Market coupling: looking at the future of the Italian Power Exchange Anna Creti, Eileen Fumagalli IEFE Università Bocconi Elena Fumagalli Politecnico di Milano Giusi Squicciarini Autorità per l’energia elettrica e il gas I mercati energetici in Italia - Dip. Matematica, MIP, AIGET 20 Novembre 2008 Outline Introduction Literature review The international context The Italian electricity market Problem definition Conclusions IEFE Università Bocconi - Politecnico di Milano - Autorità per l'energia elettrica e il gas 2 Introduction Existing electricity markets in Europe are national in scope Market integration Potential benefits: economic efficiency (decrease in market concentration) and security of supply Market integration in Europe is a reality (only in some restricted areas) Strong commitment at institutional level (ERGEG Regional Initiatives) Italy: no economic debate on this major policy decision IEFE Università Bocconi - Politecnico di Milano - Autorità per l'energia elettrica e il gas 3 This work Is market integration a good choice for the Italian electricity market? Eliminate inefficiencies in cross-border exchange Modification of the market design Feasibility of the arrangement Net efficiency gains from coupling IEFE Università Bocconi - Politecnico di Milano - Autorità per l'energia elettrica e il gas 4 Literature review (1) Relevant economic concepts regarding electricity market integration: literature on nodal pricing and transmission congestion Market integration has the potential to increase economic efficiency and to mitigate market power Ehrenmann and Neuhoff, 2003 Neuhoff, 2003 Gilbert at al., 2004 Willems, 2002 IEFE Università Bocconi - Politecnico di Milano - Autorità per l'energia elettrica e il gas 5 Literature review (2) Nordic market Belgian-Dutch market, ex-ante evaluation Kube and Wadhwa (2007) ex-post evaluation (+) Neuhoff (2003) Cournot-Stackelberg (+ Belgian consumers, - Dutch consumers) Petrov et al. (2003) supply function equilibrium, no transmission constraints (+) Hobbs et al. (2005) Cournot model (+, with caveats) Neuhoff et al., (2004) Differences in the treatment of transmission allocation and pricing models can make a significant difference in the conclusions of different models, even if they all are Cournot in energy sales IEFE Università Bocconi - Politecnico di Milano - Autorità per l'energia elettrica e il gas 6 Literature review (3) Simple market models Extension of the same conclusions to national markets should be considered with some caution More sophisticated models Real markets: results are likely to be effected by several factors, including market architecture, technical characteristics of the production industry, market structure, institutional aspects IEFE Università Bocconi - Politecnico di Milano - Autorità per l'energia elettrica e il gas 7 The international context: market model Prevalent market model Separate bilateral markets Separate clearing of the day-ahead auctions Explicit auctioning for the allocation of crossborder capacities: transmission rights are allocated separately and independently from energy (by TSOs) IEFE Università Bocconi - Politecnico di Milano - Autorità per l'energia elettrica e il gas 8 The international context: integration methods Integration of day-ahead markets: implicit auctions Market splitting: Based on the bid/offer information, the PX establishes both flows across and prices in the different market areas. In case of network congestion, the PX separates the market in two or more price areas, while utilizing the available capacity between congested areas. Market coupling: the co-operation between two or more PXs ensures that during every hour of operation the available trading capacity is utilised with power flowing from low price areas to high price areas Price or volume coupling IEFE Università Bocconi - Politecnico di Milano - Autorità per l'energia elettrica e il gas 9 The international context: Nordpool, TLC, ERI Nordic Power Market (Nord Pool) TriLateral market Coupling (TLC) started in 2006 Started as the Norwegian power exchange in 1995, extended to Sweden in 1996, Finland in 1998, Denmark in 2000 and partly also to Germany in 2005 (Kontek area) Powernext in France (2001) and APX in The Netherlands (1999) Belpex in Belgium (2006), at the same time as TLC MIBEL started in 2007 Spain (OMEL) and Portugal (OMIP): OMI (Iberian Market Operator) IEFE Università Bocconi - Politecnico di Milano - Autorità per l'energia elettrica e il gas 10 The Italian electricity market On Italian borders: explicit auction Harmonized Auction Rules: Italy, France, Switzerland, Austria, Slovenia and Greece Day-ahead timeframe, “implicit auctions are more efficient than explicit auctions and should be the target mechanism for all regions” [ERGEG, 2008] IEFE Università Bocconi - Politecnico di Milano - Autorità per l'energia elettrica e il gas 11 Inefficiencies of an explicit auction: findings Studies have found different types of inefficiencies Incorrect utilisation (wrong sign nominations): imperfect arbitrage Underutilisation of interconnector