COMMITMENT DECISIONS UNDER
THE ITALIAN COMPETITION LAW:
decline of antitrust enforcement?
Rome, April 16th 2010
Fabiana Di Porto
University of Siena
([email protected])
Commitment decisions
New powers to AGCM
(L.-dec. 223/06 modif. antitrust L.– leg.-dec. 145 and 146/07)




Interim measures (art. 14-bis antitrust L.)
Leniency programs (art. 15 § 2-bis antitrust L.)
Commitment decisions (art. 14-ter antitrust L.)
Unfair commercial practices (arts. Consumers’
code  mix of market/consumer protection)
Further pro-consumers measures
 Class actions (art. 140-bis Consumer’s code, Legdecree 206/05)

Liberalisation measures: loans’ portability; multibrand insurance distributors, etc. (L.dec. 7/07)
Commitment decisions – the discipline 1
Article 14-ter
Commitments
1. Within 3 months from notification of the launch of an investigation into
the possible violation of Sections 2 or 3 of this law or Articles [101] or
[102] of the [TFEU], companies may offer commitments that would
correct the anti-competitive conduct which is the subject of the
investigation. The Authority may, after having assessed the suitability of
such commitments and within the limits of EU law, make them binding
on those companies and terminate the proceeding without
ascertaining the contravention.
2. If the commitments made binding under Paragraph 1 are not
observed, the Authority may levy a fine of up to 10 percent of turnover.
3. The Authority, [ex officio], may reopen the proceeding if:
a) there is a change in a factual element of the case on which the
decision was based;
b) the companies concerned act contrary to their commitments;
c) the decision was based on information provided by the parties
which is shown to be incomplete, inexact or misleading.
Commitment decisions – the discipline 2
Procedure: AGCM’s Communication (12.10.06)
1. Presentation within 3 months from notification
• Form
• term non-peremptory (Tar Lazio 2902/08-Tim/Vodafone/Wind), to
be coordinated with leniency programs (art. 15 §2-bis)
• Preliminary presentation  meetings  definite version submitted
2. Publication of commitments on Bulletin & on website – unless manifestly
inadequate
• Hard core cartels  AGCM rejects (Produttori vernici marine 2007;
Gare per la fornitura di dispositivi per stomia 2007)
• Highly discretional decision – antitrust policy (Tar Lazio 2900/08)
• Derogatory decision  strict application (Tar Lazio 2902/08)
3. AGCM sets a date for final decision
4. Market test (30 days from publication):
• third parties may present written observations to proposed commit.s
• AGCM may request more info to assess value of commit.s
• Parties may reply to third parties and propose further changes
5. AGCM decides whether to accept/modify/reject commitments
1. Jurisprudential imits
Commitment
decisions
– the
the
discipline 3
• Commit.s
must be suitable
in correcting
anti-competitive
conduct being investigated
• Strictly related to competition problems
• Easily fully and rapidly enforceable (TAR Lazio14157/07)
• Not exceed remedies AGCM would otherwise impose (Alrosa
TFI -170/06 of 11.7.07; TAR Lazio 4994/09; contra: ConSta 424/08)
• control of proportionality
 no disproportion between proposed commit.s and
contested conducts (stricter in EC than IT: e.g. Merk/Principi
attivi 2007, where AGCM accepted commitments in sidemarkets and notwithstanding interim measure brought anticompetitive conduct to an end)
 adequacy in the double sense of necessary and
indispensable (not excessive) to meet the competition
concerns (Tar Lazio 4994/09 on AGCM’s decision “Servizi di
soccorso autostradale” (A391 of 2008), an alleged ADP in market
for highways’ emergency services settled through commit.s.
Decision annulled on the ground that by accepting commitments
and by making them binding the AGCM has created a brand new
regime for access to the market, thus acting as a regulator. Not
only had the AGCM unlawfully overcome its antitrust powers, but
the new regime it created (a tender procedure) was far more
restrictive than the one in place before its intervention (an
authorization regime)).
Commitment decisions – the discipline 4
market test
Investig.
opening
no hard
core
restrictions
e.g. hard
core restric.s
Commit.s
proposed
(3 months from
SoO –
peremptory)
(3rd parties’ observations)
www.agcm.it
(ev. modificat. of
commitments)
AGCM’s evaluation of
suitability of
proposed commit.s
no commits
proposed
(AGCM would
sanction)
commitments
manifestly
inadequate
Public.n of
proposed
commit.s
Binding commitments
No violation
(- no infringement assessment
(- no sanctions
(- file closed
Proceeding re-opened if:
Infringement
assessment +
sanction/
remedies
-Factual modifications
-Violation of commitments
-Commitments based on
incomplete/false/misleading infos
fine up to10%
turnover
Commitment decisions – pros&cons/1

Catricalà (President AGCM): “dawn of a new antitrust
law era” (Ann. Rep. 2007)

Polo (Prof. at Bocconi): AGCM’s role is shifting from
judge (ex post) to regulator (ex ante); “closed
confrontation between AGCM and involved parties”;
inadequate instrument in the long run (sole24ore 2007)

