different fellowship programmes:
Max Weber Fellowships for junior post-docs who would like to embark on an academic career
and improve their teaching and professional skills.
Jean Monnet Fellowships at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies with its emphasis
on research for junior academics at an early stage in their professional careers.
Senior Fellowships for established academics with an international reputation for short stays
of up to ten months in one of the Institute’s four departments.
Further information and online application materials are available at http://www.iue.it/Servac/
Postdoctoral/>http://www.iue.it/Servac/Postdoctoral/
For queries please contact: [email protected].
NOTE
1. Courtesy of : Contemporary Europe Research
Centre (CERC) at The University of Melbourne.
Lucian Jora
BOOK REVIEWS
Francesco Guida
Romania, Roma, Casa Editrice Edizioni Unicopli, 2005, 312 p.
É stato pubblicato di recente un eccellente libro:
Romania, stampato alla Casa editrice Edizioni Unicopli
di Roma, sulla collana Storia d’Europa nel XX secolo,
diretta da Marco Gervasoni e Leonardo Rapone.
L’autore del volume è Francesco Guida, professore
ordinario di Storia dell’Europa orientale presso la
Facoltà di Scienze Politiche dell’Università di Roma
Tre, segretario generale dell’Associazione Italiana
Studi sul Sud/Est Europeo.
Francesco Guida è uno storico ormai consacrato.
Fin’ora ha scritto dei volumi come: La Bulgaria dalla
Guerra di liberazione sino al trattato di Neuilly
(1877/1919), Testimonianze italiane (Roma, 1984);
L’Italia e il Risorgimento balcanico (Roma, 1984),
Nascita di uno stato balcanico (si tratta di Bulgaria)
(Napoli, 1988), Il leone e la scimitarra (Cosenza,
1990), Mezzo secolo di socialismo reale. L’Europa
centro-orientale dal secondo conflitto mondiale
all’era post/comunista (Torino, 1997), Russia ed Europa
orientale 1815/1914 (Roma, 2003). L’elenco potrebbe
continuare ancora, senza nemmeno accennare né tutti
suoi libri, né i numerosi articoli e gli studi. Tale lavoro
lo reputa come uno storico molto rigoroso, serio,
in cui s’individua una laboriosità invidiabile. La
storiografia sulla Romania aveva bisogno da molto
tempo di uno storico italiano preoccupato dalle
vicende romene, di un loro inquadramento nella
situazione della storia europea, vista come una storia
allo stesso tempo balcanica, parte dell’Europa orientale
ma soprattutto parte dell’Europa intera.
Quest’ultimo volume racconta la storia della
Romania nel Novecento. Il racconto é suddiviso secondo
una scansione ormai tradizionale e condivisa dagli
storici. Tutto si sviluppa, fatto storico acanto fatto
storico e le interpretazioni di questi fatti, svellendo
pian-piano (il libro ha 350 pagine) una storia quasi
sconosciuta dal pubblico italiano, assaltato ultimamente
da una valanga dei fatti provenienti dall’Europa
orientale. Comincia con una breve premessa dedicata
al secolo precedente, poi tratta la Romania fino alla
prima Guerra mondiale e la partecipazione del paese
alla Grande Guerra (le prime battaglie, l’abbandono
della Valacchia, l’armistizio, la pace separata, il ritorno
in campo e la Guerra con l’Ungheria per la Transilvania
e Banato). Molte pagine sono dedicate alla grand’unione
del 1918/1919 che creò la Grande Romania, ai nuovi
confini del paese nel contesto internazionale, alla
Pol. Sc. Int. Rel., II, 2, p. 121–126, Bucharest, 2005.
questione ebraica, alla questione del Danubio, al
problema agrario, alla riforma elettorale e agli sviluppi
politici nell’immediato dopoguerra, ai problemi di
politica estera, del nazionalismo e alla posizione degli
intellettuali, alla crisi politica del dopoguerra, alla
storia politica, sociale, economica e culturale della
Romania tra le due guerre mondiali. L’autore spiega
tanto la democrazia mimata che la democrazia guidata
esistenti in Romania fra le due guerre e come si arriva
alle dittature di Carol II e di Antonescu. Poi, la seconda
Guerra mondiale, con tutte le sue vicende che
riguardano anche la Romania occupa una parte
importante nel libro. Durante la Guerra, la Romania,
come l’Italia, comincia le operazioni militare accanto
ai tedeschi per finire la guerra accanto agli Alleati.
L’autore si occupa poi della nascita del regime
comunista (la questione della Transilvania, il terrore,
le Chiese e il regime, la sovietizzazione della
Romania, le purghe, gli intellettuali e il regime), della
destalinizzazione alla dittatura di Ceusescu (scrive
qui dell’eresia romena, della sua politica di
quasindependenza nelle strutture militare e politiche
est europee, Il Comecom e il Patto di Varsavia).
La dittatura personale di Ceausescu è largamente
spiegata e analizzata. Uno spazio generoso è accordato
alla rivoluzione romena di dicembre 1989 e ai fatti
storici seguenti (La Romania postcomunista, la
questione della Moldavia, come excomunisti hanno
ceduto lentamente il passo e perché è successo così).
