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Assistenza al Volo
Periodico ANACNA - ANNO XXXIIII - N. 2-3/2008
- La visione IFATCA sul futuro ATM
- 47 th IFATCA Annual Conference:
lo stato di salute nel dettaglio
- Congresso di Modena: repor t
completo e mozione finale
- Blame Culture vs Just Culture: una
completa disamina
- ANACNA scrive al Parlamento
una Visione a 360 gradi
sulla Just Culture
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Pubblicazione trimestrale,
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ANACNA
Associazione Nazionale
Assistenti e Controllori
della Navigazione Aerea
Anno XXXIII - n. 125
Semestre 2-3/2008
Direttore responsabile
Andrea Artoni
Direttore editoriale
Bruno Racoli
b.r[email protected]
Progetto grafico ed
impaginazione
Bruno Racoli
Giuseppe Gangemi
Hanno collaborato:
V. Della Bitta, R. Dentesano, G. Gangemi, M.
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Tariffa Associazioni senza fini
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EDITORIALE - Fuori come va?
IFATCA - The global future of Air Traffic
Management: the IFATCA vision.
IFATCA - 47a Conferenza Mondiale:
i lavori del Comitato A.
EUROCONTROL - Rilasciato il Performance Review Report 2008 di Eurocontrol.
EVENTI - L’errore umano nel campo
aeronautico ed in quello sanitario: dalla
cultura della colpa alla cultura della prevenzione.
EVENTI - Privilegiare le esigenze della
prevenzione rispetto alla ricerca del colpevole.
ASSOCIAZIONE - Lettera Anacna alle
isitituzioni italiane.
LEGISLAZIONE - ICAO finalmente!
LEGISLAZIONE - L’ordine delle cose ed
il valore del fattore umano.
IFATCA - Supporto ai colleghi di ASECNA.
EDITORIAL - The worldwide situation.
IFATCA - The global future of Air Traffic
Management: IFATCA vision.
IFATCA - 47th World Conference:
Committe A report.
EUROCONTROL - Performance Review
Report 2008 now available.
MEETINGS - Human error in aviation
and
medical
fields:
from
blame
culture to prevention one.
MEETINGS - Choose prevention instead
of blame culture.
ASSOCIATION - Anacna writes to
italian institutions.
LEGISLATION - ICAO, finally.
LEGISLATION - Human factor value
and how things really are.
IFATCA - Full support to ASECNA workers.
La rivista è aperta alla collaborazione di professionisti, studiosi ed esperti del
controllo del traffico aereo e
dell’assistenza al volo.
Alcuni articoli, pubblicati come
contributo indipendente di documentazione e critica, possono non esprimere il punto
di vista dell’ANACNA.
Testi, foto e materiali in genere inviati alla redazione,
pag.
2
pag.
3
pag. 46
pag. 53
pag. 61
pag. 69
pag. 71
pag. 74
pag. 78
pag. 80
page 2
page 3
page 46
page 53
page 61
page 69
page 71
page 74
page 78
page 80
anche se non pubblicati, non
verranno restituiti.
Associata alla
Unione Stampa
Periodica Italiana
(U.S.P.I.)
1
Editoriale
L
’ estate è passata. Le normali attività produttive hanno proceduto più lentamente sino a fermarsi del tutto, tranne che il controllo del traffico aereo. In questa occasione si è collaudato il sistema
ATM sotto sforzo, anche con la minaccia di impavidi disturbatori dell’etere.
Su scala mondiale, invece, IFATCA conferma che la sofferenza è ancora più
marcata laddove lo stato di benessere economico del paese è a livelli molto bassi.
Paesi come il Brasile (ma non solo), che vengono da una privatizzazione accelerata
dagli ultimi due incidenti aerei e che ha fratturato il personale operativo, reclutato in
fretta con minima o nulla formazione, in 6 (sei) federazioni professionali, dimostrano
come non si possa trascurare un settore così importante, anche per la propria immagine.
Di fronte ad inconvenienti gravi, spesso la magistratura interviene ravvisando nell’attività di controllo del traffico aereo l’unica responsabilità. Un poco in
controtendenza la recente sentenza della corte federale statunitense in merito ad
un incidente aereo avvenuto tra due elicotteri in VFR nel novembre 2003 a Torrance (California). Nonostante le risultanze del rapporto redatto dal NTSB americano (National Transportation Safety Board) indicassero nella mancata aderenza del pilota di uno dei due elicotteri alla clearance emessa dal controllore
la causa del crash presso l’aeroporto di Torrance, la corte federale ha ritenuto di
condannare la FAA statunitense per omissioni varie (understaffing, traffic flow).
In Italia sicuramente non si sorride, e la necessità di parlare di una magistratura più tecnica, specializzata e meno aggressiva diventa impellente.
Questo numero di Assistenza al Volo esce in una versione “estesa” dovuta alla necessità di coprire un semestre di attività associative e federative principalmente incentrate su eventi legati alla Just Culture. Presentiamo un documento IFATCA che riassume la visione della federazione sul mondo ATM nel prossimo futuro ed un pragmatico
riporto sull’ultimo Congresso mondiale IFATCA svoltosi in marzo. Quindi un rapido
commento al report della Performance Review Commission (PRC) di Eurocontrol per
l’anno 2007. La seconda sezione, invece, fornisce una panoramica sulla necessità di
implementare una vera Just Culture in Italia.
Ci lasciamo con la speranza che già da questo autunno le cose prendano una direzione più decisa. Siamo sicuri che esista il tessuto sociale e professionale per rendere più
ampia la già corta coperta che ci protegge. Se risveglio deve essere, e ce lo meritiamo,
che questo sia. Si tratta di eseguire quelle scelte che tutti chiedono, e senza l’illusione
che quello che accade tutti i giorni in sala, sulle spalle dei controllori non esista. 
2
IFATCA
CTA Vittorio Della Bitta - Padova ACC
N
egli anni 80, l’IFATCA produsse una brillante pubblicazione sulla sua “visione”
dell’ATM. Edizione successivamente
aggiornata nel 2004 dall’Executive Board, alla luce dei repentini cambiamenti
in atto nel settore. L’esperienza fatta in
SESAR, rivelò l’importanza di tradurre
i concetti ATM dell’ICAO in messaggi
più chiari che tenessero conto delle indicazioni dei Controllori. Il contributo
di Andrew Beadle, allora EVP Tecnico,
profondo conoscitore della materia, fu
determinante ai fini della riuscita del documento “Future of Global ATM”, che fu
completato nel 2007, rivelandosi di inestimabile valore nelle attività del SESAR
e nelle importantissime discussioni tenutesi in campo tecnico. Il tema fu ripreso
in occasione del recente IFATCA RM di
Praga, con un workshop intitolato “Quo
Vadis”, intenzionato ad indicare i possibili futuri orientamenti dell’ATM e si concretizzò nel documento di “vision” della
Federazione che copre un arco temporale
fino al 2030. Il documento raccoglie un
certo numero di concetti, quali il Global
ATM Operational Concept (ICAO Doc
9854), SESAR, NEXTGEN.
L’utilizzo del termine “vision” potrebbe far pensare a peculiarità “rivoluzionarie” se riferite al grado di conoscenze attuale. Così come qualsiasi altra
valutazione di lungo termine, questa
visione contiene, in realtà, indicazioni
o aspettative che potrebbero non trovare
realizzazione. Un documento contenente
valutazioni di lungo termine non necessariamente si attende contenga funzionalità che si ritiene trovino attuazione (prerogativa, questa, dei documenti relativi
a concetti di breve termine). Lo scopo
di tale visione è quella di descrivere la
tendenza di una prospettiva di sviluppo,
così da rendere possibile la predisposizione di misure in grado di far fronte alle
possibili evenienze.
“IFATCA’s vision document shall
show what we the global voice of air
traffic controllers expect will happen”.
L’Executive Board ha ritenuto sostenerne i contenuti alla luce del contributo che possono offrire in campo tecnico
professionale, nello sviluppo delle policy della Federazione e quale potenziale
di previsione ed idee utili a tutti gli attori del settore aeronautico. Con le dichiarazioni sul “future of Global ATM”,
l’IFATCA spiega l’impatto che una realtà ATM più performante avrà sulla conduzione delle attuali operazioni e come
l’”ICAO ATM Concept” immagina tale
processo di transizione.
THE VISION
 The whole ATM system will be performance based, and changes based
on performance cases (which includes safety cases). This will result in an
overall system that is effectively in continuous transition. Areas where high performance is required will be advancing
to newer systems before areas with less
performance needs have commenced
3
IFATCA
initial transition. There will be a need for
continuous performance improvements.
 A high level of automation will be
required in meeting the highest ATM
performance requirements. Controllers will be able to delegate tasks to automation, and in some systems the task
will have been assigned to automation in
the design of the system. This will include housekeeping tasks such as communication, coordination, surveillance, etc.
In the more advanced systems it will also
include delegating separation responsibility to automation. The controller will
need to have a high confidence in the automation as it will not be physically possible for the controller to “double-check”
what the automation is doing.
 Air Traffic control (reactive, tactical) will be replaced by Air Traffic Management (proactive, strategic). The
controller will manage traffic flows and
in the more advanced systems not separate anymore (the task will be delegated).
Active intervention (tactical) will be the
exception. The human will remain in the
loop at the network (systemic) decision
making level.
 Management by Trajectory will
form the basis of all controllers’ activities. Trajectories will be as precise
as traffic demands; that is variable over
the length of the flight and in each of the
four dimensions. For example, precision levels of time keeping of less than
10 seconds are expected where the ATM
resource (for example runway) is in highest demand.
 Airspace will be dynamic (move
around). Airspace boundaries will change to suit traffic flows, even in the terminal area. Airspace attributes will also
change over the course of a day in response to ATM services needed (or not).
Traditional distinctions between terminal
and enroute will disappear. There may be
4
more than one service provider for a given airspace block. Controllers may be
responsible for a given set of aircraft as
the set progresses (as opposed to all aircraft within an airspace block).
 UAV in non-segregated airspace.
 Local/Regional Implementations.
The following list of changes will not be
implemented globally by 2030 but it will
be expected that there will be a number of
such implementations around the globe.
 Airports will be controlled from a
remote facility (virtual towers).
 Completely automated separation
provision. In other words the separator
is not the controller or the pilot but is in
fact automation.
 Less controllers needed. This has
been the universal claim of all “advances” in ATM, however because it has
not been achieved in the past does not
mean it cannot be achieved in the future.
IFATCA needs to assess each claim on
its merits and may well find that by 2030
there is a significant change in the number of controllers required.
E’ proposito dell’IFATCA far partecipe di tali scenari, tanto le proprie Associazioni federate, quanto il resto della
comunità aeronautica, affinché siano adeguatamente compresi. L’affermazione
che segue, riassume efficacemente le
prospettive future:
“The controller will manage traffic
flows and not separate anymore.
Managing the flow of traffic and giving instruction to the system which will
resolve the conflicts. The controller’s role
will not be a simple monitor of the system but will instead be an active decision
maker that determines how the traffic will
flow. A scenario will be established which
will cater for the flows of traffic along a
given route. The machine will run in pretactical and tactical several scenarios
and will give the operator the choice of
IFATCA
the best scenario. Once the scenario is
established the realization of it will be
carried out by automated systems. To be
compared to some of the automated stock
exchanges – where the humans are giving the indicators and then the trading
is done automatically and not influenced
by the operator anymore. This example is
interesting as it shows that there is an absolute need not to forget that there will be
problems with run-away programs that
did not anticipate the consequences correctly (that is the automated stock market
“crash” – which has since been corrected). There might be a need for policy on
these issues in the future”.
Si riporta di seguito un estratto del
documento “A Statement on the Future
of Global Air Traffic Management by
IFATCA” la cui versione ultima è del 27
febbraio 2007.
1. COOPERATING TO
CREATE THE FUTURE
Creating the Future
“The future is not some place we are
going, but one we are creating.” - John
Schaar
The purpose of this document is to
assist an understanding of where current
Air Traffic Management (ATM) is, to
provide a tool for gathering support of a
particular approach and provide another
step towards working together to create
the future global Air Traffic Management that is needed.
This document is arranged so that
most of the explanation and examples
are contained in the appendices so that
the main body of the document contains
the most important points.
The Solution for ATM
The proposed solution to addressing the
safety, environment, capacity, flexibility
and efficiency needs of the future ATM is:
1. The Airspace User shall plan their
preferred 4-D trajectory, and,
2. The ATM system will modify that
trajectory to the minimum extent possible.
The difficulty with the proposed solution is that most of the states and service
providers consider this is what they have
always done, and are still doing today!
There is nothing wrong with the proposed solution or the position of the
states and service providers – except that
they are incomplete statements. The International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO) has published a “Global ATM
Operational Concept” (Doc 9854) which
supports the proposed solution but puts
these statements in context. The states
have accepted this approach. (For more
details see Appendix 1 – ICAO Concept).
More than anything else, a comprehensive solution requires a high level of
co-operation between all members of the
ATM Community.
Note: To address the transport of passengers and freight a multi-modal transport solution is needed. Air transport does not exist
in a vacuum, and a solution, particularly for
short distance high-density operations, may
be high-speed surface transport. High speed
surface transport may also be used to link
existing aerodrome infrastructure within the
destination area so that the overall capacity
of all aerodromes is used. Multi-modal solutions should especially be considered when
existing infrastructure is at its capacity and
major new ATM infrastructure is proposed.
Co-operation
The ICAO Concept frequently mentions “Collaborative Decision Making”.
This is not a “consultative” or “information” process but an involvement in the
process and the consequences.
The co-operation required is a serious
5
IFATCA
working together that requires pragmatism and compromise by all involved.
Pragmatism requires that issues are
discussed frankly, and that no issues are
left as too difficult.
It especially requires that issues such
as finance and politics are not left out of
the discussion, because practical solutions
involve both of these. Pragmatism also requires a reasonableness that does not demand more of others than you are willing
to offer yourself. (See also Appendix 6
– Pragmatic Airline Expectations).
Regarding compromise, philanthropy
may occur – but what is expected is an
“enlightened self-interest” that recognizes that the best means to achieve the required results for self is by participating.
For “enlightened self-interest” to continue to work, everyone must get something
from the system that they want – and
everyone must be prepared to give up
something. In other words, what is needed is a willingness to concede something
to get an overall better result.
It is important that there is not any
attitude of “blame” for past actions, for
it will not change where ATM is. There
must however be a willingness from each
member of the ATM community from
now on to be responsible for their actions
in creating the future ATM system.
In order to co-operate, it is of course a
requirement to be able to communicate.
The need for an evolving “Language of
ATM” is addressed in Appendix 4.
The purpose of working together is to
achieve an agreed goal.
Agreed goals should be expressed
in three major formats; a shared vision,
a shared concept and a shared performance plan.
The formats can be defined as global,
regional or state. It is expected that the
most common form should be regional documents that are consistent with
6
ICAO’s global documents.
Note: The periods of time used in the following sections are indicative only and the actual period should be collaboratively agreed.
The period of 10 years for vision and concept
iterations seems to be quicker than past experience of global ATM developments, and in
the future may be even quicker.
Agreed Shared Vision + 25 years
All members of the ATM Community
should work together to have a shared vision of 25 years in the future. It should
be completely updated every 10 years.
The purpose of the vision statement is
to agree and state the long-term objectives
to permit research and development into
possible ways of meeting that vision. It
is to provide the next step after the target
date for the current concept of operation.
The vision statement should be expressed in terms of functionality – and
never in terms of an existing technology, an
existing protocol or an existing program;
otherwise it will restrict understanding and
potential options for meeting that vision.
The vision statement does not have to
be long and involved, though it can be.
(See also Appendix 10 – No Directed
Frequency Changes).
Agreed Shared Concept of
Operation – plus 15 years
All members of the ATM Community
should work together to have a shared
concept of operation for the overall ATM
system of 15 years in the future. It should
be completely updated every 10 years.
The purpose of the concept of operation is to describe all the ATM system
functions required for a complete ATM
system. The concept of operations provides the details of the vision statement
that has been published for 10 years and
so has had time to mature (including evaluation of potential options).
IFATCA
Although expressed mainly as functionalities, protocols can be mentioned
(preferably as examples). “Named” technology or programs should be avoided. For example, “radar” has become so
entrenched as a method and term of air
traffic control that it has become difficult
toconsider what is really required for surveillance and the associated separation
methods. Another example is Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast
(ADS-B) which should be viewed as an
example of a protocol rather than viewed
as the only way to achieve functionality
in a concept of operations.
The concept of operation should be
expressed in some detail, but never to
the point of preventing the achievement
of the required functionality by other
methods and technologies.
Agreed Shared Performance Plans
+ 5 years
All members of the ATM Community
should work together to have shared performance plans.
There should always be a plan. The
period for these plans will be determined
by need, but for example may initially
cover the changes to ATM for the next 5
years, and be amended as required.
The purpose of the performance plan
is to record the outcome of collaborative decision making as to the best way
from the current system towards the
agreed concept of operation and vision.
It records the commitment of each of the
members of the ATM community.
The performance plans must describe
current systems, as well as what components will be used to progress towards
the Concept of Operation and Vision.
The ICAO Concept uses the term “systemwide safety and business cases”. In subsequent work, this is now being replaced by
the term “performance case”. The perfor-
mance cases must evaluate the options and
find the best means to address identified
ATM performance gaps (in any part of the
ATM system). All members of the ATM
community require their involvement to
be economically viable and so the cost of
change must always be included. The individual plans of each member of the ATM
community is not part of the shared performance plans as the shared performance
plans only record joint activities for the improvement of the ATM system.
Shared Performance Plans can be
amended by agreement to seize opportunities and accommodate unexpected developments. The ATM system is influenced
by factors outside the control of the ATM
community (for example viral disease outbreak) and so must be able to respond to
such unpredictable events to minimize the
negative effects on members of the ATM
community. In a similar way, the ATM system should be able to respond to opportunities that benefit the ATM community.
Achieving Predictability in ATM
Cooperation occurs in the operational
areas not just by the sharing of information, but in actions that ensure predictability of performance – and this applies both
to airspace users and service providers.
There will continue to be elements
beyond the control of the ATM system.
One example is weather. Thunderstorms
can be forecast but the exact position
and nature of the thunderstorm will not
be known with much notice – and there
is no expectation that there will be a
change to aircraft design or operation so
that passenger aircraft will be able to fly
directly through severe thunderstorms.
Thunderstorms will continue to disrupt
traffic flows. The ATM system design
should provide means to however mitigate the consequences of such uncontrollable events as much as possible.
7
IFATCA
There are however other variables
that are within the ability of the airspace
user or service provider to control. It is
expected that in a spirit of cooperation
for overall system benefit that reasonable
steps will be taken by the airspace users
and service providers to control the variables, so that the ATM system is more
predictable. See Appendix 11 for “On
Time Performance”.
Cooperation in the operational area
also includes sharing of tasks, such as
separation provision.
Constant Incremental Improvements
Improvements to ATM can be made
by improved system design, procedures
and technology. Indeed much can be accomplished with current technology. It is
unlikely that new technology, procedures
or system design will have a large singlestep improvement to ATM. One factor is
that the existing aircraft fleet will continue in operation for many years and
it would be expensive to retro-fit these
aircraft. Even if retro-fitting was agreed,
it would take time (several years) to economically update a fleet of aircraft.
ATM improvement s should be seen a
series of incremental improvements towards
the shared concept of operation and vision.
In order to make changes to ATM
easier to manage, past changes to ATM
have often been viewed on an “exclusive
use” (or segregation) model - in other
words, access to airspace based on equipage and no mixed-mode operations.
This is a regulation approach to managing the situation. However often events,
such as operation of military aircraft, has
meant that there have been significant
mixed-mode operations in airspace not
designed for it. Such ad-hoc operations
do not contribute to a safe system.
Future ATM systems should be designed on the basis that constant incre-
8
mental improvements will be made, and
so the ATM system should be designed
for mixed mode operations. This will
eventually be a safer and more robust
system, but considerable work is required in the design and operation of a
mixed mode system.
For example, the system may be
designed to accommodate only a certain amount of mixed-mode operations
which then requires monitoring of the
level of mixed-mode operations and
procedures that ensure that the level is
never exceeded.
However once established, mixed
mode ATM will permit aircraft to use
improved systems immediately (and not
at some future “implementation date”).
Also a new ATM service may be provided that, for a fee, assists an aircraft meet
a particular performance requirement to
use a particular ATM functionality. This
example would enable the airspace user
to choose whether to retro-fit an aging
aircraft or whether it is more cost effective to use the service offered by the
ATM service provider until the aircraft is
retired from service.
The ground systems of ATM can
evolve at a much higher rate than airborne systems. (For more information
see Appendix 7 – “Evolving Ground
Systems”). Ground systems have lagged
behind airborne systems, but can now
rapidly catch-up and offer significant
improvements to ATM services.
IFATCA
2. PERFORMANCE
EXPECTATIONS
The future ATM system must be performance based. Performance will be assessed for the whole ATM system, which is
for all members of the ATM community.
ICAO has developed “Performance
Based Transition Guidelines” and is producing an “ATM Performance Manual”.
See Appendix 1 – ICAO Concept and Appendix 13 – Performance Based ATM.
The ICAO Concept requires that the
future ATM system be driven to meet the
expectations of the ATM community and
be performance based. The ICAO Performance Based Transition Guidelines
discusses identifying and correcting performance gaps.
It is important to use performance
measures to achieve a goal – and not focus on the number (performance measure) as if it were the goal.
The expectations in this alphabetical
listing are to be addressed simultaneously; however note that (as the ICAO
Concepts states) “the attainment of a
safe system is the highest priority in air
traffic management”.
Each expectation will now be listed
with a comment about some performance
gaps that should be addressed in future
ATM systems.
Access and Equity
The current approach to access to
controlled airspace is drawn from the
regulator background – we will let you
in when it is safe to do. The future ATM
service-based industry approach is that
“we want your business and will get
you into the airspace if we can” (and of
course do it safely).
Both approaches may work in a similar way to a similar safety level – however the first tends towards demanding
that the airspace user do what is necessary to enter safely and the second approach tends towards the service provider making every effort to make it as
easy as possible for the airspace user to
have access.
Capacity
Available ATM Capacity will no longer be managed as “number of aircraft
per sector” but in the “number of tactical interventions required” as strategic
conflict management establishes orderly
flows of air traffic.
The service providers’ understanding of “sectors” and “centres” airspace
will evolve and no longer be strictly
geographically fixed, enable sharing of
workload both within service providers
and between service providers to provide
maximum system capacity and respond
to disruptions.
Cost-Effectiveness
This is cost-effectiveness of the entire ATM system. Changes to ATM are
needed and will have to be funded. In a
cooperative approach, those who benefit financially from the changes should
pay for the change and where there is no
financial benefit no charge. Likewise it
can be argued that if a change is imposed
on ATM by the state (without benefit to
ATM but meeting a wider community
need) that it should be state funded (however this does not often occur).
Efficiency
This efficiency relates to a single
flight perspective of efficiency. It is expected that future ATM will be able to
provide services based on an individual
flights requirements (for example, using user supplied 4-d trajectory). What
currently is missing is a feedback to (or
monitoring by) the service provider of
9
IFATCA
how successfully they met the airspace
user’s need for a particular flight, prompt
corrective behavior to negative trends
and reinforcement of positive trends.
Environment
This relates to gaseous emissions,
noise, visual intrusion, etc. Each member
of the ATM community is individually
responsible for behaving in an environmentally responsible manner. It could
therefore be argued that if the airspace
user flies their requested 4-d trajectory
without modification that they would
therefore be responsible for all environmental consequences of that flight – however this is too simplistic as the combination of all ATM activities is a community
activity and there will be a level of shared
commitment, collaboratively agreed, to
the ATM system operating in an environmentally sustainable way.
el. Standardised functionality will allow
implementation of evolving technology,
and can be more “cost-effective” than
mandating a single technology.
What is needed is a definition of the
functions required to enable global interoperability. See also Appendix 12
“Black Box Interoperability”.
Participation by the ATM Community
Participation needs to a real involvement in the entire process and consequences. Some participation has started,
but much work is still required in establishing appropriate structures and procedures. Such structures should support
and complement the ICAO structure (as
it too evolves). The best way to fund
activities relating to participation also
needs to be collaboratively addressed.
Predictability
Predictability will require effort by
service providers, airspace users and othA major limitation today is the inabil- ers to deliver agreed performance, espeity of service providers’ systems to share cially over events that can be controlled
trajectory information in a timely man- (or mitigated) by that member of the
ner (even basic flight plan information). ATM community. Uncontrollable events
Often this is between service providers’ (such as weather) should not be simply
“centres” but also occurs within centres. accepted as disruptive, but should be
Therefore the first step towards future prepared for with collaboratively-agreed
ATM 4-d trajectory management is the mitigation plans, “game plan options”,
timely sharing of ground data, especially etc. so that the consequences to predictbetween any adjacent positions (whether ability of uncontrolled events is mitigated to the maximum extent by actions of
in the same room or not).
Another major limitation is the ser- all relevant members of the ATM comvice providers’ lack of surveillance or munity acting in concert.
even electronic displays in many parts of
the world that severely limit the service Safety
providers’ ability to assess, coordinate
Safety Management has effectively
and approve requested changes.
become risk management. The concept
of a “safety margin”, which is the safety
buffer above the calculated risk, seems
Global Interoperability
Interoperability is not necessarily to have been forgotten. In a system such
a “single (technology) system”, but in- as ATM where not all events are controlstead a standardization at a function lev- lable, safety margins (that is capability
Flexibility
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above the requirement) should exist and
changes to the margin be monitored.
