“Shady Advertising”: recruitment among rebels and mobsters
Valeria Pizzini-Gambetta
Department of Sociology, University of Oxford;
[email protected]
Heather Hamill
Department of Sociology, University of Oxford;
[email protected]
ECPR General Conference
Reykjavik 25-27 August 2011
“The casually open way you put your main questions
suggests that you have no authority, no right, at all […] new members,
whoever they may be, are supposed to be recruited in secret”
(Dostoyevsky, The Devils, OUP, 1992: 434).
Abstract1
In this article we argue that recruitment into illegal groups is essentially a communicative
exchange between recruiter and volunteer, that is heavily constrained by asymmetrical
information. This paper uses signalling theory to explore how this exchange functions and
how the problems associated with asymmetrical information in this context are solved. We
compare the advertising and early recruitment strategies of paramilitary organizations in
Northern Ireland, the Red Brigades in Italy, the Sicilian Cosa Nostra organization and an
organized crime group in Apulia, southern Italy. Consistent differences persist between
collective action intended to affect political change and that of a criminal economic
enterprise but both types of group share a common problem: the need to establish
trustworthy relationships in an environment of secrecy. On the basis of this fundamental
constraint we predict that illegal groups have a strong preference for placing recruiters
where they can observe and vet volunteers without compromising themselves and that they
need to advertise their presence in order to guide volunteers towards them. We explore the
various forms of selective advertising devised by recruiters that allow them to be identified by
potential volunteers but to obscure them from law and order agents. We conclude that the
signalling behaviour in the advertising stage of the recruitment process is not sensitive to the
differences between groups in terms of their main goals but is determined by the differing
structures of the recruitment pools available to these groups.
1
The research was supported by a ESRC grant Recruitment into Extra-Legal Organisations
award number RES-061-23-0131. We wish to thank the participants at the workshop
Recruitment into Extra-legal organizations, Nuffield College Oxford 14th December 2009 for
their comments on an early draft of this work.
1
Introduction
Mario was male, fit and very sociable. He was 21 years old when, on September 8th 1943,
General Badoglio signed an armistice with the Allies leaving Italian territory from Naples to
the North in the hands of the Germans and the Fascists. His family were not politically active
but they opposed Fascism and they lived in a working class neighbourhood in a major
industrial town in the north of Italy. Mario had been conscripted into the Italian Air Force and
when the Army was disbanded he ran away. He hid at his parent‟s home until a notorious
Fascist spy visited his mother asking about his whereabouts while he was hidden under her
bed. He escaped dressed as a woman and hid in a neighbourhood where he was less known.
This set of circumstances would lead to the prediction that Mario joined the Italian resistance
movement. However he did not and when asked why, he simply replied: “I did not know how
to join.”2
The body of research on recruitment into violent illegal groups has been dominated by the
attempt to answer two primary questions: who joins and why do they join? Recent research
has contributed a great deal to answering these questions by analyzing the root causes of
mobilization at the macro level (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Collier
and Sambanis, 2005,), meso level and micro level (Saleh, 2003, Krueger and Maleckova
2002; Tal, 2002, Berrebi, 2003; Bjorgo, 2005; Sageman 2004, 2008; Gupta, 2005; Forest,
2006, Viterna, 2006, Krueger 2007, Gambetta and Hertog 2007, Weinstein and Humphreys
2008; Merari 2010; Horgan 2008; Borum 2010). However research that focuses on
characteristics and motivations of recruits misses a crucial puzzle: why do only some and not
all of those who share the same social and economic profile and motivations join? (Viterna,
2006).
Recruitment is often analysed as the result of self-selection (Bjorgo, 2005) focusing mostly
on the volunteer‟s opportunities and mind set. We assume instead that recruitment is
dependent both on a supply of willing and able recruits but also on the selection of available
volunteers according to the strategic requirements of an organization. Individuals may fail to
become members simply because they are screened out by the group they wish to join.
Neither is recruitment a one-off event. Rather it is a process of exchange between the agents
of a group (recruiters) and individual actors (volunteers). This perspective highlights one
aspect of the recruitment exchange that has received little attention: how do volunteers know
where to look for a recruiter? In order for this exchange to occur recruiters and volunteers
must first identify and then trust each other. As pointed out by the “lame teacher” in
Dostojevsky‟s The Devils often recruiters are not credible when they openly advertise for
members and volunteers, ignorant of who to approach or the selection criteria, fail to display
or signal the necessary attributes and skills for membership. Even if there is a will only a few
may find a way to display their credentials to the right audience and be accepted.
We thus identify two crucial phases in the illegal recruitment process: advertising the
recruiter‟s presence and screening volunteers leading to selection. Delineating these two
stages is a somewhat artificial devise, as empirical observations suggest that the recruitment
process is not always linear. However it does enable us to draw attention to an actor in this
process that is often taken for granted as is the notion that volunteers would automatically
trust the person approaching them to engage in illegal activities. This article concentrates on
2
Personal communication with “Mario.”
2
the first stage of the recruitment process and asks how do recruiters advertise their presence
and guarantee to volunteers that they are not imposters?
Data and Methods
This article is based on data collected from four case studies: catholic and protestant
paramilitary organisations in N. Ireland, the Italian Red Brigades, the Sicilian Mafia (Cosa
Nostra) and an organised crime group in Bari, south Italy. All of these groups vary in their
aims, structures, size and local constraints but they all share the need to find trustworthy,
loyal and competent members under the key conditions of illegality, asymmetrical
information, varying risks of infiltration and the high cost of error. Furthermore there are
similarities between the groups when it comes to membership. First there is a definite point in
time when an individual moves from not being a member and merely associated with a group
to being an actual member. For the N Irish paramilitaries and organised crime groups this
involves some form of ritual entry. For the Red Brigades an individual became a member
when the identity of other underground members was revealed to them. Second, members of
all of the groups studied have access to certain knowledge and information that binds them to
the group and which non-members do not have access to. Third, there is a code of discipline
and rules of behaviour that only members are subject to and fourth, all members receive the
protection of the group.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
Furthermore, all of these groups have experienced longevity relative to their direct
competitors. Data has been gathered from qualitative interviews with current and former
members, judicial papers, state witness statements, biographical accounts and dedicated
internet sites.
The Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) emerged in 1969. Its armed campaign was
aimed at uniting the north and south of Ireland to create a socialist republic. The IRA has
been responsible for 1713 deaths between 1969 and 2005 and lost 276 members of an
estimated 10,000 total over the same period (Moloney, 2002; Sutton, 2002).3 The IRA‟s
organizational structure included six geographical command areas within N. Ireland and the
border countries of Ireland. These command areas comprised between one and three brigades
and were headed by a commander who was directly responsible for overseeing operations,
including recruitment, within that area. On the 28th July 2005, the IRA Army Council
announced an end to its armed campaign and on the 4 th October 2006, the Independent
Monitoring Commission ruled that the IRA were no longer a threat.
The Ulster Defence Association (UDA) was formed in September 1971. It was not declared
illegal until 1992, and from 1973, used the cover name of Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF) to
claim responsibility for killing Catholics (CAIN, 2006).4 Together, the UDA and UFF have
been responsible for 259 deaths between 1969 and 2001 (Sutton 2002). Many of the attacks
carried out by the UDA are aimed at intimidating Catholics. The UDA is organised into six
brigades, each under the command of a „brigadier‟, with battalions, companies, platoons and
sections. Their steering committee, the Inner Council is composed of brigadiers from each of
3
See http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/sutton/ for updated information on deaths resulting from the
conflict in Ireland.
4
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/organ/uorgan.htm#uda . Accessed January 15th, 2007.
3
the areas plus occasionally some paramilitary or political advisors. The brigadiers exercise a
great deal of autonomy outside of the control of the Inner Council.
The Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) was founded in 1966, was declared illegal in 1974, is
smaller in number than the UDA, but is much deadlier. 5 It is linked to the Red Hand
Commandos (RHC).6 Despite its policy of no first strikes against Catholics, between 1969
and 2001, the UVF killed 426 people, 65 percent of whom were Catholic (Sutton, 2002) and
in the post-ceasefire period between 1994 and 2004 they have been blamed for 19 murders
(McCaffrey, 2005). The UVF has a more centralised command structure and operates under a
single commanding officer. Its decision making is more coherent than that of the UDA and it
exerts stronger control over its wider membership. The UDA and UVF may share the same
ideology and use similar methods, but they are uneasy bedfellows. They allied in 1991 under
the umbrella of the Combined Loyalist Military Command (CLMC) to negotiate the
ceasefires but this coalition collapsed acrimoniously in 1997. Both groups compete for the
allegiance of working class Protestants and the spoils of conflict.
Data for the N. Ireland case have been derived from 40 qualitative interviews with IRA, UVF
and UDA members and 10 interviews with the police and intelligence services. Secondary
data has been gathered from biographies, newspaper and judicial reports and a database with
details of 150 individual members has been created.
The Sicilian Cosa Nostra is an active criminal group that has been identified at least since
1865 in Western Sicily (Gambetta, 1992; Lupo, 1993[2008]). It provides informal
governance (Dixit, 2004) to the markets of illegal commodities and to illegal practices on the
markets of legal commodities (Gambetta, 1992; Fiorentini, Prelzman, 1995). It is organized
as a confederation of territorial groups – families - who share one and the same initiation
ritual and a set of rules of behaviour. The mafia families‟ territories are either whole villages
or neighbourhoods within bigger towns and are defined by common agreement ratified by the
whole organization. Successions are regulated by organizational rules and disciplined. Its
members identify themselves as those that have undergone the initiation ritual into an
organization known to outsiders as “the Mafia” and address by members as “Our thing”.