Sono pagine ben scritte, da un intellettuale
occidentale che conosce intimamente la nostra storia e sa
inquadrala nella storia regionale ed europea. Suo
discorso è veramente europeo, privo di pregiudizi e di
problemi di sentimentalismo nazionale, presenti di solito
agli storici quando scrivono della storia del loro popolo.
Un’appendice con capi di Stato e di governo, una
bibliografia breve, ma ben scelta e un indice dei nomi
completa un’opera di un grande valore e di una grande
attualità. Non dobbiamo dimenticare che in Italia si
conoscono pochissime cose sulla Romania e quello
che si sa di solito é sbagliato. Abbiamo aspettato a
lungo uno storico come Francesco Guida. E finalmente
lui è arrivato. L’opera di Francesco Guida diventerà
presto un punto di riferimento esenziale per tutti
quelli che vogliono conoscere la Romania. Non solo
il suo destino storico, ma anche il luogo della Romania
nella nuova Europa.
Ion Bulei
122
BOOK REVIEW
2
Angela Botez
Un secol de filosofie româneascã, Bucureºti, Editura Academiei Române, 2005, 488p.
This is a history of Romanian philosophical
ideas, themes and personalities opened towards the
“universal” and towards the ultimate “other” who is
nowadays the Romanian unaware of her/his own
philosophical thesaurus. The volume capitalizes on
both the roots and on the opennings represented by
the thought of the various figures of the Romanian
philosophy in the 20th century. In this book, Romanian
philosophy is depicted through the lenses of the
contemporary elements of philosophical thought.
Dusting “old” ideas, embracing them in the actual
terms of appreciation — and not merely tailoring
them fashionably — this is a work of unification of
valuable theories and ideas, in times of celebrating
diversity and difference, under such contemporary
themes and within the contemporary cultural and
philosophical paradigms in philosophy.
Such a titanic effort starts by both understanding
and highlighting the larger spiritual Romanian
paradigm within which the cultural and philosophical
one is inscribed. The author therefore identifies a
stylistical matrix of the Romanian philosophy
characterized by: (1) the reception of the main European
philosophical currents, in a well-balanced and
complementary-holistic perspective that puts the
accent both on the German (Kant and Nietzsche) and on
the French (Descartes and Bergson) philosophy, (2) the
critique of the tendencies that claim themselves as the
ultimate direction in philosophy — the logicist, the
scientist, the empirist, the intuitionalist or the
irrationalist. Each time a Romanian philosopher
enrolles in a tendency, it is a nuanced affiliation, as
this attempt is accompanied by certain specifications;
and, (3) there are certain themes and disciplines where
the Romanian authors have tried with predilection
their competencies — metaphysics, the history of
philosophy, gnoseology, the philosophy of logics, the
philosophy of science, the philosophy of conscience
or the philosophy of culture — although the other
philosophical areas are not completely ignored.
Thus, the Romanian philosophers are expressing
a serius of “integrative” concepts and themes some
“inedite” — for example Constantin Rãdulescu-Motru
with the “energetic personalism”, Ion Petrovici with
his “psycho-physical parallelism”, Constantin Noica
with the “becoming into being”, Mircea Florian
with the “theory of the given”, Lucian Blaga with the
“ecstatic rationalism” etc. — and some perceiving
culture as an “energetic mutation” (Constantin
Rãdulescu-Motru ), or as an “psychical mutation”
(Mihai Ralea), or, yet, as an “ontological mutation”
as Lucian Blaga. Some of the Romanian philosophers
have created their own philosophical method, like did
Ion Petrovici (“the empirical and rationalist method”),
Mircea Florian (“the method of recessivity”), Lucian
Blaga (“the transfigurated antinomy” and “the categorial
duality”), Petre Andrei (“the retotalizing capitalization”),
Mihai Ralea (“the cognitive hesitation”), D.D. Roºca
(“the existentialist negation”), or Emil Cioran (“nihilistic
decomposure”).
The contents of the volume follows these above
mentioned characteristic lines. The introduction
describes in the first part the stylistic matrix of the
Romanian philosophy, the specificity of the history of
the Romanian philosophy and the manner of the writing
the volume. In the second part of the introduction there
are a few important mentions dedicated to each of the
Romanian creator of language and of philosophical
school — Mihai Eminescu, Titu Maiorescu, Constantin
Rãdulescu-Motru and Nae Ionescu. The first part of the
book consists of nine chapters.
The first chapters dedicated to the metaphysics of
the 20th century tackles the orientations and their main
figures of reference — Constantin Rãdulescu-Motru,
Mircea Florian, Ion Petrovici, Nae Ionescu, Mircea
Vulcãnescu — and the postmodern resurection of
metaphysics occasioned by the integrative
metaphysical concepts identified by the author in the
work of Lucian Blaga. The second chapter confronts
the reader with the Romanian Kantianism — Ion
Petrovici, P.P. Negulescu, Constantin RãdulescuMotru, Mircea Florian and others — while discussing
in a separate section the role and scope of the
philosophy of science and logic in the Romanian
culture. The philosophy of mind and consciousness is
approached in the third chapter through a discussion
of historical sources and contemporary conceptions
in this field, complemented by the Romanian
perspectives brought about by the representatives:
Constantin Rãdulescu-Motru, Mircea Florian, Ion
Petrovici, Mihai Ralea, Camil Petrescu and others.