Another significant safety issue is
“self-contained rest of flight capability”
for aircraft. For example, if there is a
major disruption to external information
sources (such as accurate time and navigational information) the aircraft should
be able to continue for the rest of flight
with self-contained systems providing
appropriate accuracy (for example an
internal time system and a fall-back basic inertial reference system). Likewise
ATM should improve procedures so that
the flight can continue safely on its 4-d
trajectory even if communication with
all external sources is lost.
Security
ATM communications, including
voice and data-link, is not encrypted or
source verified (for example by electronic certificate) in any manner. It is susceptible to malicious attacks, including false
information and jamming. For example
it is possible to transmit false ADS-B information, or to use correct ADS-B information to track a particular aircraft.
3. HUMANS AND
TECHNOLOGY
Humans together with Technology
The ATM system is comprised of humans and technology (acting via procedures on information).
Clearly there is a need for the technology, for without technology for flight
there would be no ATM system. However the need for humans at operational
levels is under discussion. The “flight
engineer” is no longer a standard member of the flight crew. Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles (UAVs) are rapidly increasing
in number and sophistication. Are air
traffic controllers becoming redundant?
Humans will be necessary in the operational areas, including air traffic controllers, for many years – but as the technology and system evolves, the role of
humans will evolve.
The need for humans is because of
the strength of the human in managing
systems in a rational and flexible way
(that is based on sensible thinking and
judgment not programming), especially
including handling unforeseen events.
The problem has been “that is err is
human” and many ATM system “errors”
have been assigned to human error. This
has led to the belief that the human is the
cause of the problem and that removing
the human will improve safety. However
“to act unreasonably and inflexibly” at
times seems to be the attribute of technology, especially when unanticipated
events are encountered.
Human operators have become very
frustrated at being blamed for “errors”
and yet receive no recognition that it is
in fact humans who have made the automation work (for example by doing tasks
that automation was supposed to handle,
but doesn’t do so correctly). What is
needed is recognition that the strengths
of the human and the strengths of the automation are both needed – and that both
have limitations that must be mitigated.
With extended development and use,
technology can replace certain human
activities. There has been much learned
in progressive development of flight
deck systems that makes UAVs feasible
for some operations today. There is no
such equivalent yet in the development
of systems that would replace air traffic
controllers – but this is not to say that future systems may replace some air traffic control functions. The “assistant” to
the executive controller, whether a controller or support staff, is in the not too
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distant future going to find themselves
compared to the flight engineer.
It is difficult to talk of technology on
a “global scale” in relation to Air Traffic
Management systems.
In a so-called “advanced technology” industry such as air traffic control,
it would be expected that electronic
display systems would be the norm – if
only because electronic displays support the sharing of data much more efficiently than information on paper. It is
not only third world situations were such
displays do not exist – but even a busy
environment such as the North Atlantic
is only now getting electronic air traffic
control displays for the entire route! It is
an indictment to air traffic management
that some Airline Operating Companies
can display updated aircraft positions for
their fleet around the globe but the air
traffic management system cannot.
However assuming that the collaborative global approach to air traffic management will first identify and address
the most pressing needs, the rest of this
section will address what is the next step
from basic electronic display of traffic and
basic electronic sharing of ATM data.
Humans and Automation
In order to meet the increasing safety
and other performance targets of ATM,
an increasing level of automation will
be required – however the human shall
at all times remain the manager of (and
not the servant of) the automation. In basic terms this means that the human will
choose what is to be done, delegate the
execution of the task(s) to the automation and be able to intervene if required.
The automation support of the human
roles within ATM must be developed and
implemented in a way that fosters trust
and confidence by the human in the automation functions. Experience (both good
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and bad) regarding the successful implementation of automation to the cockpit
will be used in designing automation in
other areas of ATM, especially for air
traffic controllers. High-reliability systems such as fly-by-wire, full automatic
landing, etc have been implemented in
aircraft and a similar rigor is required in
the development of ground-based automation, especially when the automation
function (or failure) will have consequences for multiple aircraft at a time.
The tasks and nature of human roles
within ATM will evolve with the automation. For air traffic controllers this
will involve changes such as reduction/
removal of “house-keeping” tasks such
as frequency changes, the delegation of
specific tasks or responsibilities to other
agents (both human and automation),
adjustments in work-style to support a
more strategic trajectory management
traffic flow, changes to the staffing required at positions, etc. It is important
to make sure that the job satisfaction
and pride remains high and the overall
human experience in the future system,
while different, will not be any less attractive or important than it is today.
The humans’ role in the system will
be by design, and not become a residual
task such as “the human does whatever
the automation can’t complete”. The
ATM system design approach will ensure that the strengths of the human and
of the automation are both maximized
while the weakness of the human and the
automation are both minimized. Degraded and Recovery modes of automation
will especially ensure that the human is
never overloaded or expected to do more
than is humanly possible.
System error - that is not just “human error” but the deficiency of human
and/or automation – will be monitored
and lessons learnt. The human will not
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be responsible for automation that is not
within the ATM system design (or capacity) of the human to monitor and manage. The human operator of automation
will not be responsible for automation
behavior that is not within operator’s
ability to influence. The human will not
be responsible for information supplied
by automation that the human is unable
to verify. The human will not be solely
to blame for failure to use the automation correctly if the actions of the human
were not grossly negligent (as a deficiency in the automation’s interface to
the human is also indicated). When the
human has to change work practice as a
work-around to a task that automation is
supposed to do but doesn’t, then this will
be treated as a system error that should
be promptly corrected.
The changes in humans’ role within
ATM will affect staff selection, training,
regency requirements (especially for
“emergencies” involving degraded automation) and possibly even ratings and
endorsements.
Representatives of the humans who
will “operate” the automation will be
involved throughout the design, simulation, implementation and review of the
automation.
Technology
ATM Specific and Commercial Off - The - Shelf
We live in a technological age in which
many industries are dependent upon
technology. In order to achieve cost-effective improvements, ATM should make
maximum use of appropriate technology
which has been developed for generic
use (that is not specifically for ATM). For
example, radar screens and the graphics
processors that made the screens functional were once specifically developed
for radar applications and available only
from ATM suppliers. Now however the
Information Technology (IT) industry
has developed screens and graphics processors vastly superior to what was available within ATM. Further research and
development, which is not specifically
paid for by ATM, is improving the performance and lowering the cost of these
screens and graphics processors.
One big issue has been the issue of
“reliability” for ATM equipment. However much of the reliability of ATM
equipment appears to be theoretical and
is based on production runs measured in
hundreds. Promised reliability is not always delivered. With generic IT equipment, there is the practical experience
of production runs in the tens of thousands. The reliability of equipment needs
careful consideration, especially when
the cost of generic equipment is only a
fraction of the cost of the specific ATM
equipment (so that a good quantity of
spares can be purchased economically).
This does not mean that any generic IT
equipment will do. Whether equipment
is supplied from within ATM or “commercial off the shelf”, the equipment will
always require appropriate evaluation.
ATM should carefully define those areas
where specific and unique ATM requirements demand specialist ATM technology
– and ensure that on-going research and development of such technology occurs. For
other technology, Commercial-Off-TheShelf equipment may meet ATM needs.
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Use of non-ATM expertise
In the specification of ATM systems
it seems that expertise from areas outside
ATM is ignored.
For example, when discussing future ATM systems, much is made of the
need for information sharing (specifically System Wide Information Management (SWIM)) and generic attributes of
the data (quality assured, etc). The need
for information-sharing is not unique to
ATM, and so expertise from outside ATM
should be used. This applies to other areas too, such as software development.
ATM should not re-invent systems where
expertise is available from outside ATM.
ATM Needs
ATM does have specific needs, not
only in the aircraft, which will require
careful preparation and execution.
The ATM system has:
1. Components that are in continuous operation (eg. service provider
equipment).
2. Data needs that require updates,
both planned and corrective.
3. Program upgrades, both planned
and corrective.
4. Failure modes that ensure essential
functionality remains.
At present, the ATM system has service provider equipment that in order to
be upgraded (program or data) then the
equipment will act in a “degraded mode”
– for example without short-term conflict alarms. However program and data
upgrades should been seen as a normal
activity and the service providers’ systems should be designed in such a way
that there is no “degraded modes” (no
reduced functionality) for normal operations (including program upgrades).
At present, many ATM systems hold
only one version of data at a time, yet
scheduled updates to ATM data is a nor-
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mal ATM activity. Of course there are
issues to be addressed if operations are
being conducted at the time of scheduled
update, but these problems are not impossible to overcome.
At present, the ATM system has databases (both ground and airborne) that
cannot be progressively updated if errors
are found or unforeseen events occur. Either the errors are corrected in the next
planned update cycle, or in some cases
an update may occur earlier than planned but the system still operates for a
period on incorrect data. At present the
mitigation is to tell the humans (publish
a NOTAM) and expect the human to somehow manage the error. A system is required that allows updating incorrect or
changed information as it occurs.
The recommended solution to these problems is to view the ATM system
as compromising of many independent,
fully capable units; with each unit being
able to communicate with any other unit.
For example, the aircraft would be a unit
and each air traffic control console is a
unit. The processing power exists both in
the air and on the ground to do this using
current technology.
For example, the short term conflict
alert could be built into the air traffic control console, so that except when the console itself fails, the alert is always active.
A secure data-link should be able to
be established between any two units of
the ATM system.
ATM Capability Level
There is a need to define levels of capability within the future ATM system.
This will apply to both airspace users’ and
service providers’ capabilities as the traditional disconnect between air and ground
components should not be continued.
The capability will indicate level of ATM
functionality achieved. The ATM capabil-
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ity level will indicate that all components
are operational – that is humans have
been trained and rated, technology implemented, procedures established, etc.
Each level of ATM needs to be collaboratively agreed, preferably on a
global scale.
The concept of “management by trajectory” is fundamental to future ATM.
The first level of ATM Capability should
define existing systems that have initial
elements of management by trajectory.
Each higher level will indicate higher
management by trajectory capabilities
and other ATM functionalities as agreed.
A level of ATM 0 could apply to existing
service provider systems and aircraft that
do not meet a minimum management by
trajectory capability, as these will need
to be accommodated initially.
Note that each level of ATM capability should be described as functionalities.
Specific systems or technology would
be listed as examples only (for example,
“high accuracy, high frequency automatic reporting of position - this functionality can be met using ADS-B out”).
See also Appendix 14 – ATM Capability
Level Examples.
4. USING ICAO GLOBAL ATM
OPERATIONAL CONCEPT
COMPONENTS
The ICAO Concept lists seven components and states that the ATM system
cannot function without the integration
of all of the components. The purpose of
this section is to provide some additional
information and observations under each
of the components and then comment on
specific sections from the ICAO Concept.
The ATM Community
The ICAO Concept describes the ATM
Community and makes many references
to it. The ATM system is to be designed
to meet the needs and expectations of the
ATM community. The ATM Community
is like other communities. There are of
course individual rights – but there are
also community responsibilities. In the
ICAO Concept one such responsibility
is participation in the collaborative decision making which is fundamental to the
success of the concept.
Airspace Organisation and
Management
Airspace is owned by states (or is international airspace administered by a
state under international agreements). The
sovereign rights of states will not be affected. Despite international agreements
which will harmonize some legal issues
for ATM, there will still be state based
judicial precedent and practice which
means that ATM will have to continue to
deal with different legal systems (as other
international business and activities do).
States are interested in airspace for security (for example, military), for protecting the interests of its citizens (for example, safety and environmental issues) and
for revenue (for example, resource use
fee, taxation, etc.). In relation to military
activity, there is a need for the military to
be aware of the impact on civilian traffic
of military activities, especially discretionary activities. Discretionary activities
are activities that can be moved in location, or time of activity or both (for example training and testing). For example,
it would seem difficult to justify the cost
and traffic management difficulties associated with displacement of the whole
North Atlantic Track system (thereby affecting many aircraft) due to airspace
reserved for a few military aircraft being
tested. Military operations which are not
managed by trajectory have the greatest
effect on ATM capacity and efficiency as
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usually significant blocks of airspace are
made unavailable to all other operations.
It is important that states reinforce to their
military the importance of full cooperative
participation in airspace management.
In relation to the interests of its citizens, and in particular in relation to safety,
the states have a regulator. Some regulators deal with issues related to environmental protection but increasingly there
are independent activities and legislation
to deal with issues such as noise around
airports. The concern is that some groups
do not have an understanding of the safety
consequences of some noise abatement
procedures. For example a runway is chosen not because of a desire to annoy or inconvenience a particular group of people,
but rather due to the need for an into wind
runway. Indeed some states have published
large downwind and crosswind components as acceptable for noise abatement
which aircraft designers only expected to
be used occasionally and definitely not repetitively. Noise is not the only issue, but
issues such as visual intrusion also need
to be addressed. In future ATM it would
seem desirable that issues relating to environment should be coordinated via the
regulator (who should have the expertise
to recognize safe operations).
Note: In the collaborative decision making environment of the ICAO Concept many
groups will be involved and ATM will address environmental concerns of one of the
expectations of the ATM Community.
In the ICAO Concept, “all airspace
will be the concern of ATM and will be a
usable resource” and all airspace is managed. So both “separation service airspace” (today’s controlled airspace) and
Statement on the future of “non separation service airspace” (today’s uncontrolled airspace) is managed airspace.
Admittedly the degree of management varies, but the principle is that no
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airspace is excluded from being a useable resource.
In the ICAO Concept, “airspace management will be dynamic and flexible”.
How dynamic is yet to be determined by
the ATM community; however it will be
determined in two ways. First the ATM
Community (or regulator) will determine that a particular service is required
for safety (for example, separation provision service) or, as part of ATM system
design the ATM community will decide
that a service is required for efficiency.
It is expected that rules will be collaboratively agreed regarding the establishment/disestablishment of services. In
meeting the requirement to be dynamic
and cost-effective, it is possible that a
service will not be provided continuously, but instead as needed. This may
mean closure of control towers during
low density operations (such as at night),
and even the reduction of “separation
provision service” (controlled) airspace
during off peak times. Likewise, when
needed, separation provision service airspace could expand in response to weather diversions, etc. Of course this is not an
ad-hoc arrangement, but something that
is part of the ATM system design.
In the ICAO Concept, “any restriction on any particular volume of airspace
will be considered transitory”. The ICAO
Concept also states “Although there will
generally be no permanent/fixed constrained airspace, certain airspace will be
subjected to service limitations, including
access over an extended period, motivated
by national interests or safety issues and
appropriately considered in coordination
with the ATM community.” One way of
implementing this concept is for a regular
review by the ATM community of all restrictions based on airspace volumes (including military operations), with a view
to minimize the volumes and times of the
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airspace restrictions and wherever possible to manage flights using trajectories
(not airspace segregation).
This then allows for certain areas to
be “restricted”, but ensures that the need
for such restrictions is understood by the
ATM community. In the ICAO Concept,
“airspace boundaries will be adjusted to
particular traffic flows and should not
be constrained by national or facility
boundaries”. For this to work a number of items need to be addressed. Real
time sharing of trajectory information
between adjacent controller positions is
essential. However a major issue yet to
be addressed is service provider charges
(and or state revenue). An airspace user’s
trajectory should not be chosen based on
the cost of service provider charges, as
this would be an artificial imposition on
the use of the ATM resource. This however does not mean that the user pays
whatever charge is levied. Initially as
there is only a single service provider for
a given airspace a charging system could
be that the user pays a “network access
fee” and it is up to the service providers
to divide up that fee among them. In the
longer term, if there are multiple service
providers in a given volume of airspace
then the airspace user would pay the fee
of their chosen service provider.
The separation provision service providers will need to have arrangements
established for managing using traffic
flows. The facilities’ boundaries may
not be fixed and may adjust to the traffic
flows. This also would affect the sector
boundaries within each facility. This will
initially not be totally dynamic, but somewhat like the oceanic flex track system,
in which optimal tracks are published for
a period of time, the facility boundaries
may be determined on a periodic basis
using forecast conditions, including filed
trajectories. Automation support will be
needed as well as training service providers staff in these new procedures.
There may continue to be a need for
fixed routes – when required overall ATM
efficiency (for example to strategically
de-conflict high density traffic). There
are several issues that must however be
addressed. The number of fixed routes
must be kept to a minimum, including
minimum length and minimum period of
application. The routes will be as direct
as possible. The routes will be regularly
and collaboratively reviewed, including
assessing whether they are still needed.
There will not be only “one type of
airspace” (even though it is all managed
airspace). Different levels of services,
rules of conduct, etc will be determined
as part of the collaborative ATM system
design process.
Aerodrome Operations
Cooperation is essential for efficient
aerodrome operations. Aerodrome Owners have to needed ground infrastructure,
and need to be convinced of the value in
making changes to existing infrastructure
(like other members of the ATM community do). Airspace Users are operating
at the most critical stages of their flight
(landing and take-off), have to interface
with a number of services (both airside
and landside) and usually have the most
factors influencing the predictability of
their own operations. ATM Service Providers are providing separation services
with aircraft and other vehicles operating in very close proximity to each other
and where uncontrollable events (such
as change in wind direction) can require
complete changes to the traffic pattern in
the air and on the ground. Environmental issues, such as noise and visual intrusion, affect operational choices. Airport
capacity has been identified as a limiting
factor to growth of air transport.
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The “en-route to en-route” view of
aerodrome operations means that service
providers will act in concert to assist the
airspace user in achieving an efficient
turn-around time.
“Enroute to enroute” also indicates
the aerodromes involvement with the services offered in the airspace surrounding
the airport - not just final or initial stages
(that is in the terminal area) but “from
cruising level to cruising level”. Traditional service boundaries of “airport”,
“terminal” and “enroute” should have no
operational consequence on the user’s
trajectory. This is not to say that different needs must be addressed as the flight
progresses, for this is a practical reality,
but instead states that how the services
are organized to meet these needs should
not affect trajectory.
The 4-d trajectory will include all
movement of the aircraft (for example,
from parking to gate) and will not just be
limited to the taxiways and runways. The
4-d trajectory contains time elements,
which may be precise requirements when
needed to meet capacity demanded.
In the ICAO Concept, “runway occupancy time will be reduced”. This can
be in several ways, including brake-tovacate procedures. The 4-d trajectory
may in future nominate entry and exit
points for the runway other than fulllength when necessary to meet capacity demanded. In addition to high-speed
exit taxiways, there may be high-speed
entry taxiways. As it becomes difficult
to create new airports in some environments, closely spaced runway operations and runways for specific type of
operations (for example very light jet)
may develop. Departing at a precise
time is likely to be part of the 4-d trajectory; however the finalization of the
exact time may occur close to the departure time. Also in the ICAO Concept,
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“flight parameters will be available to
the ATM system, allowing for dynamic
spacing and sequencing of departing
aircraft, thereby minimizing wake vortex constraints on runway capacity”.
In the ICAO Concept, “the capability will exist to safely maneuvers in all
weather conditions while maintaining
capacity”. The capacity requirement can
be partly but not completely achieved and
therefore should be qualified (and also
kept as a goal). If the weather issue is only
one of low-visibility only (for example,
fog) then the future ATM system should
be able to continue operations while maintaining the same capacity as when there is
no fog (due to improved technology).
However if the weather is severe thunderstorms over the aerodrome (preventing
safe flight) or obstruction of the runway
(due to extremely heavy rain or snow) then
clearly capacity cannot be maintained.
In the ICAO Concept, “precise surface guidance to and from a runway
will be required in all conditions”. This
is a long outstanding need, especially
to meet the preceding requirement. The
4d trajectory applies during taxi, both
from and to the runway. Elements such
as “virtual stop bars” may be included in
the trajectory to assist in the prevention
of runway incursions.
In the ICAO Concept, “the position
(to an appropriate level of accuracy) and
intent of all vehicles and aircraft operating on the movement area will be known
and available to the appropriate ATM
community members”. This information
sharing should enable the service provider to instruct an aircraft to follow another even in low visibility. It may also
provide information to aircraft about to
land or take off if the runway is occupied. How best to display this information, especially in the aircraft, requires
further work.
IFATCA
Demand and Capacity Balancing
Another way to state the meaning of
the ICAO Concept is “Capacity Management first, then Demand Management” –
but this again comes down to misunderstandings as service providers claim this
is what they have always done. Similar
misunderstanding are evident with statements about “ATC delays” by airspace
users when the controllers actually delivered more through put than the sector
capacity was rated at, despite weather
and technical difficulties.
Airspace capacity is not linked to the
number of aircraft in a controller’s sector,
but the number of interventions (and other
work) of the separator (pilot or controller).
(See also Appendix 9 – Flexibility and
Capacity.) The number of interventions
required is directly related to the separation methods available, and especially the
size of the separation standard – which often depends on the technology available.
Despite claims that self-separation will
reduce separation standards, this has yet
to be confirmed (as air to air separation
standards have not been defined).
Automation support will be required
to assess airspace capacity, especially in
high density user preferred 4d trajectory
environments.
A major effect on Airspace Capacity
is thunderstorms. Thunderstorms are ex-
pected events, and are forecast with some
accuracy – however the exact location
and intensity of the thunderstorm is only
known in close to real time. The activity
of the thunderstorm rapidly varies so the
path for one aircraft around the thunderstorm is not necessarily suitable for an
immediately following aircraft. There are
examples of aircraft proceeding under
their own navigation in areas of extreme
turbulence – and of other aircraft avoiding
the area in excessive amounts that affect
the flow of traffic behind them. Significant effort should be made to determine
a safe and efficient means of transit or
avoidance of areas of high convective turbulence in a consistent manner.
Aerodrome capacity is perhaps easier
to estimate than airspace capacity, and
it will be a significant improvement to
ATM capacity that (at locations where
it is needed) low visibility operations do
not reduce aerodrome capacity.
If it is assumed that improvements to
separation methods and standards mean
that airspace capacity is not the major
limiting factor, then the main constraint
is airport capacity. The earliest airspace
user’s need (in relation to Demand and
Capacity Balancing (DCB)), is for airlines to be able to publish a schedule
with the expectation of slots being available at both departure and destination
(for one is no good without the other).
These slots allocations cannot be independent of ATM but integrated into the
ATM resource management.
The nature of aerodromes is evolving
in a similar way as for Air Traffic Service
Providers.
Aerodromes are increasingly no longer “government supplied infrastructure”, but businesses. It could be argued
that if an airline has a high need for infrastructure at a particular location for
their operations then perhaps they should
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act for runway capacity as they do now
for gates, that is a lease agreement with
the airport owner for certain capacity or
right. However the business arrangements evolve, ATM will need to know what
capacity is going to be used (really used
not just “planned”) and what spare capacity exists to accommodate shorter-term
needs such additional airline flights or
needs of business and general aviation.
Even if capacity far exceeds demand,
whether for aerodromes or airspace, this
does not prevent short-term demand
exceeding capacity – for example many
flights all planned to depart at exactly
the same time. While commercial reasons may require the airlines to publish
a common departure time as their competitor, this cannot be carried forward to
the ATM system. Likewise current systems which allow a wide time margin
(say 10 minutes) on an allocated slot time
are also unsuitable in managing ATM
resources. There needs to be a balance
between precision and flexibility, so that
while precise times may be planned, is
should be possible for a quick and easy
modification of times, both at departure
and destination, without major penalty.
The rules of exchanging “slots” would
be collaboratively agreed by the affected
members of the ATM community.
For example, the change should initially be accomplished internally to the
airline company’s operations (within
reason). In the current ATM system, the
service provider addresses many “resource conflicts”, which is when the airspace
users want to use the same ATM resource at the same time. The future ATM system will resolve such resource conflicts
using collaborative decision making.
When short term actions are required,
it is likely that the resolution will use a
set of collaboratively agreed rules, rather
than initiate a process of collaboration.
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In Capacity Management, there should
be an approach that provides a basic fixed
capacity on expected need (as collaboratively agreed) and also an understanding
of variable capacity that can implemented
(either with some notice or very short notice). This variable capacity may involve
extra cost or have consequences on availability of an ATM resource in another location (for example assistance from adjoining service providers).
Another consideration of Capacity
Management is to identify key areas or
issues that significantly affect capacity
and take action to ensure capacity will be
available. For example a service provider may (in order to ensure full capacity
is available) have extra staff employed
to cover short-term illness, provide extra
assistance, relief, etc. to that normally
rostered in order to ensure that capacity
at peak times in not affected by expected
(but not precisely predictable) events
such as short-term notice of illness.
In the ICAO Concept, “through collaborative decision making at the strategic
stage, assets will be optimized in order to
maximize throughput, thus providing a
basis for predictable allocation and scheduling”. This process should also be used
to make sure that capacity is responding to
trends in demand, which is ensuring continuing changes to ATM assets (including
new infrastructure) where optimization of
existing assets will in future not be able to
meet the trend in demand. This includes
changes in the nature of the demand (for
example, responding to growth of low
cost carriers to alternative aerodromes).
In the ICAO Concept, “through collaborative decision making at the pre-tactical stage, when possible, adjustments will
be made to assets, resource allocations,
projected trajectories, airspace organization, and allocation of entry/exit times
for aerodromes and airspace volumes to
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mitigate any imbalance”. This paragraph
emphasizes the capacity management
first (then demand management) approach. ATM capacity management involves
having the ability to make additional (variable) capacity available to reasonably
expected events (such as thunderstorms,
staff unavailability, etc). In the same way
as airlines cooperate in rescheduling passengers when aircraft assets become unavailable, service providers should be able
to cooperate when a service providers assets are temporarily unavailable.