Each group rules over its own territory and recruits its own members according to the
commonly agreed set of rules. Membership size is hard to assess as each mafia family may
have as few as two members and as many as a few hundreds. According to the Direzione
Investigativa Antimafia (DIA) report in 2008 there were at least 88 active mafia families in
Western Sicily7.
Organized crime in Bari is a relatively new group that appeared in the early 1980s. It
provides informal governance to the local markets of illegal commodities, in particular
cigarette smuggling and drugs, practices extortion and money lending at extortionist rates of
interest.It is a set of independent groups based on territories defined by the relative military
strength of each group. They share the same initiation ritual and ritually mark individual
5
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/organ/uorgan.htm#uda . Accessed January 15th, 2007.
6
The RHC is a small Loyalist paramilitary group. It was formed in 1972 and was declared
illegal in 1973.
7
Direzione Investigativa Antimafia, 2008, Relazione del Ministro dell’Interno al Parlamento
sull’Attivita’ Svolta ei Risultati Conseguiti dalla Direzione Investigativa Antimafia, secondo
semester, available from http://www.interno.it/dip_ps/dia/pagine/semestrali.htm
4
career advancement on a eight steps career ladder 8. Members are under the personal authority
of the individual boss that accepted them into the group rather than that of an organization.
Successions are not regulated by organizational rules and are a source of instability.
According to data published by the DIA in 2003 in the administrative district of Bari there
were 655 members of organized crime groups (including 273 in jail and 27 state witnesses) 9.
The Red Brigades (RB) were a left wing radical violent group active in Italy. They were
founded in September 1970. By 1982 two splinter groups formed and the original core
dissolved, mostly as a consequence of effective law enforcement action and internal
factionalism10. During that period they authored 439 violent operations causing 56 dead and
75 wounded (Galleni, 1981; Moss, 1989). They were part of a major wave of political unrest
in Italy that produced many illegal groups. Among those groups the RB were undoubtedly the
most prominent for consistency of action, and political impact (Anonymous, 1979; Pisano,
1979; Galleni, 1981, Della Porta, Rossi, 1984;; Drake, 1989; Della Porta 1995). Up to 1980
there were 5 columns in operation: Milan, Turin, Genoa, Veneto, Rome. Each column was
divided in smaller cells (brigate) including 2-5 members. After 1980 a sixth column was
formed in Naples.Their repertoire of action included a wide range of urban guerrilla
operations, from arson attacks, to kidnappings – both for political and financial reasons - and
assassinations. They reached their apex with the kidnapping and assassination of former
Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro in 1978. They never resorted to bombing and
indiscriminate violence. The exact size of membership in the RB is not known. More than
4000 people have been indicted in Italy under the accusation of “participation to armed
group” or “insurrection” between 1969 and 1989. Yonah Alexander and Dennis Pluchinsky
claim that between 1976-1979 there were 600 full-time RB members (Alexander, Pluchinsky,
1992: 194). The source of these data is not stated however Fabrizio Peci (1983) –the first
member to turn state wittness- revealed that the organization at its peak was 500 members
strong including regular –members under assumed identity and on the organization payroll and irregular members – keeping their legal identity and activities.
Primary sources for the Italian case studies (see appendix) are statements by state witnesses,
court transcripts, and published biographies. In order to assess with accuracy the membership
status of individuals we have selected only trials in which members are identified on the basis
of self-reporting or of state witness statements. As a consequence we have excluded trials of
RB members prior to 1980 that were based on police investigation and flawed by a great deal
of confusion between membership in the group and belonging to the left-wing Italian radical
movement or groups competing with RB. We have then assembled one database for each
case. The RB database counts 466 individual entries including both regular and irregular
members. The Cosa Nostra database includes 687 individual entries mostly from Palermo and
neighbouring villages. The OC Bari database includes 820 individual entries mostly from
Bari and neighbouring villages.
8
The career steps in Organized crime in Bari are: picciotto (new recruit), camorra
(acquisition of right to recruit up to two associates); sgarrista (after committing a murder);
vangelo; tre quartino; quartino; crimine. Each step introduces to knowing members at least
one step higher than ego (Conte Ugolino Trial, 1997).
9
Direzione Investigativa Antimafia, 2003, Relazione del Ministro dell’Interno al Parlamento
sull’Attivita’ Svolta ei Risultati Conseguiti dalla Direzione Investigativa Antimafia, secondo
semester, available from http://www.interno.it/dip_ps/dia/pagine/semestrali.htm
10
http://www.brigaterosse.org/brigaterosse/
5
Signalling theory and underground recruiting
Recruitment is not a one-off event but is an ongoing communicative exchange between a
Recruiter (R) – any member of an illegal group representing its corporate identity and
authorized to look for new members – and a Volunteer (V) – any individual who hopes to be
selected as a member of the group. R and V are uncertain of each other‟s type and they know
that their interests are potentially at odds: either might be an imposter. This asymmetrical
information means that R cannot assess at first sight if V is a genuine rebel, an “honest” thief,
an undercover agent (Gambetta 2009a) or if he will remain committed to the cause until the
bitter end (Gates, 2002; Weinstein 2005, 2006). R then has a strong preference for observing
V in order to assess V‟s type. Likewise, while V is eager to convince R of his trustworthiness
he also needs assurances that R is genuine. In assessing each other‟s type they face both
primary and secondary trust problems (Bacharach and Gambetta, 2001).
The primary trust problem is to ascertain if a certain individual is trustworthy. The solution is
offered by looking for an observable indicator of the unobservable quality: a sign or a signal.
The secondary trust problem is to determine if the signs of trustworthiness displayed by an
individual are true or deceptive.
Signs are unintentional displays that manifest one‟s type. Inferences from signs are made if,
for example, R observes V going about his daily business over a period of time. Signs
become signals once they are emitted by the signaller towards the receiver with the intention
of modifying the receiver‟s behaviour. The secondary trust problem then comes into view as
the receiver must discern the intentions of the signaller and whether the signals he is
displaying are honest or fake (Bacharach and Gambetta, 2001; Gambetta, 2009, 2009a).
According to Spence (1974) a signal helps to address asymmetrical information about
unobservable attributes when it is an observable indicator whose cost for the bearer is
inversely associated with his quality level: the more genuine the signaller the lower the cost
to him of bearing the signal. A receiver reads a signal as a true manifestation of an
unobservable quality because he thinks that only those who truly possess the quality can
afford to display the signal and those who do not possess it cannot afford the differential cost
of the signal. The higher the differential cost to fake the signal for the one who does not
possess the unobservable quality, the more efficient the signal (Zahavi 1993). Furthermore,
the higher the cost of error for the receiver the higher the differential cost to emit a fake
signal.
The illegal context magnifies the cost of picking the wrong partners. A mistake – recruiting a
rival or a security agent - could jeopardise the survival of the organisation and the freedom
and/or life of its members. The endogenous lack of trust in the illegal context needs to be
disproved for recruitment to occur. In order to overcome their mutual distrust and realise
their shared interest it is necessary for R and V to pay attention to signs and signals. However
signals are rarely fully informative (sorting). Most signals are either partially informative
(semi-sorting) increasing the risk of making the wrong choice or totally uninformative
(pooling) and do not assist decision making. Furthermore, the quality of many signals is
unstable and varies by changes in time and context (Gambetta and Hamill, 2005).
In applying signalling theory to the advertising stage of the recruitment process we make the
following assumptions. First R is the principal signaller and V the receiver. Second, that R
and V treat each other's identity as a desirable intangible quality. On the basis of these
6
assumptions we predict that first R will use focal points to attract V and mark them with an
exclusive identity signal; second given the cost of production and standardization R will
police the use of the signal in order to prevent mimicry and depletion.
Shady advertising
When advertising for new staff, recruiters in legal labour markets can publicly announce their
presence and their intention to hire at job fairs and via media outlets. They provide
information to potential candidates about how to apply, the selection process and the criteria
against which candidates will be judged. In contrast illegal organisations, operating in
secrecy, need to develop subtler ways of generating the common knowledge that facilitates
the coordination of supply and demand of new recruits. Under these conditions asymmetrical
information hampers the efforts of R and V to the utmost degree as truthful and untruthful
information are hard to detect. They need to follow Schelling‟s intuition that “when some
signals are desperately needed by both parties and both parties know it, even a poor signal
and a discriminatory one may command recognition” (Schelling, 1963 (1960): 79-80).
The problem of secrecy is locally contingent on the status of the group and the strength of the
rule of law. In general the weaker the rule of law the more straightforward and visible the
recruiting mechanism will be. Once a group obtains military control over a territory the
constraint of secrecy is lifted and recruiters can openly advertise for volunteers or recruit as a
form of taxation extorted from the local population. For example in 2008 in the city of Nuevo
Laredo in eastern Mexico the “Zetas” (Z‟s) drug cartel set up huge billboards on pedestrian
crossings advertising for jobs.11 Under the rule of law the constraint of secrecy is lifted only
within prisons. Here members of illegal groups are identified by their incrimination and no
longer need to hide their association. In some prisons criminal identification also acts as a
sorting device. In the Maze Prison in Northern Ireland the prison wings were segregated and
run by the paramilitary organisations. New inmates had to apply to the wing commander in
order to gain permission to come onto the wing thereby publicly acknowledging membership
of, or sympathy with, the group. Equally in Bari, Apulia, the local prison is segregated by
organized crime group and members are sorted by affiliation and assigned to the prison wing
controlled by their group12.