The next dimension approached in the book is holism
and complemetary systemism, developed with a take
on the holistic system and paradigm in the
philosophy of the 20th century and on the approaches
of the Romanian philosophers — ªtefan Lupaºcu,
Constantin Rãdulescu-Motru, D.D. Roºca, Mihai
Ralea, P.P. Negulescu, Petre Andrei, Lucian Blaga,
Octav Onicescu, Mircea Florian. The subject is
complemented by the study Mircea Eliade on
Hermeneutics and Planetary Humanism. The fifth
chapter tackles realism and its forms, in two parts:
general perspectives and an investigation of realism
and “recessivity” at Mircea Florian. The next chapter
deals with matters of phenomenology and with the
philosophy of language their trends and methodologies
and their representatives amongst the Romanian
philosophers: Constantin Floru, Camil Petrescu,
Constantin Noica, and I.D. Gherea.
The crisis of modernist philosophy is debated in
the chapter seven of the first part, starting with the
investigation of the rise of post-modernism and of the
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BOOK REVIEW
post-analytic epistemology and continuing with the
analysis of integral rationality — as an “act of
consciousness, not axiom of science” — of the
hegelianism and of the existentialism at D.D. Roºca.
The next subject is “Relativism and ContextualHistoricist Philosophy”, met in its orientations and
main trends and complemented by the study ªtefan
Lupaºcu — Post-analytic Originated Philosopher of
Science. The last chapter of the first part is entitled
Postmodernism and Nihilism, with a first study of the
crisis of historicism and modern representationalism
and a second on Emil Cioran — A Deconstructive
Philosophy.
The entire book is loaded with information.1 In a
very “beyondist” manner the information is either
explicitly or implicitly, according to the case,
sustained by the “stories” (her, his and their)
challenging the hegemonic genealogies of
knowledge and power with whatever the sources
such as the memories or the interviews, enriching the
thought with subjectivity, whenever possible.
While the first part places the accent on the
intriguing Romanian philosophical ideas in the family
of contemporary philosophical ideas and in relationship
with the main philosophical trends, the second part
offers a “diary” of the life of the far reaching Romanian
contemporary philosophical community — chapter 1,
“A Century of Romanian Philosophical Journalism”,
chapter 2, “Philosophical Publications. Main Books”,
chapter 3 “Philosophical Community. Associations and
Institutes of Philosophy” and chapter 4, “Romanian
Participation to Philosophy Congresses”.
“As a Conclusion. Perspectives of Romanian
Philosophers on National Identity and the specificity
of Romanian Philosophy” defines a topic especially
interesting for the realm of political philosophy. A.
Botez says: “Without sustaining that we have a
constituted and developed ethnic-psychology, given
— among other factors — the fracture of the Romanian
culture produced by the repressive and Stalinist
communism, we can still state that there is in the
Romanian philosophical, scientific, literary, journalistic
writing, several theoretical perspectives of great
value, many ‘esseistic’ points of view, relevant
connotations, many scattered in public conferences,
academic discourses, printed press articles. They all
compose a picture worthy of contemporary interest,
because they highlight a series of psychological
constants of the Romanian people, legitimating a new
reflection and a new investigation of the moral and
spiritual physionomy of our kind.”2
But in order to identify only the crucial benefits
of this volume, merely in a punctual manner, one has
to acknowledge first of all the trait of Romanians
“nihilist and cioranian” in nature, but lacking the
talent and the depth of Cioran. The habit of minimizing
the performances of the forerunners is especially
damaging. It is one of the ‘refuges’ for personal
misfortune, along with the trouble of being born
Romanian and the shortcomings of the system.
123
Especially young people try to ignore and deny the
substance of a Romanian philosophy before even
starting to get the feel of it. For our young philosophers
and theorists, such an incursion into the best of our
philosophical not so distant past might be opening
brighter future horizons.
This is a chance for an entire range of diverse
readers to find about the scope and the importance of
the philosophical writings of personalities such as
Lucian Blaga, Constantin Floru, Camil Petrescu, I.D.
Gherea, ªtefan Lupaºcu, and D.D. Roºca or Mircea
Florian, Ion Petrovici, Mihai Ralea and Constantin
Rãdulescu-Motru and go hence beyond the fashionable
works and present-day popular culture consideration
of Constantin Noica, Mircea Eliade, Petre Þuþea3 and
Emil Cioran.
