Analysis No. 192, August 2013
LEADERSHIP TURNOVERS IN SUB-SAHARAN
AFRICA: FROM VIOLENCE AND COUPS TO
PEACEFUL ELECTIONS?
Giovanni Carbone
Many African countries replaced their military or single-party regimes with pluralist politics during
the early 1990s. This led to the introduction and regularisation of multiparty elections for the
selection of a country’s president or prime minister. Of course, in many places, elections were not
enough to start genuine democratization processes, as non-democratic rulers rapidly learned how to
manipulate the vote and survive in the new political environment. Yet empirical evidence from our
new “Leadership change” dataset – covering all 49 sub-Saharan states since 1960 (or subsequent
year of independence) to 2012 – shows that elections did alter quite profoundly the way ordinary
Africans can influence the selection and ousting of their leaders. Coups are now a rarer phenomenon,
leadership turnovers have become more frequent, and peaceful alternation in power through the
ballot box, if still uncommon, is part of a new political landscape.
©ISPI2013
Giovanni Carbone, Associate Professor of Political Science, Università degli Studi di Milano
1
The opinions expressed herein are strictly personal and do not necessarily reflect the position of ISPI.
The ISPI online papers are also published with the support of Cariplo
©ISPI2013
The Arab Spring protests brought to the fore, once again, the issue of how
to oust immovable authoritarian leaders. Tunisia’s Zine El-Abidine Ben
Ali had been in power for 24 years. Hosni Mubarak ruled Egypt for 30
years. Muhammar Ghaddafi reigned over Libya for 42 years, while
Syrians are still to see the end of the 43-year long rule of the al-Assad
family. As authoritarian repression and widespread corruption coupled
with growing economic hardship, the politics of many Middle East and
North African countries became potentially explosive, and a single spark
triggered a string of popular protests that spread rapidly across national
borders. People insisted that their leaders go. In some countries they
managed to force out incumbent rulers, in some others they did not – or at
least not yet. In the process, Arab protesters and reformers also demanded
guarantees that, in the future, they would be in a better position to
replace their leaders in case they do not perform, they rule too harshly, or
they are simply disliked by the population. This called for the introduction
of truly competitive elections – an unrivalled mechanism for ensuring that
political leaders can be ousted and replaced at regular intervals through
constitutional means.
While pressures for political change were redesigning Mediterranean
Africa, countries on the other side of the Sahara were only marginally
affected by the events of the Arab Spring. This is partly because
sub-Saharan Africans had already been through their own season of
political reforms. Back in the early 1990s, a wave of political openings had
been ignited by the same cocktail of authoritarian rule, predatory
corruption and economic decline that was at work in the Arab world in
2011. In the space of a few years, single-party regimes and military rulers
were replaced by pluralist political systems virtually everywhere in black
Africa. Opposition forces were legalized, multiparty parliaments were
established, independent courts, free media and civic associations were
gradually allowed to emerge. At the heart of it all, elections began to be
contested by competing candidates and political parties.
Needless to say, while pluralist elections became the norm in sub-Saharan
Africa since the 1990s, only a few countries actually satisfied
internationally recognized standards of “democratic” rule. Yet, there is
little question that the average degree of democracy in the region
improved quite dramatically. The last decade of the twentieth century
definitely marked a political watershed and, whatever the shortcomings of
contemporary African regimes, they are generally much more open than
they were 25 years ago. This is evident if we look at Figures 1 and 2, based
on one of the best-known indexes of democracy. Out of scale ranging from 10 (least democratic) to + 10 (most democratic), sub-Saharan countries
jumped up from a - 5.8 average in 1989 to + 2.5 in 2010 (Figure 1). While
the latter score is still modest in absolute terms, the overall change marks
a very impressive 8-point improvement. The watershed of the early 1990s
2
While pressures for
political change were
redesigning
Mediterranean Africa,
countries on the other side
of the Sahara were only
marginally affected by the
events of the Arab Spring.
This is partly because
sub-Saharan Africans had
already been through their
own season of political
reforms
is quite visible from the graph. Similarly, if we single out states that are
deemed democratic (i.e. scoring + 6 or more on the Polity2 scale, see
Figure 2), their number as a share of all countries on the continent
increased quite noticeably from less than 6.5% in 1989 to a peak of 45.8%
in 2007, only slightly receding to 41.7% in 2010. More generally, the
overall share of country-years that African states spent under democratic
rule went up threefold, from 9.8% in the 1960-1989 period to 31.7% in the
1990-2010 period (Table 1).