Nicita (Prof. at Siena Univ.) “One may suspect that in
the game of deterrence/sanctioning/leniency AGCM
may forget that the carrot is effective when the threat
of the stick is credible. Constant forgiving may induce
perverse incentives: [better] violating antitrust laws,
accepting to eventually ex post give up some rents,
when negotiating commitments, if and when one is
‘cought’...” (homepage 31/05/07)
Commitment decisions – pros&cons/2
pros
cons
A • wider range of enf.t instruments
G • < time consuming proceedings
(no proof)
C
• easy & quick intervention
M
 < effectiveness of antitrust enf.t
 capture
 no exact definition of conduct
F
I
R
M
S
 opportunistic behaviours
 < deterrence (compared to
sanctions)
 < actions for damages (<private
• < adm.ve costs
• easy control over
commitments’ infringements
• market test (responsiveness)
•
•
•
•
no infringements assessment
no sanctions
approachable administration
< actions for damages (private
enforcement)
• avoid reputational damages
 regulatory power
 reduced transparency
enforcement)
 limit to ex ante incentives for procompetitive behaviours
 bad incentives in the long run
Commitment decisions – cases/1
 Salonico (Freshfields) “90% of AGCM’s
proceedings end up in commitment
decisions”
(Sole24Ore 21.5.08)
Perceptions matter…
Commitment decisions – cases/2
= commit.s
= non violation
= violation + sanction
viol.
non
viol.
commit.
IT
2
viol.
non
viol.
commit
Agr.
EC
101
tot
commit/
decisions
2006
2
2
-
-
2
1
1
-
0/4
2007
11
6+1
1
4
3
2
1
-
4/14
2008
3
1
-
2
4
-
1
2
4/7
2009
7
3
1
3
1
1
-
-
3/8
tot
11/33
(33% ca)
Commitment decisions – cases/4
= commit.s
= non violation
= violation + sanction
viol.
non
viol.
commit.
IT
3
viol.
non
viol.
commit.
Abuse
CE
102
tot
commit/
decisions
2006
5
4
-
1
-
-
-
-
1/5
2007
6
1+1
-
4
2
-
-
2
6/8
2008
7
2
-
5
3
-
-
3
8/10
2009
5
1
-
4
-
-
-
-
4/5
tot
19/28
(67% ca)
Commitment decisions – cases/3
type of agreem./commit. (up to 2007, art. 101 TFUE)
= commit.
tot
case
4
2
(*)
case
= violation + sanction
type agrmt
a. ACCORDI INTERBANCARI
“ABI-CO.GE.BAN”
b. ORDINE DEI MEDICI
VETERINARI DI TORINO
c. PREZZI DEI CARBURANTI
IN RETE
d. A.D.S. ACCERTAMENTI
DIFFUSIONE STAMPAAUDIPRESS (*)
horizontal
e. PRODUTTORI VERNICI
MARINE
f. PRODUTTORI DI PANNELLI
TRUCIOLARI IN LEGNO
horizontal
hard core
d.1 A.D.S. ACCERTAMENTI
DIFFUSIONE STAMPAAUDIPRESS
type commit.t/sanction
behav.l
a. reduction bank
commissions
b. abolition tariffs,
reform ethical code
d. Obblig.n to account
for free press
(commit.s only for
Audipress)
struct.l
c. facilities’ sharing
(boycott/
market
sharing)
(boycott)
commit.s rejected + partial sanction
assessment of infringement +
sanction for ADS
Commitment decisions – cases/5
tipe abuse/commit. (2006-07, 102 TFUE + 3 antitrust L.)
7
case
type abuse
type commit./sanction
1
a. Prezzi carburanti in rete
raising rivals’
costs
struct.l/
behav.l
a. facilities’ sharing +
other
3
a. Merk-Principi attivi
b. Gestione utilizzo capacità
rigassificazione
c. Tele2/TIM-Vodafone-Wind*
refusal to
deal
struct.l
b. free licenses
c. gas release
d. only Vodafone
1
d. Comportamenti restrittivi sulla
borsa elettrica
different.d
/excessive
prices
struct.l
d. virtual capacity
release
1
e. Autostrade/Carta prepagata
Vacard (failed to reimbourse
expired prepaid cards)
f. Poste/Concessionari
(auctions)
Unfavour.
contractual
conditions
behav.l
e. elimin.n expiry date +
reimboursement
f. rise Q/type of
auctioned service+
elimin. costly clauses
1
g. Enel Distribuzione (billing of
former unpaid bills as
condition for connection)
Exploit. of
final
customers
behav.l
g. modific. procedures
for connect. Of new
customers
Tele2/TIM-Vodafone-Wind
sanction of TIM and WIND, no commit.s presented
*
c.1
(weak)
Commitment decisions – critics
 Dialogue vs sanction
Enforcement pyramid (Ayres&Braithwaite
1992)
 compliance & deterrence (smoking gun)
 Accountability of AGCM
 market test ()
 judicial review
 Regulatory powers for AGCM?
proportionality (Alrosa)
principle of legality (Tar MI 5005/09)
Commitment decisions – conclusions
Are we witnessing the decline of antitrust
enforcement?
Antitrust only ex post, not ex ante
are we sure?
Antitrust should only intervene where there is no
regulation
can antitrust correct regulatory failures?
what the relationship?
what can we learn from Linkline?
comments are welcome
[email protected]
thank you for your attention!