From this perspective, this work pays homage to
the main Romanian creators of language and schools
of philosophy: Mihai Eminescu, Titu Maiorescu,
Constantin Rãdulescu-Motru and Nae Ionescu. The
first two contributed essentially to the status of
philosophy as a critical school. Eminescu, for instance,
was offering the following definition for philosophy:
“Philosophy has a critical value, it enhances the
intellect, it breaks the laziness of meditation, and
from exaggeratedly trusting foreign ideas it brings
the intellect to the habit of investigating things in a
genetic manner and weighting each word before
including it into a theory”.4 Maiorescu has transformed
this philosophical incentive into a norm. “If Maiorescu
has created a critical school, and Rãdulescu-Motru a
psychological one, around Nae Ionescu was erected
such a philosophical school that triggered the names
of C. Floru, Onicescu, Cioran, Eliade”.5
Both Eminescu and Maiorescu are evaluated here
as precursors of the “Enlightened century”, marked by
the rationalist and scientific school of C. RãdulescuMotru and by the intuitionist, anti-positivist and antilogicist school of Nae Ionescu, with personalities
such as Lucian Blaga and Constantin Noica (exemplary
personality through his paideical activity). With Nae
Ionescu, the philosophical truth is one of many, the
metaphysics a continuous confrontation with the self
and reality which brings about relativity, Mircea Eliade
highlights the fact of religion as a communicative
experience that becomes fundamental for culture, as
a nisus formativus, while Mircea Vulcãnescu sees a
philosophy of Christianity central for aspiring at the
metaphysical truth. Emil Cioran designed the search
for absolute as the recipe for bringing the individual
to the brink of despairing and saw the “small” cultures,
doomed to live tragically against the “big” cultures.
Constantin Noica remains for the attempt to infusing
subjectivism and descriptive hermeneutics into
metaphysics and Vasile Bãncilã brings a postmodernist
air to contemporary Romanian philosophy sustaining
that the philosophical essay is still literature. The
volume brings all the readers to the “bigger picture”,
the integrative one. “The universality of philosophy is
expressed through particular creations and works”.6
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BOOK REVIEW
4
NOTES
1. To better understand the extent of this informative
approach one has to look not merely at the
number of pages or at the complex structure of
the contents, but also at the great variety of
illustrations and at the extent of the selected
bibliography.
2. Angela Botez, Un secol de filosofie româneascã,
Bucureºti, Editura Academiei Române, 2005,
p. 454.
3. Þuþea is considered as well by the author although
she does not dedicate a distinct study to
investigate his works, published after his death.
“A certain type of peri-pathetical school has
entertained also Petre Þuþea, followed by his
disciples in his walks through Ciºmigiu public
garden. He was a “machinery” spontaneously
debiting aphorisms…”(p. 87).
4. Ibidem, p. 41.
5. Ibidem, p. 91.
6. Ibidem, p. 10.
Henrieta ªerban
Angela Botez
Postmodernismul în filosofie, Bucureºti, Editura Floare albastrã, 2005, 352 p.
This daring and informative work attunes the most
important Romanian preoccupations in postmodern
philosophy with the postmodern conversations of the
world, at the same time, integrating these two
dimensions in the general interest for contemporary
knowledge and society.
This example of scholarship and sound
philosophical investigation is structured in five
chapters, complemented by a list of works and
scientific communications of the author, an extended
bibliography and several pages of portraits of
postmodern philosophers and postmodern philosophy
books. The first chapter sets the frame for discussing
postmodernism in philosophy. This volume tackles the
“exploits” of postmodernism starting from the
bibliography of postmodernism as sketched by
Deborah Madsen, from the definitions of
postmodernism as considered by Linda Hutcheon and
from the postmodern themes and concepts (at D.
Harvey and J.R. Watson). In the second chapter Angela
Botez finds the historical sources of postmodernism in
certain aspects of the philosophy of Socrates, Plato,
Hegel, Spengler, Dewey, Peirce, Dilthey. The authors
responsible for the major “turns” in philosophy are
presented as forerunners, while the schools present the
protagonists of postmodernism. Thus, the French
school is present here with medallions of Derrida,
Foucault, Lyotard, Lacan, Levinas, and Deleuze.
Rorty, Paul de Man, Schrag, Sallis, Heelan, Ramsey
represent the American school. The main
representative of the Italian school is Vattimo. For the
British school the selected representatives are Polanyi
and Norris. Aside from such a classification of
postmodernism, another dimension is suggested
through the postmodern feminism investigated mainly
at Arendt, Irigaray and Kristeva.
The postmodern perspectives in philosophy are
situated in a “metaphorical and symbolic space”,
between modernity and postmodernity. From this
specific situation the perspectives opened by the
author are: realism and postmodernism, Kantianism
and postmodernism, the metaphysics and its
postmodern resurrection, postmodernism and its
renewed epistemology, the critical (postmodern)
approach to esthetics, postmodernism and religion.
The Romanian authors included in the postmodern
paradigm show the signification for present-day
philosophy of selected, most important, Romanian
philosophers. Emil Cioran is therefore present in the
volume with a philosophy of deconstruction. Lucian
Blaga is investigated in an original key, concerning
the elements he developed for a postmodern resurrection
of the metaphysics. ªt. Lupaºcu is capitalized as a
postanalitic philosopher of science. D.D. Roºca is
interpreted as a promoter of the cognitive pluralism
and postanalitic contextualism. M. Eliade is explored
for his hermeneutic method and for the notion of
“planetary humanism” that he proposes and develops.
Textualism and postmodern thought as literature are
the aspects explored at Ion Barbu. Vasile Tonoiu
represents the postmodern dialogism, the theory and
practice of the dialogical person. The contemporary
approaches of postmodern philosophy in Romania
are as well presented, as echoed by “Revista de
filosofie”, but not exclusively, in order to portray the
aria of Romanian postmodern preoccupations in terms
of names, articles, books, reviews, translations.