As a first step R and V need to meet and when secrecy is a constraint they need to solve a
problem of tacit coordination identifying a venue where the meeting of their minds will lead
to the meeting of their goals (Schelling, 1963 (1960): 83). Focal – or Schelling - points are
interdependent decisions made in the absence of communication. They are made possible
“through the agency of a system of suitably concordant mutual expectations” (Lewis, 1969:
24-25). But how do R and V develop mutual expectations? Generally they result from
common or shared experience that can be manipulated into "impromptu codes for signalling
[one's] intentions and responding to each other's signals" (Schelling 1963 (1960): 85). The
more exclusive the shared experience the more exclusive the signalling will be. People who
know each other well can develop exclusive knowledge. Furthermore R needs as many V as
possible to find him so that he can improve the quality of his choice. It becomes a multiple
coordination problem: R wishes to be where he expects more than one V to anticipate that he
will be there expecting them. Tacit coordination can hardly be left to chance between two
agents (Lewis, 1969) let alone among more than two.
11
12
We are very grateful to Rolando Ochoa Hernandez who drew this example to our attention.
Borgo Antico Trial, 1997)
7
As a condition R and V do not know each other as R and V and therefore their mutual
expectations cannot be based on experience but can be derived from their aspirations. The
focal point is where their political or criminal goals, the ambition that pushes one towards the
other, become identified with a physical place. Cultural associations, social clubs, religious
schools, trade unions, political parties legally representing their cause or neighbourhoods
strongly identified with illegal groups will be the obvious places where R and V can expect to
find one another.
These venues are also predictable to law enforcement and R cannot outwit them without also
frustrating V‟s expectations. In order to counter the broad predictability of the setting R needs
to manipulate the focal point into an identity signal that is exclusive to the group so that it
keeps them invisible to the wrong type of receiver (law and order/counter insurgency agents)
and visible to the desired one (potential volunteers) (Gambetta 2009a). We call this shady
advertising where the identifying signal is at the same time clear enough for R and V to meet
and opaque enough to elude incrimination. This focal point will become a pre-commitment
screening venue where R singles out suitable Vs who can later be tested for credibility and
competency. The design of the signal needs to address the primary and secondary trust
problem in shady advertising: a) it needs to manifest R‟s presence to V and b) needs to signal
that R is the honest bearer of the signs of the corporate identity that V is looking for.
Stationary versus itinerant recruiters
According to our data paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland, the Sicilian Cosa Nostra and
organized crime in Bari, southern Italy, share a feature that neatly sets them apart from the
Red Brigades. Members of the former set of groups were mostly born in close proximity to
where they were recruited. In contrast, there was little correlation between place of birth and
location of recruitment for the Red Brigades recruits.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
Since the databases are on members and do not include those who were rejected we cannot
use them as evidence to describe accurately the geographical profile of volunteers. However
these data suggest that recruiters in Northern Ireland and the South of Italy limited their
recruitment pool to volunteers within certain territorial boundaries. The Red Brigades were
relatively indifferent to their volunteer‟s geographical origin and accessed a significantly
more mobile recruitment pool.
This evidence shows a preference among paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland and Italian
mafia groups to use neighbourhoods as focal points where stationary recruiters would select
volunteers from among their own neighbours. Limiting the supply of volunteers to within
geographical boundaries undoubtedly reduces the efficiency of their choice. 13 People in those
neighbourhoods do not make up the whole constituency of the paramilitary organizations in
Northern Ireland or all potential criminals in the South of Italy. Small numbers of the Irish
diaspora did return to N. Ireland to join the IRA or formed cells in England but the evidence
on this is limited and the IRA were suspicious of all those whose backgrounds they could not
fully vet. However despite, or perhaps because of, their restricted recruitment practices all of
the groups in our sample have enjoyed relative success across several decades. These groups
13
We wish to thank David Laitin who raised this point at the workshop “Recruitment into
Extra-Legal Organizations”, University of Oxford, December 14th, 2009.
8
have traded access to a broader recruitment pool offering higher quality skills and
specializations for trustworthy identity markers based on local ties and knowledge.
In contrast, the Red Brigades (RB) never militarily controlled a territory. They were an urban
guerrilla group that developed a small but effective underground organization in six major
towns in Italy: Milan, Turin, Genoa, Mestre/Padua, Rome and Naples. The recruits came
from all over Italy and diverse walks of life. The most common denominator among recruits
was previous membership of ultra left-wing political groups (56.2%, missing data 43% of
total cases).
An ideological recruitment pool – and a religious one such as Al Qaeda who are not restricted
to a residentially static ethnic or religious group – manifests itself in a variety of ways that
reflect its principles and objectives: what can be called a social movement or an ideological
milieu. The movement is the milieau where R and V expect to meet one another. However a
movement can be vast, porous and can take many forms and locations. Such constituencies
have fluctuating memberships and cannot rely on local knowledge to certify recruiters.
Itinerant recruiters need to manipulate the milieu by creating more manageable focal points
through a portable identity signal whose authenticity is self-referential: a signature that is
credible to V and hard to counterfeit.
Neighbourhoods as focal points
Neighbourhoods have long been identified as key environments in which insurgents are
mobilized (Gould, 1995) and where organized crime groups recruit (Landesco 1968 (1929);
Whyte, 1943; Lombardo, 1994). They are close knit settings where strong ties develop
naturally over time through kinship and friendship. Strong ties are less far-reaching than
weak ties but they seem to work better when decisions involve coordination because “they
are better at forming common knowledge locally” (Chwe, 2001: 65; also Chwe, 2000) and do
not require any form of public advertising.
The local knowledge underpinning strong ties reduces asymmetrical information as it
certifies the properties of the individuals. In a neighbourhood R can observe and assess V‟s
behaviour and attributes over time14 . The long term monitoring of individuals through
friendship and kinship also makes infiltration of a group virtually impossible as outsiders are
easily identified. Turning existing members into informants is a more common practice. 15
Crucial to the core theme of this paper is the fact that, neighbourhoods certify R‟s identity as
well. Within neighbourhoods R can manipulate local knowledge so that their identity is clear
to friends but unclear to law enforcement agents. Once a group has monopolistic control over
violence and illegal transactions in a neighbourhood, these territories become markers of the
group identity. They also provide a background in which benign objects or behaviour, which
would go unnoticed elsewhere, can become exclusive identity markers. A fake R would be
quickly identified and punished. In the favelas around Rio de Janeiro for instance the Reds
allowed only its members to display the colour red on their territory (Anderson, 2009).16 The
monopoly of violence that they exercised in that territory allowed them to protect wearing the
14
State witness statements : CN, Buscemi; CN Mutolo; CN, Cucuzza; CPM-Messina BA, De
Felice; BA, Civitano; BA, De Tullio
15
Interviews with law enforcement agents: Interview with J, London June 2010; interview
with Colonnello Peciccia, Dia, Bari July 2008; Ispettore Berti DNA, Roma maggio 2008.
16
Diego Gambetta kindly pointed out this example to us.
9
colour red as a brand. This is a clear example of how even a pooling signal can be
manipulated into a sorting one by imposing severe sanctions on its display in order to solve
the illegal advertising problem (Gambetta 2009a: 150). Our sample shows that the higher the
levels of territorial control the less the display of identity signals by R is necessary.
Stationary recruits in Northern Ireland exploit neighbourhoods as basic sorting devices. There
are currently twenty-seven “peace walls” in Belfast demarcating Catholic and Protestant
neighbourhoods. This level of religious segregation, a direct result of the political violence,
facilitates high social knowledge not only of who belongs to what religion (self evident by
virtue of living in the neighbourhood) but also where they fit in the social order and where
their local loyalties and affiliations lie. Within these religiously segregated areas there is
competition for recruits and the paramilitary groups use painted wall murals to advertise their
presence, their territorial control and their power. One can easily compare the timeconsuming intricacy of murals celebrating the IRA with the hasty scrawl of those promoting
the less popular dissident Continuity IRA. Intricacy and artistry are correlated with levels of
control as the artist can work without harassment from the police, enemy paramilitary groups
or co-religionist rivals. The effectiveness of Northern Irish neighbourhoods as sorting
mechanisms means that in this context R very quickly moves on from vetting V‟s identity to
vetting their attributes.
The Sicilian Cosa Nostra cannot exploit the efficiency of religious segregation but it has
strong roots in certain villages and Palermo neighbourhoods and mostly recruits from them:
“Mafia members in Palermo […] do not move out of their own neighbourhood. They were
born, lived and died in their own neighbourhoods. It is their life, their own families have been
living there for generations and they are all related to each other” 17. In Western Sicily Cosa
Nostra‟s identification with certain territories can be traced back to the turn of the XIX
century (Cutrera 1900; Gambetta, 1993; Lupo, 1993 [2008]) and it is the result of a long term
investment in violence together with patronage and the iconic adoption of circular symbols
(Gambetta 1991; 1994; 2009a). It has also established a remarkable level of coordination
among the independent mafia “families” that share the same initiation ritual. According to a
popular local saying also recorded in the testimonies of Cosa Nostra members: “The mafia is
the air one breaths” meaning the pervasive presence of its reputation and power. Salvatore
Cucuzza, a member of Cosa Nostra, revealed that his recruiter was a builder in odore di mafia
(literally “one who smells of mafia”) 18. Local residents can certify mafia members because
they know that no one would pose as a member in that neighbourhood if he was not genuine.
Local knowledge is so strong that an imposter would not live to tell the tale.