The widespread introduction and the centrality of multiparty elections in
Africa’s reformed regimes supposedly altered the way politics is played out
south of the Sahara. Competitive elections, in particular, are primarily a
tool for the selection of a country’s political leadership. Accordingly, it is
reasonable to assume that the way in which political leaders are selected
and ousted in Africa was significantly adjusted after 1990. In a region
better known for military coups, violent conflicts and irresponsible rulers,
regular pluralist elections should have shaken up things. But do these
assumptions and expectations correspond to political reality? How was the
selection of leaders, their duration in power and the way they are replaced
affected by the new electoral environment? Building on over two decades
of evidence, we were able to construct a comprehensive “Leadership
Change” (LC) dataset – covering all 49 sub-Saharan states since 1960 (or
subsequent year of independence) to 2012 – to provide
empirically-informed answers to this kind of questions1.
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
-1
-2
-3
-4
-5
-6
-7
-8
-9
-10
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
2010
Figure 1 - Annual average degree of democracy (Polity2
score) for the region, 1960-2010
©ISPI2013
Source: author’s elaboration of data from Polity IV Project, www.systemicpeace.org
I am grateful to Anita Bianchi for assistance in data gathering and analysis and to Filippo
Gregorini for data analysis.
1
3
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
2010
Figure 2 - Share of democracies (i.e. Polity2 ≥ 6) among
sub-Saharan political regimes, 1960-2010
Source: Polity IV Project, www.systemicpeace.org
Democracy
Authoritarian rule
Total
1960-1989
1990-2010
1960-2010
9.8 % (115)
31.7 % (335)
19.9 % (454)
90.2 % (1063)
68.3 % (721)
80.1 % (1827)
100.0 % (1178)
100.0 % (1056)
100.0 % (2281)
Table 1 - Percentage of country-years under democracy or autocracy
(absolute values in brackets), 1960-2010
Notes: A country is deemed “democratic” when Polity2 is ≥ 6.
Source: Polity IV Project, www.systemicpeace.org
©ISPI2013
Political leaders in post-independence Africa
Independent Africa has a record of long overstaying rulers. Omar Bongo,
who led Gabon for 42 years up until his death in 2009, tops this special
league. He is followed by Gnassingbé Eyadéma of Togo, who also died in
office in 2005 after 38 years in power. In both cases, rule was so
personalised that, after they died in office, the two presidents were
quickly replaced by their sons Ali Bongo Ondimba and Faure Gnassingbé.
As many as 34 African leaders ruled their countries for 20 years or more
(Table 2 and Figure 3). Eleven of them remained in power for 30 years or
more. Their rule stretched across profoundly different political eras.
Mobutu Sese Seko, for example, took power in the Congo when Lyndon
Johnson was in the White House, and he was only ousted at the time of
Boris Yeltsin’s second term in post-Soviet Russia. José Eduardo dos
Santos still rules Angola despite being inaugurated when Leonid
Brezhnev was in the Kremlin. It may thus not come as a surprise that a
4
©ISPI2013
few post-independence African rulers – including Hastings Banda of
Malawi and Francisco Macías Nguema of Equatorial Guinea – declared
themselves “presidents for life”.
Long stays in office also implied that the citizens of a few countries have hardly
ever seen a leadership handover. This only occurred once, for example, in the
entire independent history of Angola (1979), Cameroon (1982), Swaziland
(1983), Gambia (1994) and Djibouti (1999). Zimbabwe, on the other hand, has
been ruled by Robert Mugabe uninterruptedly since independence in 1980.
The same goes for Africa’s most recently-born states, namely Eritrea (under
Isaias Afewerki since 1993) and South Sudan (governed by Salva Kiir
Mayardit since its founding in 2011). As of 2013, Africa still counted 10 heads
of state who had been in office for at least two decades.
Leader
In power from/to
Omar Bongo (Gabon)
1967-2009
Consecutive
years in office
42
Gnassingbé Eyadéma (Togo)
1967-2005
38
Josè Eduardo dos Santos (Angola)
1979-2013 (in office)
34
Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo (Equatorial Guinea)
1979-2013 (in office)
34
Félix Houphouët-Boigny (Cote d'Ivoire)
1960-1993
33
Haile Selassie I (Ethiopia)
1941-1974
33
Robert Mugabe (Zimbabwe)
1980-2013 (in office)
33
Joseph-Désiré Mobutu (Congo, Dem. Rep.)