In the ICAO Concept, “at the tactical
stage, actions will include dynamic adjustments to the organization of airspace to
balance capacity, dynamic changes to the
entry/exit times for aerodromes and airspace volumes, and adjustments to the schedule by the users”. Although this starts as
capacity management (airspace organization), it also recognizes that demand management (changes of schedules) is also
needed at times. Some events are beyond
the control of any member of the ATM
community and so the response must be
to mitigate the consequences. Contingency agreements should be collaboratively
created and agreed so that the response to
such situations has at least some measure
of equity, order and predictability.
Note: Although the terms strategic, pretactical and tactical are used, these are used
to give a sequence of events (and not “traditional” meanings of these terms).
Traffic Synchronization
Traffic Synchronization is about
achieving maximum capacity.
In the ICAO Concept “traffic synchronization refers to the tactical establishment and maintenance of a safe,
orderly and efficient flow of air traffic”.
The significance of new ways of achieving this should not be underestimated.
Traffic synchronization can be used
for same direction traffic and also for
crossing traffic. Traffic synchronization
can be used on the surface and during
climb, cruise and descent.
In the current ATM system there
is the question from the airspace user
“what is the ATM resource limitation restricting my operation”? The answer is
“the aircraft in front of you!”. The reason
for so much speed control (and vectoring) in the terminal area during arrival in
high density operations is to ensure that
the preceding aircraft does not slow too
much too soon and to establish traffic
synchronization to the arrival runway.
Conflict free 4-d trajectories are not
the answer as unless 4-d trajectories are
extremely precisely defined and flown
(within a few seconds of time), capacity
will be lost. An accurate time at the Final Approach Fix is not enough to ensure
separation during descent.
The solution to achieving maximum
capacity of airspace and aerodromes is
traffic synchronization. Basically this
means that although a 4-d trajectory may
be conflict-free (or is one designated as
requiring some separation provision)
there will be segments of the flight where
the operation of one aircraft will require
small adjustments to be synchronized
with other traffic in order to achieve
maximum capacity.
It is expected that before self-separation occurs in high density operations,
that tasks such as “maintenance of spacing” will be assigned to the flight deck.
Spacing is not the same as separation.
Spacing needs to be in excess of the separation minima, so that failure of spacing can result in action before failure of
separation. The role of separator is not
delegated, and this is not a form of cooperative separation, but instead a new
form of “air traffic control instruction”,
which requires compliance.
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Traditionally spacing is expressed
as distances but aircraft designers state
that automation would be easier if a time
is used. Whether it is distance or time,
precision will be required. The spacing
should not be viewed as an “aim” but instead a hard “requirement”. If it is not a
hard requirement then extra spacing will
be needed (to deal with loss of spacing)
and capacity will be lost.
In the concept, “wake vortex …will
continue to be a determinant of minimum
spacing”. The ICAO Concept is discussing longitudinal separation, especially
arrivals and departures from the runway.
Work will be required in reviewing
wake vortex separation standards, especially to allow for the beneficial effects of
wind and the availability of flight parameters expected in the ICAO Concept.
In addition, this does not necessarily
apply away from the immediate vicinity of
the airport. For example, if a spacing less
than wake vortex separation was desired
between two arriving aircraft, the second
aircraft could be instructed to maintain
the smaller distance and additionally instructed to descend above the wake of the
precedent aircraft (air to air exchange of
first aircraft’s 4-d trajectory could make
this possible). Both aircraft could maximize preferred descent profiles, and still
arrive in an orderly sequence.
An important issue is the degree of
tolerances applied to spacing. The spacing is not a minimum displacement – but
a displacement with (small) tolerances.
As in-trail sequences frequently involve
more than two aircraft, the second aircraft cannot use spacing as a minimum
displacement as it would affect the third
and remaining following aircraft.
In the ICAO Concept, “there will be
dynamic four-dimensional (4-D) trajectory control and negotiated conflict-free
trajectories”. Spacing instructions will
22
eventually become part of “management
by trajectory”, but initially it is likely
that spacing instructions will be a separate instruction that complements the
4-d trajectory control (in the same way
as a heading instruction does not cancel
an airways clearance). Effective spacing
techniques (together with management
by trajectory) should reduce or eliminate
traditional path stretching by radar vectors to establish a sequence.
In the ICAO Concept, “choke points
will be eliminated”. Traffic Synchronization is achieved by small adjustments
to trajectory, and displacement can be in
any of the four dimensions. For example
a small height displacement and a small
time displacement could enable an aircraft
to cross above (so clear of wake vortex)
and behind crossing traffic. Separation
standards that recognize combinations
of displacements together with accurate
trajectory (including intent) information
should greatly reduce, if not eliminate
choke points for route crossings.
In the ICAO Concept, “optimization of traffic sequencing will achieve
maximization of runway throughput”.
For departures, spacing instructions on
departure is how 4-d trajectories can be
used and not compromise aerodrome capacity. For arrivals, spacing instructions
will insure all available capacity is used.
In single runway operations (both departures and arrivals), spacing between arrivals will ensure departure “slots” are
available when needed.
Airspace User Operations
Without the airspace user there would
be no need for Air Traffic Management!
This is true for two reasons. The first is
the obvious reason (no user, no ATM).
The second reason is perhaps the real reason for ATM – that the airspace user is not
a single unified whole but many diverse
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types of missions and aircraft and there
are conflicting demands by the airspace
user for the same ATM resource (aerodrome or airspace). The ATM system is
established to enable all this activity in a
safe, orderly and efficient manner.
In the ICAO Concept, the military is
an airspace user. All airspace is an ATM
resource and the military are expected to
work in collaboration with other members of the ATM community to achieve
the most efficient operations for all.
In the ICAO Concept, “the accommodation of mixed capabilities and
worldwide implementation needs will
be addressed to enhance safety and efficiency”. The ATM system will be in
constant change and will be designed
for mixed-mode operations; in any case
the ATM system is required to accept
mixed capabilities of airspace users. The
world-wide implementation needs will
be addressed by interoperability being
described in functional terms.
In the ICAO Concept, “relevant ATM
data will be fused for an airspace user’s
general, tactical and strategic situational
awareness and conflict management”.
The design and availability of such data
systems will be part of a collaborative
process that determines the different requirements of different airspace users.
It will be based on identified needs and
should be cost-effective.
In the ICAO Concept, “relevant airspace user operational information will
be made available to the ATM system”.
The sharing of data is part of the collaborative approach within future ATM. In
particular, airspace user operational data
will assist the service provider to assist
in making each flight as efficient as possible and to maximize the available capacity of the ATM system.
Concerns about security of commercially-sensitive data, etc. will be ad-
dressed.
In the ICAO Concept, “individual
aircraft performance, flight conditions,
and available ATM resources will allow
dynamically-optimized 4-D trajectory
planning”. The ATM system not only
shall be designed to accommodate all
type of aircraft but also be designed to
optimize performance for a particular
aircraft. The constant updating of shared
information is the key to dynamic optimized planning.
In the ICAO Concept, “collaborative
decision making will ensure that aircraft
and airspace user system design impacts
on ATM are taken into account in a timely manner”. Introduction of new aircraft
types (and indeed new types of airspace
user activities) can affect existing ATM
resources or require new resources. Part
of collaborative decision making is ensuring that the ATM system is prepared
for these new types and activities.
In the ICAO Concept, “aircraft should
be designed with the ATM system as a
key consideration”.
This is a two way responsibility. The
first is that the ATM system should make
its requirements known to aircraft designers in a timely manner. The second
is that the aircraft be designed with an
understanding that the aircraft must be
able to interact with the ATM system in
an appropriate way.
Conflict Management
There are a number of changes to current ATM practice contained with the
ICAO Concept on Conflict Management.
To prevent collisions between aircraft
is now the function of Conflict Management which is “to limit, to an acceptable
level, the risk of collision between aircraft and hazards”. Of course the objective is still to prevent collisions, but in
a performance based ATM system an at-
23
IFATCA
tempt to quantify the risk is needed.
“Conflict” has been redefined by the
ICAO Concept to “any situation involving aircraft and hazards in which the applicable separation minima may be compromised”. This is what would have been
called “potential conflict” in the current
system and reflects a move towards a
more strategic solving of conflicts.
The ICAO Concept introduces no
new hazards – however they are now
more explicitly stated in one group and
are “other aircraft, terrain, weather, wake
turbulence, incompatible airspace activity and, when an aircraft is on the ground,
surface vehicles and other obstructions on
the apron and maneuvering area”. Work
on systems such as Airborne Separation
Assistance Systems (ASAS) have commenced work on separation from other
aircraft and acknowledge the other hazards but consider they are beyond the scope
of current ASAS work. It is important to
note that complete separation systems require separation from all hazards; as the
solution to avoid one hazard must also be
clear of any other hazard of any type.
The ICAO Concept makes explicit
the current processes of separation provision by defining separation modes (rules, procedures, conditions, etc) and associated separation minima. Future work
will be defining these modes, include
work on separation from weather and air
to air separation. This work will also be
necessary for the automation expected in
24
future ATM systems because a conflict
free trajectory cannot be determined unless the applicable separation modes and
minima are known to the automation.
The ICAO Concept defines three layers
of conflict management – strategic, separation provision and collision avoidance.
Strategic is simply “in advance of tactical” and strategic conflict management
techniques can be used after departure.
When a airspace user’s trajectory is
changed, the ATM system will determine
the best means of conflict management
for that trajectory.
In the ICAO Concept, “strategic conflict management will reduce the need
for separation provision to a designated
level”. Not only will strategic separation
be the norm in the future ATM, but any
remaining tactical separation will be part
of the ATM system design. This means
that tactical intervention for separation
(whether by the airspace user or the service provider) will be no more than a
pre-defined amount – and the ATM system will act to make sure that this level is not exceeded. The ICAO Concept
states that tactical separation (separation
provision) “will only be used when strategic conflict management cannot be
used efficiently”.
In the ICAO Concept, “the ATM system will minimize restrictions on user
operations; therefore, the predetermined
separator will be the airspace user, unless safety or ATM system design requires a separation provision service”. If the
ATM system determines either for safety
or design that a separation provision service is needed, then it does not mean that
the airspace user can become the separator simply on request. In the first case
(safety), it has already been determined
that the airspace user is not an appropriate separator on safety grounds. In the
second case (design) it has been conside-
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red for reasons of ATM performance that
the airspace user is not the best separator.
This is not to say that there are no cases
where the delegation of separation to the
airspace user is possible, for clearly that
is allowed for in the types of separation
provision and in delegation of separation
– however it would have to be part of the
second case and be part the ATM system
design (that is procedures defined for
when it will occur).
In the ICAO Concept, “the role of separator may be delegated, but such delegations will be temporary”. There are
requirements for delegation in the ICAO
Concept. It is important to note that it is
not reasonable to assume that separation
can be “handed back” before the termination condition. It may be possible, subject to negotiation, but it is not guaranteed. An acceptance of the delegation is
also an acceptance of the whole period of
the delegation.
In the ICAO Concept, “in the development of separation modes, separation
provision intervention capability must
be considered.” The separator can be the
airspace user, a service provider or automation. “Separation provision intervention capability refers to the quality of humans and/or systems to detect and solve
a conflict and to implement and monitor
the solution.” The intent is that the best
separator for a given situation is chosen.
In the ICAO Concept, “the conflict
horizon will be extended as far as procedures and information will permit”. This
is to ensure a strategic approach to conflict management while recognizing that
procedures will determine the appropriateness of how far to look ahead and that
information may also limit how far in
advance conflicts can be detected.
In the ICAO Concept, “collision avoidance systems will be part of ATM safety
management but will not be included in
determining the calculated level of safety
required for separation provision”.
In other words, the safety net of Collision Avoidance Systems (CAS) does
contribute to overall ATM safety – however CAS will lose value as a safety net if
CAS are included in the level of safety
required for separation provision (which
is the separation layer above).
ATM Service Delivery
In the ICAO Concept, “the role of
ATM service delivery management will
be to coordinate the delivery of services
from all service providers … in response
to an airspace user’s request for a service” and “at the strategic level … will
be responsible for conducting collaborative decision making within the ATM
community to achieve the best outcomes
for the ATM community”.
ATM Service Delivery should be on
a regional basis, and to work with other
ATM Service Delivery functions to form
an interoperable global network.
In the ICAO Concept, “services to be
delivered by the ATM service delivery
management component will be established on an as-required basis subject to
ATM system design. Once established,
they will be provided on an on-request
basis.” Note this does not mean that the
airspace user can necessarily choose not to
use the separation provision service. This
is a statement about the total services incorporated in the ATM system design, and
the “request” for the service could be the
outcome of a safety or efficiency need.
In the ICAO Concept, “ATM system
design will be determined by collaborative decision making and system-wide
safety and business cases”. The collaborative approach is essential to the success
of the concept. System-wide is also important as it ensures that the needs of all
ATM community members are taken into
25
IFATCA
account. The term safety and business
cases has become “performance cases”,
which means that safety, cost-effectiveness, etc. are all considered together.
In the ICAO Concept, “services delivered by the ATM service delivery
management component will, through
collaborative decision making, balance
and optimize user-requested trajectories
to achieve the ATM community’s expectations”. Although the airspace user’s
preferred trajectory is recognized as the
best outcome for the airspace user, trajectories will be collaboratively modified when necessary to meet all the ATM
community’s expectations.
In the ICAO Concept, “management by trajectory will involve the development of an agreement that extends
through all the physical phases of the
flight”. The trajectory may even be from
overnight parking to the gate and on for
the rest of the flight. The intent is that for
all interaction with the ATM system for a
flight, the default means of management
will be by trajectory
.
5. TRAJECTORY
MANAGEMENT
On page 1 of this statement is:
“The proposed solution to addressing
the safety, environment, capacity, flexibility and efficiency needs of the future
ATM is:
1. The Airspace User shall plan their
preferred 4-D trajectory, and,
2. The ATM system will modify that
trajectory to the minimum extent possible.
The difficulty with the proposed solution is that most of the states and service
providers consider this is what they have
always done, and are still doing today!”
It is therefore appropriate to conclude
this statement with comments on Trajectory Management.
26
Background
Air Navigation (and therefore Air
Traffic Control which was designed to
support it) has always and will always be
about 4-d trajectories. It is inappropriate,
especially when dealing with capacity
issues, to discuss 2-d or 3-d ATM “solutions” – as the aircraft’s effect on ATM
resources is always 4-d.
Even today’s ATM system with its
problems is a form of advising the airspace user of the current ATM restrictions
on available trajectories (via NOTAMs
and published routes) and allowing the
airspace user to “choose” their preferred
trajectory (flight plan) with this level of
understanding.
Then that preferred trajectory is modified to the minimum extent (for there
is no “value” to the service providers in
modifying the trajectory any more than
they have to – except perhaps to avoid
the cost of providing extra capacity).
“Free-flight” (in its various forms and
recreations) and “user preferred trajectories” invokes feelings of freedom. However in any community, including the
ATM community, your freedom to do as
you please extends only as far as when
your activity starts to affect another entity
in the community. To provide a specific
example: long delays were being experienced on a long-haul load-critical route,
so the route structure was expanded so
that 5 parallel routes were available.
The problem was that on each day of
operation, the airspace users all chose
the same route as most efficient so there
was no operational difference, just different routes in use. There may not have
been any difference if there had been
no routes, only user trajectories, as the
airspace users would again simply all
choose the same solution.
So the next part of the solution is
“user preferred routes and user separa-
IFATCA
tion” – however separation provision is
not only “missing other aircraft” (which
all are planning to be in the same vicinity anyhow) but also avoiding the other
hazards listed in the ICAO concept. Like
4-d trajectories, self-separation has been
in effect for many years around the globe
and will continue to be. However at certain traffic levels ATM design has often
required a separation provision service,
and although the areas so served may be
collaboratively reviewed, it is likely for
some time yet that a separation provision
service will continue to be specified.
An interim step between fixed tracks
and no tracks has been the flex tracks
systems that generate a “route structure”
on a 12 hour basis. The winds and other
weather, as well as the expected aircraft
types, number of aircraft, etc. are taken
into account and the most efficient routes
defined. This has been mainly for long
haul flights and has delivered considerable savings to airspace users over the
traditional fixed tracks systems.
Part of the reason behind implementing some flex tracks was that service provider’s equipment could not work without
routes (that is route based flight data processing, not geographically based). Before
more flexibility can be given to airspace
users to choose their own routes, service
providers’ systems must all be geographically based systems. However even with
geographically based systems it is expected that some fixed routes and some
flex-tracks will continue to exist in future
systems – when needed for safety or some
other ATM system design requirement.
ATM Trajectory
What is needed is not only a vision of
a wonderful future of trajectory exchanges and “free flight”, but also the practical
steps from here to there. To this end, the
“ATM trajectory” should be considered
as already existing, but it should be in a
process of continuous improvement so
that it serves both airspace user and service providers more efficiently.
A distinction needs to be made between the “trajectory” in the flight management system of the aircraft (or the
airline’s system) and the ATM trajectory.
The ATM trajectory is based on the airspace user’s trajectory but it has “tolerances” that will be used unlike any tolerances in the current ATM system (but
are similar to “block levels” and “cruiseclimb”). They are in effect “freedom of
flight tolerances”.
Another significant issue where high
precision is required is that different
flight management systems describe different paths through the airspace, for example for the same standard instrument
departure or arrival. For example, how
a “fly-by” point is flown is handled differently in the various systems. Clearly
the ATM trajectory must define a single
path as the reference trajectory (and then
“freedom-of-flight” tolerances as appropriate). The avionics can then fly a trajectory contained within those tolerances.
“Freedom-of-Flight” Tolerances
ATM tolerances have traditionally only
been used to limit the uncertainty of an aircraft’s position but many aircraft now have
highly-capable navigation systems that
have very small “uncertainty of position”.
The new concept of “freedom of flight”
tolerances is intended to allow an aircraft
the freedom of movement within a moving volume of airspace, and the precise
navigational tolerances allows the certainty of containment within that volume.
The ICAO Concept (Appendix I) provides explanations and examples of what
the future may be and in these examples
the tolerances are described as follows.
“6.14 This trajectory will be approved
27
IFATCA
with tolerances, which will constitute a
“4-D trajectory contract” between the
airspace user and the service provider.
The airspace user can accept or reject the
proposal, as part of the collaborative decision-making process.
6.15 The intent of these tolerances,
which can vary over the trajectory, is to
allow some freedom for changes within
the trajectory to be made by the airspace
user without further reference to the service provider. The tolerances are intended
to provide as much flexibility as the ATM
system can allow, while balancing the requirements of other airspace users.”
Consider the case of an oceanic flight
in low density operations. The ATM
trajectory will provide a large volume
around that aircraft, for example allowing the aircraft to change levels or reduce
speed due un-forecast turbulence, divert
left or right of track around weather, etc.
without reference to ATM – provided
that the aircraft remains within the “freedom of flight tolerances”.
There may of course be crossing situations in that oceanic volume that would
require some accuracy at a particular
point of flight, but the “freedom-offlight” tolerances would only be limited
for that period.
It is not only for such oceanic areas,
but even in high density operations. For
example, it may be that the airspace user
wants some freedom of level restrictions
to have the most economic descent profile. The airspace user might be willing to
have almost no “freedom-of-flight” in the
other dimensions (that is to follow a precise route at a precise time) provided that
there is some flexibility in required level
precision during descent. Another example is flexibility laterally when avoiding thunderstorms – but remaining under
own navigation not radar vectors because
of precise behavior in other dimensions.
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Trajectory Contract
The trajectory contract is mentioned
several times in this statement. It is essentially an agreement for the airspace
user to be at a particular location at a
particular time (within freedom of- flight
tolerances) and in return the services and
resources needed by the airspace user
will be available. This is behind the term
“on time, first served” priority. The airspace user makes good the promised performance, even if for example the winds
are slightly different to forecast.
The trajectory contract also allows
more strategic conflict management, so
that inefficient tactical solutions do not
“suddenly” occur.
The trajectory contract is modified during flight – both at the request of the airspace
user and the service provider. It would be
expected that the number of modifications
would be monitored by the ATM system as
an indication both of predictability of the
system and its flexibility!
The “trajectory contract” process is
not a race where the first to get an agreement or the first to departure is guaranteed the agreed trajectory. There will
continue to be airspace users who have
short-term requirements on the ATM
system – whether this is a new flight or a
modification to an existing flight. Part of
the ATM service is to balance the needs
of all airspace users for access, for predictability, for flexibility, for efficiency,
etc. As such re-negotiations of trajectories can be expected during flight.
The other reason trajectory modifications will be required is that the ATM
trajectory evolves throughout the flight.
When the aircraft is at the overnight
parking position, the precise time of arrival at the destination gate is not fixed
and known. The trajectory is refined
over time, both by the airspace user and
the ATM system - for example, when the
IFATCA
departure gate is known. It is expected
that the entire ATM system will become
more strategically based, so that with
increased predictability gates and other
ATM resources can be allocated well
in advance. It is likely that much of the
initial trajectory will be “planned but
yet to be confirmed”, so that gates, runways (using forecast wind, etc.) will be
assigned, perhaps for the whole flight.
However as there is a need to re-allocate resources (a different gate or runway) the trajectory modification process
must be designed so that changes can be
rapidly made.
The time element of the 4-d contract
seems to have always been a part of air
traffic control methods. As described in
ICAO PANS_ATM (Doc 4444) “separation may be established by requiring
aircraft to depart at a specified time, to
arrive over a geographical location at a
specified time, …”. The 4-d time element
is an important part of strategically managing traffic even after departure. The
ATM system needs to be able to use time
precisely for this purpose, for example
accuracy to within a second of time, and
when required a requirement within 15
seconds of the time.
IFATCA stresses that this approach
of cooperation and commitment to act is
more important than the final technology
or procedures that will be implemented.
IFATCA considers that it has the experience and expertise to participate and
assist in the process of making the future
ATM system we all need. 
CONCLUSION
APPENDICES
Appendix 1 – ICAO Concept
IFATCA considers that the best way
to address the problems being experienced in ATM is by all members of the
ATM community cooperating. The cooperation required is a serious working
together that requires pragmatism and
compromise by all involved. This involves collaborative decision making
that requires involvement in the process
and in the consequences. It requires commitment to change and a will to act at all
levels including at state level.
In 2004, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) 35th Assembly
endorsed the “Global Air Traffic Management Operational Concept” (ICAO
Doc 9854).
The ICAO Concept states:
“The global air traffic management
(ATM) operational concept presents the
ICAO vision of an integrated, harmonized and globally interoperable ATM
system. The planning horizon is up to
and beyond 2025. The baseline against
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IFATCA
which the significance of the changes
proposed in the operational concept may
be measured is the global ATM environment in 2000.”
“It is crucial that the evolution to
the global ATM system be driven by
the need to meet the expectations of the
ATM community and enabled by the appropriate technologies.”
“A key tenet of the operational concept is performance orientation.”
The ICAO Concept lists the eleven
expectations of the ATM community as:
Access and Equity, Capacity, Cost
Effectiveness, Efficiency, Environment,
Flexibility, Global Interoperability,
Partecipation by the ATM Community,
Predictability, Safety, Security.
The ICAO Concept lists seven components of the ATM system (that must all
be used as an integrated whole):
Airspace Organization and Management, Aerodrome Operations, Demand
and Capacity Balancing, Traffic Synchronization, Airspace User Operations,
Conflict Management, ATM Service Delivery
The ICAO Air Traffic Management
Operational Concept Panel (ATMCP)
drafted the ICAO Concept and was then
reformed as the Air Traffic Management
Requirements and Performance Panel
(ATMRPP).
ATMRPP have since produced the
following documents:
 ATM System Requirements
Supporting the Global Air Traffic Management Operational
 Performance Based Transition
Guidelines.
ATMRPP is continuing to work on
the “Global ATM Performance Manual”;
to be released in December 2007.
30
It is also worthwhile to remember to
the preamble to the convention that established ICAO.
“WHEREAS the future development
of international civil aviation can greatly help to create and preserve friendship
and understanding among the nations and
peoples of the world, yet its abuse can
become a threat to the general security;
and “WHEREAS it is desirable to avoid
friction and to promote that cooperation
between nations and peoples upon which
the peace of the world depends; THEREFORE the undersigned governments
having agreed on certain principles and
arrangements in order that international
civil aviation may be developed in a safe
and orderly manner and that international
air transport services may be established
on the basis of equality of opportunity
and operated soundly and economically:
“Have accordingly concluded this
Convention to that end.” Preamble to the
Convention on International Civil Aviation.
This statement on the future of global
ATM is calling for a renewed commitment to these principles, for without cooperation and the political will to act, especially at state and regional levels, the
current problems in Air Traffic Management will only deteriorate further.
Appendix 3 – Current ATM Problems
The objective of listing the problems
with today’s ATM system is not so that
someone can be “blamed”, but rather list
what is needed to be addressed by the
whole ATM community.
Various lists have been compiled of the
problems with the current ATM system
(for example ICAO Concept Appendix C).
It is not intended to repeat them all here.
There are also a wide range of needs
and environments, and a problem in one
area is not necessarily a problem in an-
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other area.
The problem is not a requirement for
“new” or “advanced” technology - in
that existing technology could be used to
address most of the needs. The solution
involves using technology, especially
existing technologies, efficiently. The
problem is not necessarily one of finance
either. Much of the “budget” of proposed
solutions is acquiring and implementing
“advanced” technology (including training staff, etc) – but many changes can be
made via procedures with existing technology. In any case, with the proposed
system-wide business cases it should be
easier to fund changes to ATM.
Performance measures are also not
the answer – for using performance measures to try and force changes will not
bring about the needed improvements.