capacity Firmness of capacity Compensation, in the event of curtailment Operational risk Trading risk and costs Newbery and McDaniel (2002); Tornquist (2006); Kristiansen (2007); EC (2007); Meeus (2008); GME (2008) IEFE Università Bocconi - Politecnico di Milano - Autorità per l'energia elettrica e il gas 12 Inefficient flows: FR-NL (2005) Nominated cross-border net exchange: French-Dutch border (2005) [Meeus, 2008] IEFE Università Bocconi - Politecnico di Milano - Autorità per l'energia elettrica e il gas 13 Problem definition Inefficiencies arise when transmission capacity is allocated through explicit auctions ? IEFE Università Bocconi - Politecnico di Milano - Autorità per l'energia elettrica e il gas 14 Inefficient flows: FR-IT (2007) Inefficient flow direction Data from: GME, (2008) IEFE Università Bocconi - Politecnico di Milano - Autorità per l'energia elettrica e il gas 15 Problem definition Inefficiencies arise when transmission capacity is allocated through explicit auctions Market integration is the preferable choice for the Italian electricity market ? IEFE Università Bocconi - Politecnico di Milano - Autorità per l'energia elettrica e il gas 16 Problem definition Inefficiencies arise when transmission capacity is allocated through explicit auctions Market integration is the preferable choice for the Italian electricity market ? Modification of the market design Feasibility of a coupling arrangement Identify the net efficiency gains that might be achieved with market integration IEFE Università Bocconi - Politecnico di Milano - Autorità per l'energia elettrica e il gas 17 Problem definition Inefficiencies arise when transmission capacity is allocated through explicit auctions Market integration is the preferable choice for the Italian electricity market ? Modification of the market design Feasibility of a coupling arrangement Identify the net efficiency gains that might be achieved with market integration IEFE Università Bocconi - Politecnico di Milano - Autorità per l'energia elettrica e il gas 18 Feasibility: day-ahead markets Day-ahead markets in the Central South region (Austria, France, Germany, Greece Italy, Slovenia) Markets with physical delivery (no France) Bilateral trading (no Greece) Common rules for explicit auctions (no Germany) IEFE Università Bocconi - Politecnico di Milano - Autorità per l'energia elettrica e il gas 19 Feasibility: products traded Traded products Italy and Slovenia: hourly products Austria, France and Germany: hourly and block orders Block orders: Clearing mechanism based on iterations between the central auction office and the different PXs (as in TLC) Implementing of block constraints in the central solver algorithm (more efficient) Implement volume coupling IEFE Università Bocconi - Politecnico di Milano - Autorità per l'energia elettrica e il gas 20 Feasibility: timing Heterogeneity in gate closure times and computation time IEFE Università Bocconi - Politecnico di Milano - Autorità per l'energia elettrica e il gas 21 Feasibility: algorithms Market clearing algorithms Market splitting (Italy and Greece) Uniform purchasing prices (Italy and Greece) Coherence of cross-border flows Time to run the local market clearing algorithms Implement volume coupling Coordination with other coupling mechanisms (TLC includes France) IEFE Università Bocconi - Politecnico di Milano - Autorità per l'energia elettrica e il gas 22 Feasibility: settlements and liquidity Settlements Harmonization to the shorter time frames would require PXs in Italy, Austria and Greece to settle cross-border trades in advance of domestic trades: PXs would have to take non zero net financial positions Market liquidity Slovenian market: extremely low liquidity Market coupling is going to increase the liquidity of the involved markets IEFE Università Bocconi - Politecnico di Milano - Autorità per l'energia elettrica e il gas 23 Conclusions Implicit auctions are more efficient solutions than explicit auctions for the day-ahead allocation of cross-border transmission capacity ≠ ≠ Efficiency gains in market coupling Harmonization of day-ahead market design Practical difficulties need to be carefully addressed Assuming volume coupling: they do not appear so critical as to prevent a progressive integration of the Italian market with neighbouring markets IEFE Università Bocconi - Politecnico di Milano - Autorità per l'energia elettrica e il gas 24 Work ahead Analysis of potential efficiency gains from coupling of the day-ahead Italian market Include structure and technical features of the markets involved Empirical studies and simulations rather than theoretical work IEFE Università Bocconi - Politecnico di Milano - Autorità per l'energia elettrica e il gas 25 Open questions As regional markets are becoming a reality in Europe, open questions are numerous Creation of regional TSO or PX Inter-regional coordination Choice of the capacity model Flow-based models Coupling of intra-day and integration of balancing markets … IEFE Università Bocconi - Politecnico di Milano - Autorità per l'energia elettrica e il gas 26