1965-1997
32
Paul Bija (Cameroon)
1982-2013 (in office)
31
Hastings Banda (Malawi)
1964-1994
30
Mswati III (Swaziland)
1983*-2013 (in office)
30
Dawda Jawara (Gambia)
1965-1994
29
William Tubman (Liberia)
1944-1971
27
France-Albert René (Seychelles)
1977-2004
27
Kenneth Kaunda (Zambia)
1964-1991
27
Yoweri Museveni (Uganda)
1986-2013 (in office)
27
Ahmed Sékou Touré (Guinea)
1958-1984
26
Blaise Compaoré (Burkina Faso)
1987-2013 (in office)
26
Lansana Conté (Guinea)
1984-2008
24
Daniel arap Moi (Kenya)
1978-2002
24
Julius Nyerere (Tanzania)
1961-1985
24
Omar Al-Bashir (Sudan)
1989-2013 (in office)
24
Moussa Traoré (Mali)
1968-1991
23
Idriss Déby (Chad)
1990-2013 (in office)
23
Ahmadou Ahidjo (Cameroon)
1960-1982
22
Hassan Gouled Aptidon (Djibouti)
1977-1999
22
Mohamed Siad Barre (Somalia)
1969-1991
22
Meles Zenawi (Ethiopia)
1991-2012
21
Maaouya Ould Sid'Ahmed Taya (Mauritania)
1984-2005
21
Juvénal Habyarimana (Rwanda)
1973-1994
21
Léopold Sédar Senghor (Senegal)
1960-1981
21
Isaias Afewerki (Eritrea)
1993-2013 (in office)
20
Jerry Rawlings (Ghana)
1981-2001
20
Leabua Jonathan (Lesotho)
1966-1986
20
Table 2: African leaders in power for 20 years or more
Source: “Leadership Change” dataset.
5
Serie1; 10-19;
56
Serie1; 20-29;
24
Serie1; 30-39;
10
Serie1; 40 or
more; 1
Figure 3: Number of African leaders in power for 10 years
or more
Source: “Leadership Change” dataset.
Besides the overstay tendency of many African rulers, however, a number
of countries in the region were notoriously affected by the opposite
syndrome, namely the instability of leadership produced by frequent
military coup d’état. The region’s long string of military takeovers was
inaugurated as far back as 1963, when soldiers ousted and murdered
Togo’s first president Sylvanus Olympio. The states that would be most
affected by this phenomenon include Nigeria, Mauritania and the
Comoros islands, which had six coups each. Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana
and Sierra Leone had five. Burundi, Niger and Guinea-Bissau had four,
while the Central African Republic, Lesotho, Mali, Sudan and Uganda
had three. In countries such as Equatorial Guinea, the Gambia or Chad,
direct military interventions seemed to be virtually the only way power
could be passed on from one leader to another.
Military coups were not only more frequent in certain individual countries,
but affected the north and western parts of Africa in particular. If one
draws a line across the continent, from Nairobi in Kenya to Luanda in
Angola, 26 of the 32 states (i.e. 81.2%) that lie north of it suffered at least
one military takeover (with the notable exceptions of Cameroon, Senegal
and Cape Verde in West Africa, Eritrea, Djibouti and South Sudan in the
©ISPI2013
Horn), whereas only 4 of 16 countries (i.e. 25.0%) south of this imaginary
line did (these are the enclave state of Lesotho and the island states of
Madagascar, Seychelles and Comoros).
It was during the 1960s and 1970s that coups became an especially
common way of ousting leaders (see Figure 4), as they often enjoyed a
6
degree of popular and at times even external support. International
legitimacy for military takeovers, however, gradually waned, contributing
to their declining incidence in Africa. Yet coups were still relatively
frequent during the 1980s and the politically fluid 1990s. In absolute as
well as in relative terms (i.e. the ratio of coups over the overall number of
country-years in a given decade; the latter increases gradually as former
colonies achieve independence or new countries are created), the largest
fall took place in the first decade of the new millennium, as electoral
procedures appeared to take root more fully on the continent.
Figure 4 - Coups d’état by decade, 1961-2010
Source: “Leadership Change” dataset.
©ISPI2013
Multiparty elections and the regularization of leadership changes?
