Biometry to enhance smart
card security
(MOC using TOC protocol)
Giampaolo Bella – Stefano Bistarelli – Fabio Martinelli
Università degli Studi “G. d’Annunzio”
Dipartimento di Scienze - Pescara
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Overview
• Biometry and smart cards
– TOC, MOC, SOC
• Procotols between application/hardware
– A MOC protocol
– A MOC via TOC protocol
• Towards a formal specification/analysis
• Discussion…
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Biometry
• Acquisition of bio-features that almost
uniquely identify entities
• From bio to digital world
– Fingerprint:
• image acquisition from a scanner
• template acquisition from the imagine
– The template stores the useful information obtained from
the image
• match algorithms receive as inputs two templates and
returns true iff the two templates are compatible
– Bio-information is usually public in the sense that
it can be ``easily’’ acquired.
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Smart cards
• Smart devices with computational and
storage resources
• Criptoki (PKCS#11) is the interface
smart-cards/applications
• Access to smart card functions through
a PIN
– We consider protocols that use also
biometric authentication
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Biometry and smart cards
• Applying biometric authentication to log on
the smart card:
– Template On Card (TOC): Only the template is
stored on board
• Requires very cheap cards
– Match On Card (MOC): The template is on the
smart card, the match is performed on board, the
live template acquisition is external
• Requires smart-cards with ``strong’’ computational
power
– System On Card (SOC): Each phase is internally
performed
• Requires currently expensive technology
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Template on Card (TOC)
• Template on Card
Smart Card
Biometric
Template
Biometric
Template
Biometric Input
User
Grant
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Match on Card (MOC)
• Match on Card
Smart Card
Biometric
Template
Biometric Input
CPU
User
Grant
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System on Card
• System on Card
Smart Card
Biometric Input
Biometric
Template
User
Grant
CPU
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A MOC protocol
•
•
•
•
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Goal: MOC + key establishment
Correctness doesn’t depend on biometry but on cryptography
The live template is a fresh scanner acquisition
The live template is kept secret for privacy reasons
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A MOC using TOC protocol
• CM is the criptoki match module
• CM signs a hash of the pair of templates only if they match
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Verification challenges?
• Biometry adds no problems
• ``Incremental’’ protocols – the two are
equivalent from the application viewpoint
– Functional
– Security
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Formal specification
• Process algebra for functional and security
aspects
– Basic sending/receiving operations
• Basic operators as sequencing (.); parallel composiiton (|)
• We have 4 different players
– Two specifications for the smart cards
• SMOC and SMT
– The criptoki C and the match module M
• MOC protocol: SMOC | C
• MOC using TOC : SMT | M | C
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– The criptoki and the match module may be distinct
processes (they share no knowledge)
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Towards formal security
analysis
• MOC is ``secure’’
– Correspondence analysis:
• Control actions to express user’ beliefs
– Smart cards issues Start(S,C,Tstored)
– Criptoki issues End(C,S,Tlive)
– For every enemy X,
• SMOC | C | X when restricted to control actions is trace
equivalent to Start(S,C,Tstored).End(C,S,Tlive) and
Tstored and Tlive match
• MOC using TOC is ``as secure as’’ MOC
– For every enemy X,
• SMT |C | M | X =control actions SMOC | C | X
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Questions?
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