The section of interviews is opened by the interview
with J. Derrida where he characterizes himself as a
product of human generosity, as a feminist, a child
(with memories of the wise old man, who the young
Derrida was, of the young 72 years old, as of the 32
years old debutante). Vattimo describes himself in
dialogue with M. Mincu as the author of Dialettica,
differenza et pensiero debole (1978) concepts —
dialectics, difference and the “weak” thought — that
5
BOOK REVIEW
he pursued in investigating throughout his entire
work. Mary B. Hesse outlines the renewed epistemology
of knowledge and a constructive critique of the
standard theory of language that used to sustain the
uniqueness of meaning and the pure deductive style
in the philosophical argumentation. C. Norris
answers as well Angela Botez in the volume,
explaining his interest in postmodernism —
deconstruction, metaphor, difference, the vague, the
hermeneutic circle, the irony, the linguistic turn, the
alterity — but also, the relationship among cuantics,
realism and anti-realism. Steven Earnshaw, also in
interview with A. Botez, shows that his works are
centered on preoccupations for the esthetics,
interpretation, meaning, culture and knowledge. He
is willing to consider the “idea” of postmodernism a
certain type of humanism. David M.K. Levin starts
with an interest in the phenomenology of Merleau-
125
Ponty, but generally takes an interest in the
contemporary continental philosophy with an
appreciation of the American school (R. Rorty,
H. Putnam, R. Brandom, C. Korsgaarti, T. Nagel —
all considered analytical philosophers).
From such structured philosophical stands the
difficulty of pinpointing the complexity, the innovations
and the dynamics of postmodernism is answered to its
best. Postmodernism pursues knowledge and takes
further the critical traditions of modernism in
deconstructing the essentialism, fundationalism,
positivism and representationalism sustained by
modernism in philosophy. This volume captures
not only the deconstructivist attempt, but also the
integrative aspects of the reform brought about by
postmodernism in contemporary philosophy, leaving
behind the less constructive lament about the “universal
abandon”.
Henrieta ªerban
Carmen Burcea
Diplomaþie culturalã. Prezenþe româneºti în Italia interbelicã, Bucureºti, Institutul Cultural Român,
2005, 164 p.
L’Institut Culturel Roumain propose au public un
livre — Diplomatie culturelle. Présences roumaines
dans l’Italie de l’entre-deux-guerres — qui reconstitue
les efforts et les profils humains et professionnels des
intellectuels italiens et roumains qui ont essayé de
construire entre les deux pays une liaison permettant
la connaissance réciproque des deux peuples
apparentés, et le complètement des moyens politiques
de diplomatie avec des moyens culturels.
L’étude est centrée sur la manière où dans l’Italie
de l’entre-deux-guerres les intellectuels roumains
ont mis les fondements de certaines structures
institutionnelles destinées à promouvoir la langue, la
littérature, la culture roumaines.
Tel que l’auteur le souligne, dans l’ensemble de
la diplomatie culturelle, l’enseignement réciproque
des langues constitue un élément central. C’est la
plus sure méthode de rendre accessible une culture,
étrangère. Et l’accessibilité assure la connaissance, ce
qui est utile lorsqu’il s’agit de promouvoir les intérêts
politiques d’un pays. C’est un des aspects qui mettent
en évidence le rapport subtile qui existe entre la
politique et la culture, et la fonction que la propagande
accomplit: “Propagande, diplomatie culturelle, stratégie
d’image sont des termes ayant un haut degré
d’équivalence entre eux, mais aussi des différences
de nuance. Ces termes désignent un composant
vraiment relévant dans la complexité des relations
internationales. La dichotomie du concept suppose
une complémentarité entre deux éléments — la
politique et la culture — dont la force est agrandie
par un troisième élément: la propagande. Dans cette
équation la culture est la couverture attractive de la
politique, et la propagande est l’instrument qui assure
leur cohésion” (p.11).
Pour obtenir les données qui sont valorisées dans
ce livre, Carmen Burcea a utilisé beaucoup de fonds
documentaires, couvrant la période de l’entre-deuxguerres jusqu’aux années 1946–1947, c’est-à-dire
jusqu’au changement de régime politique. De ces
archives accessibles, Carmen Burcea a extrait des
informations sur la vie quotidienne des intellectuels
roumains qui ont fait un but de leur désir de promouvoir
la spiritualité roumaine en Italie. Il s’agit des professeurs
qui ont institutionnalisé l’enseignement du roumain
en Italie, qui ont réalisé des traductions pour mettre
en relief la richesse de la littérature roumaine, qui se
sont entourés d’étudiants italiens intéressés à une
culture avec laquelle ils identifiaient des similitudes,
qui ont souligné les interférences entre les deux
cultures, italienne et roumaine, qui ont publié dans
les revues italiennes des articles et des études pour
prouver la passion et la ténacité de leur travail. Dans
cet effort, on ne peut rester indifférent aux difficultés
que ces intellectuels ont connues: les sacrifices
matériels, la pauvreté des ressources allouées à leur
effort par les autorités roumaines — on invoque
surtout le Ministère de l’Éducation et celui de la
Propagande —, le manque d’articulation de cette
activité de diplomatie culturelle par comparaison à
celle développée par les Hongrois, qui était plus
pénétrante et suivait un but politique précis, lié au
territoire de Transylvanie, présenté en tant que partie
intégrante de la Hongrie historique.