Post-independence sub-Saharan Africa, as pointed out, suffered from two
opposite syndromes. On the one hand, the excessively long stay in power
of a number of rulers. On the other hand, the instability of leaders all too
frequently ousted by soldiers through “irregular” means. Leadership
changes, in other words, hardly ever occurred through proper, predictable
and regular procedures. How was this scenario altered by the multiparty
reforms of the 1990s? Did the introduction of elections affect the way
African leaders succeed to each other? Three main patterns emerge from
the data.
First, leadership changes have become significantly more frequent over
the past two decades. A clear break is apparent in Figure 5. While Africa
7
Post-independence
sub-Saharan Africa, as
pointed out, suffered from
two opposite syndromes.
On the one hand, the
excessively long stay in
power of a number of
rulers. On the other hand,
the instability of leaders
all too frequently ousted
by soldiers through
“irregular” means
©ISPI2013
featured an average 3.3 leadership changes every year over the thirty
years following independence, this number rose considerably to 5.2 in the
1991-2010 period. This is in line with the expectation that constitutional
systems based on pluralist elections and, often, term limits, in spite of a
deplorable tendency to interfere with both on the part of many rulers, help
Africans ensure a more regular turnover in power.
Second, a striking new pattern also emerges when we turn to the diverse
modes of leadership change (Figure 6). The latter are here categorized into
“peaceful non-electoral transitions” (when, for example, Senegal’s Léopold
Senghor, Cameroon’s Ahmadou Ahidjo or Tanzania’s Julius Nyerere
resigned in the early and mid-1980s, power was peacefully handed over to
their successors); “multiparty elections for the executive” (as was the case
when Daniel Arap Moi stepped down in Kenya or when Nicéphore Soglo
was defeated in Benin); “military coups” (like the ones that brought to
power Siad Barre in Somalia in 1969 or Juvénal Habyarimana in Rwanda
in 1973); and, finally, “guerrilla takeovers” (such as the one that brought
Yoweri Museveni to power in Uganda, in 1986, or Meles Zenawi in
Ethiopia, in 1991).
Unsurprisingly, coups were the most common way of replacing leaders in
Africa over the 1960-1989 period, accounting for about 41% of all
handovers. But they only represented 11% of leadership changes during
the subsequent 1990-2012 years. The same goes for peaceful non-electoral
transitions, which contracted from a pretty large 35% to a much smaller
15% share over the same two periods. By contrast, the increased use of
multiparty elections became apparent after 1990, when popular votes
replaced coups to became by far the most widespread mechanism for
political handovers (72%, up from 23%). Benin best embodies this
continental shift. In the past, the country had been both one of the most
unstable on the continent (some 15 heads of state rotated in office between
1960 and 1971, with an extremely low 0.8 years average duration), as well
as experiencing the long authoritarian rule of Major Mathieu Kérékou,
who was in power for 19 years between 1972 and 1991. After the country’s
first multiparty election in 1991, however, Beninese leaders’ duration in
power stabilized at a reasonable 7.0 years average for the 1991-2012
period.
8
Serie1;
1991-2000;
54
Serie1;
1961-70; 32
Serie1;
2000-10; 50
Serie1;
1971-80; 38
Serie1;
1981-90; 29
Figure 5 - Leadership changes, 1961-2010
Source: “Leadership Change” dataset.
1961/1989;
Peaceful non
electoral
transition; 50;
35%
1961/1989;
Guerrilla
takeover; 1; 1%
1961/1989;
Coup; 58; 41%
1961/1989;
Multiparty
election for the
executive;
32; 23%
1990/2012;
Peaceful non
electoral
transition;
38; 15%
1990/2012;
Guerrilla
takeover; 5; 2%
1990/2012;
Coup; 27; 11%
©ISPI2013
1990/2012;
Multiparty
election for the
executive;
179; 72%
1960-1989
Peaceful non electoral
transition
Multiparty election for the
executive
Coup
Guerrilla takeover
1990-2012
Peaceful non electoral
transition
Multiparty election for the
executive
Coup
Guerrilla takeover
Figure 6 - Modes of leadership change, 1960-1989 and 1990-2012
Source: “Leadership Change” dataset.
9
Third, elections were not a way of merely legitimizing incumbents, but
increasingly turned into an opportunity for actual alternation in power
between opposite political forces.