(Performance measures can be very useful tools – just not good whips.) Commitment to cooperation and change is the
key and the biggest factor – including
political will at state level and regional
level. Also few solutions are going to
achieve their full potential without the
commitment to cooperation and change
by the military, which has already been
seen in some parts of the world but often
requires action at state level first.
Perhaps the next biggest problem is
that “ATM service provision” is seen as
an impediment to efficient operations
– instead of its role which is an enabler of
efficient operations. Some of this is perception; some of it is a failure to communicate meaningfully; some of it is the inefficiencies in service provision systems.
Inefficiencies are especially evident
between service providers. A radar service stops not because the aircraft is out
of radar cover but because of a change
of service provider and because the radar data is not shared. “Advanced” air
traffic control systems are unable to ex-
change flight plan data with the adjacent
“advanced” system – and what is very
bad is that the service providers actually
believe that it cannot be done (due to
technical problems that cannot be overcome)! Other air traffic control systems
have examples of difficulties even telling
the adjacent unit that the aircraft is coming (that is ATC coordination). How can
there be discussions of “System Wide
Information Management” and “trajectory exchanges with aircraft and service
providers” when it has not yet been demonstrated how this data sharing is already
achieving benefits between ground systems? No wonder there has been many
calls for “fewer service provider centres”,
for seamlessness and interoperability, for
single system approaches. The ICAO
concept defines ATM as “the dynamic,
integrated management of air traffic and
airspace — safely, economically and efficiently — through the provision of facilities and seamless services in collaboration with all parties”. Clearly this is the
hope of the future ATM system.
Inefficiencies also exist within service provider systems. Having “combined centres” is not a solution in itself.
Examples exist where “integration” has
occurred years ago – but all that was
achieved was standardization at the
equipment level (which was a very small
gain for such a big effort). The operating methods and procedures throughout
the room are far from standardized despite the passage of time. The inability to
exchange current trajectory information
between sectors using the same hardware
can also exist within centres.
Another problem is that services did
not evolve with the equipment. Examples
are known for cases where the ground
system did not support advances in aircraft systems, so examples about ground
systems only are provided. For example
31
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there are several places around the world
where radar seems to be used to monitor
procedural standards rather than apply radar services. There are also cases where
service providers have progressively updated their radar systems, but essentially
their use of the radar for control did not
change (though radar displays improved
with alarms, etc. and other “tools” for
controllers) Monopulse radar is much
more accurate in bearing detection than
the earlier generation “first-detected and
last-detected” systems – however this
does not seem to be have been used to
great advantage in re-examining the radar
standards used or for looking for ways
to use this improved accuracy other than
the traditional radar use as it was first deployed 30 or 40 years ago. (This is despite
many programs looking at using increased
navigation performance of aircraft for
“improving” service provision.) How best
to use the increased surveillance accuracy
from systems such as ADS-Broadcast is
only just starting to be debated.
Do not forget that much that is good
is done every day by service providers,
and that there already exists some cooperation within the ATM community. It is
truly amazing that the ATM system today works as well as it does on global,
regional and local levels and the level
of interoperability that is achieved. But
there are improvements that must be
made by ATM service providers to prove
the benefit that they deliver and re-establish a respected position – and this must
be done with the cooperation of all the
ATM community.
One way of describing team work is
that each member of the team does whatever they can to make it as easy as possible for other members of the team to
perform at their best. The cooperation at
all levels of ATM should seek to achieve
precisely this.
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Appendix 5 – The Evolving Air
Traffic Service Provider
The Air Traffic Service Provider
(ATSP) has undergone considerable
change, but some of the biggest changes
are yet to occur.
This section will discuss mainly the
provision of Air Traffic Control.
Initially it was common for the regulator, ATSP (ATC) and aerodrome owner to
be a government department, for example
a department of civil aviation. When the
ATSP wanted to have a particular level
of aircraft equipment, this was achieved
by regulation. If changes were needed
to aerodromes (for example changes to
lighting) this was directly under the ATSP’s control. Safety was the reason quoted for everything. Funding of long-term
projects was often difficult (as funding
depended on government allocation).
Increasingly the Regulator and the
ATSP (ATC) are now separate organizations, and the aerodromes have non-government owners or operators. The ATSP
must either be a business (for example, a
government-owned or private corporation)
or must act as if it were a business (for example, not-for-profit organization or userpays government department). The “government funded public service” ATSP is
disappearing. The ATSP can no longer by
themselves have changes made to aircraft
equipage by regulation, and similarly cannot “control” changes to aerodromes. At
least long-term funding for non-government ATSPs is less of a problem.
As an independent business now responsible to the regulator, ATSPs can expect increasing regulation of their activities – and this will include items such as
certification standards for their equipment
(previously not even a question when
combined as a government department).
However managing an ATSP’s be-
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havior by the regulator having the power
to suspend (or in extreme cases revoke)
the ATSPs license is not effective unless
there is another ATSP that can take over
from the suspended ATSP. At least one
regulator has recognized this and as part
of the license conditions of the ATSP,
an alternative ATSP must be nominated
(and a formal arrangement put in place).
This is to ensure continuity of services.
For reasons of regulation and recognizing the monopolistic (at least from a
state level) of ATSP, it is to be expected
that it will not be long before multiple
ATSPs operate in any given state’s airspace. This will be easier with the
changes in future ATM that manage all
airspace without restrictions based on
state boundaries, the exchanges of ATM
data, etc. The ATSP will truly become an
international business and have to deal
with multiple legal jurisdictions, just like
any other international business.
Other possibilities exist under future
ATM concepts. The ATSP in order to continue to trade must be able to convince
its customers that it supplies a service
worth buying. In other words, that the
ATSP can do something for the airspace
user more efficiently than the airspace
user can do it for themselves. If there is
“self-separation” airspace, but an ATSP
has convinced the airspace user that they
can do the task more efficiently (and can
meet the regulators requirements), then
the task of separation may even be done
by the airspace-users choice of ATSP.
This would result in multiple ATSPs for
the one volume of airspace.
Just as there has been the commencement of “low cost carriers” airlines, it
is also possible for the development of
“low-cost air traffic service providers”.
Examples can be drawn from government telecommunications companies that
have been privatized and then required
by the government to provide access to
telecommunication network resources so
that competition from other suppliers can
occur. This means that government regulations may require infrastructure (such
as a radar data network) of an ATSP to be
made available to competitors.
It used to be believed that a government would never let a state-owned airline to go out of business – but this has
happened. It is also wrong to assume that
a government would always support a
“national ATSP”. This is especially true
when an effective set of laws and regulations have been established by the state.
It would be as easy for the state to regulate several ATSPs as it is for one, and
ATSPs could be identified as potential
sources of government income where the
right to use airspace by offering a service
enabling its use is seen in the same way
as government “selling” the right to use
certain frequencies (for example 3G telecommunication networks).
Due to some of the possibilities mentioned above, there has been discussion
that there may only be a few ATSPs
globally. While this is possible, it is more
likely that ATSPs will for many years
continue to exist as independent entities,
however they will form alliances (for example, to develop or purchase common
ATM systems). The improved sharing of
data will make it less significant to have
“mega-centre” solutions, as smaller units
will be able to inter-operate seamlessly.
While the above has talked of ATSP
(ATC), in the ICAO Concept the term
ATM service providers (SP) is used. The
definition is broad (any “ATM service to
airspace users”) and so provides opportunities for SP to develop new products
for its customers.
The changes occurring in ATSPs
should not affect the functionalities being described in the vision and concept
33
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of operations. However the development
of business plans involving ATSPs will
have to be aware of the changes that are
occurring at the time.
Appendix 7 – Evolving Ground
Systems
ATM ground systems have generally
lagged behind development of airborne
systems. This is changing and ground
systems can now evolve very rapidly.
Traditionally civilian ATC systems
used expensive proprietary equipment.
For example when buying a radar system, the analogue radar head would only
interface with that same supplier’s radar
data processor, display processor and
screens. Upgrading of systems was so
expensive that it was delayed – sometimes until the lack of spare parts forced
a major upgrade of the system. Improvements made to the old system were not
carried forward in the new system.
The situation is different today where
advances outside of the ATM are available to be used.
Admittedly radar heads and processors are still an ATM industry – but the
output is digital data.
The computers to process the radar
data, the network connections, the display processors and screens are developed outside of ATM for a wide range
of applications – and the broader market
use of these components will mean further improvements will be made.
A major aspect of the change is that
components can be upgraded in the system without major change to the overall
system. For example, a new computer
can be installed using existing software
and performance improves.
Changes to components are not limited
to hardware. For example, an additional
functionality can be included in the software. The significant advantage is that
34
the user of the technology (for example
the controller) does not need to learn to
use a completely new set of equipment as
everything is as it was before – except for
the added functionality which of course
will require some training.
Computer software for ground based
systems is an area where significant improvements can be made – but these can
be rapid incremental improvements if
needed.
Appendix 8 – Prevention of
Collisions
Clearly the pilot in command of an
aircraft is responsible for the safety operation of the aircraft – and so must avoid
collisions.
Clearly the air traffic controller’s first
defined task is “to prevent collisions between aircraft”.
However neither the pilot nor the
controller is the agent assigned responsibility if one of the aircraft is fitted with
an Airborne Collision Avoidance System
(ACAS), for example TCAS. It has recently been reiterated that the pilot must
follow the instructions (resolution advisories) issued by ACAS and that the controller must not issue any instructions
that modify the trajectory of the aircraft.
Clearly the ACAS system has been
assigned responsibility for preventing
collisions.
The ICAO definition of air traffic control uses the term “prevent collisions”.
This definition has caused some legal
difficulties as in one jurisdiction the exact ICAO wording was copied into local
legislation. The judge ruled that despite
the aircraft not following the controller’s
instructions (which in the judge’s opinion only explained how the aircraft got to
their position), the controller clearly did
not prevent the collision and so was the
majority to blame (60%) with the pilots
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who did not follow the instructions assigned 40% responsibility.
Although the ICAO definition of Air
Traffic Control has not yet been updated, consistency with the ICAO Concept
would define air traffic controllers as responsible for separation provision – and
that collision avoidance is another layer
below separation provision.
No system, human or technology,
can guarantee to “prevent collisions”
– though that of course is the goal and
perhaps will remain the politically correct way of discussing collisions. However in serious discussions it needs to
be recognised that collisions will occur.
In discussions on setting parameters for
TCAS it was acknowledged that TCAS
may even contribute to some collisions
– but that its value was that it would prevent many collisions.
The reliance on ACAS is of concern
because there seems to be no comprehensive record of ACAS performance – for
example the number of “false” alerts (as
a separation standard was in place), etc.
In addition, although ACAS carriage
is mandatory for some airspace, aircraft
can operate with ACAS unserviceable
awaiting repair.
A significant problem is the design of
Secondary Surveillance Radar transponders now in operation that either transmit
mode A and C – or nothing at all. The
problem is when the mode C is in the error – as the pilot cannot select just mode
A. If the transponder is on, then ACAS
may generate false resolution advisory
based on an incorrect mode C level. If
the transponder is completely off, then
ACAS will not even give a traffic advisory (as the aircraft without the transponder on is not detected).
Some Air Traffic Service Providers
use only SSR surveillance in some areas
and one has issued instructions that in
such cases of Mode C being in error and
either all on or off that the aircraft should
continue to operate with the incorrect
Mode C. No consideration seems to have
been given to false ACAS alerts.
It is proposed in some areas that flight
deck automation be responsible for following the ACAS resolution advisory. Careful
analysis of current ACAS performance is
required before taking such a step.
Note: RA would then definitely not be an
”advisory” but instead a “command”.
Security is also a concern. For example malicious activity could operate a
transponder with false mode C under a
holding pattern.
A consistent ATM design is required
for automated collision avoidance systems with appropriate monitoring of the
automation’s performance.
Appendix 9 – Flexibility and
Capacity
Flexibility is the ability to accommodate change, whether or not that change
is discretionary.
ATM Flexibility is related to capacity,
for as unused capacity reduces so does
flexibility. If there is no spare capacity,
then flexibility is limited to exchanging
one “slot or use” for another – and even
this may not be possible as the resulting disruption to the flow of traffic could
cause a further reduction in capacity.
ATM Capacity should be viewed as
resource management of a finite resource
– which is the airspace or the aerodrome.
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Capacity is related directly to how much
of that resource is “in use” by each operation. “In use” applies in four dimensions
for it is not only a three dimensional volume surrounding an aircraft but also time.
For example, for departing aircraft initially following the same departure track
when a slower aircraft departs first and
takes a greater time to clear the departure
path of the faster following aircraft, then
departure runway capacity is reduced.
Increased accuracy in navigation results in an increase in capacity, as the
uncertainty of the position of the aircraft
reduces. This has been used for lateral
and vertical segregation and separation.
The notable exception has been time,
which affects longitudinal segregation
and separation. Accuracy of time within
the ATM system is capable of synchronization to less than a second, for example
by using Global Position Satellite (GPS).
When required, for example high density
operations, time at a position should be
able to be reported to the second, and requirements to be time over a position met
within 15 seconds of the required time.
Separation standards are based on
navigational capability or surveillance
capability. It has proved difficult to establish a method for determining “safe separation” for even procedural separation
standards used by service providers. The
ICAO Concept requires the development
of separation modes and minima for all
separation provision (including separation provision by airspace users). The
difficulty in this task should not be underestimated, especially for a 10-fold increase in safety as a pre-requirement. When
smaller separation standards are developed, there will be an increase in the capacity – both by the number of aircraft that
can be accommodated and a reduction in
the interventions required for separation.
Capacity is often discussed as num-
36
ber of aircraft in a sector, and is to ensure a manageable workload for the
controller. A common misleading statement is that the controllers’ separation
workload increases with approximately
the square of the increase in the number
of aircraft, that is that 3 times the number
of aircraft is nine times the workload.
This statement is not necessarily true
as it assumes that “potential conflicts”
are conflicts (that is that all aircraft in
the sector affect all other aircraft in the
sector). The controllers’ workload relates to the number of interventions required. If there is an orderly flow of traffic and few interventions are required
then a large number of aircraft can be
accommodated. However for the same
sector, if there is not an orderly flow of
traffic (that is not strategically de-conflicted or segregated) and so the controller has to frequently intervene then
many less aircraft can be accommodated. The ICAO Concept states “Strategic conflict management measures aim
to reduce the need to apply the second
layer — separation provision — to an
appropriate level as determined by the
ATM system design and operation”. In
other words ATM design is to determine
and limit the number of tactical interventions required for separation – and
this is true whether it is being done by
a service provider or by airspace user
(self separation). Future ATM systems
should not discuss capacity in terms of
“controller workload”, or “sector capacity”, but instead discuss as one factor
of capacity the number of “separation
provision interventions required”.
Another issue of capacity is the mix
of aircraft speeds, especially the size of
the speed range. In other words, if there
are a number of aircraft at a similar level but operating at different speeds (so
there is closure between aircraft) then
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the number of interventions required
will increase. This applies not only to
cruise speed but also descent and climb
speeds. Especially during climb and
descent being managed by automation,
the difference can be quite significant.
Examples have been seen of closure of
more than 20 NM between two aircraft
of the same type and being operated
by the same company arriving via the
same route and given unrestricted descent from the same cruise level with
no ATC requirements for speed control
until 10,000 feet.
So even the same type and same airline company traffic has affected both
predictability and capacity, from the
controller’s perspective in the current
ATM system. There are several ways of
solving problems of different speed, especially in a 4-d environment. The need
for different speeds needs to be accommodated within current and future ATM
systems – but does have a consequence
on capacity and therefore flexibility.
High accuracy 4-d contracts can enable flexibility! The high accuracy is required to “use” as little of the ATM resource as possible (and therefore increase
capacity). It seems contradictory at first
to say that high accuracy increases flexibility, but understanding the relationship
between use of available capacity and
flexibility is part of the answer. The rest
of the answer to flexibility is:
1. When there is either a desire or need
to change the highly accurate trajectory,
that this is accomplished very quickly
and smoothly;
2. 4-d contracts should also include
tolerances which allow maximum use
(balanced with the needs of other airspace users) of the ATM resource without
trajectory re-negotiation.
Degree of flexibility available is determined by unused capacity. Capacity is de-
termined by how efficiently the ATM resource of airspace (or aerodrome) is used.
Appendix 10 – No Directed
Frequency Changes
A vision statement does not have to
be long or complicated to have a powerful effect. Consider for example a vision
of “no directed frequency changes”.
There is an existing requirement for the
pilot and the air traffic controller to be able
to communicate directly by voice. Consider areas where Very High Frequency
(VHF) radios are used. The pilot must be
instructed when to change frequency, must
read-back this frequency, must select the
correct frequency and report on the new
frequency. There are problems with obtaining correct read-back of frequencies
and of selecting the wrong frequency. All
of this work distracts both controller and
pilot from their primary roles. As air traffic
control sectors become busier and are split
into smaller sectors, this workload of being
on the correct frequency increases for both
the controllers and pilots. If there was no
requirement for directed frequency changes, think how much this would improve the
workload of pilots and controllers.
Frequency congestion has caused the
introduction of 8.33 kHz VHF spacing,
and caused much discussion about how
best to phrase frequency change instructions. However we still have no vision in
place for removing frequency changes.
Suitable technology is already deployed in other areas. For example, consider Controller Pilot Data Link Communication (CPDLC). The pilot is required
to initiate contact with ATC and logs on
the ATC centre’s CPDLC. All transfers
between ATC centres are done automatically. The pilot usually has a display
showing which ATC centre the CPDLC
is logged on to. In addition, when logged
onto an ATC centre’s CPDLC proces-
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sor, some ATC systems automatically
transfer the messages from the pilot to
the controller who is responsible for the
aircraft at that time.
Another example of suitable technology is the mobile phone. A mobile phone
user does not have to select a particular
frequency to use and can move between
mobile phone cells without losing contact. In addition, mobile phones do not
require a “report on frequency” to establish if the call is still connected – as the
mobile phone only reports if the connection was lost.
Such a system could be designed to
allow the selection of particular frequencies by the pilot when required (in addition to having an ATC selection that automatically keeps the pilot in direct voice
contact with the relevant controller).
When considering such options, it is
important to realize that the radio calls
achieve other tasks as well. For example
it verifies the assigned level and also
reminds the controller that an aircraft
has entered his area of responsibility
(or left it). The additional tasks must be
taken into account when re-designing
the system. For example, data-link may
be verifying the assigned level, and the
controllers interface of hand-off and accept would remind the controller of an
aircraft entering or leaving the controller’s sector. However such items as this
do not preclude a vision of no directed
frequency transfer.
Despite the issues of retro-fitting, “no
directed frequency transfers” should be
evaluated as an important improvement
to ATM efficiency.
Appendix 11 – On Time
Performance
Air traffic control is about creating
orderly and efficient flows of air traffic.
One of the most significant issues of
38
current ATM separation service provision
design is that the established flow of traffic immediately starts to deteriorate. The
rate of deterioration is variable, but often
significant. The deterioration is caused
by variables (such as wind not being as
predicted) and by actions of the airspace
user and of the service provider (as individuals take tactical actions without
awareness of overall system consequences). This occurs in all phases of flight.
Air traffic control is often viewed in
terms of aircraft “conflict pairs” and actions to make them miss. This view has
arisen because of a very tactical approach
to air traffic control. However the air traffic situation is not that chaotic, where any
combination of aircraft can conflict. The
aircraft has an airways clearance and cannot change its route and assigned level
except on request (or in an emergency).
Although the aircraft is cleared from departure to destination (in controlled airspace), a process of coordination between
adjacent ground positions progressively
authorizes the flight to transit a sector of
controlled airspace, but this coordination
is all internal to the service providers.
This “authorization” to transit a sector is
contained in written agreements (for example spacing/rate, levels, etc) or may be
individually coordinated. Clearly this is
not a random collection of aircraft pairs,
but establishing orderly flows.
Two aircraft can conflict in three
ways – same direction traffic (but different speeds), crossing traffic and opposite
direction traffic.
Consider the case of two aircraft travelling in the same direction at the same
level at approximately the same speed.
If the aircraft are near the minimum
separation standard and either the first
aircraft slows or the second aircraft accelerates then the controller will have to
act quickly to prevent a loss of separa-
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tion. Surprisingly in a significant number
of cases, aircraft can vary speed without
advising air traffic control.
Consider the case of aircraft crossing at
a point at the same level. Whether they will
pass with separation or not (if there was no
intervention) depends on the time they each
reach the crossing point. Even if the pilots
have nominated an estimated time for the
crossing point (for example a position report in procedural (non-radar) airspace),
they are not required to make good this
time – unless it is an ATC requirement.
The uncertainty of the aircraft’s position along its cleared route makes more
strategic control of aircraft difficult and
disrupts orderly flows of air traffic.
In a similar way, there is also uncertainty in the vertical profile, especially
with rapid changes in level.
The need for “on time performance”
is currently compromised in several
ways. For example, a controller clears an
aircraft direct - but then the gate is not
ready on arrival because the aircraft is
earlier than expected. In a similar situation, a pilot slows in cruise as the airline
company has advised the pilot that the
gate will not be ready – but the controller
only observes that the aircraft is slowing
and conflicting with other traffic.
One means of dealing with this uncertainty is a 4d trajectory contract. The
aircraft would be expected to make good
the trajectory and so be at nominated positions at the nominated times.
Slight variations in actual wind to
predicted wind would not be sufficient
to vary the contract as the aircraft would
vary its speed to make good the required
times. Despite the change in fuel burn,
an overall ATM efficiency is expected
– that should save fuel burn occurring at
unpredictable and inefficient times. The
service provider would not vary the trajectory based solely on a short-term gain
in one or two sectors. The whole ATM
system will collaboratively ensure that
needed resources and services are provided at the agreed times.
On time performance (4-d contract)
is critical for ensuring ATM capacity is
maximized.
Appendix 12 – Black Box
Interoperability
One approach to interoperability between aircraft and the ATM system is the
“ATM black box” approach.
The “ATM black box” would function in a similar way to a computer’s
operating system that interfaces between the specific hardware on the
computer and the software application.
Every aircraft would be equipped with
a black box. “ATM” would design the
application side of the black box and
maintain it for global standardization.
The aircraft manufacturers would be
responsible for making connections
(interfaces with their specific hardware
and software) on the “hardware” side of
the interface.
The challenge to ATM is to define
the functionality that is required (a long
overdue activity).
It does not mean that all aircraft would
be capable of all functions. If an aircraft
was not capable of an ATM requested
function then it would give a suitable
“NULL” response, etc. This way a common interface would exist between the
aircraft and any other ATM systems.
Even if the solution of a black box for
ATM is not the chosen solution, it is still
useful to consider a “virtual” (or software based) equivalent.
Appendix 13 – Performance Based
ATM
Much work is currently underway in
determining how best to have a perfor-
39
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mance-based ATM system, both at ICAO
(see Appendix 1 – ICAO Concept) and in
the states. This section will not summarize or repeat the current work but rather
highlight a few points, to start with what
ATM performance is not about.
A common mis-quote of the ICAO
Concept is that the future ATM system
will be performance driven (instead of
correctly quoting that it will be performance based).
The ICAO Concept talks of being
driven only three times:
1. When discussing the current situation: “driven by safety and increasingly
by commercial or personal outcome expectations”.
2. When discussing the future situation: “driven by the need to meet the expectations of the ATM community”.
3. When discussing scaling concept
components: “driven by minimum safety
levels”.
This is not an issue of semantics – for
it is not the performance measure (the
number) that is the real goal, but rather to
address the reason behind why this measure was set. So the real goal of ATM is
not to achieve a number (performance
measure) but to meet expectations (by
using performance measures).
Note: Another mis-quote of the ICAO
Concept is to refer to the “Airspace User
Expectations” instead of “ATM Community
Expectations” – this is partly due to the large
number of Airspace User related expectations in the list, however it remains the expectations of the whole ATM Community
that is the driver and goal.
A significant concern is that “ATM
Performance” cannot be allowed to become “Performance Pay” (or other remuneration or working conditions) – especially for any operational staff. This is because it appears that the human response
40
in decision making is compromised in
achieving a particular “numbered” result
instead of achieving the best outcome
overall – that is personal performance/
outcome wins out over system performance/outcome. This is not considered
desirable in operational areas of ATM.
Another significant concern is the
lack of data at operational levels, for
there is much discussion about overall
ATM performance and yet little practical
measurement of what the ATM system
actually does.
The easiest to acquire would be expected to be automation performance.
However, for example, serious discussions are occurring about Aircraft Collision Avoidance Systems (ACAS) without complete data on the ACAS performance. Fundamental questions about
the number of RA generated etc are left
in many cases to human reporting systems, and many events are not collected.
In other cases of automated reporting, it
seems too easy to dismiss the report as
“not relevant” and then that statistic is
no longer available in any form (whereas a robust reporting system should be
able to report all occurrences and provide different ways of viewing the significance of events). There are concerns
that such “classification” of events is at
times used to produce a particular performance outcome (no more than x level 1s, no more than x level 2s, etc.), that
is a reasonable data distribution rather
than the data as it is.
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Lack of data does not only relate to
“abnormal” or “error” situations – but
also for “normal” performance.
There is a lack of comparative data
(how was today compared to yesterday, last week, last month, last year) –
whether at senior or operational manager
level and therefore almost no corrective
behavior (to mitigate negative and reinforce positive). There is a lack of balanced data – for example if there is so
many minutes of delay in a sector (an
inappropriate measure itself), where are
the corresponding measures of minutes
of oversupply of traffic to sector, number
of aircraft over capacity, etc. – and what
do they all mean anyhow?
Can a manager at any level be asked
“how is (your part of) ATM going today
…” and have a meaningful (comprehensive and balanced) answer?