La dimension humaine de ces intellectuels
résulte des détails qui décrivent ces difficultés. On ne
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BOOK REVIEW
passe pas de vue les rivalités entre ces intellectuels,
rivalités qu’on ne doit ni condamner ni justifier: elles
faisaient partie d’un ensemble de relations personnelles
et professionnelles. On insiste sur les profils de
Claudiu Isopescu ou Th. Solacolu, dont la rivalité a
beaucoup nourri la correspondance des deux avec
leurs amis. On présente un entier «réseau» qui
divisait ce milieu intellectuel en amis et ennemis,
milieu centré autour de grandes personnalités telles
que Nicolae Iorga ou Nicolae Titulescu. On met aussi
en évidence les limites et les erreurs qui ont été faites
par ces intellectuels: Eliade par exemple critique le
travail de Claudiu Isopescu d’enseigner le roumain et
de faire traduire, par ses étudiants italiens connaisseurs
du roumain, certaines oeuvres littéraires roumaines,
et il met en discussion les critères de sélection des
oeuvres à traduire et le manque d’un projet à ce sujet.
Mais, ces limites sont à leur tour facilement
explicables, surtout si l’on prend en considération les
ressources financières réduites et un certain manque
d’organisation des autorités roumaines vis-à-vis de la
propagande en Italie. Un espace que les intellectuels,
esprits éclairés de l’époque, ne voulaient pas perdre
en faveur de la propagande hongroise, mieux organisée
et qui profitait au manque d’information pour
imposer sa réalité historique et géographique. La
lecture du livre nous présente les données concrètes
mesurant cette différence d’organisation et d’efficacité
entre les deux propagandes.
Le livre est structuré en quelques parties: La
propagande roumaine en Italie; les Lettorati —centres
de cultures; les Précurseurs; les Chaires et les
6
Représentants; les Dépositaires d’une tradition;
Riassunto; Images. La lecture nous permet de connaître
bien des détails sur le fonctionnement des centres
culturels roumains en Italie, sur l’activité de la presse
roumaine, sur les actions initiées par les ministères
roumains liés à la diplomatie culturelle — le Ministère
de l’Éducation et de la Culture, celui des Affaires
Étrangères, celui de la Propagande, sur l’activité des
professeurs qui enseignaient le roumain en Italie.
Tout cela dans un contexte historique dont les
changements ont beaucoup influencé les relations
italo-roumaines, dans le plan politique et culturel. Par
exemple, l’auteur mentionne les discriminations raciales
qui ont fait que des intellectuels roumains d’origine
juive soient obligés par les autorités roumaines à
rentrer en Roumanie et à quitter leur fonction ou le
fait que ces professeurs, tellement dédiés à leur mission
culturelle, attendaient du régime communiste une
amélioration de leur situation. Mais ce régime a
interrompu brusquement les relations avec l’Italie et
a provoqué le refus de la plupart de ces intellectuels
de rentrer en Roumanie.
Le livre a le mérite de présenter d’une manière
objective la diplomatie culturelle roumaine en
Italie, et l’auteur met en lumière avec intelligence
l’entrecroisement de la politique avec la culture.
L’activité de ces intellectuels ne doit pas étre oubliée,
elle peut offrir un modèle même aujourd’hui, dans le
contexte où la Roumanie a besoin de se construire
une image positive à l’étranger, favorable à l’intégration
européenne, un enjeu politique qui pourrait se servir
des instruments de la diplomatie culturelle.
Ruxandra Luca
THE REVIEW OF REVIEWS
The Journal APPRAISAL, vol. 5 no. 3, March
2005 (Great Britain), edited by Richard T. Allen, is
exploring an area of general interest in (political)
contemporary philosophy, the post-critical and
personalist studies. From the contents of this issue
there are to be mentioned, amongst others, the actual
study entitled A dialogic constitution of the person,
by Tomas Taransky, On being responsible for acting
irresponsibly, by Richard Prust and Benjamin Huff,
but also Communal morality, by R.J. Brownhill.
A second main aspect to highlight is the
announcement of the 7th & 8th April SPCPS conference
on post-critical and personalist studies organized
with Nottingham University. From the pages of the
journal the reader might notice, as well, the part
dedicated to the scientific life, to recent seminars and
conferences — the report on the 8th International
Conference on Persons, Warsaw, August 9th–12th 2005,
and, at the same time, the presentation of the Romanian
conference with international participation (the
American E. Gilder visiting professor at Sibiu
University, the editor, R.T. Allen and the Chilean
Cultural Attaché) occasioned by the 110th anniversary
of the philosopher L. Blaga organized by “Revista de
filosofie” in September 2005. The brief and substantial
considerations of the editor might trigger an interest
in Blaga’s philosophy. “They (E. Gilder and collab.)
concluded: “Approaching the parallel between ironism
(Rorty) and the historical being (Blaga) one understands
that the tragedy of historical being is therefore
counter-balanced, in a very complex and tensioned
way, by chances to live authentically as a (liberal)
ironist and as an inherently creative being’. But Blaga,
I would add, also said that experience there is something
more to, and corrective of, philosophy.”