Nonetheless migration, social mobility and resettlement policies by city councils affect
recruitment within neighbourhoods (Lombardo 1994). Hamlets controlled by the mafia in the
XX centuries for instance are now absorbed into the outskirts of the city of Palermo and are
no longer as cohesive. This is even more so in Bari. Their old town stronghold was eroded in
the 1970s by social housing policies that moved people to satellite neighbourhood projects.
At the same time it has become fashionable for the local bourgeoisie to live and entertain in
the old town. As a consequence some criminal families have moved into these new
neighbourhoods of mixed provenance. Other criminal groups who have stayed in the old
town have seen the world around them change, transforming close-knit environments into
more composite surroundings. Kinship and friendship networks now cut across several
17
18
AC-PA: 148
CN, Cucuzza: 274.
10
neighbourhoods and recruiting pools have become less coherent 19. This issue is exacerbated
in Bari by the existence of several independent and competing groups that may occasionally
co-operate but have no common structure. Turnover and instability increases the need for
signalling who is in control.
Recruiters within a social movement
Research focusing on social movements describes general radicalization paths from protest to
violence identifying networks built on local knowledge rich environments such as friendship,
kinship and to some extent neighbourhoods (Della Porta 1995; Diani, MacAdam 2003;
Gould, 1995). These mechanisms can effectively explain the compositions of mobs in violent
protest as the ones during the French revolution in 1789, the Paris Commune in 1870, and
perhaps the Middle Eastern Spring in 2011. They can even explain “prime movers” and the
early formation of groups. The RB were born by the fusion of several smaller prime mover
groups originated at local level and based on strong ties: “We were all trusted comrades: we
had known each other for a long time and were very good friends” (Franceschini, 2004: 44).
However once political violence mutates from a sudden outburst to being more organized and
structured local knowledge is no longer the main certifying mechanism. Often volunteers
would know that they had the opportunity to enter a group but they would not know which
group, of the many operative at the time, had approached them (Anonimo, 2006 [1981]). The
path towards a specific group could be long and windy as described by Antonio Morocco
who sought to enter RB for several years starting in 1976 and eventually joined only in 1981:
I was looking for the RB. I went to Prato looking for a contact with what was left of the NAP
[...] spent about twenty days on trains. Went to Turin instead and some friends made me an
appointment in Milan with the RB. I went but it turned out they were the guys from Rosso. So
I joined Corrado Alunni’s group but then I left it and joined the Communist Combatant
Formations that were close to Front Line [...] I was not happy there and asked to join the
Walter Alasia column of the RB. I was accepted the day before the Sandrucci kidnapping
[1981] (quoted in Bocca, 1985: 276)
Local knowledge becomes weak over time in social movements because of their geographical
extension, rapid growth, and porous borders. Infiltrators and undercover agents easily
penetrate movements and security conscious groups as the RB did not hide within the wider
movement as other groups did (Segio, 2006; Boraso, 2006) but rather hid from it 20. At the
beginning RB were recruiting openly within the movement, according to Roberto
Franceschini, a founding member: “Everybody knew us name by name” (Franceschini in
Bocca, 1985: 49). RB tightened security after uncovering a police informant in 1971
((Casamassima, 2007: 28) and having been nearly wiped out once a base in Milan was raided
by the Police in 1972 (Franceschini, 2004; Moretti, 1994; Morlacchi, 2007: 88). The handful
of remaining members went underground and ever since regular members were required to
exit all networks that would help to trail them (Curcio, 1993; Franceschini, 2004; Moretti,
1994). The urban guerrillas melted back into the background of the urban jungle
(Marighela,1966) mimicking the life of factory workers in the industrial North of Italy (Peci,
1983) and the ordinary middle classes in Rome (Moretti, 1994). Irregular members –the ones
keeping their legal identity and connections - kept the group in touch with the wider
19
20
BA, Bottalico; BA, Civitano; Court case vs Abbinante et alii, 2006
RB security rule in Tesandori, 2004 (4): pp.395-400
11
movement and scouted it for volunteers21. They were part of individual brigades and as such
in touch with only one underground member at a time to protect the security of the
underground core of the group and minimizing the cost of mistakes.
Identity signalling among neighbours
The neighbourhood identifies a physical space within which further specifications are needed
to design the members‟ identity signal. Joining the mafia involves a secret initiation ritual
after which members have access to the common knowledge about the organization, business
matters and members‟ identity (Gambetta, 1992; Chew, 2002). This information is secret and
exclusive; its possession differentiates mafia members from ordinary criminals (PizziniGambetta, 1999) and from their own kin. The latter distinction is especially arduous to detect
even among neighbours. Likewise members of the IRA, UDA and UVF in Northern Ireland
all pass through an initiation ritual and gain insider knowledge that distinguishes them from
non-members. While V may not know who exactly is a member, he or she needs to know
where they convene otherwise he may display his criminal prowess or ideological
commitment in the wrong place and not only miss his chance to be chosen but he could be
mistaken for a nuisance or a challenge.
Signs
Within territories some signs offer primary indications to V to narrow his field leaving still
dangerous margins of approximation. A first cue of R‟s identity in mafia groups is gender.
Women are barred formal entry both in Sicily and Bari. They cannot be recruited and cannot
recruit. If they have a role in these organizations it is still an informal and vicarious one
(Siebert, 1996; Pizzini-Gambetta, 1999, 2006, 2008). Gender, however, is a sign of who is
not R, rather than a sign of who is R and additional refinement of the identity signal is
needed.
Cultural traits such as dialects, accents and their variations are also likely to be pooling signs
rather than discriminating signals. In Bari, for instance, the local dialect spoken in the old
town is a variation of the general dialect in which short sounds are even shorter than average
making it barely comprehensible to outsiders and very hard to imitate. This is not however a
form of slang or exclusive code such as the Baccagghiu spoken by criminals in Palermo at
the end of the XIX century (Alongi, 1886). It is very hard to discern whether speakers adopt
dialects out of habit or lack of alternative expertise rather than as an intentional display.
Dialects and accents identify those born and bred in a specific part of town but will not sort
Mafiosi from law abiding citizens or from petty, non-organized criminals from the same area.
Likewise in Northern Ireland there is regional variation in accents and the pronunciation of
certain letters and words. However, at best, these only act to distinguish Catholics from
Protestants and will not sort paramilitaries out from their co-religionist neighbours.
Kinship is another partial identifier. In Sicily it overlaps at times with mafia membership but
it is not sufficient to entitle one to membership 22. Nine members of the Zanca family were
indicted for mafia association in the Palermo Maxi trial but only one was accurately
identified as a member by state witnesses23. In Bari the core of a criminal group is often made
of a set of brothers and cousins, such as the Montanis in the San Paolo neighbourhoods or the
Capriatis in the Old Town as a rule however no one can directly recruit his own kin and the
21
Bonavita in Catanzaro, Manconi, 1995: 120; statement by Savasta and Libera court case
Moro-ter; Peci, Cianfanelli, Fenzi in Moran, 1986; Parodi, Maccari, Vai in Bianconi, 2003)
22
CN, Iuculano; CN, Giovanni Brusca; CN, Contorno; CN-CPM-Messina
23
Palermo Maxi trial 1986; CN-Contorno, 2-3, 58; Cn-Sinagra.
12
group membership does not coincide with the kinship group (BA, Bottalico; BA, De Felice;
BA, De Giovanni, 29.6.2001: 26). However this distinction is blurred for outsiders who
would treat the all of the kinship group with respect.
Conventional signals
Within group-controlled territory conventional signals – that is signals where the relationship
between signal design and signal message is somewhat arbitrary (Guildford and Dawkins,
1995: 1692) – can be transformed into identity signals. Examples associated with Mafia
groups include wearing certain clothes and jewellery; displaying tattoos and scars and the use
of nicknames (Alongi, 1989; Cuntrera, 1900; Gambetta 1994, 2009a; Varese 2001; Hill
2003). While wearing jewellery is uncommon among Cosa Nostra members in Western
Sicily in Bari new members are given –according to different groups - a diamond ring to wear
on their little finger or an ear-ring shaped as a star by their padrino24 on the day of their first
initiation ritual to mark their new status25. We have no evidence that wearing diamonds by
non-members is discouraged or punished by the group. However, there may be no need for
enforcement as the signal is financially unaffordable by most people. It is a signal of
membership as long as it is displayed in that socio-economic environment. The same can be
said for the ostentatious display of wealth. 26
Nicknames are common in the criminal world although to a varying degree. According to our
database nearly all members of OC in Bari have nicknames that can be individual or
collective, referring to siblings. In Cosa Nostra nicknames are less frequent (Gambetta,
2009a: 230-250). While nicknaming was a common practice among ordinary people in the
past nowadays the public use of nicknames is rare among ordinary people and only used
privately in Bari and in Sicily. Publically displaying a nickname therefore is a sorting signal
that does discriminate criminals from the rest of the local population but its identifying
virtues stop there. These names are not like nom de guerre conferred at the time of the mafia
initiation ritual and mostly predate formal membership. Once admitted no effort was made to
erase these names and no punishment was inflicted on ordinary criminals using nicknames.
Scars and tattoos are marks produced at the cost of physical pain and imply economic costs to
erase them (Gambetta 2009a). They can be displayed as signals of individual attributes and
history or as identity signals of membership of a group. Scars and tattoos are not displayed in
Western Sicily. Rather the opposite is true. "[Mafia members] do not wear symbols [segnali],
they don't sport tattoos, they don't show nothing" 27. Even in prison the diminutive "boss of
bosses" Salvatore Riina counter-signalled and “ did not look like one of those criminals
covered in tattoos, he was quiet, rather short”28.