An interesting measure of performance used on aircraft carriers is the
rating of each landing by an observer.
It would be an interesting experience
to have feed back from each flight as to
how effectively the services offered met
the airspace user’s expectations.
This section is not against ATM performance measures – instead it is stressing how important performance measures are to understand where ATM is
and how far to where ATM should be.
But do not expect 1, 10, 100 or even
1000 “numbers” to enable an understanding of ATM or even just to fix ATM. And
be careful that the performance measures
chosen and the way that they are used
actually progresses towards meeting the
community’s expectations of ATM.
Measuring ATM performance at this
time seems to be both a science and an
art – for getting the right measures and
interpreting them correctly is difficult.
Appendix 14 – ATM Capability
Level Examples
The ATM system must support aircraft of different types and capabilities,
so a means of indicating capability is required.
In addition, the whole ATM system
must be capable (service provider and
airspace user) – and so the whole ATM
system must be able to indicate its capabilities as it evolves.
These examples are based on work
initially done for aircraft capabilities in
SESAR, but expanded into an example
of ATM capabilities. They are indicative of the approach that aims to describe
required functionalities rather than required technologies and defines the progressive evolution of ATM.
ATM-1 systems will have:
 To support collaborative decision
making, basic information sharing:
- High-accuracy, high frequency automated sharing of aircraft position information. For example: for aircraft ADS-B
out, for service-providers capability for
automated shared aircraft position data to
airspace users and other service providers.
- Basic automated event reporting
for example: for aircraft ADS-C consistent with To Be Defined (TBD) standards, for airline reporting changes in intended trajectory (“flight plan”) status or
details, for service providers changes in
status of ATM resources (airspace, weather, capacity, etc.).
- Basic airspace-user/service-provider data-link. For example CPDLC consistent with TBD standards.
 To support management by trajectory (including queue management and
separation):
- Controlled Time Over (CTO) function – single constraint (both airborne
and ground systems)
- Vertical and longitudinal constraint
41
IFATCA
management to prescribed accuracies.
- 2D-RNP (appropriate to the operation).
ATM-2 systems will have ATM-1 capabilities plus:
 To support collaborative decision
making:
- Trajectory sharing air/ground and
ground/ground via functions designed
for ATM.
- Increased airspace - user / service - provider data-link capabilities (for
example: to support ADS-B in, CPDLC
consistent with TBD standards, airline/
service-provider data-links).
 To support management by trajectory (including queue management and
separation):
- CTO functions – multiple constraints.
- Functions related to Spacing/Sequencing and Merging
- Vertical navigational performance
requirements to prescribed accuracy
- Vertical constraint management to
prescribed accuracy
- Longitudinal constraint management to prescribed accuracy.
ATM-3 systems will have the ATM-2
capabilities plus:
 To support collaborative decision
making:
- Meteorological data sharing.
- Trajectory sharing: air/air
 To support separation management:
- Longitudinal navigational performance requirements (appropriate to the
operation).
- Cooperative Separation functions
- Self-Separation functions
Appendix 15 – Putting Ideas into
Practice
This appendix gives some examples
translating the concept terms into practi-
42
cal application.
Example 1 - High Density Radar
Environment with Capacity Problems
Consider an environment where there
is guaranteed radar coverage from multiple sensors, there are military requirements for airspace blocks and there are
several states and service providers who
wish together to implement some of the
ICAO Concept. The major issue identified is one of capacity (and so flexibility). Delays in access to airspace and in
transit are considered by the airspace
users as excessive.
In this statement it has already been explained that capacity is tied to the amount
of ATM resource used, the number of
interventions required for separation provision, etc and of the ICAO Concept’s
move towards strategic separation.
Instead of insisting on higher precision navigation from aircraft that are
already highly capable, the service providers determine that the best way to use
less ATM resource per flight is to review
the radar separation standards used. This
is not only to implement a common radar standard amongst all the service providers, but also to use radar combined
with the precision of aircraft navigation
to create new radar surveillance route
separation standards. (This is not “radar
monitoring by controllers who intervene
when it is not working – as this is tactical
– but instead a strategic separation that
proves the routes are separated under set
conditions – which may or may not have
automatic route compliance function.)
Even without new standards, it is expected that a 3 NM radar standard could
be applied – but the service providers are
investigating if it can be reduced even
further to establish strategic separation
as soon as possible after departure.
Another major issue is the lack of direct routes due to airspace blocks used
IFATCA
by the military. As an interim stage to
a more comprehensive management by
trajectory, the military agree that for any
airspace block that significantly affects
civil traffic, then an appropriate corridor
structure would be established to permit
civilian transits even when the areas are
active. This involves collaborative decision making by the military, airspace
users and service providers. The states
have advised service providers and the
military that the costs of civil diversions
around military areas must be monitored
and discretionary military activities
modified so that they do not unreasonably affect civil traffic.
The following steps detail the action
plan for implementing the strategic separation and reducing the amount of ATM
resource used by each flight, while improving safety.
1. As the target ATM environment
is high-reliability radar surveillance, determine separation standards to be used
in such an environment. Develop new
separation standards, this includes radar
lateral (or route separation), departure
standards, crossing standards and combined-displacements standards. Keep standards separate at this stage (for example,
do not mix radar with wake vortex standards). The same separation standards
are to apply to all ATC facilities.
2. Determine radar surveillance
need (including redundancy and Mode
S), establish system-wide access to shared radar data (initially for service providers, then airlines, etc). For efficiency,
identify all radars surplus to requirements
and decommission. Add as soon as possible ADS-B surveillance (for extra information when available, including intent).
3. The future is management by
trajectory, so review all “blocks” of airspace, especially military and high level
prohibited and restricted areas, for ap-
propriateness of dimensions and to create transit corridors. (This review to be
repeated regularly to ensure appropriateness of airspace allocations.)
4. Create “direct routes” for operations above Flight Level (FL) 110 (or
11,000 feet above ground level), building
in the radar route separation standards
(from step 1) and making use of transit
corridors (from step 3). Do not consider
facility and sector boundaries when creating routes. Determine the strategic (preferred) and tactical separation methods
to be used as part of route creation, including the handling of crossing routes.
The routes must not be created ignoring
the fact that restricted-access airspace
volumes exist. If there is frequent use
of a restricted airspace (for example, a
military restricted area), the route must
avoid it (for example by using a transit
corridor). For all other (infrequent) defined restricted airspace volumes, define
routes around the airspace for when the
airspace is active (defined diversions)
that can be used for strategic separation.
5. For high density routes, define parallel routes that permit strategic
separation of opposite direction traffic
or same direction traffic with different
speeds. Consider route speed limits (minimum and maximum).
6. Define vertical requirements
for routes (for strategic separation with
other routes, especially during climb and
descent).
7. For safety, create off-level “standards” for routes (small vertical displacement).
8. Design standard departures and
arrival routes for operations below FL110,
considering environmental requirements
and separation (especially strategic) requirements. Consider defined speed requirements for last stages of arrival routes
(for each segment, perhaps even in ground
43
IFATCA
speed not indicated airspeed).
9. Review facility boundaries to
suit routes promulgated. Ensure adjacent
facilities can exchange airspace at least
at boundaries (to handle weather diversions, etc).
10. Review sectors within facilities
minimizing vertical boundaries. This
does not create the ATM system of the
future – but it does address a few of the
problems currently experienced and will
prepare the ATM system for the bigger
changes required to implement other aspects of the ICAO Concept. Note that
this is not a technological solution – in
the sense that the solution is simply using
what is already available today.
This example demonstrates the very
big test of the commitment of the ATM
community to achieve the changes needed. It does not affect states sovereign
airspace or rights – and their laws and
regulations still apply. The major change
is for the service provider whose area of
responsibility may no longer be precisely
aligned with state boundaries - but this is
just requiring service providers to act like
an international business (like the airlines). It is still up to the states to decide
whether the regulator can accept the action of the “regulator of location of business” of the service provider as sufficient
or whether separate action is required.
The military will not necessarily have
less airspace, as trade-offs are done – but
the selection of airspace for
discretionary military activities will
have additional requirements (in addition
to the requirements for transit corridors).
The airspace users should find a significant increase in availability, capacity and
flexibility.
Although this has not implemented
4-d trajectories, many direct routes are
available including through previously
blocked airspace. Some restrictions are
44
placed on trajectories to ensure capacity
but this is an acceptable trade-off to the
problems of delays and lack of capacity.
It creates an environment in which commitments can be made to further improve
the ATM system.
Example 2 - Global Upper Airspace
Whereas the previous example was
states working together, this example
provides a global approach to solving
some of the problems. Global ATM has
many inconsistencies and problems. One
approach to making a change on a global
scale is a commitment to establishing a
global upper airspace with agreed standards for ATM and a commitment of
service providers to work together to
achieve the best results.
Pick a level, for example FL200. All
operations above the level would be considered as part of global traffic (even if
only on a domestic flight).
One early standard for this upper airspace may be that any data-link capable
aircraft will always be in data-link communication with a service provider. Note
this does not mean that there will always
be the expense of data exchanges, but the
capability of data-link communication
will be available, even if only for emergency communication. It also does not
mean only one service provider for this
airspace. It does mean that agreements
will be put in place that an aircraft can
send a data-link message to the controller
responsible for the flight. For example, it
seems unreasonable that the passengers
can be talking on satellite phones while
the pilot has been trying for the last 20
minutes to request a level change via
HF – or even just to give a routine position report. In the days when HF was
more common, it was very common for
service providers to relay messages that
they overheard. Service providers should
be able to relay to other service providers
IFATCA
messages received via data-link (or other
forms of communication).
Another issue for upper airspace may
be a traffic information service, or assistance with strategic de-confliction of
known traffic prior to entry to a particular airspace, especially in Traffic Information Broadcast by Aircraft (TIBA)
airspace. Once again this is not to deny
the rights of the state, but a cooperative
approach to sharing information between
as many of the affected members of the
ATM community as possible. This is a
serious problem when ground infrastructure is not meeting a minimum standard
and it is inappropriate to leave it to the
airspace users to sort out as best that they
can when assistance can be provided.
Once the high priority safety items have
been addressed, interoperability standards
for global upper airspace would be developed. Of course upper airspace does not
exist by itself and is affected by the choices
made for ground systems for airspace below FL200. However in a cooperative data
sharing environment, cost effective solutions should be able to be implemented.
For example, with appropriate preparation it may be possible to define and
implement 4-d trajectories in the upper
airspace long before it would be practical to implement 4-d trajectories for
lower airspace.
Global electronic surveillance of operations above FL200 is also a possibility.
The intent here is not to prescribe a
particular solution in upper airspace, but
to indicate that such a division might
have practical and beneficial outcomes.
Appendix 16 – “It will never
happen …..”
At one time it was hard to believe that
an airline flight crew would not contain a
flight engineer –however automation has
taken over that task.
At one time it was hard to believe
that the government would not support
a national airline carrier that was failing
– but this has happened.
At one time it has hard to believe that
a passenger aircraft would be without
physical flight controls, but now fly-bywire has been successfully implemented.
There are many more examples.
Just because promised changes have
not yet occurred does not mean they will
never occur.
“People who say it can’t be done
should get right out of the way of
those who are already doing it!” Iris
Caskey 
45
IFATCA
Novità dalla 47^ Conferenza è la richiesta sottoposta ed approvata dai Direttori,
lavori del comitato A, iniziati nel di suddividere il Manuale in due volumi:
pomeriggio del 10 marzo, sono uno contenente le policies amministratistati condotti sotto la supervisio- ve ed un secondo contenente le policies
ne dell’ex EVP Africa, Albert Taylor e tecniche e professionali.
Il vice Presidente, riporta le tappe
71 le nazioni rappresentate direttamente
raggiunte sia dal magazine della Federao a mezzo “proxies”.
Alla Federazione si aggiungono, que- zione, assurto agli onori della cronaca
st’anno, le Associazioni di Madagascar, per la completezza e professionalità dei
Marocco (nuova associazione) e Brasile contenuti, sia del website, costantemente
(FEBRACTA-nuova associazione), per aggiornato ed in grado di offrire il proprio contributo al perseguimento degli
un totale di 132 Member Associations.
Marc Baumgartner apre la serie del- obiettivi della Federazione.
Il report dell’EVP AFRICA / MIDle relazioni dell’EB, riportando il consolidamento della Federazione avviato DLE EAST, Henry Nkondokaya, si è
negli ultimi anni ed accennando agli im- invece concentrato sulle difficoltà che
pegni che richiedono la massima atten- sta vivendo l’area di interesse, non
zione. L’assenza della figura dell’EVP- senza però tralasciare le prospettive di
Technical è stata colmata dallo stesso sviluppo avviate: nel settembre 2008
Presidente che si è assunto l’ulteriore verrà implementata la RVSM, mentre
onere. Quella della limitatezza di risorse le procedure GNSS sono diffusamente
(sia umane che economiche) disponibili implementate nella regione. Il progetto
è un fattore importante: la Federazione di implementazione di nuovi sistemi di
ha, per tali motivi, dovuto declinare mol- comunicazione satellitare tra i paesi delti degli inviti a partecipare a meeting e l’Africa orientale e settentrionale sono
conferenze in un momento importante di in avanzato stadio di sviluppo. Sono otsviluppo di nuovi scenari internazionali. time le relazioni con le organizzazioni
A tali difficoltà si aggiungono quelle re- internazionali (ICAO, IATA, IFALPA
lative alle maggiori spese da affrontare e CANSO). Nel complimentarsi per il
per i viaggi a seguito del venir meno, nel ritorno del Marocco tra le associazioni,
tempo, delle disponibilità delle compa- l’EVP AFM, ha riportato anche l’integnie aeree. Marc ha ricordato gli incontri ressamento di altri paesi (Burundi, Libae gli impegni in atto con IFALPA e IATA no, Leshoto) ad unirsi all’IFATCA.
Il report dell’EVP AMERICAS, Ceper il perseguimento di comuni obiettivi,
evidenziando il consolidato “status” del- dric Murrell, non ha potuto non menzionare gli enormi sforzi profusi dalla Fela Federazione in seno all’ICAO.
A quello del Presidente è seguito l’in- derazione per tentare di risolvere il caso
tervento del Deputy President, Alexis “Brasile” a seguito dell’incidente che ha
Braithwaite, impegnato nel CAC-Con- coinvolto, il 17 luglio scorso, un Airbus
stitution and Administrative Committee. 320 della compagnia TAM durante un
CTA Vittorio Della Bitta - Padova ACC
I
46
IFATCA
atterraggio sull’aeroporto di Sao Paolo
con condizioni meteo avverse. L’EVP
ricorda il forte comunicato stampa di
condanna nei riguardi del governo brasiliano, responsabile dell’invio in prigione
dei leaders dell’associazione dei controllori e del ricorso a personale militare
non qualificato nella fornitura dei servizi ATC. Comunicato che ha garantito la
scarcerazione del personale coinvolto.
Continuano peraltro le vicissitudini
legate al processo in corso per il precedente mid-air collision del 2006, che
vide coinvolti un B737-800 con un Embraer Legacy 600.
Items come la “safety” e “staffing”
rimangono prioritari nell’intera regione.
Continuano infatti le difficoltà degli Stati
Uniti, alle prese con un’ondata di pensionamenti senza precedenti: 850 nell’ultimo periodo, cui si affiancano circa 800
promozioni ad incarichi di diversa natura. Nello stesso periodo sono stati avviati alla selezione 1150 nuovi aspiranti. Al
momento solo 4 di questi hanno completato con successo l’iter formativo, mentre altissime sono le percentuali dei dimissionari prima del completamento del
programma addestrativo. L’EVP AMA,
ha riportato anche l’interessamento della
Colombia ad unirsi all’IFATCA.
Alexis Braithwaite effettua il riporto
per John Wagstaff, EVP Asia/Pacific,
impossibilitato a presenziare i lavori. I
problemi di “staffing” affliggono l’intera area ed un ulteriore peggioramento è
atteso verificarsi a seguito del raggiungimento dei limiti di età da parte di aliquote
significative di personale di esperienza.
Secondo problema, in ordine d’importanza, è quello legato al conseguimento
del livello 4 di inglese. L’ICAO Language Proficiency requirements saranno
raggiunti da aliquote ridotte di personale
operativo per le scadenze stabilite.
Le percentuali di incremento dei vo-
lumi di traffico nella regione spaziano
da un +5 ad un +30% (in confronto alle
medie di altre aree, valutate in un 3-4%).
L’introduzione delle procedure RVSM
ha in parte calmierato questi notevoli indici di crescita, mentre i fattori limite del
sistema ATM rimangono oggi la congestione delle aree terminali e le limitazioni di pista. Nell’area è stato per la prima
volta attivato un sistema di controllo dei
flussi per far fronte alle necessità durante
i periodi di maggior picco.
Patrik Peters, EVP Europe, riporta
I temi affrontati durante il suo mandato:
“staffing”, “salaries”, “retirement age”,
“motivating new ATCOs” e “perception
of the ATC profession”.
Buone sono le relazioni con Eurocontrol e con gli organismi di rappresentanza sociale europei (ETF, IFATSEA,
ATC-EUC). Non manca l’elogio delle
iniziative congiuntamente affrontate da
IFATCA ed Eurocontrol, l’ultima delle
quali, il “joint yearbook”.
L’Olanda chiede se IFATCA abbia una
propria strategia relativamente all’innalzamento dei limiti d’età pensionistica dai
60 ai 65 anni. L’EVP risponde che dipenderà dalla portata del problema su ampia
scala. L’Olanda afferma che l’IFATCA
non sarà probabilmente in grado di fornire il proprio contributo alla MA, in
considerazione dell’imminenza della discussione in Parlamento, motivata dalla
esiguità di disponibilità di personale.
Patrick riporta sul tema affrontato durante il recente meeting europeo con il
workshop intitolato “quo vadis”. Il riferimento agli impegni regionali evidenzia
la difficoltà dei paesi europei ad ospitare
i Regional Meetings, divenuti nel tempo
una “vetrina” sul paese onerosa da sostenere in termini economici. Di qui la proposta di tagliare i programmi sociali, che
hanno portato i costi organizzativi all’eccesso. A seguito di tale pronunciamen-
47
IFATCA
to, il Portogallo, con Lisbona, si candida
ad ospitare il prossimo meeting europeo
del 2008. Per quanto riguarda i prossimi
RM, si candidano Koss per il 2009 e la
Slovenia per il 2010.
All’intervento dell’EVP Europe, seguono i report del Conference Executive, Jack van Delft, dell’EVP Finance,
Dale Wright, sullo stato finanziario della
Federazione. L’ordine di grandezze in
discussione è rappresentato dai seguenti
valori contenuti nell’auditor report:
•
total incomes391,893.05 USD;
•
total expenses 323,947.46 USD.
Viene sollevato il problema finanziario più immediato: la valutazione del dollaro e se è stato predisposto un breaking
point per la Federazione: al vaglio.
L’EB destina 40,000 USD al nuovo
Controller Magazine Reserve Fund, da
aggiungere alla disponibilità del General
Reserve Fund.
Tord Gustavsson, Chairman del FICFinance Committee, solleva la questione delle affiliation fees.
Le spese di viaggio continuano a crescere: sono infatti venute meno nel tempo
le agevolazioni concesse dalle compagnie
aeree. Tali costi aggiuntivi stanno, di fatto
limitando ulteriormente le disponibilità
economiche in grado di garantire il regolare svolgimento delle attività della Federazione. Le MAs sono chiamate a decidere se accettare la riduzione di una parte
delle attività o aumentare le subscription
fees. Segue una lunga discussione sull’argomento con una serie di proposte.
La Svizzera propone di alzare del 1520% le fees delle associazioni di CAT 1
per coprire i maggiori costi che la Federazione sta affrontando per far fronte alle
sempre maggiori esigenze e la sempre
più ricorrente necessità di coprire anche
le spese dei viaggi (EB, Chairmen, …).
Si chiede il ricorso a piani alternativi
a seguito del decremento del valore del
48
USD, suggerendo anche il ricorso ad altre valute: l’euro o il dollaro canadese.
Le fluttuazioni delle valutazioni sono per
altro continue e poco stabili. Si apre un dibattito sulla proposta Svizzera, supportata
dalla Svezia: se si ambisce ad avere una
Federazione forte ed in grado di incidere
sulla scena internazionale, si rende necessaria una rivisitazione delle disponibilità.
Un successivo intervento propone di
affrontare la situazione di emergenza con
un contributo una tantum su base volontaria o per un periodo di tempo limitato (entro un orizzonte di 1-2 anni). La
Svizzera, insieme a Germania, Australia,
Svezia ed USA, vengono invitati ad incontrarsi per stabilire una linea da proporre. Sui suggerimenti proposti prevale
la linea di non proporre aumenti delle
quote di adesione se non su base volontaria (invito rivolto alle CAT 1 MAs).
Sullo stesso tema, Marc supporta
con forza l’invito rivolto a tutte le MAs
a dichiarare il corretto numero di soci,
garanzia questa di un adeguato livello
di entrate in grado di permettere alla Federazione di affrontare gli impegni futuri. L’intervento di Marc è rivolto all’urgenza di trasformare la Federazione da
un “volountary club” che fa un ottimo
lavoro ad una realtà in grado di far fronte
in modo compiuto ai crescenti bisogni.
Questo proposito non si concilia purtroppo con la limitata disponibilità di risorse
economiche. La proposta di un aumento
delle “fees” da sottoporre al vaglio dei
Direttori durante i lavori della Conferenza del 2009 potrebbe essere una soluzione. Quel che si vorrebbe, invece, è che
tutte le MAs dichiarassero onestamente
il reale numero dei propri iscritti: “I’d
like this committment transposed into
a honest approach”. (IT 900). Marc richiama il paragrafi 3.1.4, 3.1.6. e 3.1.7
dello Statuto. Se un’associazione ha un
problema, lo Statuto offre gli strumenti
IFATCA
e le misure appropriate al riguardo. Non
è pertanto tollerabile il ricorso ad espedienti di sorta.
Per queste ragioni si è ritenuto importante creare differenti categorie.
Marc espone a tutti una tabella con il
numero degli iscritti: la lista gialla individua le anomalie (l’Argentina, dichiara,
ad esempio, 20 iscritti in un paese che
è un continente e annovera migliaia di
ATCOs): questo è il problema!
La presentazione sul contributo
offerto dalle singole associazioni al
riguardo è stata molto più efficace di
qualsiasi altro riporto!
Sempre il FIC presenta le quote
di sottoscrizione annuali per gli anni
2008/2009 (in dollari):
SCALE
(individual
members)
SUBS per
members
USD
first 300
17.02
next 300
15.61
next 400
14.25
above 1.000
13.42
2
All
10.03
3
All
6.61
CATEGORY
1
Resta invariato il tetto massimo di
27,307.74 USD di quote associative annuali per associazione.
Il Canada, la Nuova Zelanda e UK,
sono i paesi eletti per il FIC, per il mandato 2008/09.
Il WORK PROGRAMME del FIC-Finance Committee per gli anni 2008/2009,
è il seguente:
1. Determination of Amounts and
MA Categories;
2. Enter the Controller Reserve
Fund into The Manual;
3. Work with the EB to monitor the
currency fluctuation of the U.S. Dollar
and address if necessary;
4. Review the rights of suspended
members (with CAC).
Philippe Domogala, Editor del magazine, presenta lo stato delle sottoscrizioni alla rivista. Il titolo è esplicativo:
“I want it all, and I want it for free“. Tutti
gradiscono copie gratuite del magazine.
Gratuita è probabilmente la copia della
rivista nazionale perché già pagata dalla
quota associativa nazionale pagata. Non
è la stessa cosa per The Controller.
Solo 53 MAs su 132 hanno inviato
sottoscrizioni per la rivista e meno della
metà per una sola copia . La sottoscrizione annua è stata ridotta nel tempo a 30
USD per incentivarne la distribuzione.
Vengono stampate 3500 copie e si
registrano sottoscrizioni per 3000 (ogni
MA riceve comunque una copia gratuita). Il numero delle subscriptions non
gratifica purtroppo lo sforzo compiuto
per una produzione dai contenuti qualitativamente rilevanti.
The very, very good (10): più di 100
copie
The good one (21): più di 10 copie
The bad ???
The ugly (83): nessuna copia ordinata.
L’Egitto sottopone una WP sull’opportunità di predisporre una versione
elettronica del documento.
L’EB, attraverso Philippe Domogala,
esprime apprezzamento per l’iniziativa,
già più volte percorsa in seno all’EB,
RM ecc. L’idea è ben accolta, ma le
difficoltà tuttora esistenti nella maggior
parte dei continenti (Africa, Asia e America latina) a disporre di collegamenti
internet ad alta velocità, rendono, tale
ipotesi non percorribile al momento. La
veste grafica di un qualsiasi magazine è
pesante da scaricare e necessita quindi di
un’alta velocità di acquisizione dei dati.
È inoltre un problema di incomes: si pen-
49
IFATCA
si al venire meno delle 500 sottoscrizioni
americane, senza, per altro, ridurre di una
virgola il workload di chi lavora per la rivista, che, per assurdo, aumenterebbe. È
poi una questione di prestigio nel mondo
per il modo in cui IFATCA, attraverso la
rivista, si affaccia e si presenta all’intero
contesto aeronautico.
Il Controller Steering Committee ha
al vaglio differenti “business models”
per la rivista e sta ulteriormente esaminando differenti opzioni per risolvere i
problemi delle sottoscrizioni, ivi compresa la possibilità di predisporre una
versione elettronica.
John Redmond, presenta la WP
relativa ad una nuova disciplina delle
Proxies e delle votazioni a mezzo proxies. Le associazioni ricevono normalmente le “proxy forms” ad inizio anno.