Henrieta ªerban
REVISTA DE FILOSOFIE, no. 1-2/2005, edited
by the Romanian Academy presents a first groupage
on The history of the contemporary philosophyJacques Derrida (1930-2004) where the reader can
find an interesting interview with K. McKenna, The
Three Ages of Derrida, the study The Journey of
Derrida from Socrates and Plato to Freud and
Heidegger, by Angela Botez, Death at Nice – feeling
thorn apart by Teodora Pavel and The Issue of logical
and Mathematical Idealities in the ‘Phenomenological’
Lectures of Derrida, by Victor Botez. A special attention
should be given to Petru Vaida’s concept of human
genre in the philosophy of the last Lukács, and to the
elements of modernity identified at Nichifor Crainic
by Mona Mamulea, and, as well, to the signal concerning
Professor Alexandru Boboc’s recent book Nietzsche
between Elenism and Modernity, or Beyond Actual and
Inactual.
Henrieta ªerban
REVISTA DE FILOSOFIE, no. 3-4/2005, edited
by the Romanian Academy was dedicated to Blaga’s
anniversary. Professor Alexandru Surdu, PhD, member
of the Romanian Academy, tackles the actuality and
potentiality of Blaga and Lupaºcu’s ideas. The diplomat
and specialist on Kant Rainer Schubert investigates
the production of a conscience of time at Blaga
and Kant. Professor Mircea Flonta, PhD, explores the
historicity and progress at Blaga, Professor Alexandru
Boboc, PhD, member of the Romanian Academy
Pol. Sc. Int. Rel., II, 2, p. 127–129, Bucharest, 2005.
investigates the metaphor and the myth at Blaga
and Cassirer, while Professor Angela Botez, director
of “Revista de filosofie”, compares aspects like
convergence and transcendentalism at Blaga and
Emerson, while Aurel Codoban confronts ideas
from Eliade and Blaga. The articles from the header
Logics, argumentation and interpretation bring
critical approaches of the paraconsistent logic, of the
logic of accept and of the exercise of argumentation at
Aristotle, J. St. Mill, B. Russell and Hintikka.
Henrieta ªerban
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THE REVIEW OF REVIEWS
La revue STUDIA POLITICA, editée par
l’Institut de Recherche Politique — centre de
recherche qui fonctionne sous le patronage de
l’Université de Bucarest — nous propose dans le
numero 3/2005 un sommaire divers et de qualité, où
l’on peut trouver comme un point de convergence
l’intérêt pour l’analyse de la realite roumaine, à partir
de diverses approches sur les divers secteurs de la vie
sociale. La variété du sommaire compose un tableau
intéressant de la société roumaine de différentes
époques historiques. On va se concentrer sur les
premiers trois articles qui, à la lumière du passé,
construisent des messages instructifs pour le présent,
surtout en ce qui concerne la modernisation, problème
qui a préoccupé les hommes politiques roumains au
XIXe siècle, lorsqu’il s’agissait de construire l’État
moderne et de réaliser la synchronisation avec
l’Europe Occidentale.
La modernisation est liée à la construction
politique de la nation roumaine, du libéralisme roumain
à l’époque qui débute avec la moitié du XIXe siècle
et de l’articulation des mécanismes démocratiques, où
un rôle déterminant revenait au parlementarisme et à
la participation politique. De ces trois articles on voit
se contourer les questions fondamentales dans le
discours sur la nation roumaine et sur sa construction
politique, cela dans le contexte des relations politiques
internationales: les auteurs paraissent s’interroger
principalement sur le statut de l’État roumain dans ce
contexte international, sur le rapport entre le centre et
la périphérie dans le développement de la civilisation
européenne et sur l’impacte de la position périphérique
des pays roumains sur la modernisation de la société
roumaine. Quel serait donc le bon équilibre entre le
désir de garder la spécificité roumaine et le besoin de
synchroniser la société au niveau de développement
de l’Europe Occidentale? Où se trouve-t-il le
mécanisme dont dépend la difficulté d’abandonner la
résistance au changement — celui-ci toujours inspiré
par des modèles occidentaux — en faveur de la
modernisation? Comment faut-il faire ce changement,
sans toucher aux particularités du fondement roumain,
qui est fortement valorisé par les hommes de culture
et les hommes politiques roumains qui critiquent les
formes sans fond? De possibles réponses résultent
des articles auxquels on fait référence dans cette
sommaire présentation. Pour illustrer les préoccupations
des auteurs on va citer de leurs textes. De la sorte, le
prof. Daniel Barbu s’interroge: “Were the Romanian
Liberals, like other political elites form the periphery
of modern Europe just a `class of importers` facing the
difficult assignement of adjusting a form of
government and an ideal of political reform that they
learned to admire elsewhere to a benighted and
unyileding traditional society?”1. Et à cette question,
l’auteur donne une réponse, qui est inscrite dans le
même cadre expliquatif constitué par l’équation
centre-périphérie: “It seems that in the European
peripheral societies, where modernity was still
2
overdue and industrialization was late to visit the 19th
century, the intellectual juxtaposition between form
and foundation, illusion and reality, words and facts
allowed for an artificial polarization of the political
actors of the representative regime, between a ‘red’
liberal and progressive Left and a reactionary,
conservative and traditional Right”2. Certainement, il
n’est pas possible et d’ailleurs on ne s’est pas proposé
par ces citations d’épuiser le contenu de l’article,
dont la richesse argumentative résulte de l’analyse
des faits historiques et des positions adoptées par les
hommes politiques de cette époque qui marque le
passage du XIXe au XXe siècle. Le titre de l’article
— The Nation against Democracy. State Formation,
Liberalism, and Political Participation in Romania
— est d’ailleurs suggestif pour l’idée que l’auteur
veut démontrer.