As Table 3 shows, in a majority of cases pluralist elections in Africa did not
produce a leadership change. Prior to 1990, in particular, incumbents won
the vast majority of multiparty elections. Indeed, it was virtually
impossible for a sitting president or prime minister to suffer an electoral
defeat and leave office, either because they would simply not organize an
election open to alternative candidates – pluralist elections at this time
in a majority of cases
pluralist elections in Africa
did not produce a
leadership change. Prior to
1990, in particular,
incumbents won the vast
majority of multiparty
elections
were a rarity – or, when they did, because they would not allow any such
candidate to get more votes than themselves. There were only sporadic
exceptions, such as in parliamentary Mauritius, where power changed
hands peacefully following the results of the 1982 election.
After 1990, as already mentioned, multiparty elections became the new
standard. Many African rulers were quick to adapt to this a new
multiparty context and survive in office. Yet in almost a quarter of all
cases opposition candidates were now able to defeat ruling groups at the
ballot box and snatch the country’s leadership from the incumbent or his
party. Moreover, this does not include all those cases in which the so-called
“first” or “founding” elections of the 1990s led to the removal of a
non-elected leader (i.e. a leader who had not come to power through
multiparty elections based on universal suffrage), such as in Benin and
Zambia (1991), in Congo-Brazzaville (1992), in Burundi, Madagascar and
the Central African Republic (1993), as well as in South Africa and
Malawi (1994). When these cases are included, some 17 sub-Saharan
countries, or 34.7% of all cases, saw power changing hands peacefully at
least once following the electoral defeat of an incumbent leader. In places
such as Benin, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, São Tomé e
Príncipe, Senegal and Zambia, this happened twice or more. Mauritius
reached a record four times.
Short of full electoral alternation, elections still helped promoting
leadership turnovers by marking the end of a president’s stint, with many
new African constitutions limiting office to two consecutive terms. Thus,
as many as 19 incumbent presidents stepped down between 1990-2012
due to term limits, something that had simply never happened before. In
©ISPI2013
many cases, the successor came from the outgoing president’s own party,
his takeover sanctioned by an election victory (“electoral succession with
no alternation” in the Table and Figure).
10
After 1990, as already
mentioned, multiparty
elections became the new
standard. Many African
rulers were quick to adapt
to this a new multiparty
context and survive in
office. Yet in almost a
quarter of all cases
opposition candidates
were now able to defeat
ruling groups at the ballot
box and snatch the
country’s leadership from
the incumbent or his party
1960-1989
Incumbent wins
Total
1990-2012
22
113
135
Electoral succession (no alternation)
1
16
17
Opposition wins (alternation)
3
39
42
26
168
194
Total
Table 3 - Multiparty elections for the executive, 1960-1989 and 1990-2012
Source: “Leadership Change” dataset.
Note: when an incumbent and/or his party (who had not come to power through multiparty
elections) were replaced through so-called “founding elections”, this is not counted as “alternation”.
1961/1989;
Incumbent
wins; 22; 85%
1961/1989;
Electoral
alternation;
3; 11%
1961/1989;
Electoral
succession
(no alternation);
1; 4%
1990/2012;
Incumbent
wins; 113; 67%
1990/2012;
Electoral
alternation;
39; 23%
1990/2012;
Electoral
succession
(no alternation);
16; 10%
1960-1989
Incumbent wins
Electoral succession (no
alternation)
Electoral alternation
1990-2012
Incumbent wins
Electoral succession (no
alternation)
Electoral alternation
Figure 7 - Elections and alternation in power, 1960-1989 and 1990-2012
Source: “Leadership Change” dataset.
©ISPI2013
Conclusions
Many African countries replaced their military or single-party regimes
with pluralist politics during the early 1990s. This led to the introduction
and regularisation of multiparty elections for the selection of a country’s
president or prime minister. Of course, in many places, elections were not
enough to start genuine democratization processes, as non-democratic
rulers rapidly learned how to manipulate the vote and survive in the new
political environment. Yet empirical evidence from our new “Leadership
11
©ISPI2013
change” dataset – covering all 49 sub-Saharan states since 1960 (or
subsequent year of independence) to 2012 – shows that elections did alter
quite profoundly the way ordinary Africans can influence the selection
and ousting of their leaders. Coups are now a rarer phenomenon,
leadership turnovers have become more frequent, and peaceful
alternation in power through the ballot box, if still uncommon, is part of a
new political landscape.
12