In normali circostanze, qualora impossibilitata a presenziare ai lavori della
Conferenza, una MA può inviare alla
Segreteria la “proxy designation” fino ad
un giorno prima dell’inizio della stessa.
Si sono però verificati casi di impossibilità da parte di talune MA di raggiungere
in tempo utile le località in cui si svolge
l’evento, così come può rivelarsi necessario ricorrere alle poxies anche durante
i lavori della Conferenza. In necessità
di disporre del quorum per garantire il
regolare svolgimento delle attività dei
Comitati, si è provveduto a stabilire un
tetto del 25% di proxies per le “Plenary
sessions” e del 50% per le “Committee
sessions”.
Allo scopo di premiare coloro che
si sono distinti nelle attività IFATCA,
la Federazione ha inteso “recuperare”
l’Award of Merit (riconoscimento utilizzato in misura minima rispetto allo
Scroll of Honour).
Cristoph Gilgen conferma, con
l’”esperienza” brasiliana, la professionalità già dimostrata durante la crisi
50
conseguente all’incidente di Uberlingen. Questi, insieme ai portoghesi Isabel Cambraia (CISM specialist di NAV
Portugal) e Virgilio Belo (controllore di
Lisbona Approach e part-time incident
investigator di NAV Portugal), ricevono il riconoscimento per il supporto
garantito con la preziosa attività CISM
e con la gestione della situazione della
crisi venutasi a creare a seguito dell’incidente avvenuto il 29 settembre 2006
in Brasile.
Sono poi state discusse le nuove
ToRs del TPS-Technical and Professional Secretary e dell’EB Secretary.
Viene messa in discussione la WP dal
titolo: “Possible Establishment of a Minimum Percentage of Representation
in a Region, to Establish or Maintain
Affiliation”, presentata dal CAC-Constitution & Administration Committee.
Di seguito si riporta il testo della decisione approvata:
“There is currently no threshold for
minimum representation of controllers
within a specific area, for affiliation with
IFATCA. Should such a threshold be established, it would be reasonable that the
threshold be “majority” representation.
Should this be the case, IFATCA would
lose something in the order of 20 Member Associations” (giacchè non rappresentano la maggioranza dei controllori
nell’area).
Di rilievo politico è poi stata la presentazione della WP presentata dal
CAC relativa all’importante tema: “Examine the necessity of minimum service
requirements for election to Executive
Board and Standing Committee chair
persons”.
La Nuova Zelanda, la Svizzera ed il
Sud Africa sono i paesi eletti per il CAC,
per il mandato 2008/09.
Il WORK PROGRAMME del
CAC COMMITTEE per il biennio
IFATCA
2008/2009 è il seguente:
1. Review the rights of Member Associations who have individual
members located in more than one IFATCA region.
2. Review the rights of suspended
members (with FIC).
3. In consultation with all interested parties, review the structure and terms of reference of Standing Committees,
giving special consideration to regional
representation.
CROATCA , l’Associazione croata,
conferma la candidature ad ospitare l’Annual Conference del 2009 a Dubrovnik.
ADCA, l’Associazione domenicana, candida la Repubblica Domenicana
(Punta Cana) ad ospitare la conferenza
IFATCA del 2010.
Si rinnova il problema della disponibilità offerta dall’opzione “all-inclusive”,
probabilmente affascinante, ma lontana
dalle possibilità dei paesi di cat 3.
Senza poi tener presente gli impegni
di Conferenza che poco si conciliano con
la possibilità di disponibilità illimitata di
pasti, vivande, sport, più vicini ad una
necessità di tipo turistico.
L’Olanda, con Amsterdam offre la
disponibilità per il 2011 insieme agli
Emirati Arabi, con Dubai.
Sulla seconda candidatura sorgono
dubbi sulla possibilità per tutti i Paesi di
poter liberamente accedere al paese (il
caso Israele è evidente).
Il Direttore della delegazione degli
Emirati, afferma di aver già intrapreso
tutti i passi per offrire uno permesso speciale a quei paesi normalmente soggetti
a restrizioni.
Vengono poi discusse tre WPs:
•
Late WP 006 “2006/2007 income and expenditure Account” (EB presentation);
•
Late WP 007 “Disposition of
funds (on reserve funds)” (EB pre-
sentation);
•
WP 38 “Budget for Fiscal Year
2008/2009” (EB presentation).
In Closed session viene poi affrontato il tema relative alla sospensione di
alcune MAs:
COUNTRY
AMOUNT
(in USD)
ANGOLA
549.10
BAHAMAS
498.90
BOTSWANA
246.68
CHAD
284.45
CONGO
852.14
COSTA D’AVORIO
161.21
ECUADOR
98.00
EL SALVADOR
149.29
FILIPPINE
542.08
GAMBIA
88.17
GHANA
303.95
GIBUTI
126.68
GUATEMALA
1,041.93
HONG KONG
2,993.40
INDONESIA
IRAN
MAURITIUS
733.54
1,622.00
98.00
NAMIBIA
412.20
NIGER
532.28
PANAMA
411.60
PERU’
68.78
ROBATCA
77.52
ROMANIA
6,183.80
SIERRA LEONE
64.60
TUNISIA
314.00
YEMEN
203.68
ZIMBABWE
139.20
51
IFATCA
i tentativi con il supporto di tutte le organizzazioni internazionali: IATA-ILOIFALPA-ETF hanno fornito il proprio
diretto contributo. Sono stati redatti articoli, interviste, press releases. Senza
alcun risultato. Il rappresentante brasiliano, presente ai lavori del comitato A,
riporta di avere iniziato a coinvolgere,
APPLICATION FOR MEMBER- non senza difficoltà, organismi e personaggi di rilievo del mondo politico
SHIP: BRAZIL
Marc aggiorna la situazione dei colle- nazionale. ETF testimonia le difficoltà
ghi militari brasiliani. La privatizzazione è di penetrazione all’interno di un paese
avvenuta solo in parte su alcune realtà ae- quale il Brasile. Parla di “Step by step
roportuali generando associati in 6 diffe- approach”, pur nell’evenienza di circorenti associazioni. IFATCA ha chiesto loro stanze favorevolissime che hanno visto
di creare una Federazione di associazioni. tutte le Organizzazioni collaborare per il
Ciò è avvenuto. FEBRATCA sostituirà le conseguimento dei medesimi obiettivi.
FEBRACTA diviene membro della
6 esistenti (1000 associati). 35.000 USD
sono stati pagati agli avvocati per i recenti Federazione internazionale.
Di seguito si riportano i candidati alle
fatti avvenuti. 93 sono i processi militari
in atto nel paese a seguito delle proteste cariche sociali, poi eletti:

Paul Neering (Netherland),
seguite e concretizzatesi in scioperi.
Si nutrono speranze che il Ministro del- LOEU ;

Philippe Domogala, Editore del
la Difesa ed il Congresso avviino il processo di smilitarizzazione già in corso in altre Controller Magazine;

Joy
Bhattacharya
(india),
nazioni della medesima area, anche se le
pressioni interne (militari per lo più) con- TPSEC;

John Redmond (Canada), CAC
trastano, con forza, tale prospettiva.
La maggior parte dei colleghi forni- (Constitution and Administration Comscono il servizio in accordo agli standard mittee);

Laura Cassani, Liaison Officer
ICAO, anche se il governo e le Autorità
hanno spesso “sorvolato” sul livello di all’ILO-International Organizations a
conoscenze (professionali e di lingua) Ginevra;
Quanto all’elezione dell’Executive
del personale. Cristoph Gilgen, aggiunge
che sono comunemente applicate SMOP Board nella Plenary Session:

President and CEO, Marc Baucon assistente in posizione, l’inglese è
al di sotto degli standard più elementari. mgartner;

EVP TEC vacante;
Così gli standard addestrativi. Duran
EVP America, Alex Figuereo
te l’incidente, personale coinvolto era
specializzato per il traffico OAT e senza (Dominican Rep.);

EVP Europe, Patrick Peters
nessuna cognizione di cosa siano le separazioni da applicare! Segue una lunga (Germany) EGATS;

EVPF, Jimmy Dale Wright
discussione. Si suggerisce di unire gli
sforzi IFATCA-IFALPA per raggiungere (USA);

EVP Professional, Scott Shallies
in qualche modo le autorità brasiliane.
L’EB riporta di aver già esperito tutti (Australia). 
La somma totale dovuta da queste associazioni è di 18,797.18 dollari. L’EB
propone di ricorrere allo “Special Circumstances Fund” per venire incontro alle
difficoltà dei paesi riportati sopra.
Lo Yemen incorre nella “termination
of membership”.
52
Eurocontrol
E’
stato pubblicato il giorno
11 maggio 2008 il report
della Performance Review
Commission (sito internet: http:\\www.
eurocontrol.int\prc\public\subsite_homepage\homepage.html) a consuntivo
delle attività ATM svolte nell’area europea nell’anno 2007.
Il documento, una vera miniera d’informazione, si compone di diverse sezioni d’approfondimento che descrivono
il passato anno ma che essenzialmente
indicano, attraverso raccomandazioni,
i campi d’intervento su cui lavorare. Il
report, può essere liberamente scaricato
dal link: http:\\www.eurocontrol.int\prc\
gallery\content\public\PRR_2007.pdf
Di seguito, forniamo solo alcune brevi
informazioni contenute nel documento.
Andamento del volato
L’alta crescita del traffico aereo
(5.3%) è continuata nonostante l’alto
prezzo del carburante, avvicinandosi
così alla previsione effettuata nel 2006.
La crescita del volato si è sviluppata in maniera differente in Europa
(da -2% a +25%). Il massimo raggiunto è stato di 33 506 voli.
L’obbiettivo dichiarato per ciò
che concerne il ritardo ATFM (1 min/
volo), non è stato raggiunto nel 2007
(1.6 min/volo) e quasi certamente
non lo sarà nel 2008.
Le note più significative che si
percepiscono dalla lettura della sezione riservata all’andamento del
traffico aereo sono:
 la crescita del traffico si mantiene
ancora a valori molto alti (>12%)
nei Balcani e nelle aree Baltiche;
 l'aviazione Low-cost e quella Business continuano a rinforzarsi
(+25% e +10% - rispettivamente);
 La crescita del traffico si origina principalmente dall'aumentato
numero di jet. La crescita è stata
marcata specialmente in Polonia,
negli stati baltici e negli stati sud
orientali europei.
 L'alta crescita in Spagna, Francia ed Italia dipende fondamentalmente dalla crescita del volato
“low-cost”.
 I voli, in generale, si concentrano
nello spazio aereo superiore.
Ritardi
Le analisi dei dati, indicano che gli
ACC di Ankara, Lisbona, Roma, Monaco
e Karlsruhe sono stati in grado di assorbire alte quote di traffico ad alti livelli di
53
Eurocontrol
Distribuzione dei FLs richiesti (suddivisa
per categorie di aeromobili)
produttività senza per questo introdurre
ritardi significativi. Si ricorda che Monaco e Karlsruhe operano in una delle aree
più congestionate europee.
La causa ricorrente che impedisce
l’apertura di settori appropriati a ricevere il traffico in arrivo negli ACC, è legata
alla mancanza di personale. Il ritardo generato dalla mancata apertura rimane a
livelli alti (non c’è variazione tra il 2002
ed il 2007). Il problema dell’understaffing, anche secondo Eurocontrol, deve
essere risolto il più presto possibile.
Safety
Il riferimento al documento ATM 2000+
Strategy è evidente: “il valore assoluto
degli incidenti ed eventi gravi NON deve
aumentare, indipendentemente dalla crescita del traffico”.
Lo stato della Safety in Europa non è
Incrementi di traffico percentuali e in voli/
giorno
54
Albania
Armenia
Austria
Belgio
Bosnia-Erzegovina
Bulgaria
Cipro
Croazia
Danimarca
Finlandia
Francia
FYROM
Germania
Grecia
Irlanda
Italia
Lituania
Lussemburgo
Malta
Moldova
Monaco
Montenegro
Norvegia
Olanda
Polonia
Portogallo
Regno Unito
Rep. Ceca
Romania
Serbia
Slovacchia
Slovenia
Spagna
Svezia
Svizzera
Turchia
Ucraina
Ungheria
Legenda:
L: In ritardo
NR: Nessun riporto
P
L
P
P
L
P
L
P
L
P
P
P
P
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
P
NR
L
ND
ND
NR
L
L
L
NR
L
NR
L
NR
P
P: Parziale
ND: Nessun dato
OK: Dati forniti
Full compl.
AST
Regulator
ANSP
perfetto, anche se in lento miglioramento. Manca un consistente numero di stati
membri, fra coloro che forniscono dati attendibili, rendendo incerto il risultato statistico offerto. La tabella a seguire offre
indicazioni sulle carenze informative.
X
X
OK
OK
X
X
X
X
X
X
OK
X
OK
X
OK
X
OK
X
OK
X
OK
X
OK
X
OK
OK
OK
OK
OK
X
OK
X
OK
OK
OK
X
X
X
Le pagine successive, riportano un quadro sinottico generale e sui cinque principali ATS providers europei. 
Eurocontrol
RITARDI: La tabella riporta, per ogni ACC, il traffico giornaliero medio, il
ritardo per volo (in minuti/volo), la percentuale di ritardo aeroportuale sul totale dei
ritardi. (Nota: non vengono riportati gli ACC per i quali, nei quattro anni presi in
considerazione, sono stati riportati ritardi pari a zero)
55
Eurocontrol
Dati specifici dei SERVICE PROVIDERS: le tabelle che seguono ripor-
tano i dati principali (volumi di traffico, dati significativi, sicurezza, costi e ritardi)
per alcuni tra i maggiori Service Providers europei: AENA Spagna, DFS Germania,
DSNA Francia, ENAV Italia e NATS Gran Bretagna.
56
Eurocontrol
57
Eurocontrol
58
Eurocontrol
59
Eurocontrol
60
Eventi
Convegno organizzato dalle cattedre di Diritto Aeronautico, Diritto della
Navigazione Aerea e Diritto dei Trasporti dell’Università di Modena e
Reggio Emilia
CTA Marcello Scala - Milano ACC
N
el “mondo” del trasporto aereo é divenuto un momento
di confronto molto sentito il
Convegno che, ormai da qualche anno,
l’Università degli Studi di Modena e
Reggio Emilia organizza in giugno.
Forse mai come quest’anno le aspettative non sono state deluse, infatti, il 27
e 28 giugno u.s., in una sala gremita, personalità autorevoli si sono confrontate e
hanno dato vita ad un interessantissimo
dibattito in merito alle problematiche
comuni connesse all’errore umano nelle
organizzazioni complesse a rischio “consentito” quali il settore del trasporto aereo e sanitario.
I navigazionisti modenesi, come
amano definirsi, hanno così presentano
il meeting: “In aeronautica le politiche
più recenti nel campo della prevenzione puntano, attraverso specifici sistemi di segnalazione, a far emergere il
maggior numero possibile di eventi …
omississ… eventi riconducibili, principalmente, al fattore umano e organizzativo …omississ… .
Per questa ragione, le politiche di
prevenzione nel campo aeronautico puntano alla crescita e diffusione di una
vera e propria cultura della sicurezza
del volo, attraverso anche la costante
sensibilizzazione dei singoli individui a
segnalare i propri errori …omissis… .
L’affermarsi di questo tipo di cultura
trova però un limite nei vigenti ordinamenti giuridici di moltissimi Stati, che
continuano a privilegiare la “cultura
della colpa” …omissis… l’obbiettivo è
individuare gli interventi legislativi più
idonei per passare da una “cultura della
colpa” a una “cultura della prevenzione” …omissis…”.
Il Convegno, con la collaborazione
dell’Italian Safety Committee (I.F.S.C.)
nonché con il patrocinio dell’Associazione Italiana di Diritto della Navigazione e dei Trasporti (A.I.DI.NA.T.), si
è sviluppato in due differenti sessioni
proseguendo il percorso iniziato a Udine il 30 novembre u.s. con il Convegno intitolato: ”L’errore umano nelle
attività aeronautiche: oltre la cultura
della colpa”.
Parrebbe superfluo dire che tutti gli
interventi sono stati di notevole interesse
e che la tavola rotonda ha visto un consesso animato e costruttivo, ma così non
è poiché il principio del cambiamento
non solo è stato promosso ma parrebbe
abbia iniziato a germogliare.
L’iniziativa, che ha quale peculiarità l’accostamento del campo sanitario
a quello del trasporto aereo, se inizialmente ha determinato un pò di scettici-
61
Eventi
smo, poiché ad un primo esame non si
rilevavano punti comuni a due settori
apparentemente così distanti, col susseguirsi delle relazioni ha sempre più
convinto.
Entrambi i settori, infatti, comuni
per velocità decisionale e complessità
organizzativa mirano alla prevenzione il cui fine precipuo è quello di far
sì che la percentuale di rischio tenda
a zero, a prescindere dalle peculiarità
proprie, possono e devono affrontare la
problematica muovendo da una JUST
CULTURE!
Premessa comune è quella per cui
l’errore non deve essere considerato
una colpa bensì l’attuazione di un procedimento non risolutivo rispetto al
risultato atteso: “accidents in complex
organizations cannot be attributed to
any single cause!”
Al fine di fugare ogni dubbio, è
giusto dare evidenza che nessuno dei
partecipanti ha impostato il proprio
intervento con lo scopo di ottenere un
ambiente di lavoro caratterizzato dall’impunibilità.
Il traguardo principale è difatti quello di prevenire la maggior parte delle
criticità facendo emergere anche quelle
più latenti, assicurando, nel rispetto del
sistema legislativo vigente, il perseguimento delle rispettive funzioni, prerogative e aspettative.
Funzioni, prerogative e aspettative
che, seppur differenti, hanno a cuore il
medesimo bene giuridico, la sicurezza!
Questo approccio sistematico, proprio della Just culture, permetterebbe di
ridurre la percentuale di errori e quelli di
essi che determinano l’insorgere di conseguenze dannose.
Partendo da questo assunto e tenendo
in considerazione che questi settori sono
caratterizzati, tra l’altro, da una tendenza
alla riduzione del rischio a zero – peraltro
62
senza mai poterlo raggiungere – Autorità
Giudiziaria, operatori e utenti concordano che dovrebbero migliorare la loro intellegibilità per poter ottenere l’optimum
tra tutti i risultati possibili.
FRONT LINE
D
al dibattito emerge, innanzitutto, che entrambi i settori sono
caratterizzati da una organizzazione
complessa, (per ambiente e tecnologia) con tempi di reazione necessariamente molto brevi – talvolta immediati
– e istituzionalmente ritenuti settori a
rischio “autorizzato”, cioè, settori professionali nel quale il rischio è elemento
congenito.
Ambiti lavorativi dove il minimo
comune denominatore è dunque l’ERRORE UMANO e nei quali le condizioni ed eventualità critiche sono sempre latenti.
L’errore (es.: slip, lapse, mistake)
può essere individuale, organizzativo
oppure di sistema e si deve distinguere dalla violazione (es: routine, eccezionale).
Se l’errore si può definire, come già
esposto, l’attuazione di un procedimento non risolutivo rispetto al risultato atteso e può essere sia colpevole sia non
colpevole, la violazione si distingue da
esso poiché caratterizzata da una intenzionalità di base e, oltretutto, per definizione illegale.
Queste ultime, le violazioni, nonostante siano palesemente contrarie alla
diligenza dovuta vengono commesse,
soprattutto, da operatori nella maggior
parte dei casi esperti (auto-referenti) che
percepiscono come immediati i possibili
vantaggi ma non come possibili e/o probabili i costi.
Eventi
Emerge dunque che, quale primo
passaggio logico, al fine di determinare una riduzione di entrambi i comportamenti, è da ritenersi fondamentale la
presenza di una cultura della sicurezza
che informi, educhi, incoraggi e insegni: NO BLAME!
L’errore, infatti, essendo atto non volontario e persistente, a differenza delle
violazioni, trova nella cultura della prevenzione lo strumento ideale per una sua
correzione.
Elemento cardine della succitata cultura è il REPORTING SYSTEM, inteso
quale mezzo non solo reattivo ma soprattutto proattivo e predittivo.
Sue caratteristiche peculiari devono
essere, ad esempio: definizioni standard, una tassonomia adeguata al settore di utilizzo, interfaccia opportuni e
una complementarità con tutto il sistema organizzativo, privacy, unica banca dati, diffusione delle informazioni,
feed back.
E’ stato rilevato, inoltre, che l’evoluzione normativa mondiale, europea e, a
cascata, nazionale – sia nel settore sanitario sia in quello del trasporto aereo
- ha portato all’esistenza, tra l’altro, di
differenti banche dati e differenti sistemi
di raccolta e analisi dati volti alla prevenzione.
Questi ultimi, in ambito nazionale nel
trasporto aereo (E.N.A.C. – obbligatorio,
A.N.S.V. - volontario) non godono però
di una vera e propria autonomia rispetto
alle prerogative dell’autorità Giudiziaria (elemento percepito dagli operatori
come facente parte della cultura della
colpa - N.d.A.).
L’articolo 9 del D. Lgs. n. 213/06, infatti, così riporta:
”Salvo che il fatto costituisca reato
e fatte salve le norme nazionali dettate
in materia di accesso alle informazioni da parte dell’autorità giudiziaria in
sede penale, le informazioni relative
agli eventi raccolti dall’ENAC e dall’ANSV nelle rispettive banche dati
sono utilizzate unicamente per fini di
prevenzione”.(1)
Quest’ultima “eccezione”, comporta,
in sistemi ove le criticità sono sempre latenti e dove la differenza sostanziale tra
un mancato incidente e un incidente è la
sola magnitudo delle conseguenze, una
minore efficacia delle indagini tecniche
a carattere preventivo.
I relatori rilevano che, essendo conclamato che l’approccio accusatorio
non porta all’eliminazione delle condizioni di rischio e non esclude la possibilità che uno stesso avvenimento si
possa ripetere – con altri operatori –, la
riduzione, rectius il non aumentare, del
numero di reports sia situazione non auspicabile.
Difatti, le indagini tecniche che
scaturiscono dai reports, sia volontari
sia obbligatori, sono utili al fine di far
venire alla luce le criticità dei sistemi
accertando le cause in una ottica di prevenzione.(2)
Lo scopo è quindi da ritenersi duplice
poiché individuando le condizioni critiche diventa possibile una loro correzione riducendo, dunque, la possibilità che
l’episodio, rectius errore, si ripeta.
Consegue a ciò che gli effetti negativi
a esso collegati saranno inferiori.
Pertanto quanto è emerso porta entrambi i settori a privilegiare la JUST
CULTURE, anziché la ormai anacronistica cultura della colpa.
Infine, avendo il settore del trasporto
aereo iniziato ad affrontare suddette problematiche prima del settore sanitario,
oltre a un sempre costruttivo confronto, quasi certamente, il settore sanitario
potrebbe ritrovare nel know how e nelle tecnologie del settore aeronautico un
inaspettato supporto.
63
Eventi
DIRITTO - AUTORITA’
GIUDIZIARIA
Sotto il profilo penale
G
li interventi tenuti dai
a vario titolo presenti
vegno, hanno unitariamente
che nel rispetto dell’attuale
mento vige:
relatori,
al Conribadito
Ordina-
•
l’irrinunciabilità del momento
sanzionatorio;
•
l’espletamento dell’attività d’indagine (preliminare/ probatoria), logicamente, ex post;
•
l’obbligo, all’interno delle attività a rischio consentito, di regole di
cautela/diligenza;
•
l’utilizzo del parametro dell’agente modello ovvero del rispetto dell’applicazione dei protocolli prestabiliti;
•
la differenza tra compiti e prerogative dell’A.G. e degli operatori;
I relatori hanno dunque chiarito che
l’attuale Ordinamento non prevede nei
settori in argomento nessuna eccezione
e, una volta appresa una notizia di reato
e accertata l’esistenza dei presupposti,
l’attività giudiziaria è dovuta.
In altri termini non esiste attualmente
una norma che possa escludere, ovvero
modificare, una indagine penale - e un
eventuale rinvio a giudizio - qualora la
notizia di reato emerga da avvenimenti
accaduti sia nel settore sanitario sia in
quello aeronautico.
Partendo da queste premesse gli stessi
relatori hanno tenuto a precisare alcuni
concetti e muovere alcune critiche costruttive nei confronti della loro attività.
Inizialmente è stato ribadito che il
commettere un errore non comporta di
64
per sè alcuna responsabilità e ancor meno
imputabilità, ma che attualmente il rischio, quale componente costitutivo della
società moderna, per gli operatori costituisce una potenziale penalizzazione.
Ciò deriva da una apparente tendenza
ipersanzionatoria dello stesso, il rischio,
che risulterebbe soprattutto riscontrabile
nella giurisprudenza civile.
In un secondo momento, in merito ai
reati colposi, dopo aver accennato alla
differenza tra l’elemento soggettivo (colpa) e quello oggettivo (nesso di casualità), quali elementi costitutivi degli stessi,
è stato sottolineato come, già partendo
dalla semplice lettura della definizione di
reato colposo, essi non risultano di semplice distinzione ”Il delitto:…omissis…
è colposo, o contro l’intenzione, quando l’evento, anche se preveduto, non è
voluto dall’agente e si verifica a causa
di negligenza o imprudenza o imperizia,
ovvero per inosservanza di leggi, regolamenti, ordini o discipline. …omissis…
art. 43 c.p.”.
Succitata discriminazione è stata evidenziata in considerazione dei riflessi nel
settore civile dei giudicati penali.