L’article de Silvia Marton — dont le titre est Les
libéraux roumains. Entre l’archéologie identitaire et
la construction politique de la nation roumaine vers
la moitié du XIXe siècle — est construit à partir de
l’analyse de la manière où les libéraux articulaient
leur doctrine sur des thèmes suggestifs dans l’ensemble
de la construction politique roumaine (l’Union et la
«nationalité»; comment peut-on devenir, du point de
la loi, citoyen roumain; la nature de la représentation
politique), dans le contexte historique du XIXe siècle.
L’analyse porte sur l’activité et les discours des
parlementaires, qui constituent une riche source pour
reconstruire les débats de l’époque: «Les parlementaires
roumains expriment d’une manière qui leur est propre
un des paradoxes ‘troublants’ des États du Centre et du
Sud-Est de l’Europe, concernant la combinaison entre
l’archaïque et la modernité. On proclame la nécessité
de la modernisation rapide — les députés prennent
toujours comme modèle «l’Europe civilisée» — et on
invoque en même temps la tradition des «ancêtres»,
tout comme la durée considérable de l’État, tradition
et continuité étatique qui, dans la voie de la
modernisation, doivent piloter les actes du nouvel
État»3. Silvia Marton lie la «conduite» des
parlementaires roumains au cadre de l’idéologie
libérale de la moitié du XIXe siècle, à savoir à une
certaine hiérarchie des nations, qui faisait de leur
progrès, de leur civilisation, de leur grandeur, une
précondition de l’État-nation. Les critères qui
permettaient à un peuple de se considérer une nation
et qui construisaient cette hiérarchie sont ceux établis
par E. Hobsbawm et invoqués par Silvia Marton4
(l’existence d’un État actuel ou d’une mémoire
historique et d’une tradition; l’existence des élites
culturelles de longue tradition et ayant cultivé une
langue écrite; la capacité de conquérir de nouveaux
territoires) pour appliquer ce modèle au cas des libéraux
roumains. Les conclusions sont bien intéressantes.
L’article signé par Raluca Alexandrescu sous
le titre La démocratie roumaine: vocation ou
exercice de volonté, traite à son tour de la modernité
politique roumaine de la seconde moitié du XIXe siècle,
3
THE REVIEW OF REVIEWS
de la perspective de l’histoire conceptuelle, à partir
des directions concurrentes qui existaient à cette
époque entre les intellectuels et les hommes
politiques impliqués dans ces débats: les libéraux et
les conservateurs. R. Alexandrescu propose une
nouvelle approche méthodologique pour opérer avec
les concepts que l’on utilise dans les discours sur la
démocratie.
Dans le sommaire de la revue on trouve d’autres
études sur: les réseaux franco-hongrois et la France,
de 1896 à 1914 (Nicolas Bauquet), le conflit
générationnel et politique dans le milieu des écrivains
bessarabiens de l’entre-deux-guerres (Petru Negurã),
le mouvement des femmes roumaines entre 1929–1944
129
(Alexandra Petrescu), la propagande communiste au
département de Ialomiþa (Rãzvan Pantelimon), la
philosophie marxiste dans la Roumanie communiste
(Alexandru Stãiculescu), Vladimir Tismãneanu —
historien du communisme roumain (Dragoº Petrescu,
Cristina Petrescu), la coopération, la confiance et les
préjugés ethniques en Roumanie (Dragoº Dragoman).
La rubrique Annales nous propose une lecture
chronologique de la vie politique roumaine actuelle,
pour la période 1 avril–30 juin 2005. La revue nous
offre une série de récensions des livres actuels, et une
présentation des auteurs ayant contribué au présent
numéro, très utile pour connaître leur profil intellectuel
et professionnel.
NOTES
1. Daniel Barbu, The Nation against Democracy.
State Formation, Liberalism, and Political
Participation in Romania, en: “Studia Politica”,
vol. V, no. 3/2005, p. 550.
2. Ibidem, p. 551.
3. Silvia Marton, Liberalii români. Între arheologia
identitarã ºi construcþia politicã a naþiunii la
jumãtatea secolului al XIX-lea, en: “Studia
politica”, vol. V, no. 3/2005, pp. 568–569.
4. Ibidem, pp. 566–567.
Ruxandra Luca
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SCIENCE
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