In Northern Ireland tattoos are widely displayed but they only signal support for, rather than
membership of, a paramilitary group. Some groups in Bari instead displayed an identifying
tattoo to show the ritual bond between a specific boss and his crew (for example, the Montani
family). Its display was monitored by the group and was so identifying that as soon as the
boss‟s power started to wane the tattoos were surgically erased and their former bearers
24
Or Godfather.
BA, Bottalico; Borgo Antico Trial 1997
26
The display of wealth is not common among Cosa Nostra members in Sicily.
27
CPM-Messina: 542
28
CN, Mutolo: 321
25
13
passed under a new boss‟s protective wing 29. Scars instead are generally displayed. The
initiation ritual in Bari includes, among its extremely complex liturgy, the creation of scars on
the forearms during the rite of passage from third to fourth level and one in the shape of a
cross on the right hand thumb under the nail during the passage between the second and third
level30. Very interestingly the scar to identify the passage to the fifth step in the hierarchy,
called santista, is named "the visible and invisible star [...] I wear it on my thumb, others on
their forehead"31. It is a small incision, and as its name suggests, it is a signal that aims at
being visible to friends and invisible to foes.
Sorting signals
It is an open question as to how beneficial it is for an illegal group to be identified by sorting
signals. After 1978, a mafia state witness recalls, "They decided that we should no longer kiss
each other because it had become a sign through which the Police could identify us"32. It is
intriguing to notice that Cosa Nostra and the paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland, all
long-lasting and relatively stable groups, display so few conventional markers of their
identity. As a Sicilian state witness clearly pointed out "In Apulia [...] they behave
differently; since they are a new mafia, they wear lots of earings, long hair, knife scars, as we
[Cosa Nostra] did long ago"33. Transforming local conventional signs into sorting signals can
make groups vulnerable to incrimination. The aggregation of more than one semi-sorting
signal into an identifying conventional trait is more suitable. However variation in the
number of people displaying semi-sorting signals can make them unstable too. In close-knit
environments illegal groups can control, through intimidation, the inflation of a signal and its
consequent dissipation. They can reduce the number of “wannabes” who display it and
prevent it from becoming pooling, like the “Reds” gang in Rio. However, they can do very
little to those citizens who in order to differentiate themselves from the illegal group stop
displaying a trait and consequently turn it into a sorting signal. For example, people may
decide to move out of the neighbourhood, invest in education, improve their communication
skills by dropping a local dialect, avoid tattoos or certain clothing and patterns of behaviour
that have become associated with members of the illegal group. In order to counter the
overexposure resulting from this kind of distancing behaviour, the best identifying traits for
members of illegal groups need to be minimalist.
The advantages of adopting minimalist behaviour as a signal of identity are that it is not
incriminating and it is stable over time. Long-lasting illegal groups shed identity signals that
become corrupted - either by inflation or deflation. Sicilian Mafia groups, at one time, used a
code language (Baccagghiu), garments (bonaca), jewellery (ear-rings), uncommon behaviour
(kissing between males) 34 and hair-styles (cocciolani) (Alongi 1886; Cutrera, 1900; Lupo
1993; Gambetta 1992, 1994). Nowadays Sicilian mafia members do not seem to display any
distinctive features. They look ordinary and rustic, more like peasants than Al Capone and
seem to have adopted a counter signalling strategy. “When I met Riina – Giovanni Drago a
Cosa Nostra member claims – I noticed that he was normal, a peasant, however we knew his
standing”35. Likewise in Northern Ireland paramilitaries aim to appear inconspicuous. A
29
BA, Civitano
BA, De Tullio, 9.6.1998
31
CPM-Annacondia: 2460
32
CPM-Calderone: 319
33
CPM-Messina: 576
34
CN-Calderone
35
CN, Drago: 289
30
14
senior UDA commander told us: “I didn‟t mind people bragging in a bar: “I‟ve fucking killed
this, and I‟ve fucking killed that” as that took the attention away from my people. I can
honestly tell you that if anybody I was connected with would have been sitting at a bar,
talking like that, he would have been out on his fucking ear, because he was bringing it
[attention] on himself and back to me.”36
Innocent behaviour can be a signal of illegal identity when displayed in local knowledge rich
environments where the illegal group exerts territorial control. A mafia wife in Brooklyn
realised her husband‟s change of status after he was admitted into the Gambino family from
two clues: they were treated “like royalties” wherever they went and they had to stop seeing
their usual friends who belonged to the world of petty crime (Milito, Potterton, 2003).
Proximity to, or being seen with, a known member is another innocent but very revealing
sign. In the 1960s Tommaso Buscetta‟s brother pointed out that his sibling was a member of
the mafia by hinting that he would exclusively be seen with “those that swagger [annacanu],
that is mafiosi because for them swaggering is a way to set themselves apart from ordinary
people”.37 How incriminating is it to sport a confident walk? Mafiosi still swagger to signal
their standing and they still congregate together: “I was always near these people because we
were all men of honour. We lived like that all day, we played football; we did everything
together”38.
In Bari proximity remains the strongest indicator of membership: “When you see someone
walking with someone else, it is sure, by default one understands that that person is a member
[…] otherwise he should be on his own”. 39 They spend a great deal of time in the company of
each other and their closeness over time reveals their membership.40 Non-members and even
next of kin are not allowed such physical closeness: “[his brother] if he sees a clan or a crew
standing somewhere, he goes there, greets and goes away. He cannot stay; he is not together
with them”.41 In other contexts this would be viewed as an exclusive, perhaps unhealthy,
friendship but within a particular territory is the signal of membership of an exclusive group.
The strategic significance of proximity is further shown by its opposite. Enforced separation
is a form of punishment. When Cosa Nostra members seriously breach the rules their
punishment is to become posati (put aside). They “are forbidden to speak to fellow members”
and their distancing is closely monitored.42 How members “retire” further demonstrates how
proximity to members is strategically managed. Severing contacts indicates retirement. In
New York City many mobsters opt for the disguise of a pooling signal and join the stream of
middle class retired people who choose to spend their twilight years in Florida. In Sicily they
move abroad or try to become invisible to the criminal world but at times fail and pay severe
36
Interview with UDA 2.
“solito accompagnarsi con individui che si „annacanu‟, cioe‟ con mafiosi, perche‟ per il
mafioso, camminare „annacandosi‟ e‟ un modo di distinguersi dalla gente comune” (CPM,
1971: 192)
38
CN, Cancemi: 260
39
“Walking together” in this case means to spend time together(BA, Borgia/StrisciuglioCarcere 1555) .
40
BA, De Tullio; BA, Civitano; BA, Borgia; Borgo Vecchio Trial, 1997; interview with
Judge Scelsi.
41
BA, D‟Andrizza
42
CN, Buscetta; CN,Contorno; CN, Calderone
37
15
consequences.43 In Bari they either physically move away from the territory or enter criminal
trades that are outside of the interests of the group. They go back to their life as bank robbers,
burglars and petty thieves or failing to have alternative criminal skills “go mad” and nobody
approaches them anymore. Even in Bari failure to clearly mark separation from the group is
severely punished.44
If sticking together signals membership to neighbours, invitation to join the company of
members of the criminal group is the sorting signal that R emits towards V. The only nonmembers allowed proximity to members in Bari are trainees, called promessi who have asked
for the flower and are being tested. 45 Equally in Palermo “They watched me for a couple of
years – Cancemi claimed – I noticed that they got me closer more and more. Even when they
met me the greetings were different […] they were, as to say, more affectionate”.46 The word
they adopt to indicate trainees who have not yet undergone the initiation ritual is "the close
ones" ("avvicinati"), a condition that can last "one, five or even twenty years".47
This herd display happens in the groups‟ territories around front locations. They can be bars
and social clubs, like the "Bagni Virzi'" in Palermo or family shops with mangy back rooms
like Carmelo Colletti‟s office in the province of Agrigento.48 In Bari they are billiard rooms,
game arcades, bars and disenfranchised political social clubs. 49 In Northern Ireland the Rock
Bar, the Felon‟s Club and the Berlin Arms in West Belfast are pubs and social clubs where
members of paramilitary groups meet. Some of these venues openly display idleness; others
were business establishments. All have one thing in common. They are public places that do
not display welcoming signs to visitors. It is often unclear what they were for. In short they
are not advertising to attract customers off the street. Quite the opposite they display a sort of
aposematic shabbiness. One should resist the dangers of over interpretation but it is hard not
to think that the look of these premises could be a discriminating signal. After all, no real
business can afford not to attract customers. In Bari and Palermo their regulars are almost
exclusively members of organised crime groups and in Northern Ireland either members or
sympathisers of the respective paramilitary organisation. These places sort out people looking
for a cup of coffee or a pint of beer from those seeking to make contact with R. V can also be
certain that someone trying to pass themselves off as a member of the IRA or the Mafia, for
example, would never dare do so in these venues. Thus they certify the recruiter while at the
same time they are places where he can blend in with sympathizers who obscure him from
prosecution.
43
OSAG; CN, Marsala ; OS Maxi trial 1986
BA, Civitano; BA, Bottalico
45
BA, De Felice. Proximity is also a handicap signal to check loyalty since it exposes the
group to enemies as well. Promessi are especially exposed since they are not well known as
future members and still risk enemy fire. It can be seen as a compromising signal as well. The
longer they display proximity to the group the harder it will be for them to erase the acquired
marker. These themes will be further discussed in another paper.