Qualora, infatti, venisse emessa una
sentenza - in sede penale - la cui formula assolutoria prevedesse la non colpevolezza per la mancanza del nesso
di causalità, in sede civile non sarebbe
possibile alcuna azione volta al risarcimento del danno, azione che sarebbe invece possibile qualora mancasse, quale
elemento costitutivo del reato stesso, la
sola colpa.
Altro aspetto peculiare sotto il profilo penale sancito dall’ articolo 27 della
Costituzione è che: “La responsabilità
penale è personale. …omissis…”, cioè si
risponde in sede penale solo e solamente
per fatto proprio e colpevole. .(3)
Suddetto principio rileva ai fini della
ripartizione della responsabilità in quan-
Eventi
to, escludendo qualsiasi concetto di responsabilità penale collettiva, risulta di
particolare importanza nei settori, aeronautico e sanitario, ove a causa di una
struttura complessa il momento decisionale è differentemente assegnato. .(4)
Altra tematica d’interesse (sia le motivazioni relative all’incidente di Linate
sia relativa all’incidente di Cagliari la
vedono presente - N.d.A.) è stata l’omissione impropria (art. 40 II c.p. “…omissis… Non impedire un evento, che si ha
l’obbligo giuridico d’impedire, equivale
a cagionarlo.”) - quale obbligo giuridico
di comportamento - e la posizione di garanzia ad essa correlata.
Il richiamato principio ha visto nel
tempo una sua dilatazione trovando
– purtroppo – talvolta la sua genesi non
solo in precise previsioni legislative ma
anche in fonti convenzionali.
Non potendo valutare positivamente succitata estensione interpretativa gli
Organi Giudicanti sono stati invitati, nel
valutare ex post il comportamento degli
operatori, a limitarsi a una mera applicazione/interpretazione del dettato normativo – la cui inosservanza comporta la
punibilità - senza “creare” ex novo regole di condotta.
Da ultimo si è preso atto che se nel
settore penalistico, premessa l’applicabilità generale di esimenti e cause di giustificazione, non vi è traccia di una norma
simile a quanto previsto dall’art. 2236
c.c. in base alla quale “Se la prestazione
implica la soluzione di problemi tecnici
di speciale difficoltà, il prestatore d’opera non risponde dei danni, se non in caso
di dolo o colpa grave.” – imperizia/criterio di attenuazione della colpa – ma il
principio di riferimento va trovato nella
analisi combinata delle disposizioni previste agli artt. nn. 43, 132, 133 c.p. eccezione civilistica che, in ogni caso, non
trova applicazione nei settori a “rischio
consentito”. (5)
Concludendo, per il settore aeronautico, il ragionamento tipico applicato in un
procedimento processuale è stato schematicamente esemplificato come segue:
1. il settore risulta a struttura complessa e caratterizzato da un processo
decisionale altamente frammentato;
2. bisogna individuare l’Ente titolare
della posizione di garanzia;
3. bisogna ricercare al suo interno
l’operatore responsabile che ha commesso la mancanza.
A onor del vero è stato anche evidenziato che sembra iniziata, da parte
dell’A.G., una maggiore sensibilità all’aspetto prettamente preventivo delle
indagini nonostante quest’ultima funzione competa alla attività amministrativa e
non giudiziaria.
Si è rilevato inoltre che vi sono sicuramente delle interferenze nello svolgimento delle rispettive indagini e che i
maggiori limiti del sistema sanzionatorio
sono:
• pene non eseguite;
• contraddittorietà dei precetti;
• ostacolo all’accertamento delle
vere cause;
• ostacolo all’accertamento dell’emersione dei dati rilevanti;
• obbligazioni risarcitorie adempiute da terzi;
• percezione d’inadeguatezza della
tutela della parte danneggiata;
• complessità del sistema;
In generale emerge, probabilmente,
un orientamento giurisprudenziale volto
a tutelare il contraente terzo – passeggero ovvero paziente – ritenuto l’anello
debole del sistema, anziché privilegiare
la ricerca di un punto di equilibrio tra
la responsabilità di colui che è preposto
alla gestione del rischio e colui che subisce un eventuale danno dall’esercizio
dell’attività stessa.
65
Eventi
Sotto il profilo civile
R
elativamente all’aspetto civilistico, oltre ad un notevole incremento della cause nel settore sanitario,
sono stati affrontati, in modo molto sintetico, alcuni aspetti.
In primo luogo è stato evidenziato
la dilatazione della portata del contenuto dell’art. 2050 c.c.: “Chiunque cagiona danno ad altri nello svolgimento di
un’attività pericolosa, per sua natura o
per la natura dei mezzi adoperati – art.
965 cod. nav. - , è tenuto al risarcimento,
se non prova di aver adottato tutte le misure idonee a evitare il danno.” (inversione dell’onere della prova).
Tale orientamento è ormai presente
nella giurisprudenza della Cassazione
Civile e, a scopo meramente esemplificativo, si è fatto riferimento a una tra le
tante Sentenze. (6)
La Sentenza riguarda una causa tra un
cliente, la ditta proprietaria dell’elicottero e il pilota (responsabilità contrattuale
e extracontrattuale):”…omissis… osserva a tal fine questa Corte che la navigazione aerea non è considerata dal legislatore come una attività pericolosa, né
può ritenersi che essa (per la sua natura,
le caratteristiche dei mezzi adoperati o
la sua spiccata potenzialità offensiva)
possa definirsi oggettivamente pericolosa, …omissis… .
Tuttavia, in concreto tale pericolosità
sussiste tutte le volte in cui tale attività
non rientri nella normalità delle condizioni previste …omissis… ordinarie condizioni atmosferiche, con conseguente
applicabilità della disposizione dell’art.
2050 c.c. tutte le volte che la navigazione
aerea risulti esercitata in condizioni di
anormalità o pericolo … omissis…”.
Pilota e ditta condannati in solido al
risarcimento dei danni.
66
In secondo luogo è stata menzionata
un’altra sentenza del giudice di legittimità(7) le cui motivazioni di altissimo pregio sono da ritenersi di grande interesse
poiché afferenti il Simposio modenese.
La Sentenza si riferisce al settore sanitario e trattando diverse sfaccettature
relative al rapporto tra medico-paziente-ente, affronta tra le altre tematiche
relative alla responsabilità contrattuale
ed extracontrattuale, onere della prova,
ripartizione delle responsabilità (equipe), risarcimento danno morale e indagini peritali.
Per tale ultimo aspetto il Giudice così
motiva:”…omissis… Altrettanto scontata
è la regola di diritto a mente della quale le consulenze e la documentazione di
parte costituiscono semplici allegazioni
difensive, onde il giudice di merito non è
tenuto a motivare il proprio dissenso in
ordine alle osservazioni in esse contenute, quando ponga a base del proprio convincimento considerazioni incompatibili
con le stesse e conformi al parere del
proprio consulente, né è tenuto, anche a
fronte di esplicita richiesta di parte, a disporre nuova consulenza d’ufficio, atteso
che il rinnovo dell’indagine tecnica rientra tra i poteri del giudice …omissis… .
Al riguardo, infatti, la corte territoriale ha spiegato le ragioni per le quali
recepiva le argomentazioni dei due consulenti tecnici d’ufficio (definite convincenti e persuasive e giudicate ingiustificatamente contraddette dal giudice di
primo grado) …omississ…”.
In terzo luogo, e infine, è stata paventata la non remota possibilità di una
applicazione, al settore aeronautico e a
quello sanitario, della legge(8) che disciplina la responsabilità amministrativa
delle persone giuridiche, delle società e
delle associazioni anche prive di personalità giuridica.
Il succitato decreto legislativo disci-
Eventi
plina la responsabilità degli enti per gli
illeciti amministrativi dipendenti da reato, ascrivendo in capo all’ente stesso una
responsabilità per i reati commessi nel
suo interesse o a suo vantaggio.
sumere come proprio il concetto che
esso tende a zero;
 rendere esenti da qualsivoglia
responsabilità gli operatori che abbiano rispettato il S.M.S. previsto.
CONCLUSIONI
Il bene giuridico da tutelare è la sicurezza e lo strumento più idoneo è la
prevenzione.
How do you feel just culture in your
organization? 
A
lla luce di tutte le argomentazioni trattate e degli autorevoli
parei espressi, rammentando gli obiettivi dell’ICAO per il periodo 2005-2010
“creazione ed applicazione del Safety
Management System (SMS) in tutti i settori del trasporto aereo; applicazione della Just Culture; elaborazione di uno State
Safety Programme”, intendendosi qui
completamente richiamate le conclusioni del Convegno di Udine, si riportano le
seguenti conclusioni:
 trovare un punto di equilibrio
tra le esigenze di prevenzione e giustizia;
 applicare l’art. 2236 c.c. anche
alle attività a rischio “consentito”;
 creare una norma penale che
sia simile, per scopo e intenti, a quanto in campo civile è perseguito mediante l’articolo 2236 c.c. (e.g. gross
negligence);
 novellare il d. lgs 213/2006 e
rendere le banche dati di E.N.A.C. e
A.N.S.V. inaccessibili all’A.G. o rendere quantomeno inaccessibili tutti i
reports volontari;
 rendere indipendente l’indagine tecnica da quella di carattere penale;
 rammentare che la qualità del
servizio è strettamente correlata alle
risorse;
 rammentare che non si può raggiungere l’assenza del rischio ma as-
Note:
1
Questa situazione è stata evidenziata, in
modo negativo, in una recente attività di auditing
svolta dall’I.C.A.O. in Italia, soprattutto in presenza di indagini contemporanee. L’art. n.7 del
Regolamento A.N.S.V. – forse in contrasto con
quanto previsto dal d.lgs n. 213/06 – rende invece
completamente irriconoscibili i dati di colui che
effettua la segnalazione.
2
Nel 2007 A.N.S.V. ha raccolto circa mille
reports da cui sono scaturite circa cento inchieste
tecniche obbligatorie e trenta inchieste dell’A.G..
Nel settore sanitario si stima che circa il 2% di tutti gli errori commessi porti a conseguenze gravi.
3
Presupposti della sanzione penale sono: offesa a uno o più beni giuridici, antigiuridicità del
fatto, commissione direttamente rimproverata al
soggetto.
4
Eg.: capacità di settore, emissione di flussi,
emissione di autorizzazioni. Differenza tra responsabilità del medico e responsabilità medica,
equipe.
5
Eg.:”…omississ… In tema di colpa, nelle
attività pericolose consentite, …omississs… maggiori devono essere la diligenza e la perizia nel
precostituire condizioni idonee a ridurre il rischio
consentito …omississ… Ne consegue che l’impossibilità di eliminazione del pericolo non può
comportare una attenuazione dell’obbligo di garanzia, ma deve tradursi in un suo rafforzamento.
…omississ…”. Cass. Civile sez. IV, n. 7026/ 03.
6
Cassazione Civile sez. III, n. 5971/ 2005.
7
Cassazione Civile sez. III n. 13953/ 2007.
8
D.lgs. n. 231/ 2001.
67
Eventi
Partecipanti al Convegno
Prima sessione:
Presidente Dott. Casagranda (Direttore DEA dell’ASO di Alessandria),
Com.te Ralli (Ralli Associates) “L’errore umano e organizzativo in campo aeronautico”;
Prof. Franchi – Presidente dell’ANSV
“La prevenzione in campo aeronautico:
profili normativi e relative problematiche giuridiche”;
Dott. Ing. Carrabba (Direzione Centrale Regolazione Tecnica E.N.A.C.)
“La segnalazione degli eventi aeronautici alla luce del d.lgs. 2 maggio 2006,
n. 213”;
Dott. Bianco – Pres.te F.N.O.M.C.e.O.,
“L’errore umano e organizzativo in campo medico”;
Prof. Piacevoli – Direttore U.O.C.
rianimazione/anestesia A.O. San Filippo
Neri di Roma, “Clinical Incident Reporting: database 1999-2006”;
Dott. Coen – Direttore Medico di urgenza e pronto Soccorso A.O. Ospedale
Niguarda Milano “Caso di studio: l’errore umano in pronto soccorso”;
Prof. Trapani – Ordinario di Diritto
Penale Università Roma Tre “Colpa e
nesso di causalità in relazione alle attività a rischio di errore tecnico-organizzativo”;
Dott. Drigani – Presidente Corte di
Assise di Appello di Trieste “Errori in
campo medico e aeronautico: giurisprudenza a confronto”;
Dott. Clivio – G.i.p. Tribunale di Milano “Repressione dei reati e tutela delle
esigenze di prevenzione in campo aeronautico e sanitario”;
Com.te Borgna – Segretario Generale
I.F.S.C. “Segnalazione di eventi aeronautici: il software IFSC SDS, una opportunità per la prevenzione”.
68
Seconda sessione: “Dalla cultura
della colpa a quella della prevenzione:
un’ipotesi possibile ?”:
Presidente Prof. Tullio (Ordinario di
diritto della navigazione nell’Università
“La Sapienza”);
Prof. Antonini (Ordinario di diritto
dei trasporti nell’Università di Udine);
Com.te Barbato (Direttore esecutivo
tecnico A.N.P.A.C.);
Dott. Bufo (Dirigente E.N.A.V. Spa
Centro aeroportuale Catania);
Prof. Catino (Associato sociologia
dell’organizzazione nell’Università di
Milano-Bicocca);
Dott. Coggi (Direttore di AirPress);
Dott. Ing. Gaggero (Hospital Risk
Manager Assicurazioni Generali);
Dott. Laudi (Procuratore della Repubblica Tribunale di Asti);
Dott. Paciaroni (Procuratore della
Repubblica Tribunale di Macerata);
Dott. Campagnoni (Direttore Dipartimento di emergenza e accettazione
Ospedale di Aosta);
Dott. Testi (Direttore SOC Medicina
legale ASL 2 Torino);
Col. Tosto (Capo Ufficio Giuridico
Ispettorato Sicurezza al Volo A.M.).
Riferimenti
Costituzione (eg. art. 27); Codice Civile (eg. art. nn. 1176, 1228, 2043, 2050,
2236); Codice Penale (eg. artt. nn. 40, 43,
132, 133); Codice della Navigazione;
Annessi I.C.A.O. nn. VI, XI, XIII,
XIV; D.O.C. I.C.A.O. n. 9859;
Direttiva 2003/ 42 C.E.; Regolamento
CE 2096/05; Regolamento CE 1330/07;
d.lgs. n. 66/99; d.lgs. n. 213/06;
Circolare E.N.A.C. GEN n. 1/07;
A.N.S.V. Regolamento per il trattamento
delle segnalazioni volontarie;
Prof. James Reason (University of
Machester).
Eventi
Il documento conclusivo del convegno di Modena
Fermo restando il
soddisfacimento del
diritto dei danneggiati al
risarcimento dei danni
Assicurare all’inchiesta
tecnica di competenza
dell’ANSV la garanzia della
genuinità e della schiettezza
dell’informazione.
A
conclusione del convegno
“L’errore umano nel campo
aeronautico ed in quello sanitario: dalla cultura della colpa alla
cultura della prevenzione”, organizzato
il 27 e il 28 giugno, a Modena, dalla cattedra di diritto aeronautico dell’Università di Modena e Reggio Emilia in collaborazione con l’Italian Flight Safety
Committee (IFSC), di cui AIR PRESS
ha dato notizia nel fascicolo 28 del 14
luglio 2008 (pag. 1150) è stato predisposto un documento conclusivo, scaturito
dalle relazioni e dal contributo dialettico
offerto dalla tavola rotonda, che auspica
quanto segue:
1) Nel campo aeronautico ed in quello sanitario, oltre che in altri caratterizzati da attività ad elevato contenuto tecnologico, occorre privilegiare le esigenze
della prevenzione rispetto alla ricerca
del colpevole, fermo restando il soddisfacimento del diritto dei danneggiati al
risarcimento dei danni.
2) Con particolare riferimento alla
prevenzione nel campo aeronautico, occorre garantire all’Agenzia nazionale per
la sicurezza del volo (ANSV), nel contemporaneo avvio delle indagini di competenza dell’Autorità giudiziaria, l’incondizionata e tempestiva disponibilità
di tutti gli elementi necessari al regolare
e proficuo svolgimento dell’inchiesta
tecnica, fra cui l’immediato accesso ai
luoghi e alle cose dell’incidente, libero
dai condizionamenti implicati dal sequestro penale.
3) Occorre assicurare all’inchiesta
tecnica di competenza dell’ANSV la garanzia della genuinità e della schiettezza
dell’informazione, conseguibili con il
riconoscimento della tutela del segreto
alle deposizioni rese, dell’anonimato a
chi le rende, dell’inacquisibilità e inutilizzabilità in sede penale sia dagli atti
istruttori assunti dall’ANSV, che dei
documenti da questa acquisiti, che delle
conclusioni dalla stessa rassegnate.
4) Occorre estendere l’inacquisibilità e l’inutilizzabilità in sede penale agli
atti e ai documenti relativi alle indagini
svolte da ogni soggetto che, per legge o
per contratto, nel settore aeronautico ed
in quello sanitario, sia obbligato alla raccolta di dati, con la finalità di monitorare
le attività ad elevato contenuto tecnologico per conoscerne e ridurne i rischi.
5) Occorre acquisire la consapevolezza della sussistenza di settori ad elevato
69
Eventi
livello tecnologico, quali quelli in riferimento, in cui le caratteristiche del servizio esigono un alto grado di produttività
ed un forte ritmo di attività, riducibili
soltanto a fronte della paralisi di quest’ultima e delle riconnesse ripercussioni
negative sulla collettività.
ci e periti che, beneficiando di ampi tempi di indagine e di sofisticati mezzi di valutazione e di ricerca, nella valutazione
ex post facciano emergere incongruenze
o errori del comportamento assunto dall’operatore in situazioni contingenti di
urgenza.
6) Occorre, conseguentemente, affermare la necessità che nei settori suddetti,
in cui il rischio può essere ridotto ma non
azzerato, ed in cui il ritmo necessariamente sostenuto dell’attività comporta
l’accettazione naturale di un certo livello
di rischio, l’eventuale errore dell’operatore sia valutato nell’ambiente concreto in cui egli opera, in considerazione
dell’impossibilità naturale di eliminare
completamente il rischio, anche in considerazione delle caratteristiche e dei ritmi
dell’attività richiesta.
10) Occorre ampliare e vivacizzare il
dibattito su questi temi, in modo da far
comprendere le caratteristiche concrete
dell’attività tecnica, propria del settore
aeronautico e di quello sanitario, a coloro che debbono giudicare (magistrati) ed
a coloro che possono influire migliorativamente sulla legislazione vigente (politici). 
7) Occorre valorizzare, ai fini dell’esenzione dalla responsabilità, l’adozione di tutte le misure adeguatamente
previste in apposito e preesistente piano
di sicurezza.
8) Occorre applicare i principi suddetti
non soltanto all’operatore finale (ultimo
anello della catena), ma a tutti i soggetti
che hanno concorso nell’organizzazione
del servizio, fino ai vertici della stessa,
valutandone il comportamento in relazione, per un verso, al rispetto delle regole
di sicurezza e dei protocolli tecnici precostituiti, per altro verso, all’eventuale
inesigibilità di comportamenti diversi da
quello tenuto, in relazione all’ambiente,
ai mezzi disponibili ed a quelli procurabili con le risorse esistenti.
9) Occorre evitare di affidare incondizionatamente la soluzione dei problemi,
concernenti l’accertamento della colpa e
del nesso di causalità, a consulenti tecni-
70
Associazione
Riportiamo di seguito la lettera inviata dal Presidente ANACNA ai rappresentanti delle
istituzioni nazionali in seguito ad alcune recenti sentenze della Magistratura italiana, in
particolare quella sull’incidente di Cagliari del 2004, per porre l’attenzione sulla necessità
di affermare chiaramente nel nostro Ordinamento Giuridico i principi propri della “cultura
della prevenzione” anzichè la “cultura della colpa”, allineandolo agli orientamenti prevalenti in ambito internazionale, dove si tende sempre più a privilegiare la “JUST CULTURE”.
Al Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri
Al Ministro di Grazia e Giustizia
Al Ministro dei Trasporti
Al Presidente della IX Commissione Permanente Trasporti
Al Presidente della VIII Commissione
Permanente Lavori pubblici e Comunicazioni
Oggetto: Recenti sentenze della Magistratura Italiana e l’introduzione della
“Just Culture” nell’ordinamento giuridico nazionale.
Il 17 Marzo u.s. il Tribunale Penale di Cagliari ha condannato due Controllori del traffico aereo in servizio a Cagliari avvicinamento alla pena di tre anni di
reclusione (ridotti ad anni 2 per la scelta del rito abbreviato), nonché, in solido,
al pagamento di una provvisionale di € 75.000 per responsabilità civile e spese
processuali.
Una sentenza che ha creato sbigottimento e reazioni non solo tra i Controllori e
tutte le loro organizzazioni sindacali, ma anche tra i piloti, gli operatori aeronautici
e di diritto.
Il verdetto di colpevolezza (così come si evince dai verbali del dibattimento,
pur in attesa di una motivazione che tarda ad essere emessa) si è incentrato in
particolare sul fatto di aver autorizzato, sia pure su richiesta del pilota, un avvicinamento a vista notturno (Visual Approach) “senza fornire al pilota stesso tutte le
informazioni necessarie sull’orografia del terreno”.
Il comportamento del personale addetto al controllo del traffico aereo è stato
conforme a quanto previsto dalla normativa e dai regolamenti tecnici in materia di
servizi di controllo del traffico aereo, così come sostenuto dagli stessi superesperti
che la Procura della Repubblica di Cagliari aveva designato come propri consulenti tecnici.
Le informazioni di carattere topografico sull’orografia del terreno, che il controllore avrebbe omesso di comunicare al pilota, fanno parte di condizioni aggiuntive relative al Visual Approach notturno emanate, in data 20 giugno 1991,
dall’allora Direzione Generale dell’Aviazione Civile (D.G.A.C.) del Ministero dei
71
Associazione
Trasporti con foglio n.° 41/8880/AM.O, specificatamente indirizzato a tutte le Direzioni Circoscrizionali Aeroportuali (DD.AA.CC.) e, per opportuna estensione,
alle Società di Trasporto Pubblico Passeggeri (TPP) e Trasporto Pubblico Merci
(TPM) relativamente alle condizioni a cui i piloti dovevano attenersi in sede di pianificazione e condotta del volo per poter effettuare in sicurezza Visual Approach
notturni in Italia.
Gli atti processuali hanno appalesato che le suddette condizioni aggiuntive non
erano contenute nella regolamentazione tecnica che disciplina la resa del servizio
del controllo del traffico aereo in ambito nazionale ed internazionale, né sono mai
state portate alla conoscenza dei controllori del traffico aereo, tant’è che alle richieste dell’allora AAAVTAG (ora ENAV S.p.A.) di conoscere e diffondere il contenuto di detta direttiva, correttamente la D.G.A.C., prima, ed ENAC, in seguito,
hanno insistito nell’argomentare che il contenuto della stessa non rientrava nelle
competenze AAAVTAG/ENAV, in quanto materia contenuta in documenti internazionali (Annesso 6 dell’ICAO e JAR OPS1 dell’U.E.) di esclusiva spettanza degli
equipaggi di volo e delle Società di Navigazione Aerea.
Corre l’obbligo sottolineare che né ENAC, né ENAV S.p.A., né AMI, nell’esercizio delle rispettive funzioni di “regulator” e “provider” dei servizi di controllo
del traffico aereo in Italia, in quattro anni di vicende processuali, nonostante i
solleciti a mezzo stampa provenienti dall’ANACNA, hanno ritenuto di dover far
chiarezza sulle norme in vigore sul Visual Approach e su tutta una serie di manchevolezze nella produzione normativa nazionale, che hanno portato a processare
due Controllori incolpevoli.
La normativa italiana sul “Visual Approach” cui si dovevano attenere i Controllori militari di Cagliari, contenuta nel Manuale dei Servizi del Traffico Aereo
(ed. 1998) dell’Aeronautica Militare Italiana, non fa alcun cenno alle condizioni
aggiuntive in parola.
I Controllori condannati hanno verificato che sussistessero le condizioni fissate
dal manuale militare, di cui sopra, con scrupolosa insistenza, così come si evince
dagli atti del processo, in particolare dalla registrazione delle comunicazioni radio.
Riscontro di ciò e dell’impossibilità da parte degli stessi di rilevare il contenuto
delle condizioni fissate da D.G.A.C./ENAC per gli equipaggi di volo può essere facilmente estrapolato non solo dalla relazione peritale dei cinque consulenti tecnici
del Pubblico Ministero, ma anche da alcune raccomandazioni diffuse dall’Agenzia
Nazionale Sicurezza Volo (ANSV) nel corso dell’inchiesta amministrativa aperta
subito dopo l’incidente.
Omissivo invece il comportamento di ANSV che, a tutt’oggi, è venuta meno al
proprio dovere istituzionale di accertare, entro dodici mesi dalla data dell’incidente (D.L. 25 febbraio 1999, n° 66, art.12, comma 1), le reali cause all’origine della
sciagura aerea avvenuta nel febbraio 2004 e di redigere la relativa relazione, onde
poter fare opera di prevenzione (a tutto campo), scongiurando – come nel caso di
specie – che potessero sussistere dubbi sulle cause tecniche dell’evento.
Pur tenendo nella dovuta considerazione che le relazioni, i rapporti d’inchiesta e
le raccomandazioni di sicurezza non riguardano in alcun caso le determinazione di
colpe e responsabilità, ANACNA ritiene che la mancanza di un autorevole rapporto
conclusivo di ANSV sulle reali cause che hanno determinato l’incidente, insieme ad
72
Associazione
una doverosa puntualizzazione da parte dei vertici istituzionali dell’Aviazione Civile
e Militare sulle reali competenze dei Controllori del traffico aereo, avrebbe aiutato
magistrati inquirenti e giudicanti a sciogliere quei dubbi che neppure la relazione dei
consulenti tecnici nominati dal Pubblico Ministero ha fugato.
ANACNA non può rimanere insensibile alle innumerevoli pressioni dei propri
associati che reclamano norme certe e chiara definizione delle competenze dei
soggetti preposti ai vari livelli organizzativi dell’Aviazione Civile/Militare e dell’Assistenza al Volo in Italia, situazione che ha portato l’Associazione professionale a consigliare ai Controllori del traffico aereo italiani di negare autorizzazioni
al “Visual Approach diurno e notturno” nonostante ciò comporti tempi di volo più
lunghi e consumi di carburante maggiori a carico dell’utenza.
L’abnorme ed immotivata, a nostro avviso, espansione di responsabilità dei Controllori del traffico aereo in Italia, comune ad altre categorie esposte ad elevati rischi
professionali (piloti, medici, forze dell’ordine, etc.), necessita di risposte precise sotto due differenti profili: in merito agli obblighi che incombono sugli stessi nell’assolvimento delle loro delicate funzioni (ovvero certezza tra l’applicabilità della norma
tecnica in seno all’ordinamento giuridico italiano) e relativamente ad una diversa
considerazione dell’errore umano involontario e scusabile in settori caratterizzati da
un’organizzazione complessa (per ambiente e tecnologia). Settori professionali già
gravati dai pesanti oneri derivanti dall’immediatezza dei tempi di reazione richiesti, nonché dal rischio insito all’attività prestata. Le tematiche sopra esposte, oggetto in questo momento di crescente interesse tra gli esperti del settore, a livello
nazionale ed internazionale, e di autorevoli pareri espressi nel corso dei più recenti
Convegni (gli ultimi dei quali tenuti presso l’Università di Udine e l’Università di
Modena), evidenziano la delicatezza e l’importanza del dibattito in corso.
E’ notizia di questi giorni che l’ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization),
su iniziativa di Eurocontrol, appoggiata dalla Conferenza per l’Aviazione Civile degli Stati Europei (ECAC), ha presentato all’esame del proprio gruppo specialistico di
investigazione e prevenzione degli incidenti aeronautici un documento di lavoro che
intende promuovere presso gli Stati contraenti il concetto di “Just Culture”.
Tale iniziativa prevede la realizzazione di un programma di segnalazioni atteso
favorire la prevenzione degli incidenti aeronautici (incident reporting) e l’investigazione dei sinistri (accident/incident investigation) che, qualora condiviso, porterà a
radicali cambiamenti nei contenuti dell’Annesso 13 alla Convenzione di Chicago.
L’Associazione professionale dei Controllori della Navigazione Aerea, impegnata a sostenere anche in ambito internazionale l’affermarsi dei principi propri della
“cultura della prevenzione” sulla “cultura della colpa”, ritiene doveroso evidenziare
l’importanza, per il nostro Ordinamento Giuridico, di allinearsi agli orientamenti
prevalenti in ambito internazionale tesi a privilegiare la “JUST CULTURE”.
ANACNA auspica, pertanto, che la riforma tenga in debita considerazione la
“cultura della prevenzione”, con la consapevolezza che nei sistemi più evoluti
l’approccio accusatorio non porta all’eliminazione delle condizioni di rischio e soprattutto non esclude la possibilità che uno stesso avvenimento si possa ripetere.
Roma 25 agosto 2008
Giovanna Rocchi - Presidente Anacna
73
Legislazione
Importante proposta di
regolamentazione ICAO,
presentata e commentata dal
Com.te Renzo Dentesano,
Investigatore d’incidenti
aeronautici.
L
a rivista aeronautica Flight International annuncia una meravigliosa notizia per tutti coloro che abbiano a cuore il ristabilimento
globale di una “corretta cultura – just
culture” nel campo del diritto, cioè in
tema di preciso accertamento delle cause
di ogni incidente aeronautico, prima che
gli individui in qualsiasi modo coinvolti
nel fatto diventino preda esclusiva della
magistratura penale.
Inoltre tale accertamento risulta indispensabile all’opera di prevenzione
di tali accadimenti, attraverso la possibilità, da parte degli addetti ai lavori, di
comunicare le loro osservazioni (mantenendo l’incognito) sulla sicurezza delle
operazioni di volo, senza timori di poter
essere indagati o perseguiti per tale meritorio comportamento.
Apprendiamo dunque con piacere
professionale la notizia che su iniziativa
di Eurocontrol, appoggiata dalla CEAC
– Conferenza per l’Aviazione Civile degli Stati europei – l’ICAO ha finalmente
presentato all’esame del proprio Gruppo
specialistico di investigazione e prevenzione degli incidenti aeronautici AIG un
documento di lavoro.
Documento che intende promuovere
presso gli Stati contraenti quel concetto
di corretta cultura globale nei confronti
dei già esistenti principi di libero scambio delle informazioni e di un’investigazione degli incidenti aeronautici vera-
74
mente libera dalle pastoie giudiziarie.
Qualora tale documento sia approvato dall’AIG nel prossimo Ottobre, quasi
certamente ciò consentirà un prossimo
adeguamento delle norme internazionali
contenute nell’Annesso 13 alla Convenzione sull’Aviazione Civile Internazionale, Annesso nel quale sono appunto
definite le norme uniformi (Standards)
e le specificazioni consigliate (Recommended Practices), note come SARPs
dell’ICAO in materia.
L’annuncio pubblicato da Flight International il 1° Agosto esordisce come
segue: «L’ICAO – International Civil
Aviation Organization – intende bloccare
l’apertura automatica dei procedimenti
giudiziari a carico di piloti, controllori
del traffico aereo e di altro personale addetto alle operazioni di volo (quali meccanici ed ingegneri) a seguito di disastri
o incidenti aeronautici, in quanto tale
apertura automatica di tali procedimento giudiziari è [purtroppo! – ndr] prassi
diffusa presso diversi Stati contraenti».
E prosegue: «Se il Gruppo AIG raccomanderà l’adozione delle proposte
contenute nel documento di lavoro per
favorire una corretta cultura globale
relativamente al programma di comunicazioni sulla prevenzione degli incidenti
(incident reporting) e sull’investigazione
dei sinistri aeronautici (accident/incident investigation), ciò porterà quasi sicuramente a nuovi radicali cambiamenti
nei contenuti dell’Annesso 13 alla Convenzione di Chicago.
Quello della “just culture” è un concetto molto sofisticato, per il quale ancora non esiste una definizione internazionalmente concordata e pertanto l’ICAO
ritiene proprio compito primario quello
Legislazione
di provvedere alla definizione delle sue
caratteristiche tecnico-linguistiche».
Citando poi: «...un bisogno urgente quello di stabilire un nuovo effettivo
equilibrio fra le esigenze di migliorare la
sicurezza nel campo dell’aviazione civile
e quelle dell’amministrazione della giustizia a livello internazionale», il documento trasmesso al Gruppo AIG chiede
allo stesso di concorrere a sostenere ed
approvare l’inserimento nell’Annesso 13
della definizione di “just culture”.
Il relativo testo proposto è il seguente: «Una cultura nella quale gli operatori di prima linea od altri non vengano
puniti per azioni, omissioni o decisioni
da essi adottate, che siano proporzionali alla loro esperienza ed addestramento, ma nella quale non sono tollerate
colpe gravi, violazioni intenzionali o
atti dolosi».
Infine il documento di lavoro spiega
che: «corretta cultura – just culture – faciliterà enormemente la comunicazione
e lo scambio d’informazioni di sicurezza
quale contributo sostanziale al miglioramento della sicurezza dell’aviazione
internazionale e fornirà la prova che i
procedimenti giudiziari a carico di coloro che abbiano compilato delle comunicazioni volontarie di sicurezza, indicanti
errori spesso dovuti a sistemi organizzativi carenti e non adeguati, hanno invece
avuto il risultato di far crollare lo scambio di quelle informazioni di sicurezza in
quei Paesi nei quali sono stati promossi
dei procedimenti penali a carico dei segnalatori di informazioni, così creando
una “cultura di copertura delle magagne del sistema”, anziché favorirne la
dovuta trasparenza.
Perciò, se sarà approvata, la proposta, una volta licenziata dall’AIG,
esorterà tutti gli Stati contraenti ad
adottare e ad applicare i principi della
corretta cultura del diritto aeronautico
all’interno dei rispettivi ordinamenti
giudiziari».
Fin qui l’annuncio diffuso da Flight
International in merito alle mosse dell’ICAO in tema di just culture/no blame
culture.
Esame della situazione
italiana
L
e investigazioni degli incidenti
aeronautici nel nostro Paese sono
troppo spesso ritardate da parte degli interventi della Magistratura inquirente che
si avvale del disposto dell’Art. 112 della
Costituzione «Il pubblico ministero ha
l’obbligo di esercitare l’azione penale».
Il Codice di Procedura Penale ne richiede, di fatto, l’intervento ogni qual
volta vi sia anche solo l’ombra della possibilità di un reato perseguibile
d’ufficio.
Sul tema desidero invece presentare il
concetto della “just culture”, così come
presentato dall’IFATCA – International
Federation of Air Traffic Controllers’
Associations – alla prossima approvazione dell’ICAO: «…“Just Culture” can be
described as an environment that is free
from threat of punishment, does not focus
blame on system components (operators)
and ensures comprehensive and systematic safety occurence reporting. – Una corretta cultura può essere descritta come un
ambiente che è libero dal rischio di punizione, non si concentra sulle colpa dei
componenti il sistema (addetti alle operazioni di prima linea) e garantisce una
esauriente e regolare interscambiabilità
dei fatti riguardanti la sicurezza».
E tanto dovrebbe bastare per inquadrare il problema come si pone attualmente in Italia.
Come annunciato dal Capo del Governo, a Settembre avrà inizio (in effetti
il processo ha già avuto inizio, l’articolo è stato
75
Legislazione
il processo di
riforma della Giustizia tra le altre indispensabili innovazioni da apportare ad
un sistema giudiziario da tempo gravemente malato di protagonismo.
Ciò comporterà, noi vogliamo sperare, il rinnovamento di intere parti del Codice Penale (c. p.) e di quello di Procedura Penale (c. p. p.), oltre a quelle parti del
Codice della Navigazione – Parte Aerea
- (c. n.), congiuntamente alla revisione
del D. Lgs. 66/99 (istitutivo dell’ANSV
– “Agenzia Nazionale per la Sicurezza
del Volo”), che, tutti assieme, mettono in
crisi la corretta e tempestiva investigazione tecnica dei sinistri e degli incidenti (accidents/incidents) dell’aviazione
civile in ambito nazionale.
Infatti, la mancanza di chiarezza e di
precisazione dei termini sia nella maldestramente plurimodificata riforma del
Codice della Navigazione – Parte Aerea,
che in tutta la normativa prodotta nel
corso di diverse legislature a partire dagli anni ’90, a cui si è aggiunta la poco
coraggiosa normativa prodotta in materia
dall’allora Comunità Europea, ha portato
infine al punto critico esistente sulle investigazioni degli incidenti aeronautici,
che sono troppo spesso impedite o ritardate dagli interventi della Magistratura
inquirente.
Per dar conto di ciò, ecco elencati nell’ordine i provvedimenti attuati in
materia, con in rilievo i relativi punti
critici e conflittuali tra le due esigenze,
da una parte quella dell’accertamento
delle cause per una tempestiva opera di
prevenzione a favore della sicurezza del
trasporto aereo, dall’altra quella della
punizione di colpevoli o presunti tali:scritto ad agosto 2008 - N.d.R)
1. Direttiva 94/56/CE del 21 Novembre
1994.
Stabilisce:
«Art. 1 – Obiettivo –La presente di-
76
rettiva è intesa a migliorare la sicurezza del volo facilitando il rapido
svolgimento delle inchieste tecniche
il cui unico fine consiste nella prevenzione di futuri incidenti [in inglese:
accidents] o inconvenienti [in inglese: incidents].
Art. 4 – Obbligo d’inchiesta – Ogni
incidente aereo (accident) o inconveniente grave (serious incident) è sottoposto ad inchiesta.
Art 12 – Gli Stati membri mettono
in vigore le disposizioni legislative,
regolamentari ed amministrative necessarie per conformarsi alla presente direttiva al più tardi il 21 Novembre 1996».
2. Decreto Legislativo 25 Novembre
1999, n. 66 – [di attuazione nazionale
dopo 5 anni e con 3 anni di ritardo
sulla data ultima di applicazione].
Sancisce:
«Art. 1 – E’ istituita l’Agenzia nazionale per la sicurezza del volo, di seguito denominata Agenzia, sottoposta
alla vigilanza della Presidenza del
Consiglio dei Ministri, con compiti in
materia di inchieste su incidenti [vedi
sopra] e inconvenienti [vedi sopra] nel
settore dell’aviazione civile, dotata di
personalità giuridica e autonomia
economica, amministrativa, regolamentare, patrimoniale, contabile e finanziaria, che opera con indipendenza di giudizio e di valutazione, nel rispetto della normativa internazionale
in materia [rif.to all’Annesso 13 della
Convenzione di Chicago sull’Aviazione Civile Internazionale – N.d.A.].
Art. 3 – L’Agenzia, fatte salve le
competenze del Ministero della Difesa … omissis … conduce le inchieste
tecniche di cui all’articolo 826 del c.
n., così come sostituito dall’articolo
17, comma 1, del presente decreto,
Legislazione
con il solo obiettivo di pervenire incidenti [vedi sopra] e inconvenienti
[vedi sopra], escludendo ogni valutazione di colpa e responsabilità [rif.
to all’Annesso 13 ICAO – Cap. 3 –
paragrafo 3.1].
Art. 3, comma 3, - L’Agenzia provvede in particolare, a:
b) – collaborare, ove richiesto, con
l’autorità giudiziaria nello svolgimento di inchieste correlate a fatti aeronautici; [inconcepibile, visto la statuizione di cui al comma 1! – N.d.A.].
Art. 10, comma 2: Salvo quanto “previsto” [sic!] dall’articolo 348 del c.
p. p., gli Investigatori incaricati dall’Agenzia, sentito il Pubblico Ministero [al “potere del quale sono dunque subordinati” – N.d.A.], al fine di
svolgere l’inchiesta di propria competenza, possono:
a) – accedere al luogo dell’incidente
… omissis;
b) avere accesso immediato ai registratori di volo e a qualsiasi altra
registrazione [es.: ATC – N.d.A.]
attinente l’aeromobile coinvolto nell’incidente … omissis.
Art. 12 – Relazioni e rapporti d’inchiesta - … La relazione d’inchiesta
è trasmessa entro 12 mesi dalla data
dell’incidente, salva l’ipotesi in cui
l’inchiesta [ipotesi unica! – N.d.A.],
per la sua complessità, si protragga
oltre tale termine … omissis …
Art. 17 – modifiche al titolo VIII, libro
I, parte II al codice della navigazione … Art. 827 (Norme di riferimento)
– Nell’espletamento dell’inchiesta
tecnica di cui all’art. 826, l’Agenzia
procede in conformità con quanto
“previsto” [sic!] dall’allegato 13 alla
Convenzione relativa all’aviazione
civile internazionale, stipulata a Chicago il 7 Dicembre 1944, approvata e
resa esecutiva con decreto legislativo
6 marzo 1948. n. 616, ratificato con
la legge 17 aprile 1956, n. 561».
Per quanto attiene invece lo scambio
volontario delle informazioni di sicurezza riguardanti l’aviazione civile, contemplato dalla Direttiva 2003/42/CE del 13
Giugno 2003, relativa alla “segnalazione di taluni eventi nel settore dell’aviazione civile”, com’è stato denominato
tale documento comunitario, in Italia se
ne è vista l’attuazione dopo 3 anni con
un D. Lgs. n. 213 del 2 Maggio 2006,
denominato “Istituzione di sistemi per la
segnalazione degli eventi aeronautici”.
Questo contempla la possibilità per
chi voglia contribuire alla sicurezza con
ogni tipo di segnalazioni, di inviarle a due
banche dati, la prima gestita da ENAC
riguardante le segnalazioni obbligatorie previste per gli eventi aeronautici
meritevoli d’essere segnalati, mentre la
seconda, gestita dall’ANSV, offre la possibilità per chiunque voglia contribuire a
migliorare la sicurezza delle operazioni
di volo con segnalazioni volontarie e riservate a fini di prevenzione.
Fin qui tutto bene, ma purtroppo nel
corpo del D. Lgs. 213/06, all’art. 9 – Utilizzo delle segnalazioni, esiste la possibilità, apertamente contemplata, per l’Autorità Giudiziaria in sede penale, di accedere a tutte le informazioni contenute
nelle due banche dati relativamente agli
eventi raccolti a fini di prevenzione da
ENAC e da ANSV, in tutti i casi nei quali
l’A.G. possa sospettare che qualche segnalazione possa avere rilevanza penale.
E perché ciò avvenga basta poco,
poiché il Codice Penale, contemplando
diversi tipi di “delitti contro l’incolumità pubblica”, quali ad es. sono l’art. 428
– Naufragio, sommersione o disastro
aviatorio”, l’art. 449 – Delitti colposi
di danno (incendio o disastro per caduta di aeromobile adibito al trasporto di
77
Legislazione
persone) – (che però non riguardano la
fattispecie, in quanto dolosi o colposi e
pertanto extra concetto di “just culture”);
mentre solamente il dubbio che un fatto possa riguardare l’art. 432 – Attentati
alla sicurezza dei trasporti -, basterebbe
a dar adito al sospetto che una tale notitia criminis possa essere custodita in
una delle due banche dati, perché queste
possano esser violate nella loro riservatezza dall’A. G. in cerca di prove di reato
Ecco dunque un altro elemento di sfiducia da parte di chiunque fosse intenzionato ad inviare segnalazioni volontarie e riservate, utili ai fini della sicurezza
delle operazioni di volo.
In conclusione, come si può ben vedere, un bel guazzabuglio di norme contraddittorie o penalizzanti, che hanno un
unico risultato: quello di ritardare, se non
di impedire definitivamente, l’accerta-
mento delle vere cause tecniche, così inficiando l’opera di prevenzione degli incidenti da un lato, o quello di sfiduciare
la collaborazione volontaria di segnalatori di eventi nel settore dell’aviazione
civile dall’altro, a vantaggio unicamente
d’una scenografica caccia al colpevole o
presunto tale tra gli operatori di prima linea costretti a prendere le loro decisioni
in pochi attimi e spesso in ambienti organizzativi lacunosi e carenti, sulla base
di tesi accusatorie, alle volte avvallate
dall’intervento di consulenti tecnici d’ufficio autoreferenziati e come tali scelti
dalla Magistrature inquirente.
A tutto ciò, in ambito mondiale, si
cerca di porre rimedio.
Sarà nostra cura cercare di ottenere il
riconoscimento della “Just Culture/no
blame culture” anche in Italia. 
Roma, 5 Agosto 2008
Considerazioni ontologiche e
derivazioni pratiche in aviazione
del Com.te Renzo Dentesano,
Investigatore d’incidenti
aeronautici.
eccezioni. Agli umani appare come eccezione soltanto il fatto non ancora spiegato. I fatti inspiegabili o presunti imprevedibili sono tali perché non se ne è ancora
compreso il meccanismo o le cause, non
si è ancora riusciti ad intendere quali siano le regole che li governano.
Il mondo materiale è un mondo nel
quale le regole non patiscono eccezioni.
Non ci sono oggetti che possano decidere di comportarsi in modo diverso da
quello per cui sono stati determinati dalle regole naturali.
Ma, … quando entra di scena l’uomo,
le cose cambiano.
Anche se dal punto di vista della di-
A
ristotele considerava l’ontologia il fondamento d’ogni
sistema oggettivistico e, riguardo la natura delle cose e del loro
evolvere, ha ragione ancor’oggi.
I fatti naturali fluiscono e si realizzano secondo regole eterne ed immutabili.
Il mondo naturale e materiale è un
mondo nel quale ogni evento ed ogni
soggetto rispondono a regole certe, senza
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Legislazione
pendenza dalle regole naturali le cose
fanno parte della stessa classe di “oggetti”, l’uomo ne differisce ontologicamente:- è un essere unico, caratterizzato da
capacità razionali e dotato di coscienza
e di libertà.
Di conseguenza all’uomo non si applicano solo le leggi della natura (ed in
ciò non differisce da resto); ma egli è soggetto a norme morali e giuridiche, dalle
quali però è libero di discostarsi: alcune
sono scritte nella sua stessa natura, altre
dalla società in cui vive e quest’ultime
non sempre sono le più corrette.
Una collettività umana (detta società
o Stato) è tanto migliore in quanto addotta regole giuste, in armonia con le leggi
naturali, che comunque devono essere
istituite per il bene ed il rispetto comune,
rispettate e fatte rispettare anche riguardo alla certezza della loro applicabilità
“erga omnes”, purché vi sia la certezza
della loro congruità.
Alla nozione di “Stato di diritto” si è
arrivati attraverso millenni di progresso
giuridico, scientifico, tecnico e filosofico.
Questo è lo Stato in cui vige la “just
culture” per l’essere umano.
E’ lo Stato in cui il “fattore umano”
è tenuto nella giusta considerazione:l’uomo, nelle sue azioni, può sbagliare,
in quanto ciò è insito nella sua natura,
ma il dovere della società in cui vive e
lavora è quello di capire per quali ragioni ha potuto involontariamente sbagliare
e perché l’organizzazione per la quale
opera non è stata in grado di prevenire e
di correggere in tempo l’errore involontario iniziale.
Ecco dunque:- si tratta di comprendere cos’è successo.
E per comprendere cos’è successo, in
aviazione, si è giunti da tempo ad aprire
delle investigazioni che siano in grado di
determinare con la massima probabilità
possibile i fattori causali che hanno con-
sentito o favorito l’errore iniziale, fino ad
arrivare ad una conseguenza disastrosa.
Queste investigazioni tecniche, a
differenza dalle indagini giudiziarie,
non cercano il colpevole, bensì cercano
di capire perché un evento imprevisto
e razionalmente poco spiegabile sia
potuto degenerare fino ad assumere la
connotazione di disastro, con perdita di
vite umane.
Ecco dunque che uno Stato di diritto deve darsi delle regole certe anche in
questo campo: qui non basta che venga
emesso un avviso di garanzia nei confronti del presunto autore involontario
della deviazione dalla norma, dell’autore dello sbaglio “umano”, per garantire
che la verità venga a galla attraverso dei
semplici accertamenti procedurali, qui
necessita che l’indagine tecnica venga
condotta con approfondimenti tecnici del
caso, dell’ambiente e dell’essere umano
che vi operava, per arrivare alla certezza
di aver trovato i fattori causali e per poter provvedere acché queste non abbiano
più a ripresentarsi.
Attraverso l’interpretazione scientifica degli elementi emersi da una rigorosa ricerca investigativa si deve riuscir a
determinare i fattori causali che possono esser stati alla base della defaillance
dell’operatore umano e si deve cercare
di porvi rimedio per il futuro, costruendo
delle valide difese contro il ripetersi dello stesso tipo di errore umano.
Solo allora e solo su quelle basi, la
giustizia potrà eventualmente fare il suo
corso, se così sarà necessario in base alle
leggi che la società civile si è data a ragion veduta.
Utopia ? Forse, se anche la prossima
riforma della giustizia nazionale non terrà conto delle ingiustizie commesse finora, in ambito aeronautico, in nome della
Giustizia. 
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IFATCA
INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION
OF AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROLLERS’ ASSOCIATIONS
INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORT
WORKERS FEDERATION
JOINT ITF-IFATCA PRESS RELEASE
Unacceptable Mistreatment of Air Traffic Controllers
in ASECNA Countries
2 September 2008 - The International Transport Workers Federation (ITF) and the
International Federation Of Air Traffic Controllers’ Associations (IFATCA) jointly
condemns the actions of the ASECNA authorites to detain, suspend and otherwise
harass the air traffic controllers of our members in the federation of ASECNA.
We have been following the recent events and are aware of the industrial action
which has recently taken place and the suspensions which followed for 14 of our affiliates members.
We were particularly concerned at this response since the strike was suspended by
our affiliates in its second day after receiving verbal promises from the Prime Minister
of Niger.
We now understand that the Burkina Faso authorities have also decided to dissolve
the federation of ASECNA ATC association (FAPCAA).
This sequence of events is unnecessarily escalating an already difficult situation in
the region.
Our members suspended the strike in good faith on the second day and yet
have been seriously abused by suspensions and their Union threatened with derecognition.
We ask you urgently to lift the suspensions immediately and to refrain from further
sanctions in order to establish a positive framework in which management and union
leaders can come together and begin to discuss the issues and reach a satisfactory way
forward for everyone.
It should be noted that the ICAO Africa and Indian Ocean (AFI) region which encompasses the ASECNA States in Africa, is to implement Reduced Vertical Separation
Minimum (RVSM) procedures in the region with effect from 25 September 2008.
Needless to say, the safe and efficient introduction of RVSM requires the availability of an adequate number of properly qualified and highly motivated workforce of
air traffic controllers.
ASECNA’s action to continue the suspension and support of detention of a number
of controllers is a very negative development that threatens to affect the safety of flight
operations in the airspace and airports under ASECNA’s control.
It is vital for our members but also for the economies and general well being of the
various states in the region, that air traffic control services are placed on a more secure
basis which will continue to give confidence to the traveling public.
Only an effective return to the negotiating table can achieve this goal. 
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