46
CN, Cancemi: 260; also CN, Cucuzza: 274
47
CN-CPMMessina, 515
48
CN, Calzetta; CN, Sinagra; OSAG
49
BA, Bottalico; BA, De Tullio 9.6.1998; BA, D‟Andrizza 28.6.1999; La Republica on line,
14.10.2009
44
16
Identity signalling within a social movement
Over its life span the underground membership of the RB totaled no more than 150-200
members (Moretti, 1994). According to our database regular and irregular RB members
amounted to 466. Even allowing for a number of irregulars that have never been identified
these data suggest that recruiters could not naturally cover the whole of the Italian left-wing
movement. They had to scout for volunteers and kept moving within the ultra-left radical
milieu. Members biographies confirm that they concentrated in some crucial sections of the
ultra-left movement manipulating them into their focal points and that they moved around
towards areas where RB was not present when “comrades were calling us” (Peci, 198?: 39;
Moretti, 1995; Vai in Bianconi, 2003: 79; Fiore, 2007: 106).
As R‟s credentials could not be guaranteed by local knowledge alternative devices needed to
be in place. The claiming logo and signature of the group became the signalling device that
kept the communication between recruiters and volunteers flowing. RB was the first leftwing violent group in Italy to systematically claim its actions after they went underground in
December 197250. From this moment onward, recruiters announced their presence through
their political signature that was the uniquely identifying mark by which the group claimed its
actions (Moretti 2000 (1994): 139). Volunteers on the other hand expressed their willingness
exploiting the RB easy to reproduce logo. RB expressly adopted a brand – the circled five
pointed star and the group name - easy to reproduce by militants (Franceschini, 1988: ??). In
order to sign their acts of violence instead they designed a more complex signature of which
the brand was only a part. The exclusiveness of the signal was given by a composition of
traits that only a highly structured group capable of planning complex operations could
assemble. The group signature had a high cost of production and was marked at several
levels in order to protect it from forgery (Pizzini-Gambetta, forthcoming). Mimics could
manage to counterfeit part of the signature however there was not another group among the
many that emerged in Italy in the second half of the 1970s capable of producing a credible
fake of the whole RB signature.
Acts of political violence claimed by the group using the exclusive identity signal marked the
beginning of recruiting campaigns in new areas (Bonavita, 1995: 128; Fiore 2007: 48;
Bianconi, 2003: 134-135). In 1973 the kidnapping of a senior manager – Amerio – started a
recruiting campaign in the FIAT factory in Turin (Fiore, 2007: 47). In 1974 the kidnapping of
a judge – Sossi- gave way to the creation of the Genoa branch (Bocca, 1985: 73; Fenzi, 1998:
19; Dogliotti, 2003). These actions made it more likely that an R circling V was an authentic
RB member rather than an imposter. As in Dostoyevsky‟s novel, recruiters directly
approaching volunteers out of the blue were not credible as Patrizio Peci‟s reaction to the first
approach revealed: “I did not believe him on the spot, I thought he was a show-off. „Who is
this guy? He claims he wants to put me in touch with the Red Brigades, what a fool. It is not
that I disliked the thought. Rather that it was hard to believe. It was as if while playing for [an
amateur local football team] one would come to me and say „Come with me I‟ll introduce
you to Bearzot [the Italian team manager]‟. I couldn‟t believe him” (Peci, 1983: 39)51.
50
Al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia (QAP) also devised a signature to regularly claim its actions
after it was forced underground in 2003. We thank Thomas Hegghammer for this insight.
51
Similar disbelief is at the core of the rule n.7 of the Jihadist manual: “Ask yourself, what
[sic!] does this person trust you? In a world where literally anyone can be a spy, why does
this person trust you? Why are they claiming to be a Mujahid, and telling this to a person who
they met over a computer or at the masjid? Why are they telling you they want to conduct
Jihadist operations or make hijrah? You cannot know if anyone in sincere, and this is the sad
17
In the aftermaths of major actions R would signal his presence by leaving signed pamphlets
and documents either in specific locations or mailing them to left wing militants (Bianconi,
2003: 119, 134-35; Pergolizzi, 2006). “The attention aroused by communiqué from a
clandestine group – Moretti maintains – is the main reason for the communiqué existence.
Through it we conquer new comrades, we test if we have support and approval or not”
(Moretti, 2000 (1994): 139). Wherever signed documents were found R was nearby,
“measuring its effects among the workers” (Fiore, 2007: 48). His aim was to listen and
register people‟s reactions to the bait he had disseminated and then approach the militants
that showed promising signs of interest (Bianconi, 2003: 29, 69-70). R would approach V
with supreme caution using indirect language: ““He took me to my first appointment with the
Red Brigades. He told me about it in a vague and allusive fashion how we used then when
everything was told by innuendoes [...] between the lines” (Fenzi, 1998: 19). Only at the end
of prolonged testing that could last several months would V be introduced to an underground
member of the organization (Fenzi, 1998; 1995; Raufer, 1993).
The use of the RB signature as a signalling device helps to explain why, throughout their
history, the RB persistently claimed minor actions such as arson and Molotov cocktail
attacks. Those actions that appeared meaningless to a large audience and incongruous to a
group that could hit major targets with military precision were signals to localized
recruitment pools: “I counted that over the whole of Italy the RB set on fire about a thousand
[cars], even though the news papers hardly ever reported them […] we did not care if La
Stampa did not report them as long as the factory workers kept talking about them” (Peci,
1983: 146-47; Fiore, 2007: 48).
Conclusions
In this article we address the question of how illegal groups advertise for members when they
need to be both visible to potential recruits and invisible to law enforcement agencies. We
treat advertising and the early stages of recruitment into illegal groups as an ongoing
communicative exchange between recruiters and volunteers that is hampered by
asymmetrical information. We argue that signalling theory offers mechanisms to solve the
information problem and to enable the coordination of supply and demand in an underground
labour market. We highlight similarities and differences in the signalling behaviour of
groups that differ in their aims and structures but need to solve similar problems. These
behaviours are summarised in Table 3.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
Signalling behaviour at the advertising stage of the recruitment process is not sensitive to the
differences between the organisations as far as their main motivations and goals are
concerned i.e. whether they are pursuing political change or economic gains through
criminality. Rather, signalling is sensitive to the different structure of the recruitment pools
of the groups. Violent radical groups pursue the political interest of disenfranchised
constituencies that perceive themselves as victims of discrimination and injustice. From here
reality. Think about why they would trust you of all people, and not someone else. The
answer is because they are seeking to arrest you, and this is part of their grooming process.”
(http://jihadology.net/2010/12/19/new-article-from-online-jihadist-at-an%e1%b9%a3ar-almujahidin-english-forum-10-methods-to-detect-and-foil-the-plots-of-spies/)
18
they draw resources in terms of finances, protection and recruits. The recruitment pool of the
group is usually a sub-section of its constituency. The constituency boundaries, and as a
consequence those of the recruitment pool, are determined by the way individuals come to be
part of it. People can be born into a natural constituency or can become members of one
based on beliefs; whether these beliefs are ideological or religious is not relevant here.
Territorial recruitment pools such as those of paramilitary organisations in Northern Ireland
and organized crime groups in Italy reveal similar forms of signalling whereas ideological
recruitment pools show remarkably different behaviour. Groups that draw their recruits from
a territory or neighbourhood rely on their territorial control as certification of their recruiters‟
identity. Groups that have consistently exercised territorial control over time such as Cosa
Nostra and the paramilitaries in N. Ireland show more parsimonious signalling than less
stable groups like the organised crime groups in Bari. They can rely on more stratified local
knowledge than the others as identity markers.
The paramilitaries in Northern Ireland are stationary recruiters who maintain a degree of
territorial control but who also compete with rival groups for recruits. They therefore publicly
mark their territory and advertise their presence (see for example the paramilitary murals
dotted around Belfast). However, scrutiny from the security services and threats from enemy
and rival groups means that individuals do not display their affiliation in what they wear or
their day to day demeanour. Their dress and their presence in a neighbourhood are weak
semi-sorting signals. Their proximity to other members of the organisation is the
discriminatory sorting signal of membership and focal points where V can find R are pubs
and clubs where members gather together. Likewise Cosa Nostra are also stationary recruiters
for whom proximity is the sorting signal of membership. They differ from paramilitaries in
N. Ireland in that they have a total monopoly and no rivals. Their formidable reputation has
been established over decades of persistent presence in Sicily and they operate within a
relatively small geographic area so public advertising is unnecessary. They also have a
carefully planned leadership succession to ensure stability and protection of their member‟s
interests so individuals do not need to publicly signal their membership or their tough-guy
credentials. The key difference between the organised crime groups in Bari and Cosa Nostra
is that in Bari there is no planned succession of leadership. Therefore while the group does
not mark its territory it is important for individuals to try to distinguish themselves as being
tough and powerful individuals who can command the respect and loyalty of their
subordinates and could assume leadership of the organisation. They signal their status with
conspicuous consumption wearing expensive clothes and jewellery and displaying tattoos and
scars.
The solution to the advertising problem for the stationary R thus relies on semi-sorting
signals in a uniquely identifying setting. When the constituency and the recruitment pool are
territorial and the result of a relatively lasting tradition - like Catholics in West Belfast or a
village in Western Sicily - credentials may be certified by their identification within their
constituency or turf and no extra display may be needed..
The RB instead relied on a geographically dispersed recruitment pool and used itinerant
recruiters scouting within the Italian ultra left movement. Itinerant recruiters are heavily
affected by issues of accreditation as secrecy makes the fact that they reveal themselves
highly suspicious. As they cannot rely on local knowledge to certify their qualities they need
transportable identity signals that, in the case of the RB, are the uniquely identifiable markers
of its signature when claiming acts of political violence. That however is only the first step
19
and trust between R and V develops over a long and guarded process of mutual scrutiny. The
guarded approach of R reassures V of her honesty. Only an agent provocateur would not fear
that V could be a potential undercover agent.
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22
Table 1
Case studies
Northern Ireland
Red Brigades
Cosa Nostra
Organised
Crime, Bari
x
x
Ritual entry
x
Binding
exclusive
knowledge
x
x
x
x
Subject to a
code of
behaviour
x
x
x
x
Receive group
protection
x
x
x
x
Table 2
Percentage of members born in the same place they were recruited
%
O.C. Bari
89
Cosa Nostra
82
N Ireland paramilitaries
79
Red Brigades
46
23
Table 3
Recruiter’s identity signalling
Type
Sorting
Semi-sorting
Cosa Nostra,
Bari, N. Ireland
Neighbourhood
Bari, N.Ireland
Local dialect
Cosa Nostra, Bari
Kinship
N. Ireland
Religion
Signa and
signals
Gender
Cosa Nostra,
Bari
Jewellery
Bari
Scars and
tattoos
Bari
N. Ireland, RB
N. Ireland
Bari
Nicknames
Meeting venues
and Proximity
Cosa Nostra,
Bari, N. Ireland
Targets of
violence
Northern Ireland
Claiming
signature
Pooling
Red Brigades
Red Brigades
24
Sources of Databases and qualitative data on Cosa Nostra, Organized Crime in Bari
and the Red Brigades
Cosa Nostra
Pettinato: Legione Carabinieri di Palermo, Rapporto giudiziario relative alla denunciua di
Riina Salvatore e altri 25, redatto il 25 agosto 1978
CPM-Annacondia: Commissione Parlamentare di inchiesta sul fenomeno della mafia e sulle
associazioni criminali similari, XI legislatura, audizione del collaboratore di giustizia
Salvatore Annacondia, 30 luglio 1993
CPM-Buscetta: Commissione Parlamentare di inchiesta sul fenomeno della mafia e sulle
associazioni criminali similari, XI legislatura, audizione del collaboratore di giustizia
Tommaso Buscetta, 16 November 1992
CPM-Calderone: Commissione Parlamentare di inchiesta sul fenomeno della mafia e sulle
associazioni criminali similari, XI legislatura, audizione del collaboratore di giustizia
Antonino Calderone, 11 novembre 1992
CPM-Messina: Commissione Parlamentare di inchiesta sul fenomeno della mafia e sulle
associazioni criminali similari, XI legislatura, audizione del collaboratore di giustizia
Leonardo messina, 4 dicembre 1992.
CPM-Mutolo: Commissione Parlamentare di inchiesta sul fenomeno della mafia e sulle
associazioni criminali similari, XI legislatura, audizione del collaboratore di giustizia Gaspare
Mutolo, 9 febbraio 1993
CPM-Messina: Commisisone Parlamentare di inchiesta sul fenomeno della mafia e sulle
associazioni criminali similari, XI legislatura, audizione del collaboratore di giustizia
Leonardo messina, 4 dicembre 1992.
OSmaxi: Sentenza Ordinanza della Corte di Assise di Palermo contro Abbate Giovanni+706,
Palermo 8/11/1985, voll.XXXX. UL S250.b.98.690-729.
GOTHA: Tribunale di Palermo, sentenza contro Adamo et alii N° 800165/07 registro GIP
BARICN: Tribunale di Bari sentenza contro Leggio+61, 1969
OSPA Buscetta: Verbale degli interrogatori dell'imputato Tommaso Buscetta, luglio-agosto
1984 allegati a OSPA (vedi), voll. III, pp.358 UL S250.b.98.730-732.
CN-AC: Verbale degli interrogatori dell'imputato Calderone Antonino, voll.IV. UL
OP.1400.364.1-4.
CN-SC: Verbale degli interrogatori dell'imputato Calzetta Stefano, 12/3/1983-28/2/1985 (non
continui), allegati a OSPA (vedi), voll.V. UL S250.b.98.674-678.
CN-AC: Verbale degli interrogatori dell'imputato Salvatore Contorno, ottobre 1984-giugno
1985, allegati a OSPA (vedi). Vol.I pp.224. UL S250.b.98.733.
CN-VM: Verbale degli interrogatori dell'indiziato V.Marsala presso il Procuratore Generale
della Repubblica di Palermo dicembre 1984/aprile 1985, vol.I.
CN-AS: Verbale degli interrogatori dell'imputato Sinagra Vincenzo, 30/11/1983-30/4/1985
(non continui), allegati a OSPA (vedi), voll.II. UL S250.b.98.683-684.
CN-SV: Verbale dell'interrogatorio dell'imputato Leonardo Vitale rilasciato il 30/3/1973,
allegata a OSPA.
CN-MA: propalazioni di Melchiorre Allegra rilasciate alla polizia di Castelvetrano nel 1937,
pubblicato da L'Ora, 22-25 gennaio 1962.
Anonimo: Uomo di rispetto, Mondadori, Milano 1988. Intervista-racconto della vita di un
uomo d'onore dagli anni Cinquanta agli anni Ottanta,
CN-MM: Verbali degli interrogatori dell'imputato Francesco Marino Mannoia (8/10/8919/6/1991).
SSPA 26/1/85: Sentenza della Corte di Assise di Palermo contro Pravata' Michelangelo + 7,
vol.I.
CPM-CC: Comando generale dell‟arma del Carabinieri, Relazione del comandante generale
dell‟arma del carabinieri alla Commissione Parlamentare sul fenomeno della mafia,
18.3.1987
25
CN-LM: Verbali di testimonianza del collaboratore di giustizia Leonardo Messina presso il
Tribunale di Palermoe Caltanissetta - Direzioni Distretuali Antimafia, 30.6.1992-????
[paginazione continua]
CN-AF: Verbali di testimonianza del collaboratore di giustizia Anzelmo Francesco (DNA)
CN-BS: Verbali di testimonianza del collaboratore di giustizia Barbagallo Salvatore (DNA)
NCN-BE: Verbali di testimonianza del collaboratore di giustizia Brusca Emanuele (DNA)
CN-BSA: Verbali di testimonianza del collaboratore di giustizia Brusca Salvatore (DNA)
CN-BG: Verbali di testimonianza del collaboratore di giustizia Brusca Giovanni (DNA)
CN-CV: Verbali di testimonianza del collaboratore di giustizia Calcara Vincenzo (DNA)
CN-CS: Verbali di testimonianza del collaboratore di giustizia Cancemi Salvatore (DNA)
NCN-CT: Verbali di testimonianza del collaboratore di giustizia Cannella Tullio (DNA)
CN-CSA: Verbali di testimonianza del collaboratore di giustizia Cucuzza Salvatore(DNA)
CN-DF: Verbali di testimonianza del collaboratore di giustizia Davi‟ Francesco (DNA)
CN-DCF: Verbali di testimonianza del collaboratore di giustizia Di Carlo Francesco (DNA)
CN-DMB: Verbali di testimonianza del collaboratore di giustizia Di Maggio Baldassarre
(DNA)
CN-DMMS: Verbali di testimonianza del collaboratore di giustizia Di Maggio Mario Santo
(DNA)
CN-DG: Verbali di testimonianza del collaboratore di giustizia Drago giovanni (DNA)
CN-FGB: Verbali di testimonianza del collaboratore di giustizia Ferrante Giovan Battista
(DNA)
CN-GGO: Verbali di testimonianza del collaboratore di giustizia Galati Giordano Orlando
(DNA)
CN-CG: Verbali di testimonianza del collaboratore di giustizia Ganci Calogero (DNA)
CN-GG: Verbali di testimonianza del collaboratore di giustizia Grado Gaetano (DNA)
CN-GGI: Verbali di testimonianza del collaboratore di giustizia Guglielmini Giuseppe
(DNA)
CN-LBG: Verbali di testimonianza del collaboratore di giustizia La Barbera Gioachino
(DNA)
CN-LS: Verbali di testimonianza del collaboratore di giustizia Lansalaco Salvatore (DNA)
CN-LA: Verbali di testimonianza del collaboratore di giustizia Leonardo Angelo (DNA)
CN-MG: Verbali di testimonianza del collaboratore di giustizia Maniscalco Giuseppe (DNA)
CN-MGI: Verbali di testimonianza del collaboratore di giustizia Marceca Giuseppe (DNA)
CN-MAG: Verbali di testimonianza del collaboratore di giustizia Marchese Giuseppe (DNA)
CN-MUG: Verbali di testimonianza del collaboratore di giustizia Mutolo Gaspare (DNA)
CN-OF: Verbali di testimonianza del collaboratore di giustizia Onorato Francesco (DNA)
CN-PF: Verbali di testimonianza del collaboratore di giustizia Palazzolo Salvatore (DNA)
CN-PFR: Verbali di testimonianza del collaboratore di giustizia Pattarino Francesco (DNA)
CN-PG: Verbali di testimonianza del collaboratore di giustizia Pulvirenti Giuseppe (DNA)
CN-SFR: Verbali di testimonianza del collaboratore di giustizia Scrima francesco (DNA)
CN-SVI: Verbali di testimonianza del collaboratore di giustizia Sinacori Vincenzo (DNA)
CN-SRO: Verbali di testimonianza del collaboratore di giustizia Spatola Rosario (DNA)
OC Bari
Marte 2000: Tribunale di bari, Corte di Assise di bari, sentenza contro Anaclerio
Giacomo+73, RG 5/2000
Abbaticchio1999: Trib di Bari, Sentenza contro Abbaticchio et alii, N.13141/97 G.I.P.
Abbaticchio2001: Trib di Bari, Ordinanza di custodia cautelare contro Abbaticchio et alii,
Proc. n.16368/01 R.N.R.-D.D.A.
Abbinante2006: Trib di Bari, Ordinanza contro Abbinante et alii, Proc. n. 19313/05
26
R.G.G.I.P.
Addante2003: Trib di bari, Ordinanza di custodia cautelare contro Addante et alii, Proc. n.
6919/02 Reg. G .I. P.
Agnello1995: Trib di Bari, Ordinanza di custodia cautelare contro Agnello et alii, proc.
penale n. 45/95-21 DDA
Amatulli2002: Trib di Bari, Sentenza parziale contro Amatulli et alii, N. 405/02 R.G. SENT
Ammirabile2003: Trib di bari, Richiesta di ordinanza cautelare contro Ammirabile et alii,
Proc.832/2003-21 P.M.
Armigero2004: Trib di Bari, Ordinanza di Custodia cautelare contro Armigero et alii, N.
7340/01 R.G. GIP
Barbaro2002: Trb di Bari, Ordinanza applicativa di misure cautelari contro Barbaro et alii, N.
9055/2001 R.G.GIP
Borgo Antico: Trib di Bari, Sentenza di Corte di Assise contro Amoruso et alii, N° 4/04 Reg.
Sent.
Capriati2003: Trib di Bari, Ordinanza applicativa di misure cautelative contro Capriati et alii,
N.11266/03 Mod. 21 D.D.A.
Conte Ugolino: Trib di bari, Sentenza i Corte di Assise contro Accettura et alii, 5.12.1996
D'Ambrogio2001: Trib di bari, Sentenza del Giudice per le indagini perliminari contro
D'Ambrogio et alii, N. 929/01 R.G. SENT
Lattanzi2004: Trib di Bari, Sentenza di Corte d'Assise contro Lattanzi et alii, DEP. IN
CANCELLERIA IL 28.06.2004
Mayer2002: Trib di Bari, Sentenza di Corte di Assise contro Laraspata et alii, 20.7.2002
Mayer2004: Trib di Bari, Sentenza di Corte di Appello contro Laraspata et alii, 04/04 R.S.
Vitellaro2000: Trib di Bari,Ordinanza di custodia cautelare in carcere contro Vitellaro et alii,
Proc. n.6000/00 Reg. G .I. P.
State wittness statement by the defendants: Bottalico Vito; Civitano Antonio; D'Andrizza
Luigi; De Tullio Angelo; Laraspata Tommaso; MercoledisantoGiovanni; Vitellaro giovanni;
Capriati mario; Colella nicola; De Gilgio Francesco; Laraspata Raffaele; Luce Luigi;
Rondinone Lorenzo; De Felice Giovanni; Centanni Mario; Montani Giuseppe; Borgia
Giuseppe.
Red Brigades:
interviews (DOTE archive c/o Istituto Cattaneo Bologna):
Alfredo Buonavita (pubblicata)
Antonio Savasta (pubblicata)
Claudio D‟Aguanno (pubblicata come Piero)
Enrico Baglioni (publicata)
Enrico Fenzi
Florinda Petrella (pubblicata come Claudia)
Gatto
Gianni Maggi
Gino Aldi
*Grazia Grena
Marco Ferrandi (pubblicata come Marco)
*Marina Premoli
*Nicola Solimano
Paolo Aleandri
Paolo Lapponi (pubblicata)
Pasquale Avilio (pubblicata come Raffaele)
27
Published interviews:
Raffaele Fiore in Aldo Grandi, L'ultimo brigatista, Rizzoli Milano, 2007
Alberto Franceschini in G.Fasanella, A.Franceschini, Che cosa sono le BR, Rizzoli, Milano
2004
Mario Moretti in M.Moretti, Brigate Rosse. Una storia italiana, Intervista di Carla Mosca e
Rossana Rossanda, Baldini&Castoldi, Milano, 1994
Adriana Faranda in Jameson, ?., Interview with Adriana Faranda, in Jameson, The Heart
Attacked, 1989
Catanzaro, R., Manconi, L., Storie di Lotta Armata, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1995
Patrizio Peci and Giordano Bruno Guerra, Io, l'infame, Mondadori 1983
Raufer, X., "The Red Brogades: Farewell to Arms" "Studies in Conflict and Terrorism", 16,
1993, pp.315-25
Biographies:
Fenzi, E., Armi e bagagli. Un diario dalle Brigate Rosse, Costlan, Milano, 1987
Gallinari, P., Un Contadino nella metropoli: Ricordi di un militante delle Brigate Rosse,
Bompiani 2006
Morucci, V., Ritratto di un terrorista da giovane, Piemme, Casale Monferrato, 1999
Morucci, V., La peggio gioventu': Una vita nella lott armata, Rizzoli, 2004
Braghetti, A.L., Tavella, P., Il Prigioniero, Feltrinelli, 2005
Bianconi, G., Mi dichiaro prigioniero politico: Storie delle Brigate Rosse, Einaudi, Turin,
2003
Guagliardo V., Di sconfitta in sconfitta, Edizioni Colibri', Milan, 2002
Franceschini, A., Mara, Renato e io: Storia dei fondatori delle BR, Mondaodri, Milan, 1988
Giudicial papers
Court statements by Patrizio Peci, Massimo Fancianelli, Enrico Fenzi, in Moran, S.E., Court
Depositions of three Red Brigadists, Rand Corporation 1986
Tribunale di Turin – Uff. Istr. GI Mario Carassi
Sentenza-ordinanza n.341/80 del 9/12/80 nel p.p. vs Anelli Francesca + 83
Tribunale di Rome – Uff.Istr. GI Ernesto Cudillo
Sentenza – ordinanza n. 1482/78 A GI del 15/01/81 nel p.p. vs Alunni Corrado + 37
Tribunale di Venezia – Uff. Istr. GI Carlo Nordio
Sentenza – ordinanza n. 274/80 A GI del 3/2/82 nel p.p. vs Fasoli Marco + 8
Tribunale di Turin – Uff. Istr. GI Antonio Palaja
Sentenza – ordinanza n. 918/80 del 9/12/82 nel p.p. vs Acella Vincenzo + 76
(6448/75 + altri)
Tribunale di Mi- uff.istr. GI Antonio Lombardi
Sentenza-ordinanza n. 1094/78F + 291/79F + 75/79F + 302/79F + 752/79F + 110/81F +
176/81 F Del 28/5/81 nel p.p. vs Azzolini Lauro + 26 Procura della Repubblica di Milano –
PM Filippo Grisolia
Requisitoria del 25/3/83 nel p.p. 490/81 F + altri vs Adamoli Roberto + 96
Tribunale civile e penale di Milano – GI Antonio Lombardo
Ordinanza n. 489 / 81 RGGI del 21 / 12/ 1981 nel p. p. vs Di Gennaro Pietro + 1
Tribunale civile e penale di Milano, Uff. Istr. GI Antonio Lombardi, Sentenza – ordinanza n.
441 / 81 F RGGI del 23 / 11 / 1981 nel p.p. vs Fadda Silvano + 3
Tribunale civile e penale di Milano – Uff. Istr. GI Antonio Lombardi, Ordinanza n. 127 / 82
+ 471 / 82 F + 1153 / 82 F + 1170 / 82 F + 1234 / 82 F del 21. 12. 1982, Nel p. p. vs Esposito
Giovanna + 6
Procura della Repubblica di Venezia – Pm Gabriele Ferrari, Requisitoria del 18/7/83 nel p.p.
179/82 a RGPM vs Alunni Corrado + 122
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Tribunale di Milano – Uff. Istr. GI Antonio Lombardi, Sentenza-ordinanza n. 624 / 83 F +
509 / 83 F RGGI del 19 / 7 / 1983 nel p. p. vs Bellosi Francesco + 37
Tribunale di Milano – uff. istr. GI Antonio Lombardi, Sentenza – ordinanza n. 187/83 F +
473 / 83 F + 1202 / 83 F del 7/2/ 1984 nel p.p. vs Ferlicca Angelo + 21
Tribunale di Napoli, Uff.Istruzione GI Carlo Alemi, Sentenza-ordinanza n.881/83, 915/83,
538/84 nel P.P. vs Busetto Maria Cristina+37
Procura della Repubblica di Napoli – PM Gerardo Arcese e Olindo Ferrone, Requisitoria
contro ACANFORA MARIO + 130 (981 / 81, 1186 / 81, 1279 / 81, 77 / 82, 341 / 82, 503 /
82, 508 / 82, 794 / 82, 1510 / 82, 1523 / 82, 1738 / 82, 292 / 83, 856 / 83, 918 / 83, 940 / 83,
1071 / 83, 1481 / 83)
Tribunale di Napoli, Sostituti Procuratori della Repubblica Olindo Ferrone e Gerardo Arcese,
Atti relativi al procedimento penale a carico di Busetto Maria Cristina + 37 (NAP, BR)
Requisitoria del 26 / 7 / 84,
Tribunale di Roma, Ufficio istruzione-sezione 23, GI Francesco Amato, Ordinanza di rinvio
a giudizio (N.995/81 A.G.I.) e Sentenza di, proscioglimento (N.3/83 P.G), In data 21.7.1983
vs ACANFORA Mauro + alii
Procura della repubblica di Brescia Ordinanza 1888/83 contro Longo Renato et alii,
published in "Per Aspera ad Veritatem. Rivista di Intelligence e di cultura professionale", n.8,
1997
websites:
Brigaterosse.it/personaggi
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